In 1955, when the first major title was conferred after the founding of the People's Republic of China, Deng Hua and Han Xianchu were awarded the titles of the 7th founding general and the 11th founding general respectively, and the two were transferred to the northeast after the beginning of the Liberation War to work together for a long time.
In 1950, Deng Hua became the commander of the 15th Corps, and Han Xianchu served as deputy commander and concurrently served as the commander of the 40th Army, and in February he was ordered to garrison the southeast coast and prepare for the liberation of Hainan Island in Guangzhou.
At that time, at the pre-war military enlargement meeting, most of the cadres and backbone cadres within the corps suggested that the general offensive against Hainan be postponed to the end of June and the beginning of July, before which the main infiltration operation was focused on and the effort was foolproof.
But Han Xianchu, who was the deputy commander, was clearly opposed, insisting that the end of June was too far behind, that the decisive battle must be advanced to between March and April, and that his reasons should be explained in full view of everyone.
First of all, what liberated Hainan was a cross-sea operation, which is different from the operation of crossing the river and crossing the river, once April passes, the direction of the ocean currents and winds on the sea will change, and if our army goes straight up against the wind, it will not be conducive to the advance of the operation.
Secondly, the longer our army takes to prepare, the longer it will be left for the enemy to prepare, and in addition to the fact that the current international situation is unpredictable and unpredictable, there are many uncertain factors.
Third, infiltration operations not only fail to expand the results of the battle, but also pose a great risk, and once they are attacked and besieged by the superior forces of the enemy, the limited ships of our army will be severely damaged.
However, Deng Hua, as the commander of the corps, had to consider the whole picture knowing that Han Xianchu was reasonable, and at present, the 15th Corps was not ready to land across the sea to seize the island, and the risk of rushing to send troops was too great, after all, the garrison on Hainan Island was Xue Yue, a famous general of the national army known as the "God of War", with 100,000 heavy troops, as well as aircraft and warships in the sea as support.
The Battle of Hainan Island was a cross-sea landing operation, which had to be won with one blow and did not have any risky capital, so the two would argue every day at the combat meeting on the issue of the time of dispatch.
Until the beginning of April, when it was about to lose the advantage of wind direction, there was no concrete result, Han Xianchu was very anxious, so he immediately crossed the level and sent a telegram to Chairman Mao, which pointed out: Our army infiltrated the operation, understood the enemy's movements, the enemy also found out the law of our army's deployment, and has strengthened the defensive counterattack of mobile troops, if you insist on continuing to infiltrate the operation, it is very likely that the enemy will seize the fighter, and once the ship is damaged and cannot return, it will be unfavorable to the battle across the sea and seize the island, and once the fighter time is dragged to May or June, Once the battle is delayed until next year, the situation will be even more unfavorable to our army, so it is recommended that the main force cross the strong attack on a large scale.
At the end of the telegram, Han Xianchu also said that in this battle, he could put aside his personal honor and disgrace and life and death, and personally command the front-line battle with the army, and after this telegram was quickly sent to Beijing, Chairman Mao was very happy and publicly praised Han Xianchu for his courage and strategy, and was a fierce general with courage and courage.
Immediately after receiving the battle order, Deng Hua weighed the situation and thought about it again and again, and personally ordered that Han Xianchu lead a army of troops to go out in wooden boats in early March and take advantage of the favorable wind to force the crossing of Hainan Island.
After 56 days of bloody battle, Xue Yue was defeated, and the enemy's attack and defense system of land, land and air trinity swept across the island, and finally successfully liberated Hainan before the Korean War, otherwise once it was stationed by the US Navy's ocean fleet, the liberation of hainan island north was far away.
Chairman Mao's contribution to this battle also made Chairman Mao remember that in 195, at the first major award of titles after the founding of the People's Republic of China, he personally approved the promotion of Han Xianchu's lieutenant general to general.
The second conflict between Deng Hua and Han Xianchu was the Fourth Campaign to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, which began at the end of January 1951. Han Xianchu advocated taking advantage of the enemy's weak defense, first attacking Pingli and then threatening the enemy's flank rear, while Deng Hua advocated hitting Hengcheng first, where although the troops were concentrated, the general combat effectiveness was low and it was easier to win.
The two sides' completely different operational proposals made Peng Dehuai very embarrassed, but after repeatedly weighing the pros and cons, Peng Dehuai finally ordered an attack on Hengcheng, but unfortunately, although Hengcheng was successfully liberated, Pingli waited for reinforcements, and could not attack for a long time, which made Han Xianchu deeply regretful.
He always insisted that the volunteer army should take advantage of the enemy's unstable foothold to occupy Pingli from the very beginning, which was enough to affect the overall situation, and to attack Hengcheng was to miss the fighter, so in the end Deng Hua's strategic decision had obvious mistakes.
We do not know whether Han Xianchu's strategy is correct or not, but one thing is certain: Ridgway, commander-in-chief of the US Eighth Army, believes that The position of Tongpingli is special, and not only rejects the request of the soldiers on the front line to withdraw troops, but also insists that they stick to the reinforcements and finally try to ensure that the position is not lost.
Of course, we cannot deny that there may be other uncontrollable situations in the adoption of Han Xianchu's tactical suggestions, but Han Xianchu's strategic vision and foresight are very commendable for their strategic vision and foresight in realizing the importance of Tongpingli one step at a time.