In mid-February 1951, after winning the victory in the Hengcheng counterattack, the Volunteer Army and the People's Army all moved to the north bank of the Han River and began to turn to the movement defense on the whole line.
The plan of the Volunteer Command was to prepare for 2 months to gather troops, replenish troops, improve transportation, wait for the enemy to penetrate deeper, put the Han River behind the enemy, and then counterattack.
After that, the volunteer army adopted a combination of echelon retreat and counterattack, delaying and killing the enemy, and exchanging space for time.
Commander-in-Chief Peng Dehuai particularly pointed out: To retreat is to retreat, but we must not retreat too much, and we can only retreat to the political line of the "38th Line."
The news from both sides of the Han River revived MacArthur's interest in the Korean war, and he did a very funny thing - as a superior, he actually took the credit of Ridgway's subordinate.
After the bankruptcy of the "Christmas Offensive", MacArthur, a five-star general in the US army, was exhausted due to the pain of defeat.
Even William Siebold, a political adviser who had worked with him for many years, was surprised to find that his long-serving boss had lost the brilliance of charisma and power, and that his famous oil-stained military hat and the corn cob pipe not only reflected his former glory, but made him even more tired and depressed.
In the weeks after Ridgway succeeded the dead Walker as commander of the 8th Army, MacArthur did not point fingers at his front-line commander.
Since most of the war reports were not good, MacArthur even ordered that the press communiqué of "Building One" be given to the headquarters of the 8th Army, because the old man understood that the farther away he was, the better.
But when MacArthur saw Thatchglio resume his offensive and fight the Han River, his strong vanity itched again, and he began to pull these "victories" to embellish himself.
On February 18, Ridgway drew up a tentative attack plan called Operation Butcher and demanded strict secrecy from his subordinates.
On the eve of the offensive on February 20, MacArthur suddenly flew to the Korean front, and in the face of more than a dozen reporters gathered at the operational command post of the 8th Army, he calmly and plainly declared: "I have just ordered the resumption of the offensive." ”
As soon as MacArthur said this, it immediately shocked Ridgway, who was standing behind him, and almost fainted.
For Ridgway has been brewing this plan since he took over as commander of the 8th Army, and it can be said that the brewing of this plan was carried out in a situation where the idea of retreat was prevalent among commanders at all levels, including MacArthur.
Although Ridgway had reported the plan in detail to MacArthur, neither MacArthur nor his staff had played any role in conceiving or drafting the Operation Butcher plan.
Now, the vain old man had easily taken the credit out of his own hands, for he was implying to the press that it was he, MacArthur, who had flown in from Tokyo, judged the situation, consulted with his staff, and immediately ordered an attack, not someone else.
MacArthur's move also gave the army's press inspectors a blow, because just the day before, Ridgway had sternly ordered them to pay attention to secrecy: "Your duty is to protect the safety and interests of your own army, and even if a general officer violates the confidentiality rules, he should be severely punished." ”
The current report of MacArthur's conversation with reporters puts press censors in a dilemma: if you don't send it, the old man will not tolerate it; if you send it, it is equivalent to poking out the offensive intelligence, which naturally endangers the security and interests of our own army.
After much deliberation, considering that MacArthur "had the unquestionable authority to announce the military action of his choice," the rudder's press inspectors compromised.
Arranged by MacArthur's horse-patting aide-de-camp, Major General Courtney Whitney, the news quickly became the headlines of major newspapers in the United States and was extremely eye-catching.
Ridgway grew increasingly annoyed, for on the eve of each of his elaborate offensives, MacArthur would fly from Tokyo on his Allied Supreme Commander to inspect the forward attacking forces and symbolically fire the gunshots.
MacArthur did this, crediting his Ridgway to his own ledger, and more importantly, leaking the information due to the commander-in-chief's publicity.
Ridgway believed that just by virtue of MacArthur's flamboyant position of being escorted by multiple fighters and bombers when he flew in the air, the Chinese communist army judged that the Un Army was going to act.
So Richgway searched his stomach and carefully wrote a letter to MacArthur.
In his letter, Ridgway implied that the commander-in-chief's inspection of the front line was too much excitement and attention-grabbing, and that the real danger was that these actions would leak information to the enemy before launching an offensive, thus posing a threat to security.
When Ridgway sent out the letter, he was very distracted.
He knew that, in his capacity, to raise an objection to MacArthur's inspection would probably be regarded as a disrespectful act, an act of disapproval of his superiors, or an act of violating the rights of his superiors, and the consequences would be unimaginable, and the old man would not be angry and strange!
To Ridgway's surprise, MacArthur inexplicably accepted his most implicit advice.
From then on, MacArthur's frequent inspections of the front were arranged after the offensive was launched, which is probably the only example of a subordinate who dared to advise him and keep himself in peace during MacArthur's decades of military career.