In the fourth campaign, General Peng Da, who was on the battlefield, hesitated in the next deployment of the volunteer army, which was a very rare scene. Is it to fight Hengcheng or Pingli first? Did he take Deng Hua's suggestion or Han Xianchu's? In the end, Peng Zong still decided to take the lead in taking Hengcheng, but unexpectedly this decision became a pain in Deng Hua's heart.
On January 25, 1951, Ridgway launched Operation Thunderbolt against the Volunteer Army, the first full-scale counterattack launched by the Combined Forces. This time, he regarded the battlefield on the Western Front as the focus and let the well-equipped US troops advance rapidly, in order to bring the ROK troops on the Eastern Front forward. In the face of Ridgway's action, General Peng ordered the troops to resist the Attack of the American Army in the west, and then gradually introduced the ROK troops in the east into the encirclement, and after annihilating them, attacked the main American force from the flank, so as to disintegrate the enemy's offensive. Although the battle plan has been set, how can we withstand the attack of the American army on the Western Front? In the end, General Peng entrusted this arduous task to Han Xianchu, the whirlwind general, and asked him to lead many generals of the 38th Army and the 50th Army to stop the enemy's advance at all costs on the Han River.
Han Xianchu was a general who had fought countless hard battles, but this time he felt unprecedented pressure, and this was not out of fear of the enemy, but felt that this battle would have to sacrifice a lot of fighters. The 50th Army was originally the 60th Army of the Nationalist Army, and Zeng Zesheng's commander had always been coldly looked at by Chiang Kai-shek because he was from the Dian Army. After the 1948 uprising, Zeng Zesheng and a number of his generals were reorganized into the 50th Army, and then quickly arrived at the battlefield after the outbreak of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, during which they won many victories with the brother troops, and the chiefs also attached great importance to this unit. After receiving the order to resist the attack of the American army, Zeng Zesheng led the 50th Army to fight the enemy bloody battle on the south bank of the Han River for 7 days and nights, firmly holding the position in his hands in the artillery, until he received the order to retreat of the whole army. After the end of the fourth campaign, Zeng Zesheng was very excited to confide in General Peng that the troops could finally raise their heads. General Manager Peng also had special admiration for Zeng Zesheng's bloody battle, and did not hesitate to praise him, saying that after the new equipment came, it was given priority to replace the 50th Army.
Although the 50th Army withdrew after completing the task of blocking the attack, the 38th Army, known as the Banzai Army, continued to fight. Because the soldiers were in the throat of the east-west battlefield, in order to ensure that Deng Hua's troops could fight better on the eastern front, the troops still did not retreat after the thawing of the Han River, and were firmly nailed to the position like nails. However, from February 8, the U.S. army shelled the 38th Army day and night, and not only that, but Ridgway also ordered the troops to intersperse backwards during this period, and one of the units quietly touched the back of the 113th Division. Although the troops were now facing the danger of being caught between the front and the back, under the death orders of the chief, the soldiers completely trampled the rat to death after two days and nights of bloody battle. Although many commanders and fighters were brave and fearless, after a long battle, the ammunition and food supplies of the troops were basically exhausted, and many companies on the positions did not return alone. Although this made many people feel extremely frustrated, the volunteer army at that time really couldn't come up with anything more. In the end, Liang Xingchu hurried from the country to give the soldiers an exciting mobilization, which greatly boosted the morale of the troops and repelled all the enemies who rushed to the position. Under the command of Han Xianchu, the 38th Army and the 50th Army continued to fight in the face of an extremely dangerous situation, although the casualties were very heavy, but it bought valuable time for the troops fighting on the Eastern Front, and Deng Hua basically completed the deployment on February 9.
Now the ROK troops on the eastern front are blocked in the Hengcheng area, while the American troops on the western front are pinned down in the Pingli area. The volunteers had two paths to go, to fight Hengcheng first or to pingli first. On this issue, Deng Hua and Han Xianchu put forward different views, which also made Peng Zong difficult.
Deng Hua believed that hengcheng should be the first to be taken this time, because this would eliminate the ROK troops to the greatest extent, and if the first move was made in Pingli, the enemy might quickly retreat, thus losing the opportunity to annihilate the enemy. However, Han Xianchu believed that he should move pingli first, although there were no more enemies there than Hengcheng, but it was a strategically important position. If it can be successfully taken, then the US troops on the Western Front will be completely exposed, but if they first attack Hengcheng, then it will give the US troops the opportunity to send reinforcements, and then it will be very difficult to fight again. The reason why the two had different opinions was because Deng Hua mainly wanted to destroy the enemy's living forces as much as possible, while Han Xianchu was thinking about taking the strategic place first, and At this time, Peng Zong was also caught in a dilemma. At that time, he did not want to act on both sides at the same time, but the volunteer army was extremely short of personnel and materials at that time, so he could only choose one deployment operation. Although he asked them for their opinions many times afterwards, both of them were very adamant about their advice. After a period of reflection, Mr. Peng still adopted Deng Hua's advice to attack Hengcheng first, and then sent a battle plan to Beijing, and immediately after receiving approval, he began to deploy.
