For any battle, strategic objectives cannot simply be measured by casualty figures. Otherwise, the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union would have been a complete defeat. Many people believe that the Fifth Campaign to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea was not well fought, and the casualties were not small. However, if the fifth campaign is placed in the context of the entire Korean War and later the strategic layout of the two sides, it makes the American army begin to be afraid of the attack of the volunteer army.
Even if they can cross the 38th line, it will not be easy to continue to go deeper and regain the "lost ground".
There is a very worthy topic to discuss: before the fifth battle, did the U.S. military plan to drink the Yalu River? Probably a lot of people will blurt out: "Absolutely not". The strategic focus of the Americans is in Europe, and they are fighting only a "limited war" in Korea, and it is an acceptable reality to stabilize the war situation near the 38th parallel.
There is nothing wrong with this view, but it does not fully represent the true intentions of the U.S. government. At least since Ridgway launched Operation Thunderbolt (the fourth campaign), the U.S. military has not thought of stopping the war only after it reaches the 38th Parallel.
During the Third Campaign (December 31, 1950), the Volunteers crossed the Imjin River and fought the 38th Parallel, driving the Americans near the 37th Parallel. The U.S. army began a counteroffensive on January 25, 1951, and returned to Rinjin River in mid-April. Since the volunteers withdrew from Seoul (March 17), the U.S. army encountered little resistance in the process of returning to the 38th Line.
If the U.S. government has no ideas about the area north of the 38th Parallel, it should "accept it when it is good" at this time, and let the Kaesong peace talks start three months in advance. Ridgway did indeed ask for instructions: "Can the troops cross the 38th Line?" The response he got was: "It's just a military decision." "The implication of the US government is that it is up to you, the military commander, to decide according to the situation on the battlefield.
War is a continuation of politics, and the main reason for MacArthur's dismissal was that he repeatedly touched political red lines. Ridgway, without political scruples, immediately changed the battle plan: "Sword points" to the "Iron Triangle" region in central Korea. A week later, the Volunteers launched their fifth campaign.
So, what kind of result did the fifth campaign achieve? The Kaesong Peace Talks are a superficial phenomenon, and what really makes the US military jealous is:
Will the Chinese military launch another campaign of equal magnitude or greater in the future?
As the U.S. army advanced northward, Ridgway had learned through intelligence that the Chinese army might launch a major offensive. However, this did not shake his confidence in seizing the "Iron Triangle". However, when the Americans occupied Tieyuan and Jinhua, they stopped in the Pingkang Valley (blocked by the 26th Army), and Van Vliet expressed his dissatisfaction with Ridgway over the matter. In fact, it is the US government that really presses the "stop button".
For the U.S. government, if the battle goes well, it is not too much to say how the troops will advance north. We can even make a hypothesis:
If the U.S. military easily occupies the "Iron Triangle" as it did across the 38th Parallel, or if the Volunteers do not have enough troops to stop the U.S. troops, then their next target is likely to be Pyongyang-Wonsan.
In fact, there is a better proof: When the US army lands at Inchon, captures Seoul and Pyongyang, and advances all the way to the Yalu River, will it stop and negotiate peace with Kim Il Sung? They would only jump out and call for negotiations when the volunteers recaptured Pyongyang and the troops were on the 38th parallel.
The volunteers launched the fifth campaign to make the Americans understand a truth:
Even with absolute air and sea supremacy, the U.S. military could not stop more Chinese soldiers from crossing the Yalu River, and these soldiers only needed to carry dry food for a few days to quickly join the battlefield.
Since the U.S. government had no more troops to put into the Korean theater, it was a luxury for them to easily push north.
What are the strategic objectives of the Fifth Campaign? Whether it was to prevent the U.S. military from continuing to advance north, or to dispel the idea of landing operations, it turned out that the U.S. military had no hope of defeating the volunteers in Korea, which is why the armistice negotiations lasted for two years. No matter how "unsatisfactory" the U.S. military is at the negotiating table, it has not launched a large-scale campaign.