Edit | Yu Bin
Produced by | Chaoqi Network "Yu see column"
In the past 5 years, the transformation of traditional car companies and the entry of new forces of cross-border car manufacturing have made the development of the new energy automobile industry in full swing. Xiaopeng, Ideal, Weilai, Weima, Zero Run Automobile, etc., which were concentrated in the period 2014-2015, are more grasping the time and place, winning the first place, and occupying a place in the new energy vehicle market.
While the three new car-making forces of "Wei Xiaoli" have been listed one after another, laying the status of the first echelon industry, there are also countless new car-making enterprises that have caught up and tried to join the first echelon. In 2021, the zero-running car, which ranks fifth in the world in terms of sales of pure electric vehicle companies and fourth in China, is one of them.
Recently, the news that Zero Run Automobile has submitted its IPO form on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and sought to be listed has not gone away. This also means that if the zero-run car is successfully listed, it will seize the 4th seat of the listing of the new car-making forces, and even in the second echelon of the new car-making forces, it will be the first to land on the capital market.
However, the zero-run car that has always claimed to be a high-end self-developed car, the sales volume mainly relies on the micro-car T03 below 100,000 yuan, which will account for nearly 80% of the total car delivery in 2021.
Zero-run cars, which are not high in sales and sales rankings, have also been questioned. Whether it can be successfully listed is also uncertain.
The new car-making forces collectively lose money, and it is difficult to run zero alone
The development status of zero-run cars can be found through the performance of the industry's leading enterprise "Wei Xiaoli". In 2021, the delivery volume of the three companies has exceeded the 90,000 mark, but it is still in the quagmire of losses. Even the ideal of the lowest investment in research and development in the past has not escaped the fate of loss, with a net loss of more than 300 million yuan for the whole year, which is even doubled compared with the previous year.
Therefore, some people in the industry believe that the listing of major new energy vehicle companies is not how prosperous such companies are, but helpless to seek financing to continue their lives.
Without exception, zero-run cars have also fallen into a state of continuous losses, and there are signs of selling one loss after another. That is to say, as its sales volume increases, the loss of the mouth is also tearing bigger and bigger.
For example, between 2019 and 2021, the net profit attributable to the mother of the zero-run car was 901 million yuan, 1.100 billion yuan and 2.846 billion yuan, respectively. In the whole year of 2021, zero-running cars delivered a total of 43,748 electric vehicles, achieving sales of 3.059 billion yuan in automobiles and parts, while the sales cost of zero-running vehicles in the same period was 4.520 billion yuan.
From this calculation, in the past three years, the cumulative loss of zero-run cars has reached 4.8 billion yuan, with an average of 1 car sold, with a loss of more than 30,000 yuan. This is also due to the fact that the previous zero-run car has been blessed by 8 rounds of capital, and the amount of financing has exceeded 10 billion, which can also last until now.
The reasons for the loss of zero-running cars are also traceable. According to the prospectus, from 2019 to 2021, the gross profit margin of zero-running cars is -95.7%, -50.6% and -44.3%, respectively. Although there are signs of improvement, in fact, it is due to the decrease in the marginal cost of sales, management expenses, etc. after the increase in sales.
At the same time, the zero-run car that has been announced to be developed in the whole region, although there is a significant gap between the R & D investment and the head of the new force car companies. However, relative to the scale of its revenue, there are also some overwhelmed and more insufficient grain and grass.
Therefore, in terms of listing and fundraising purposes, ZeroCar said that it expects that 40% of the net amount will be used for research and development of new models, autonomous driving technology, three-electric system technology, etc., 25% will be used to increase production capacity, 25% will be used to expand business and enhance brand awareness, and 10% will be used for operations and general corporate purposes.
According to the prospectus, from 2019 to 2021, the company's research and development expenses were 358 million yuan, 319 million yuan and 740 million yuan, respectively, totaling less than 1.4 billion yuan. Horizontal comparison found that in the first three quarters of 2021, THE R&D expenditure of WEILAI Automobile was 2.073 billion yuan, and that of Xiaopeng Automobile was 2.663 billion yuan.
Although the R&D investment is almost only a fraction of the head car-making force, the proportion of R&D expenses in each period of total revenue has decreased significantly year by year, 306.4%, 45.8% and 23.6% respectively, but even so, R&D investment is also one of the main expenses of zero-run cars.
At the same time, as a cutting-edge brand, the lack of brand power is bound to affect its sales. Therefore, while developing products, zero-running cars also need to invest heavily in brand marketing in order to find a sense of existence. Many factors have led to its inability to make ends meet, and losses have become the norm.
Best-selling low-cost cars, it is difficult to support the positioning of "high-end cars"
Unlike the ideal car, which relied on the first mass production car to stand on the market footing, the first mass production car of the zero-run car almost collapsed.
It is understood that in July 2019, the company's first mass-produced model S01 began to be delivered, which is a smart electric coupe, priced at 129,900 yuan to 149,900 yuan after subsidies.
Relevant data show that by the end of 2021, the model has delivered a total of 2708 units. Throughout Q4 2021, deliveries were even more dismal, at only 51 vehicles.
In addition to the fact that sales were very different from expectations, the car also swept its brand and reputation. In 2020, the first 200 owners of S01 collectively defended their rights, accusing the model of faulty braking system, power system, vehicle engine system and control system.
However, the response of zero-running cars is slightly perfunctory: "The products meet the national quality standards, and the problems raised by users are mostly accidental, not safety quality problems." Such a response obviously does not satisfy consumers.