In fact, in addition to Han Xianchu, Ridgway also attaches great importance to Pingli. Because once this place is taken by the volunteers, it will pry the main force of the Western Front, followed by a large-scale retreat. Therefore, during the period when Deng Hua captured Hengcheng, Ridgway used all means to send additional troops to Pingli, and repeatedly stressed to his subordinates that no matter what the price was, he must take Pingli in his hands.
After receiving ridgway's death orders, Captain Freeman, who had wanted to retreat from Pingli, began to build strong ring fortifications around him. In addition to countless mines and dense barbed wire, numerous howitzers and tanks were deployed for defense, and countless supplies were received from the rear. In this way, an American army of more than 6,000 people hid in this position like an iron wall, and for the volunteer army that lacked heavy firepower, it was already more difficult to take Pingli than to ascend to the sky. However, in this situation of imbalance between attack and defense, there were very serious problems on the volunteer side. The first is that the local terrain is very unfamiliar, and the warriors can only look at the map to march and fight, so the actual situation will be more or less different. In addition, it was not possible to properly grasp the situation of the enemy, and at that time it was not even clear the real number of the enemy, let alone the firepower situation to be faced. Then the various units were not fully prepared, resulting in the dispersion of troops after the outbreak of the battle, as if it had become a pot of porridge, and the corresponding results could not be achieved in the face of heavy casualties.
But even in this imbalance between attack and defense, the warriors gritted their teeth and fought with the enemy's blood, but it was difficult for the artillery fire to wait until night, and the enemy all shrank into the ring fortifications. After this, the troops suffered heavy casualties, but when they saw that they could take the position immediately, the sky was about to light, and then Ridgway sent reinforcements and even if they reached Pingli, the volunteer side basically ran out of ammunition and materials after several battles. On February 15, 1951, Deng Hua gave a death order to Wen Yucheng, commander of the 40th Army, demanding that Pingli must be taken on the 16th. However, Wen Yu's preconceived that the casualties of the troops were too large, and they were no longer sure enough to defeat the enemy. Finally, after careful discussion, Peng Zong issued a very heavy order to retreat, and the battle of Pingli was over.
This was also the first major defeat of the Volunteer Army since the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, which had an extremely far-reaching impact on the subsequent war situation. If the volunteers were able to succeed in taking Pingli, they could still take the initiative in the ensuing battle, and it was possible to continue to advance south. However, after the defeat of this battle, our army fell into a deep passivity and turned to strategic defense, allowing Ridgway to grasp the initiative of the imbalance between attack and defense, and he may also launch a large-scale attack at any time. After this, the volunteer troops could only temporarily retreat backwards, coupled with the fatal defect of material supply, and finally had to confront the enemy in the area of the 38th Line.
Why did the volunteer army that marched all the way defeat pingli? Here it can be roughly divided into three reasons. First, there was a mistake in intelligence, when the troops underestimated the enemy, and thus some ideas of light enemy germinated, which led to the launch of an offensive without adequate preparation. The second is the confusion of command in the battle, because too many troops were mobilized in this battle, and the troops and the troops could not achieve coordinated operations, resulting in fighting each other in the battle, basically not cooperating with each other. The third is the failure to use tactics rationally, and the troops have basically interspersed with detours before, so that they can eliminate a large number of enemies. However, this time the soldiers were engaged in a tough battle, and the troops did not adjust the corresponding tactics, resulting in very heavy casualties. In addition, there is actually a more objective reason, that is, the troops have basically reached their limits, and the enemy troops have just resisted at this time, so they can hold the strategic point of Pingli.
After the battle, ridgway and the combined forces were so demoralized that the Roks even called it the Second Inchon Landing. Although it is not as exaggerated as they say, the impact is enormous. This time, although the volunteer army took the initiative to withdraw from the battlefield, it also fully exposed its weaknesses, and because the soldiers lacked heavy firepower, there was a huge disadvantage in the battle. Because of this, the US military dared to hold the position after the attack, rather than blindly fleeing to the rear after being attacked, which also made those US troops more confident to continue to fight.
The defeat in the battle of Pingli struck a deep blow to Deng Hua, who had originally suggested hitting the horizontal support first. He then took the initiative to send telegrams to the various units, making a profound review of his own command mistakes, which was not easy for a senior commander. But after that turbulent period, deng hua's mistakes were magnified countless times, and he could only constantly conduct self-examination, and the feeling of shame for sacrificing soldiers had always haunted his heart. But then again, if Mr. Peng had adopted Han Xianchu's opinion at that time, the situation might have been completely different after that. Although Han Xianchu also believed that the weaknesses of the volunteer army would be exposed sooner or later, if the situation of the fourth battle was reversed by taking Pingli, then the enemy might not have discovered these weaknesses so quickly. It can also be seen from this that Han Xianchu's strategic vision is so far-reaching that he can always seize the fleeting opportunity at key moments. But even this can not negate Deng Hua's contribution, he is still a general on the battlefield, victory and defeat is a common thing, and a defeat cannot negate a person's merits with a defeat.
The defeat in the battle of Tongpingli also made Chairman Mao and other chiefs realize the importance of heavy artillery. If we do not want to let the soldiers sacrifice more on the battlefield, these things are indispensable, so in the time that followed, our army attached great importance to the research and development of heavy firepower, which is also the main reason why our army attached great importance to this aspect later.