On February 13, 1951, the Hengcheng Counterattack was officially launched. Deputy Commander Deng Hua of the Volunteer Army commanded the 39th, 40th, 42nd, and 66th Armies to counterattack in the direction of Hengcheng and Wonju, and defeated the South Korean 8th Division, which was advancing north of Hengcheng.
The enemy U.S. 2nd Division was ordered to reinforce, but the end was even more embarrassing, a main armored battalion was ambushed by volunteers in the middle of the road, and even before the front line arrived, it was almost completely destroyed.
The main south Korean force suffered defeat and began to retreat madly, and the always arrogant US 2nd Division could not care about its face, and fled the battlefield under the cover of the air force. Taking advantage of the victory to pursue, the volunteer army annihilated more than 12,000 enemy troops in one fell swoop, hitting the Entire United Nations Army on the Eastern Front and forcing it to retreat 26 kilometers.
An enraged Ridgway blamed the campaign on South Korean forces, believing that their rout and retreat had led to the defeat of the Americans.
Ridgway even described the friendly forces' performance in Hengcheng in his memoirs this way: "The South Korean troops almost regarded the volunteer army as a natural general. If the volunteer soldiers with rubber bottoms suddenly appeared on the positions of the South Korean army, they always frightened many South Korean soldiers and fled for their lives without looking back. ”
But unlike his old boss, MacArthur, Ridgway didn't just fight with his lips. After the great rout of Hengcheng, the famous AMERICAN general did not mess up, but had his own unique judgment of the entire war situation.
After three campaigns, the use of volunteer troops and supplies had reached its limits. Ridgway understood that the victory in the Hengcheng counterattack would not solve the dilemma of the volunteer army. Therefore, at this most critical time, the UN army must retain a "counterattack" card in the situation of defeat, and this bottom card is Pingli.
Located 40 miles south of Line 38, Tsupinli was a transportation stronghold on the U.S. front. The loss of Pingli means that the right wing of the US 9th Army is empty, the entire UN front will be cracked, and Ridgway's long-planned offensive plan will be declared completely bankrupt. "The volunteers will definitely attack Pingli, and the American troops must also defend Pingli, no matter what the cost." This was Ridgway's most determined idea after the Hengcheng counterattack.
At that time, the defense of Pingli was the 23rd Regiment of the 10th Army, and after learning of the defeat in the direction of Hengcheng, the regimental commander Freeman made a plan for retreat, and even ordered the soldiers to pack their luggage. But what Freeman did not expect was that what he finally waited for was not an order to retreat, but a plan to stick to Pingli.
Ridgway gave the 10th Army Commander Byers a death order: "If you withdraw from Pingli, I will withdraw you first!" At the same time, Ridgway also gave way to the 28th Regiment of the US 2nd Division in Bunmuri to immediately reinforce Theopyeong-ri, and the US 9th Army, the British 27th Brigade and the South Korean 6th Division moved between Tsungpyeong-ri and Bunmauri, closing the gap in front of the US 10th Army.
In the humble village of Tongpingli, Ridgway smashed almost all the troops he could mobilize.
After the victory of the Hengcheng counterattack, Deng Hua made Pingli the next goal. According to the convention, the US 2nd Division and the South Korean 8th Division had already retreated, and the Us troops defending Pingli would inevitably choose to flee south in order to avoid becoming a lone army. If at this time the volunteers catch up and strike at the mobile war, it will be the best opportunity to expand the results of the battle.
Peng Dehuai also mentioned in a telegram sent to Deng Hua on February 12, Wu Xinquan, commander of the 39th Army, and Xu Binzhou, political commissar: "Most of the pseudo-Eighth Division has been annihilated... The opening of the battle has been opened, the enemy may be shaken, it is best to grasp the enemy in the front with one front, insert the main force behind the enemy's flank, and annihilate him in the movement when the enemy retreats. The specific deployment was decided by Deng. ”
The fighter plane was fleeting, and there was not much time left for Deng Hua to consider. At that time, the volunteer army estimated that the defenders of Tongpingli were at most 4 battalions, and there were only field fortifications, and the defense was relatively weak. Therefore, after receiving Peng Dehuai's instructions, Deng Hua immediately ordered the 119th Division of the 40th Army to cooperate with the main force of the 39th Army and the 126th Division of the 42nd Army to prepare to encircle and annihilate the enemy in Pingli on the evening of the 13th, and to be under the unified command of Xu Guofu, commander of the 119th Division.
But Xu Guofu, who received the order, had a somewhat heavy heart, and he faced two thorny problems. First, the volunteer army attacked 5 regiments in Tongpingli, each from 3 divisions and 1 army, which was not assembled, and the communication links were difficult to connect, and it was difficult to achieve unified command. Second, the offensive order was issued in a hurry, and the volunteer army did not have a detailed grasp of the enemy situation and terrain in Pingpingli, which was equivalent to fighting an unprepared battle.
Xu Guofu had asked the Eastern Front Headquarters to postpone the general offensive time in order to coordinate the participating troops and familiarize themselves with the battlefield situation, but the reply he received was: "The enemy situation is only one or two battalions, and may have escaped a part, and the enemy must be quickly captured and cannot be delayed." ”
After receiving the final order, Xu Guofu convened a meeting of front-line commanders. However, because of the stalemate of the war, only 3 of the 5 regimental commanders were reached. However, Li Wenqing, deputy commander of the 375th Regiment of the 42nd Army, brought the real situation in Pingli, the enemy's strength was by no means more than two battalions, and they showed no signs of trying to escape, but put up a defensive posture.
