During the Liberation War, there was a relatively rare situation: when a major war was about to start, two PLA generals suddenly said to their superiors: This battle cannot be fought like this! For the two targets of attack, A and B, it is necessary to overturn the original battle plan of hitting A first and then hitting B, redeploy the campaign, and change to hitting B first and then hitting A.
It is reasonable to say that soldiers take obedience to orders as their duty, and your superiors order you to fight, even if it is a sword, a mountain, a sea of fire, and a sea of courage to go forward, how can it go against the intention of your superiors and overturn the established battle plan?
In fact, this proposal to temporarily change the battle plan was not only fully taken seriously by the superiors, but was eventually adopted and considered "completely correct."
The two plastered PLA generals were Deng Hua (1955 general) and Zeng Kelin (1955 air force major general), who were then the chief and deputy commanders of the 7th Column of the Northeast Field Army.
It was in December 1948, after Chiang Kai-shek's army was surrounded by our army at five isolated points in Beiping, Tianjin, Tanggu, Zhangjiakou, and Xinbao' security, and in accordance with the instructions of the Central (Central) Central Military Commission, our army concentrated its forces and annihilated the enemy each.
In order to cut off the enemy's retreat route from the sea to the south and finally complete the isolation of Beiping, the original plan of the Central (Central) Central Military Commission was to first capture Tanggu and then attack Tianjin.
As early as ten days ago, in mid-December, the Central (Central) Central Military Commission sent a telegram to the Northeast Field Army, asking the Northeast Field Army to quickly insert itself into Tianjin and Tanggu with three columns, annihilate the enemy on the Tianjin and Tanggu lines, control the line, cut off the connection between Tianjin and Tanggu, and then annihilate the enemies in Tianjin and Tanggu one after another and control the sea outlet.
From 22 to 24 July, after the liberation of Xinbao and Zhangjiakou, our army's next round of goals was to liberate Tanggu and Tianjin.
The victory on the Pingsui Line wiped out Fu Yisheng's main force, and the attempt of the enemy in Pingjin to flee west became a failure.
At this time, the second column, the seventh column, and the ninth column of the Northeast Field Army had already assembled in Tanggu in accordance with the instructions of their superiors. The commanders and fighters of the columns were highly motivated.
According to the instructions of the Central Military Commission, Deng Hua, commander of the Seventh Column, and Zeng Kelin, deputy commander of the Seventh Column, after studying, sent reconnaissance troops to thoroughly understand the enemy's situation and the terrain and geographical location of Tanggu, and at the same time sent a small number of troops to carry out tentative attacks.
However, the troops suffered heavy casualties in the test attack, such as a regiment of the Twentieth Division attacking the beach station, annihilating more than 700 enemies and inflicting more than 600 casualties on their own.
At the same time, Deng Hua and Zeng Kelin found that the vicinity of Tanggu was a salt flat with waterlogged water, ditches running through it, no ice in winter, no digging fortifications, and it was difficult to approach the enemy.
The enemy's headquarters and main forces are stationed on docks and warships, and they can escape by boat at any time, so it is difficult to complete the task of encircling and annihilating the enemy in Tanggu.
To this end, after repeated consultations, Deng Hua and Zeng Kelin, together with the commanders of the Second column and the ninth column, made a report to the command organs of the Northeast Field Army according to the actual situation, and suggested that this battle could not be fought in this way, and that it was not the best policy to fight Tanggu first.
The "Eastern General" attached great importance to this situation, and the next day he sent chief of staff Liu Yalou (general in 1955) and Xiao Hua,political commissar of the First Corps (general in 1955) to beitang, the commander of the operations department and staff officers, by car.
Founding General Deng Hua and Founding Major General Zeng Kelin
After Arriving in Beitang, Liu and Xiao listened attentively to Deng Hua, Zeng Kelin, and Wu Shanfu's analysis of the enemy situation, the terrain, and the advantages and disadvantages of the gains and losses of Tanggu.
After the meeting, Liu Yalou, Xiao Hua, and others inspected the terrain and finally reached an agreement, holding that it was indeed more than worth the loss to attack Tanggu first, and that if tianjin were to be attacked first, it would obviously be more favorable to the overall situation of the campaign.
On December 29, the second chiefs of Lin and Luo sent a telegram to the Central (Central) Military Commission, stating that "according to the reports of the troops in the vicinity of Tanggu on the reconnaissance of the terrain, all of them show that the terrain is not conducive to combat..."
On the basis of this situation, they suggested that our army should change its decision to attack Tanggu first, besiege Tanggu without fighting, and first capture Tianjin.
The Central Military Commission and the supreme commander immediately approved this proposal and decided that five columns would seize Tianjin first.
When Deng Hua and Zeng Kelin saw the words in the telegram that "it was completely correct to abandon the plan to attack Tanggu and concentrate five columns to prepare to capture Tianjin," they were finally relieved.
The "former general" of Pingjin immediately ordered two divisions of the twelfth column to monitor the enemy in Tanggu, and the first, second, seventh, eighth, and ninth columns began to move west on December 30, approaching Tianjin.
In early January 1949, our army began to operate on the periphery.
On January 14, the Northeast Field Army launched a general offensive against Tianjin.
At 3 p.m. on the 15th, the siege ended in victory. After only 29 hours of fighting, our army completely annihilated 2 armies and 10 divisions of the enemy, totaling 130,000 people. At this point, Tianjin was officially liberated.
The next day, the Northeast Field Army officially pointed its sword at Tanggu, and the regiments of the 147th Division of the 40th Army and the 136th Division and the 159th Division of the Forty-sixth Army launched an attack on the enemies of Tanggu and Dagu respectively in the south and north of haihe.
More than 50,000 defenders in Tanggu and Dagu faced the pursuit of the two large armies of the People's Liberation Army and fled by boat in the confusion. On the morning of January 17, 1949, Tanggu was liberated.
It is undeniable that the campaign to liberate Tianjin and Tanggu went so smoothly and was inextricably linked to Deng Hua and Zeng Kelin's proposal to attack Tianjin first and Then Tanggu.