Before the outbreak of the War of Liberation, the Nationalist army had an absolute superiority in both strength and weapons and equipment. At that time, the total strength of the Nationalist army was 4.3 million, with a complete range of land, sea, land and air; the total strength of the People's Liberation Army was 1.27 million, less than one-third of the opponent's, and there was no navy and air force; and looking at weapons and equipment, at that time, a quarter of the Nationalist army was Us armament, a quarter of the Nationalist army was domestically produced, and the remaining half of the Nationalist army was Japanese armament.
How big was the firepower gap between the enemy and us at that time? Let's make a comparison and you'll know. Taking the integrated 11th Division as an example, the division was equipped with 11,520 long and short guns, including 2,370 automatic weapons such as submachine guns; 440 artillery pieces, the largest caliber of which were American 105 mm howitzers; 120 rocket launchers; and 360 cars. At that time, the best equipped of the People's Liberation Army was the first column of the Northeast Democratic Coalition Army, with a total of 13,991 long and short guns, including 92 automatic weapons such as submachine guns, and 46 artillery pieces, of which the largest caliber was a Japanese 75 mm mountain gun. The difference in firepower between the two sides is evident from this.
It was precisely because of the absolute superiority in troop strength and firepower that the old Chiang Kai-shek confidently declared before the war that it would take only one year to end the war. In the first year of the war, the Nationalist army did occupy a certain advantage on the battlefield, but in the second year it began to decline, and in the third year, it was even more defeated. So why did Old Chiang Kai-shek, who had absolute superiority, lose the War of Liberation in just three years? Look at who the commander-in-chief of the four major Kuomintang crackdowns is, you can understand.
During the Liberation War, Chiang Kai-shek successively set up four major suppression generals, namely the North China Suppression General, the Northeast Suppression General, the Central China Suppression General, and the Xuzhou Suppression General. At that time, the commanders-in-chief of the four major crackdowns were Fu Zuoyi, Wei Lihuang, Bai Chongxi, and Liu Zhi. Among these four people, except for Liu Zhi, the remaining three were all famous generals in the Nationalist army. However, if we pay close attention to it, we will find that Fu Zuoyi and Bai Chongxi are not the concubines of Old Chiang, Bai Chongxi is still old Chiang's sworn enemy, and Wei Lihuang was not trusted by Old Chiang because he was close to the Eighth Route Army during the War of Resistance, so there were many contradictions between the generals and commanders, and they were not single-minded, which laid the groundwork for the defeat on the battlefield.
On December 2, 1947, the Kuomintang General Suppression Of North China was established, and Fu Zuoyi was appointed as the commander-in-chief. Fu Zuoyi originally belonged to the Yan Xishan faction, and during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, he fell out with Yan Xishan, and old Jiang saw that he had an opportunity to take advantage of it, so he planned to take Fu Zuoyi for his own use. Fu Zuoyi himself had a certain strength, coupled with his outstanding performance during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, so he was appointed by Lao Jiang as the commander-in-chief of the North China Suppression Campaign. However, old Jiang was not confident about Fu Zuoyi, and sent his close associate Chen to succeed him as deputy commander-in-chief of the North China Suppression Campaign and commander-in-chief of the Beiping Garrison, in order to contain Fu Zuoyi.
At that time, although Fu Zuoyi was nominally the commander-in-chief of the suppression, he could not command the Central Army under his command at all. If Chen Ji did not nod, Fu Zuoyi would not even be able to move a regiment of the Central Army. At the end of December 1947, the Battle of Laishui began, and Fu Zuoyi's 35th Army was surrounded by the Jin-Cha-Ji Field Army, and Fu Zuoyi urgently ordered the nearby Central Army to go to relieve the siege, but Chen Ji refused. As a result, the 35th Army was eaten by the Jin-Cha-Ji Field Army for more than 8,000 people, and the commander Lu Yinglin committed suicide in despair.
After this battle, the contradiction between Fu Zuoyi and Chen Ji became deeper and deeper. Chen Ji also openly confronted Fu Zuoyi at the combat meeting on many occasions, and several times he could not get off the stage. Fu Zuoyi sent three telegrams to Chiang Kai-shek requesting his resignation, but it was not until the end of October 1948 that Old Chiang transferred Chen back to Nanjing and promised that the central army in Northern China would be under Fu Zuoyi's command. However, at this time, the Liaoshen Campaign was nearing its end, and the Dongye army was about to march south, facing the two-sided attack of the Dongye and North China Field Armies, and Fu Zuoyi's defeat had been decided.
