This is the 288th original article of Shi Shuoxing
It is said that after the Jin defeat of the Qin army in the Battle of Ma Tunnel, it basically relieved the worries of the southward advance, and because Wu constantly harassed Chu, Chu could not go all out to the north. As far as the situation of Jin-Chu vying for hegemony is concerned, the Jin State is already in a superior position in terms of strategic posture, and only waits for the opportunity to fight a decisive battle with Chu.
In the first year after the Ma Tunnel War (577 BC), Zheng Cheng's envoy Gongzi Xi attacked Xu and was defeated by Xu, and Zheng Cheng personally led an army to attack Xu and entered the outer GuoCheng of his capital. Xu Cut land to seek peace, and Zheng Fang withdrew. Xu was an ally of Chu, and Chu wanted to send troops to save Xu, but there were different internal opinions, and he saw that Xu had already been with Zheng He, so he did not send troops for the time being.
The following year, the King of Chu still sent an army to attack Zheng, advancing to the storm tunnel (present-day Western Yuanyang, Henan), and then turned to attack and defend, as for the first stop (present-day southeast of Sui County, Henan). Zheng Chenggong sent Gongzi Xi to counterattack the State of Chu, capturing Xinshi (新石, in present-day Ye County, Henan) and threatening the chu army's rear road, and Chu retreated on his own.
In August of that year, Duke Gong of Song died and was succeeded by his son Duke Ping. Infighting broke out between the pro-Chu and pro-Jin factions in the country, and the commanders of the Left Division, Yu Shi, Dasi Kou Xiangren, Shaosi Kou Linzhu, and Dazai Xiang and Shaozai Yufu defected to the Chu state. At the same time, internal changes also occurred within the Jin state, and Bozhou Plough also defected to the Chu state. Sima Zi of Chu believed that the Jin dynasty was in turmoil and would be unable to take care of the Central Plains. But in fact, Jin was actively preparing, waiting for the fighter to fight a decisive battle with Chu. In the winter of that year, Jin Shiyao also joined forces with the doctors of the States of Song, Qi, Lu, Wei, and Zheng to make an alliance with King Shoumeng of Wu at Zhongli (present-day Fengyangdong, Anhui). This was the first contact between Wu and Jin after the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Doctor of the Central Plains, and the purpose of the Jin was to deal with the Chu State.
In the eleventh year of King Jian of Zhou (575 BC), in order to induce Zheng Guo to turn his back on Jin and pro-Chu, the State of Chu sent gongzi Cheng to Zheng and Xu cut off Chu Ruyin's field and Zheng in order to form an alliance. Zheng Chenggong then sent gongzi Si to ally with king Gong of Chu at Wucheng (武城, near present-day Nanyang, Henan). In April of that year, Gongzi Xi led an army to attack the Song Dynasty. The Song army was first victorious over Fengpi (汋陂, in present-day Ninglingdong, Henan), but was proud of its victory and neglected its guard, and was completely annihilated by the Zheng army. After Jin learned of Zheng's rebellion against Jin and the information of attacking the Song state, he decided to send an army to attack Zheng and summoned Qi, Lu, and Wei to send troops to the meeting. After Chu Wenjin sent troops, he also quickly sent troops north to help Zheng. In June of that year, the Jin and Chu dynasties fought the Battle of Yanling (鄢陵, northwest of present-day Yanling, Henan).
On June 29, the Chu army reached the front of the Jin army camp in an attempt to break the Jin army before the Qi, Lu and other armies arrived. Luan Shu, the marshal of the Jin Dynasty Army, said: "Chu Shuai is frivolous, and he will retreat in three days." If you retreat, you will win. The commander of the new army, Hao Zhi, said that the Chu army had six weaknesses: "Erqing (referring to zi rebellion and zizhong) are evil to each other; Wang Zhao is old (the relatives and soldiers of the king of Chu are all sons of nobles); Zheng Chen is not neat (Zheng Jun's formation is uneven and untidy); the barbarian army is not Chen (barbarian soldiers cannot form a position); Chen is not obscure (the deployment does not avoid obscure days); and Chen Erjia is loud (loud and noisy in the formation, there is no military discipline). Convergence (military discipline will be more sloppy after the battle). After each other, there is no fighting heart... I will do it. ”
The Jin army then set up a flat stove and lined up in the camp. The Jin army had learned that the elite of the Chu army was in the middle army, and was determined to first concentrate the main force to attack the right army of Chu and the Zheng army, and after breaking them, then concentrate its forces to attack the Chu army. After the deployment was completed, the Jin army opened a camp and attacked the Chu army.
After the battle began, king Gong of Chu was shot in the left eye and retreated wounded. When the Chu army heard that the king of Chu was wounded, the army's morale was shaken, and the Right Army of Chu was attacked by the elite Jin troops, could not support it, and also retreated, thus affecting the morale of the Chinese and left armies, and also retreating with the Right Army. King Gong of Chu led his guards to retreat over Yingshui to the north bank of Yingshui to accommodate the defeated army.
When the Jin army pursued Yingshui, the sky was already twilight, so it stopped pursuing. The Chu left army bravely fought again when it retreated, and it was not until night that the two sides stopped fighting. Originally, the Jin and Chu armies were ready to fight again the next day, but when the Chu Communist King summoned the Marshal of the Chinese Army to study the next day's battle plan, zi anti could not come because he was drunk. When the king of Chu saw that the marshal was like this, he was afraid that the battle would be difficult to win, so he ordered the withdrawal of his troops overnight and returned to Chu.
In the Battle of Yanling, although the Jin army won, the strength of the Chu army did not weaken much. However, due to the internal contradictions of the Jin Dynasty, the princes knew that the Jin dynasty would be in internal strife and refused to sincerely attach themselves. For example, Dr. Lu's uncle Sun Qiaoru said: "There are many governments in Jin Dynasty today, and it is not possible to follow them, and it is better to be in Qi and Chu than to die, and to despise Jin." Therefore, the strategic pattern of the Jin-Chu struggle for hegemony has not changed greatly due to the Victory of Jin in the Battle of Yanling. The State of Zheng still insisted on annexing Chu, so Chu still controlled the states of Zheng, Xu, Chen, and Cai in the Central Plains; the State of Song was still resolutely attached to Jin, so the states of Lu, Wei, Cao, and Qi north of the Song state were all attached to Jin.
The Jin and Chu countries were still in a situation of relative balance of power, and what was different from before was that Qin's strength in the Battle of Ma Tunnel was greatly reduced, and the threat to the rear of Jin was greatly reduced, while the State of Wu was becoming stronger and stronger, and the threat to Chu's flanks and backs was greatly increased, which had a great impact on the development of the subsequent struggle for hegemony!
How do you see the Jin-Chu struggle for hegemony
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