Regarding the Spring and Autumn Five Hegemons, there are many versions in ancient times, the most widely circulated is derived from the "History of Suoyin", that is, the Duke of Qi Huan, the Duke of Jin Wen, the Duke of Qin Mu, the King of Chuzhuang, and the Duke of Song Xiang, of which Song Xianggong and the Song State he represented were undoubtedly the weakest overlords.
The problem is that the Song State, which is so weak in strength, is far inferior in territory, population, and national strength to the State of Qi, the State of Jin, the State of Qin, the State of Chu, the State of Yan, and even the State of Lu, so why did Song Xianggong have the heart to compete for hegemony, and why did he compete for the position of hegemon? What is less known is that the emergence of Song Xianggong's desire to fight for hegemony began with the entrustment of Qi Huangong to him.
After King Keyin of Wu, he concentrated the remnants of Yin Shang in the area of Chaoge, led by Wu Geng, the son of King Huan. After the failure of Wu Geng's restoration, the Zhou Dynasty moved the Yin people to song land (in present-day Shangqiu City) and handed them over to the administration of Wei Ziqi, the land of the King of Sui, and specially allowed him to use tianzi to worship the Shang Dynasty and be a guest with Zhou, so the Song State was the country of the remnants of Yin Merchants and had a special status.
Because the Song Kingdom was a "remnant of the former dynasty", it was a big white eye in the Zhou family, and many fables in the Spring and Autumn And Warring States periods were all about the Song people, "pulling up seedlings to help grow", "Ding Gong sinking wells", "waiting for rabbits", "covering ears and stealing bells" and other stories always say "There is a person in the Song state..." How to tell how stupid the Song people are. The same as the Song Kingdom is the Zheng Kingdom, which oscillates between the Jin and Chu, so there are also many fables about the stupidity of the Zheng people.
However, during the Song Xianggong period, the Song people rose up, which once made many princely states in the Central Plains look up, and thus was listed by later historians as one of the five hegemons of the Spring and Autumn Period, and the rise of song Xianggong was closely related to the attitude of the Duke of Qi Huan towards him.
In 651 BC, the Duke of Qi Huan held a general meeting of princes in Kuiqiu, and the monarchs of Qi, Lu, Song, Wei, Zheng, Xu, and Cao were participated in the alliance, and King Xiang of Zhou also sent representatives to participate, and praised the Duke of Qi Huan. There were five main contents of the meeting, namely, it was forbidden to direct the "water disaster" to other countries, it was forbidden to refuse to sell grain in other countries, it was not allowed to replace the prince, it was not allowed to replace wives with concubines, and women were not allowed to participate in state affairs. It was a victorious congress, a successful congress, with the unanimous adoption of resolutions by the monarchs, and the hegemony of the Duke of Qi Huan had reached its peak.
In the Kwai Qiu Alliance, duke Huan of Qi also had a separate communication with Duke Xiang of Song, entrusting him to take care of Prince Zhao of Qi (the third son of Duke Huan of Qi), and once someone in the state of Qi seized the throne, he hoped that Song Xianggong would send troops to quell the rebellion. The earnest entrustment from a super overlord naturally flattered Song Xianggong, who had just succeeded to the throne, and immediately agreed.
In 643 BC, Yi Ya and Shu Diao starved the Duke of Qi Huan alive and launched a mutiny to support Gongzi Wuxia (the eldest son of duke Huan of Qi) as the king, and Crown Prince Zhao fled to the Song kingdom to ask for help from Song Xianggong. Although the State of Song was still very weak at that time, Song Xianggong was willing to keep his promise and was ready to help Crown Prince Zhao return to China to regain the throne.
Song Xianggong adopted the mainstream game at that time, that is, to send notices to various princely states, telling everyone that the traitors of the State of Qi had violated the Kwai Qiu Covenant and wantonly replaced the prince, and now we were going to correct the chaos and escort the prince to the State of Qi to succeed to the throne. However, the Song state was weak, and song Xianggong's appeal was not large, and most of the princes ignored it, and only the three kingdoms of Wei, Cao, and Yi sent some soldiers and horses.
The arrow was on the string and had to be sent, so in 642 BC Song Xianggong could only lead the army with a hard scalp, but because Prince Zhao was the heir chosen by Duke Huan of Qi, he had great appeal in the State of Qi, so when facing the Song army, the People of the State of Qi were not in harmony and the military was scattered, and finally under the internal response of Prince Zhao's supporters, Song Xianggong easily defeated the "rebels", and Prince Zhao (Qi Xiaogong) successfully entered the Qi capital Linzi to succeed him.
He ordered three princely states to defeat the powerful Qi army in one fell swoop and help the former hegemonic state to rectify the chaos, so that Song Xianggong became famous in one fell swoop, and the taste of victory also made Song Xianggong intoxicated.
