Without industrialization drive, only relying on R & D investment, there will be no next-generation technology in the long run. That's where the most worrying thing is.
Author 丨 Meng Hua
Edited 丨tian grass
Produced 丨 Automan Media
In the 2021 China New Energy Vehicle Sales List, whether it is Japanese companies, Japanese brands, or subdivision models, none of them have entered the top 15. It is an indisputable fact that Japanese brands are lagging behind in the commercial mix of new energy vehicles (EVs and PHEV).
In fact, on the PHEV alone, Toyota and Honda still maintain a certain market reputation, and the problem is mainly in the EV.
Japan sold 4.46 million passenger cars in 2021, 40% of which were "electrified" models, but EVs accounted for only 0.4% of total sales. Among them, the imported EV is 8610, accounting for half of EV sales (mainly Tesla). So much so that the International Energy Agency (IEA) only takes stock of the US-Europe market, and classifies the Japanese EV market as "other".
Germany announced the 2020 "Comprehensive Ranking of Decarbonization Patents", which counted more than 1.55 million decarbonization patents in 50 segments. By country, Japan will occupy the first place in 2020 in the three areas of "electric vehicles", "hybrid vehicles" and "all-solid-state batteries".
If divided by enterprises, Toyota ranks second (ranked first in 2015) and Panasonic seventh; if you look at the number of patent applications, Toyota still ranks first.
Even without quantification, Japanese companies are also in a leading position in the separator and anode cathode technology of power batteries, and battery companies have obvious perceptions (because they have to purchase upstream and pay patent fees), but these advantages have not been transformed into commercial advantages of Japanese companies on the whole vehicle, which is puzzling.
1
Is the "electrification" of Japanese companies really speeding up?
Public opinion disagrees on this and gives a lot of interpretations. Even without discussing the reasons and wishes, it is obvious from the facts that the Japanese companies are screwing up on the road to electrification, basically being dragged down from their own comfortable space and established rhythm, and forced to run a "reluctant track".
Nissan's current goal is to electrify all new cars in major markets by the early 2030s. Obviously, Nissan's plan, from the time node, the market scope to the implementation of the force, there are ambiguities.
Mazda aims to account for 25% of global sales of EV products by 2030, with the rest being HEVs and PHEV.
Both descriptions of goals are "hopeful," which seems to imply a lack of confidence and that the goal itself is "not worth taking seriously."
Honda, which uses China as the EV anchor market, has a much clearer attitude. Among the "advanced markets" represented by Honda's plan in China, the sales volume of EVs and fuel cell vehicles will reach 40% in 2030, 80% in 2035, and 100% in 2040.
Honda CEO Toshihiro Mibe said: "The choice for mainstream family cars is electric, and for larger commercial vehicles, it should be hydrogen fuel cells. That is our conclusion so far. This means that Honda is no longer considering the large-scale deployment of hydrogen passenger cars within 10 years.
In December 2021, Toyota announced its 2030 strategy, which was revised to "invest 4 trillion yen to develop EVs, release 30 EV models by 2030, and electrify 100% of Lexus models by 2035" instead of "investing 4 trillion yen to develop EVs, releasing 30 EV models by 2030, and electrifying Lexus in 2035" instead of 2018.
Reducing the strategic position of technology-dominant HEV and FCV, Toyota must be painful. It is equivalent to being forced to go by the situation and basically losing the strategic initiative.
As if that wasn't enough, Toshihiro Mibe also said that Honda saw rather difficult technical challenges in hydrogen fuel and would not become mainstream in 10 years, calling on Toyota to stop pursuing hydrogen technology and focus on EVs. This is actually consistent with the attitude of multinational car companies such as Mercedes-Benz, BMW, Ford, General Motors, and Volkswagen, that is, the strategic position of hydrogen fuel solutions is "downgraded".
Akio Toyoda has been re-elected chairman of the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA) for three consecutive terms (until May 2024), and Toshihiro Mibu's public shouts, while unusual, are of practical significance. Akio Toyoda has always taken the position of "carbon optimality" to determine the direction of the industry, rather than unconditionally taking sides with EVs. Mibuhiro's statement is equivalent to urging the entire Japanese auto industry to change course.
2
The great power strategy must be followed
Why do Japanese companies have a split in technical position and reality cognition for EVs?
Both Japanese companies and the Japanese government have long recognized that the EV strategy means not only electric vehicles themselves, but also infrastructure support. It is precisely at this point that Japan lacks confidence.
Some people believe that Japan's policy has fully shifted to electric. The Japanese government plans to double the subsidy for new EVs from April 1, 2022, up to a maximum of 800,000 yen (about 44,500 yuan). The subsidy standard is similar to the German subsidy of 6,000 euros (about 43,000 yuan), which is half lower than the French maximum subsidy of 12,000 euros. The programme budget has not yet been approved by Parliament.
However, the subsidy standard is based on the premise that sales are small. Moreover, according to the experience of various countries, consumption subsidies have never worked alone. The support of the production end, the coordinated construction of the industrial chain, and the encouragement policies for infrastructure operators should be launched together to form a set of policy combinations.
Now this practice gives people the feeling that the policy is supported, but it is not fully supported, which can be regarded as a kind of "scene-oriented problem".
