Speaking of guerrilla warfare, many people think that it is the CCP's unique way of fighting, but in fact, in the middle of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the Kuomintang also formally made a decision to set up a theater behind enemy lines to conduct guerrilla warfare. Under such a background, the Rusu Theater was established, and the northern Soviet battlefield became one of the important links.
At the beginning of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the military authorities of the Nationalist government made detailed strategic planning and military preparations for northern Jiangsu.
At the beginning of the all-out outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Kuomintang's overall strategic planning and overall operational deployment were concentrated in the two battlefields of North China and Songhu.
North China is the main battlefield and the main deployment area, while the Songhu battlefield and the Zhejiang battlefield gather the elite of the national army, on the one hand, attack the Japanese base in the Shanghai area, organize the Japanese army to forcibly land, maintain the security of the capital, and force the Japanese army to disperse its troops in the unfavorable battlefield in Jiangnan, so as to fully grasp the war situation.
It is not difficult to see that geographically speaking, Shandong and northern Jiangsu are the centers connecting the two combat areas.
In other words, covering the flanks of the northern and southern battlefields and maintaining the connection between the two battlefields became the main strategic task of the Rusu Theater. From the current point of view, the Kuomintang's strategic vision is still good, and it is necessary to worry about the Japanese attack on northern Jiangsu and Shandong.
On the Japanese side, after the Lugou Bridge Incident, The Chief of Operations Ishihara Guan'er insisted on the policy of not expanding, and vigorously advocated limiting the combat area to the Pingjin area as much as possible, and not using force unless south and central China had no choice but to use force.
However, in the Japanese invasion of China, the undercurrent of expanding the war is already difficult to resist. After the Battle of Songhu on August 13, the headquarters of the Chinese Garrison in Tun submitted an application to the military department to launch a campaign on the Shandong Peninsula. In September of the same year, after the North China Front defeated the Kuomintang army, it once again proposed to launch the Shandong Campaign.
Based on the above strategic research and judgment, the Kuomintang formulated the following defensive policy in the northern Jiangsu region:
In order to ensure the connection between the northern and southern armies, the northern Jiangsu region should allocate the main forces along the Xuhai railway line and divide some troops into Linyi, Huaiyin and other places.
At the end of 1937, in order to unite the Japanese forces in the north and south, the Japanese army launched the Xuzhou Operation. In order to achieve victory, the Japanese army attacked and occupied an important communication point in northern Jiangsu.
During the Battle of Xuzhou, the Kuomintang focused mainly on guerrilla warfare.
On May 12, 1938, Chiang Kai-shek sent a secret telegram to Li Zongren, emphatically proposing that the guerrillas east of the southern section of the Jinpu Railway should have the main task of destroying transportation, eliminating small groups of Japanese troops, and destroying their supplementary organs.
According to the battle plan at that time, the Kuomintang made military deployments in the northern Jiangsu region.
Set up a special army to serve as the defense of northern Jiangsu!
On January 1, 1938, the 24th Group Army was formally established, with Gu Zhutong as commander, commanding the 89th Army and the 57th Army, in addition, the 24th Group Army had absolute command of the Eighth Army Guerrilla Army, the Fifth Theater Guerrilla Corps, and the Hongze Lake Water Guerrilla Corps.
The northern Jiangsu region was mainly defensive, supplemented by raids and disturbances, and cooperated with the Battle of Xuzhou.
In view of the Battle of Xuzhou, guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines played a role.
In January 1939, in order to better implement guerrilla warfare, the Kuomintang formally established two theaters of operations, Lusu and Chaji, to serve as anti-Japanese combat work behind enemy lines.
At that time, in the Lusu area, the Japanese army was mainly the Second Army of North China, and the first part of the Central China Dispatch Army, with a total strength of about 4 divisions and regiments, a total of more than 100,000 people, mainly gathered along the Jiaoji and Jinpu railways, on the north bank of the Yangtze River, along the coastal harbor Yantai, Qingdao Weihaiwei and other places.
In response to this situation, the Kuomintang Military Commission assigned the north of the Yangtze River, the east of the Jinpu Railway, and the south of the Yellow River to the Lusu Guerrilla Theater.
Soon, the Military Commission established the First and Second Guerrilla Theaters in northern Jiangsu.
The First Theater of Operations was commanded by Handler and commanded by Li Shouwei's 89th Army, Chen Taiyun's Northern Jiangsu Guerrilla Corps, and northern Jiangsu Security Corps. By 1943, it had grown to 6 columns.
The Second Theater of Operations, commanded by Li Mingyang, had jurisdiction over seven detachments and a section of the Northern Jiangsu Security Regiment, and by 1943 had grown to 14 columns, 6 detachments, and special service corps.
In addition, the Military Commission also made detailed provisions on the tasks of the Rusu Theater of Operations:
It was required to move towards the canal line in the Yancheng, Baoying, and Gaoyou Hunuma areas, and to separate one part to operate in the eastern section of the Lianghuai, Siyang, and Longhai Roads, to maintain communication between Lusu and maintain contact with the 57th Army.
From the division of guerrilla areas to the allocation of troops, the Kuomintang in northern Jiangsu has made detailed arrangements, which also marks the formal formation of the battlefield behind the enemy lines of the Kuomintang in northern Jiangsu.