However, the electric micro-car T03, which was subsequently launched by zero-run cars, was priced at 68,900 yuan to 84,900 yuan after subsidies, and sales peaked due to the relatively low price. The data shows that in 2021, the delivery volume of Q3 and Q4, T03 will exceed 10,000, with a total of 39,100 vehicles delivered.
Moreover, according to public data, in 2021, zero-run cars delivered a total of 43,748 intelligent electric vehicles in 2021, ranking sixth among the new forces of Car Manufacturing in China, and the delivery volume was second only to the 69,700 units of Wei Xiaoli and Nebu Car and the 44,200 units of WM Motors.
However, T03 delivered a total of 37,700 vehicles, accounting for 79.4% of the total deliveries of zero-run cars that year, ranking third among the car models sold by China's pure electric vehicle companies to C-end customers in 2021.
As a result, its ultra-low-priced cars have supported the entire performance of zero-run cars. And the zero run that has always claimed to be a high-end brand is obviously not willing to stop here. So, can zero run occupy a place in the mid-to-high-end market? The answer is that it is not so easy.
It should be known that at present, in the mainland new energy vehicle market, models priced at 150,000-300,000 yuan are the mainstay, and data show that while the penetration rate of new energy vehicles is gradually increasing, the proportion of car sales in this price segment is also rising year by year, and even expected to reach 49.1% in 2026.
It is foreseeable that if a zero-run car wants to gain a foothold in the mid-to-high-end car market, it first needs to break through the sales volume of cars in this price segment. Although the S01 has failed to test the waters and has been unable to return to heaven, the zero-run car will not stop with the help of other models to hit the high-end.
It is understood that in October 2021, the new medium-sized SUVC11 of zero running began to be delivered, and the price after subsidies was 159,800 yuan to 199,800 yuan. Deliveries of Q3 and Q4 in 2021 were 253 and 3,712 units, respectively, and the number of orders for this model was 22,500 units at the end of 2021. Although the market performance is not outstanding, it is also a step forward in the mid-to-high-end automobile market.
However, in the next few years, whether zero-run cars can catch up with the current market leaders will also have variables. According to its prospectus, it plans to launch 1-3 models per year in the future, and 8 new models will be launched by the end of 2025, covering cars, SUVs and MPVs of various sizes.
It is understood that its founder Zhu Jiangming even shouted out the bold words of catching up with Tesla in the field of assisted driving for 3 years, and also set a small goal for zero-run cars to reach 500,000 units by 2025. Judging from the current scale of zero-run cars, zero-running wants to achieve such a goal in the short term, I am afraid that there is a long way to go.
And if it achieves a breakthrough in best-selling models, the dream of zero-run cars to create high-end cars will probably become a flower in the mirror and a moon in the water.
"Global self-research" may be difficult to reverse the situation
As mentioned above, the proportion of R&D investment and revenue of zero-run cars is decreasing year by year, and there is a huge gap with the new forces of head car manufacturing. However, this does not affect the determination of zero-run cars to adhere to "global self-research".
"We don't play with concepts, we don't tell stories." Founder Zhu Jiangming once described zero running in this way. Therefore, in the process of zero-run development, it has gradually been labeled by itself as self-research. You know, it's not just zero-run cars that advocate full-stack self-development.
Xiaopeng Automobile, one of the new car-making forces, has long thrown out "China's only intelligent software full-station self-developed vehicle", which also claims to be the second after Tesla.
However, even if Xiaopeng's market has begun to take shape and successfully landed on the capital market, the outside world has also criticized its so-called "full-stack research and development". For example, its so-called self-developed three-electric system is actually a cooperation with top companies, and the relevant technology is still from affiliated enterprises. Taking the battery cell of Xiaopeng P7 as an example, the component is developed by Xiaopeng in cooperation with Ningde Times and Jiangsu Times.
As a leading enterprise recognized as a power battery in the world, Ningde Era obviously does not have much achievement in the battery system, which shows its self-developed color geometry.
Similarly, the so-called self-development of zero-run cars has also been accused of a long road. Unlike other new car-making forces, at present, only zero-run is the entire intelligent driving system from hardware to software all developed by themselves.
All electronics-related products, zero-run cars are built from the beginning of resistance, while other brands are more focused on applications and algorithms. Moreover, behind the zero run, Dahua co., Ltd. is China's leading smart IoT solution provider, dahua co., Ltd.'s technology was originally from the bottom of the start, self-research and self-creation is the tradition of zero run.
However, it should be known that although the prospects of global self-research are unlimited, it is not without thresholds. From the perspective of the research and development cycle alone, this layout will also lengthen the zero-run front and extend the time period for mass production of its new models. Related technologies require a long period of accumulation and precipitation.
Therefore, even since the establishment of Zero Run in September 2015, Zero Run has taken nearly seven years of research and development time. At this time, it is much behind the new car-making forces in the head. Whether it can rely on this positioning alone to break back a round in the future is still unknown.
epilogue
There is a way that those who do not seek the overall situation are not enough to seek a domain. Zero-run cars advocate global self-research, and there is nothing wrong with controlling technical autonomy.
However, in this era of rapid change, only the objective conditions of time, location, and people are available at the same time, and enterprises have the opportunity to defeat the enemy. The dividends brought by various preferential policies in the new energy automobile industry are the best time.
Zero runs, which start at almost the same time as other players, are still in the second echelon, which may be related to its ideal of "global self-development". It can be seen that as a rare global self-research enterprise in China, the courage of zero running dares to be the first is commendable, but the challenges are also visible to the naked eye.
However, once the zero-run car has precipitated enough technical capabilities and brand influence, perhaps with the help of capital, it can one day soar.