This is actually in line with the Japanese government's consistent thinking. In 2010, japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry released the "Next Generation Vehicle Strategy", which planned to account for 30%-50% of traditional fuel vehicles in 2030, while HEVs accounted for 30%-40% of "next-generation vehicles", EVs and PHEV combined accounted for 20%-30%, FCVs accounted for 3%, and clean diesel vehicles accounted for 5%-10%.
Of course, the planning is a joke today. Even 10 years ago, this line of thinking seemed too small. The Japanese government is not predicting that something is wrong, but blindly wants to stay in the "advantageous zone" and does not consider the strategy of a big country.
For an industry that focuses on overseas markets, the existence of "visual blind spots" can be fatal. Japan shouldn't really think it's qualified to define the track.
After 2008, both China and the United States chose the direction of electrification. The United States, which experienced relative stagnation from 2016 to 2020, is now back on track. As early as the beginning of this century, Europe has defined a radical direction for carbon reduction. After the 2015 Paris Agreement, Both China, the United States and Europe have fully promoted the implementation of "electrification" as a national strategy.
And what has Japan been doing for so many years? Huge investments have been made to hydrogen energy, but so far no heavyweight countries have followed suit. For a long time, it has also tried to respond to the "electrification" strategy of major countries with "electrification", and now it is adjusting step by step in the direction of electrification.
3
Japan's grievances and adjustments
This has nothing to do with cognition, Japan has its own grievances.
First, Japan's self-sufficiency rate in primary energy is only 7%, the lowest among developed countries. In October 2021, the Japanese government identified a package of energy transition policies, the most important of which is the Energy Basic Plan (adjusted every six years). The goal is to reduce carbon emissions by 46% by 2030 (compared to 2013) and achieve carbon neutrality by 2050.
To this end, the more important measures proposed by Japan are: to improve the energy self-sufficiency rate and strong resilience, and to strengthen the bottom line of energy and resource security; the "highest priority" development of secondary energy actually refers to hydrogen energy - ammonia energy (the use of low-cost raw materials such as lignite coal and rice straw); nuclear power is maintained at 20%-22%, which resists the huge pressure of public opinion; the proportion of coal power and gas power is greatly reduced, and the "renewable energy" power generation is guaranteed; the popularization of new energy vehicles is accelerated, and fuel substitution is promoted.
Japan's carbon emission targets have also been adjusted in response to the intensity of public criticism. Previously proposed, carbon emissions in 2030 will be reduced by 26% compared with 2013, which has been sprayed by global public opinion. Compared with the carbon emission targets in Europe and the United States, it is indeed too comfortable.
Considering that Japan itself cannot control the pricing power and reliable supply channels of coal and natural gas, the "46% emission reduction target" has now also made it a suckling force, which is only in line with the overall goal of cooling 1.5 °C in the Paris Agreement, but public opinion has criticized this goal as "unrealistic".
The entry of renewable energy represented by wind photovoltaics into the grid will raise electricity prices, and Japan's electricity cost control target in 2030 will be difficult to achieve (the target is 9.9-10.2 yen/kWh). And from 2021 to 2022, fossil fuel prices will take off directly, and the control target will not be played before it has started.
Second, the apartments and buildings in Japanese cities are managed by private enterprises, and the renovation and installation of high-power charging piles in each building not only requires power companies to be equipped with transformers and lines separately, but also requires the approval of the owners' assembly, and it is extremely impossible to promote high-voltage charging in residential areas.
In fact, China's urban communities have encountered the same problem, but it has become a game between property, power operators and OEMs. For the owner of the car, it is a big trouble. But for the city as a whole, this is just a detail of the popularization of new energy infrastructure, and the policy aspect can be promoted as a whole, and it is difficult to "unblock" only relying on commercial logic.
The point is that every successive Japanese government has been shocked by the amount of policy projects and funds required to change infrastructure. One is to fear of losing the support of the people's votes; the other is to be afraid of difficulties, always thinking of grasping policies that are effective and costly, and promoting infrastructure transformation is obviously not among them.
Third, Japan's confidence in ensuring the supply of primary energy and metal raw materials is insufficient. The deeper reason is that the Japanese market size is limited, and the inertia of the vehicle market is very strong (after all, it has led in the energy-saving technology of fuel vehicles), so there is no need to establish a whole electric industry chain.
This explains why Japanese companies have accumulated a large number of technical patents upstream of power batteries, but they can only cooperate with Chinese companies to recover the cost of technology research and development. For Chinese companies, the demand for Japanese patents is also rigid in the short term, but it is being rid of.
For technology, Japanese companies tend to maintain the moat of high-end technology, while low-end technology is basically released to opponents, and instead researches the next generation of technology to maintain the technical generation gap.
The current generation gap is still there. For example, Ouyang Minggao believes that Japanese companies are 5 years ahead of Chinese companies in solid-state battery research and development (but in 2022, solid-state batteries have jumped tickets).
The problem is that Japan, the so-called low-end technology, cannot industrialize itself. Because the Chinese enterprises led by the Ningde era will be below the cost price of Japanese companies, it is very difficult. Japanese batteries still occupy 10% of the market share, but they are basically driven by Tesla's demand. Japanese automakers want to do electric vehicles, and can only cooperate with Chinese and Korean companies.
Japan's shift from government to business is now seeing this ominous prospect. Participating in the great power electrification game becomes the only option. As for hydrogen energy, it can only remain as a spare tire, and it may be a spare tire for a long time.
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