Xu Guofu immediately reported the situation to his superiors, but received no response. The news that followed made Xu Guofu even more annoyed, and the 42nd Artillery Regiment suffered enemy air raids and could not participate in the battle on time. The 375th Regiment of the 125th Division also temporarily lost contact, and the strength of the offensive group was greatly reduced.
However, because the scheduled time for the attack had arrived, Xu Guofu could only order the 356th and 357th Regiments of the 119th Division and the 359th Regiment of the 120th Division to attack Pingli without artillery support.
At the beginning of the battle, the volunteer attack was relatively smooth. The 356th Regiment and the 359th Regiment successively captured several high ground southeast of Pingli, and the 357th Regiment also made progress. However, after nightfall, the attacking troops encountered stubborn resistance, almost every high ground was fortified by the enemy, and the artillery support and light and heavy fire were also relatively strong.
The battle became more and more arduous, and the volunteer soldiers gave full play to their specialty of night fighting, destroying the enemy's bunker fortifications one by one. But at the same time, every time our army captures a high ground, it has to pay a huge number of casualties. Xu Guofu once recalled the battle in Pingli: "Almost every platoon of ours had soldiers who died because of blocking the gun holes of the bunkers. ”
After two days and nights of fighting in Pingli, the outer positions were occupied by our army, and the enemy retreated in an undulating area of less than two square kilometers, stubbornly resisting with houses, stronghold fortifications and powerful artillery fire. The enemy was trapped, and the volunteer soldiers no longer had heavy grenades and explosive canisters specifically for tanks, and could only carry out small weapons.
The real situation of the enemy is far more than less than 2 battalions as the intelligence says, but 4 infantry battalions, 1 artillery battalion and 1 artillery company, 1 anti-aircraft artillery company and 1 tank squadron, with a total strength of more than 6,000 people, which is not absolutely inferior to the number of volunteer attacking troops, and has strong artillery support.
Such a battle of unequal firepower is destined to require huge casualties. The casualties of the 3 regiments of the 40th Army participating in the attack reached more than 1830, of which the 3 battalions of the 349th Regiment suffered almost all casualties.
The enemy's reinforcements, under the cover of aircraft, artillery, and tanks, came to Therapyeong-ri in a frenzy, and the volunteer reinforcements were equally arduous.
On the morning of the 15th, Deng Hua decided to send reinforcements to the front line and once again issued the order to attack Pingli. At the same time, Deng Hua also called Wen Yucheng, commander of the 40th Army, asking him to unify the command of all the units participating in the battle, and on the 16th, he must take Pingli. But what Deng Hua did not expect was that Wen Yucheng on the other end of the phone said in a strong tone: "I suggest that the troops participating in the battle immediately withdraw from the battle." ”
The 40th Army was the first unit to enter the DPRK, and Wen Yucheng, who fought from the Yalu River to Pingli, also had a very clear understanding of the US army. The stubborn resistance of the enemy in the battle of Pingli, and the reinforcements at such a cost, it is obvious that they are determined to fight to the death. In the absence of heavy weapons, the volunteers hastily attacked the enemy who was holding a stronghold by means of field warfare, and it was not wise to attack the enemy's strength with its own shortness.
Wen Yucheng had a resolute attitude, believing that since there was no certainty of victory in the strong attack on Pingli, he should change his strategy in a timely manner and not fold All of Bendu into it. The subordinate generals "disobeyed" in the telephone in this way, and some ill-tempered chiefs may be about to scold directly, but Deng Hua did not do so.
After understanding the battle situation on the front line, this deputy commander of the volunteer army, who had experienced hundreds of battles, made a very calm analysis and judgment, and did not have any stubborn opinions. Deng Hua told Wen Yucheng: "Don't put down the phone, I will ask Mr. Peng for instructions now." Peng Dehuai's last order was also: "Agree to immediately end the battle in Pingli." ”
Before dawn on 16 February, the volunteer offensive forces withdrew from the battle, and the armies that had advanced to the vicinity of Wonju also moved northward, massing in the area from Longtou-ri (砥平里 north) to the hengcheng line and north to the south of the east-west line of Hongcheon. At this point, the first phase of the fourth campaign was over.
After the war, Deng Hua took the initiative to review his judgment and command mistakes, but gave great affirmation to the volunteer troops participating in the war, and he personally called the front-line commander-in-chief Xu Guofu and said:
"You Xu Guofu really didn't let the enemy run away!" Although we were wrong, you played well. You can adjust the deployment in time, randomly attack, and deserve to be an old war. Our frontline commanders should be like this, adapting to changes on the fly, changing the enemy and changing us, and not being alarmed. Although we have paid a great price, the responsibility is up to me, in my command, and it is up to me to take responsibility. As soon as the follow-up troops come up, I will make up for your attrition..."
Although the Battle of Pingli did not achieve the expected combat objectives, it became a true portrayal of the other side of the Volunteer Army to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. Wen Yucheng dared to "disobey orders on the battlefield" and, after accurately judging the situation of the war situation, boldly put forward his own suggestions. And Deng Hua can listen to the opinions of his subordinates and dare to take responsibility, which is even more rare. Xu Guofu once recalled: "I was very excited to hear Deng Hua's words, and I expressed my admiration for his courage to take responsibility. This was rare at the time. ”
The overall strategy of the battle in Pingli was right, it was a point that could turn the tide of the situation, otherwise Ridgway would not have ordered the Americans to hold and reinforce at all costs. However, this battle, because the time of launch was relatively hasty and the enemy situation changed greatly, so the volunteer army's offensive action did not achieve the expected results.