The civil unrest after the death of Duke Huan of Qi, and the struggle for power between the sons of Duke Xiao of Qi (the other sons of Duke Huan of Qi) inevitably declined, so that the position of overlord of the princes was vacant. The so-called "Qi lost its deer, the world chased it together", Song Xianggong wanted to chase the deer one by one.
At that time, Qin chu was a "barbarian" in the eyes of the princes of the Central Plains, Song Xianggong believed that they were not qualified to dominate, the Central Plains Jin state had long been in civil strife, qi civil unrest and favored by Song Xianggong, other Lu states, Chen states, Cao states, etc. seemed to be worth mentioning. After thinking deeply, Song Xianggong felt that the current opportunity was rare and he could participate in the struggle for hegemony, but mainly not to compete for hegemony with the strength of military divisions, but to establish hegemony in the form of an alliance and the Spring and Autumn Uprising.
The Ziyu of the Song Dynasty advised: "Small countries are fighting for alliances, and disasters are also disasters." Song Xianggong ignored it and began to plan the "Huimeng" struggle for hegemony in the second year of the quelling of the Internal Strife in Qi (641 BC), that is, to become the leader of the alliance at the time of the Alliance, so as to determine the hegemonic status.
The first step in the alliance to fight for hegemony is to have a little brother who supports him. In order to establish his authority, he first sacrificed the king of the small state of Dongyi as a sacrifice, and then besieged the state of Cao, in short, to coerce and induce the princes to support him. But the problem is that the Song state is weak and cannot act as an umbrella for the weak country, so the responder chats that many princes do not obey, and the Song state can only bully some small countries that are not obedient, and there is nothing to do for the slightly larger disobedient Chen, Cai, Zheng and other countries. In the end, only a few small states, such as Wei, Yi, Cao, and Shui, supported Song Xianggong.
The second step in the alliance's struggle for hegemony is to become the recognized ally of the princes at the time of the alliance. In 639 BC, Song Xianggong came to Ludi to meet the princes, Qi, Chu and other large and small princely states. At the alliance meeting, Song Xianggong regarded himself as the leader of the alliance, which made the state of Qi and the state of Chu dissatisfied, and failed to achieve the intention of hegemony, and finally the state of Chu suggested that the dispute be shelved for the time being, and wait until the autumn to meet the alliance in Ludi to discuss the issue of the alliance lord. In the autumn of that year, Song Xianggong did not listen to advice, insisted on not taking the army, and was very trustworthy to go to the Ludi Alliance, and as a result, when there was a dispute between Song Xianggong and King Cheng of Chu as overlords, the State of Chu did not pay attention to morality and suddenly sent troops out to capture Song Xianggong. In the winter of the same year, when the princes met again, after the mediation of Lu Gong, Song Xianggong was released.
Since it is impossible to fight for hegemony through alliances, it is only possible to resort to force. Song Xianggong heard that Zheng Guo supported the Chu state to dominate, and his heart was very unhappy, so he found a reason to attack Zheng Guo, Zheng Guo asked the Chu state for help, and the Chu state "attacked Song to save Zheng", so Song Chu broke out the Battle of Hongshui. In the following history, we all know that Song Xianggong strictly observed the Zhou rites in order to show the style of the Song Kingdom, to win the battle, and was unwilling to use despicable tactics to win, but the Chu army did not pay attention to morality and raided the Song army, and finally Song Xianggong was defeated, and he was shot in the thigh by the Chu army, and the next year the wound attack died.
Song Xianggong's ambition to compete for hegemony began with the entrustment of Duke Huan of Qi. However, from the perspective of Song Xianggong's struggle for hegemony, ignoring that force is one of the key supports for hegemony, in the early 20th century, Roosevelt of the United States "one hand stick, one hand carrot", to achieve the American hegemony of the United States, but Song Xianggong only has "benevolence", but there is no stick support, so it has not been able to become a recognized hegemon, and even to a certain extent has become a "laughing stock" and "shame". If this is the case, why is he listed in the "Historical Index" as one of the Five Hegemons of the Spring and Autumn Period?
The reason is very simple, Song Xianggong is the Spring and Autumn righteousness, every word and deed strictly abide by the Zhou rites, can be called the spring and autumn era of the model, especially in the Battle of Hongshui, Song Xiangzhiren style of military use, now seems foolish, but at that time it reflected the demeanor of the old nobles, but encountered the "barbarian Chu state" that did not pay attention to the rules and did not obey the Zhou rites, so in the eyes of many princes in the Central Plains, Song Xianggong was also regarded as "although defeated and honorable". When later generations looked at this period of history, measured from the perspective of "the head can be broken, the blood can be shed, and morality cannot be lost", as an example of observing the Zhou rites, Song Xianggong did have a reason to become one of the five hegemons of the Spring and Autumn Period.