After the Xi'an Incident, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party achieved the second cooperation, in order to be able to establish an anti-Japanese united front, in the early days of the Red Army's reorganization into the Eighth Route Army, due to the interference of the Kuomintang, our Party made many major concessions, one of which was the abolition of the political commissar system, and the Political Department was once changed to the Political Training Department.
Xi'an Incident
In October 1937, after the victory of Pingxingguan, the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army withdrew to Wutai Mountain for recuperation. Ren Bishi, director of the Political Department of the Eighth Route Army, sent Huang Kecheng, director of the Organization Department of the Political Department, to inspect the work of the troops. In the 115th Division, Huang Kecheng exchanged views with division and regiment cadres, went deep into the company and held discussions with cadres and soldiers, and in just ten days in the army, Huang Kecheng found many problems. More than 2 months after the establishment of the 115th Division, due to the cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communists in the War of Resistance, the Eighth Route Army and the Nationalist Army have increased in coordination and cooperation on the battlefield, and there have been close contacts, and many unhealthy tendencies and evil tendencies of the Kuomintang troops have inevitably affected the cadres and fighters of our army.
Flat type Guan Dajie
There is no political commissar in the army, and the ideological and political work of cadres and fighters is not managed. His fighting style is obviously sluggish, and cadres and fighters at all levels of the army have also developed bad habits. In the long run, the Eighth Route Army will become like the Kuomintang army, bureaucracy will prevail, officers and soldiers will be separated, and classes will be opposed. It was divided into various factions and various hills, which seriously affected the combat effectiveness of the Eighth Route Army.
For example, when we meet, we do not call them comrades, but call them brothers. Normal work contacts, you have to eat and drink. There are also a few cadres who envy the Kuomintang officers, pay attention to pomp and circumstance, and privately print the business card of the "major general," play a mighty manner in front of the soldiers, and flaunt their might to the common people. The most serious was Zhou Kun, chief of staff of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, who was tempted by the Kuomintang's sugar-coated shells and was so greedy that he absconded with huge sums of money, causing a great negative impact on our army.
Huang Kecheng
After returning to the headquarters, Huang Kecheng made a report to Ren Bishi, drafted written materials to report to the Central Military Commission on the problems found in the inspection, and suggested that the political commissar system of our army be immediately restored. Subsequently, the political commissar system was re-established in the Eighth Route Army, and the political training offices of the three divisions were changed to the political department, and the director of the political training office was changed to the political commissar.
Huang Kecheng and his comrades-in-arms
Soon, Huang Kecheng was also appointed as the political commissar of the 344th Brigade of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, and together with the brigade commander Xu Haidong led the 344th Brigade to jinjiyu and created the base area of the southern section of the Taihang Mountains.
After the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, Huang Kecheng once again keenly realized that in China's future strategic pattern, the northeast has an extremely important strategic position. The northeast is not only rich in products, but also the most important industrial base in the Far East, especially the Kuomintang army is in the rear, the northeast lacks the main force of the national army, and whoever occupies the northeast first has a great strategic initiative. Therefore, Huang Kecheng suggested to the central authorities to start the layout of the northeast as soon as possible, and proposed that the Eighth Route Army should immediately march into the northeast, with a number of at least 50,000 people, preferably more than 100,000 people.
On September 19, the CPC Central Committee issued the "Instructions on The Present Tasks and the Strategic Principles and Arrangements for Defending and Developing to the North," which made a strategic plan for marching into the northeast, drawing elite troops and strong generals from all over the country and going north to the northeast. At the end of September 1945, Huang Kecheng received orders to march into the northeast. At that time, the central government considered the long distance and suggested that Huang Kecheng rest in Shandong for a period of time before acting. Huang Kecheng believed that it was now necessary to enter the northeast in the shortest possible time and seize the strategic place, and the superior agreed. Huang Kecheng immediately led 35,000 men of the 3rd Division of the New Fourth Army to the northeast day and night, becoming one of the first main forces of our army to reach the northeast.
Zeng Kelin, who was the first to enter the northeast at that time, reported to the central authorities: The northeast is full of weapons, and the troops do not have to carry weapons when they go to the northeast. Zeng Kelin, who arrived in the northeast earlier, did get a Japanese arsenal handed over by the Soviet army, which was well equipped and numerous, so that Zeng Kelin's troops were re-equipped, and later the Soviet army handed over most of the Japanese ammunition to the Nationalist army. Many Eighth Route Army troops who entered the northeast from Shandong listened to rumors that the northeast was full of weapons and left their equipment directly in Shandong, resulting in a large number of "unarmed soldiers" in our army after arriving in the northeast, and even "called Hanako" without guns and clothes.
However, Huang Kecheng thought that he had grain in his hands and did not panic in his heart, so the 3rd Division not only brought enough weapons and ammunition, but also brought cotton clothes and cotton pants for the winter. When passing through Shandong, he also refused the request of the old leader Chen Yi to let him stay for a few days and support the Shandong troops in combat, and rushed to Guanwai without stopping.
On November 25, Huang Kecheng led his troops to Jinzhou. Immediately throw yourself into the battle to mobilize the masses, establish a base area, and eliminate the bandits.
Chen Yi
Huang Kecheng's strategic vision is very unique, Chen Yi once commented on Huang Kecheng: "Don't look at you Huang Division Commander wearing myopic glasses, his eyes can see far, it is clairvoyant."