On January 17, 1948, Lao Jiang set up the Northeast Suppression General, and Wei Lihuang became the commander-in-chief to clean up the mess for Chen Cheng. During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, Wei Lihuang and the Eighth Route Army got close together, and for a time the idea of joining our party came up, so Old Chiang was not completely at ease with him. After the Liaoshen Campaign began, Lao Jiang flew to Shenyang several times to replace Wei Lihuang in command of the battle. During this period, in order to rescue Jinzhou, he forced Wei Lihuang to lead his troops out of Shenyang to relieve Fan Hanjie. Wei Lihuang believed that Shenyang was far from Jinzhou, the road was full of liberated areas, and the troops could be intercepted and ambushed at any time, so he resolutely did not agree to send troops to reinforce Jinzhou.
Old Jiang actually bypassed Wei Lihuang and directly gave Liao Yaoxiang an order to lead troops to relieve Fan Hanjie. In the end, Liao Yaoxiang was strongly blocked by Liang Xingchu in Montenegro, and soon after the entire army was destroyed in western Liaoning. Liao Yaoxiang's corps was the absolute main force guarding Shenyang, and after the collapse of the corps, it was only a matter of time before Shenyang was lost. On the eve of the fall of Shenyang, Wei Lihuang flew to Beiping, and the old Jiang dismissed him from his post and investigated him for the crime of "hesitating to make up his mind, taking a lost plane, and causing him to lose a serious town." What Wei Lihuang had taken over was already a mess, and old Jiang had interfered with his command, and it was not surprising that the Nationalist army had failed in the Liaoshen Campaign.
In June 1948, Lao Jiang established the Central China Suppression Bureau, with Bai Chongxi as the commander-in-chief. Bai Chongxi was the leader of the Gui clan and had repeatedly opposed Jiang, so Old Jiang was not at ease with him. In order to limit Bai Chongxi, Lao Jiang assigned Huang Wei's 12th Corps and Song Xilian's 14th Corps to the Central China Suppression General Order. At that time, there were three corps under the jurisdiction of Central China, only Zhang Gan's third corps was the main force of the Gui clan, but Zhang Gan's corps was a small corps, with a total strength of less than 50,000 people, and its strength was far inferior to that of Huang Wei and Song Xilian. As a result, Bai Chongxi was restrained everywhere and was very sympathetic.
Before the outbreak of the Huaihai Campaign, old Chiang Kai-shek originally wanted Bai Chongxi to be the commander-in-chief of the nationalist army, but Bai Chongxi first agreed and then changed his mind, and the strong and solid old Jiang was shabu,000, which was a sullen breath in his chest. After the Battle of Huaihai broke out, Huang Wei's corps rushed from central China to the battlefield to participate in the battle. As soon as this heavy army group left, Bai Chongxi's pressure was suddenly much less, and he took the opportunity to expand his strength and also co-opted some of the miscellaneous armed forces. In this way, the strength of the Gui clan in central China surpassed that of Song Xilian's corps, and Bai Chongxi's waist rod suddenly hardened.
Soon after, Huang Wei's corps was surrounded by Nakano in a double pile, and in order to relieve Huang Wei's siege, old Jiang Dian ordered Song Xilian's corps to leave from central China and rush to the battlefield to participate in the battle. However, Bai Chongxi held the corps and did not hesitate to confront Old Jiang on the phone, and in the end, Song Xilian's corps did not participate in the battle. In the face of the PLA's attack, Bai Chongxi and Lao Jiang were supposed to be grasshoppers on a rope, but because of his own selfishness, he demolished Lao Chiang's platform everywhere. With such subordinates, it is not surprising that Old Chiang Kai-shek lost the War of Liberation.
Almost at the same time as the Central China Suppression General Was Established, Lao Jiang also set up the Xuzhou Suppression General, with Liu Zhi as the commander-in-chief. Liu Zhi was a close confidant of Lao Jiang and made many meritorious contributions during the Northern Expedition and the Central Plains War, so he was deeply trusted by Lao Jiang. However, after that, Liu Zhi seemed to have exhausted Jiang Lang's talents, and during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, he was even more defeated, and was eventually abandoned by old Jiang. When the Battle of Huaihai broke out, Old Jiang really had no one to use, so he had to push Liu Zhi to the forefront again. However, he was not at ease with Liu Zhi's command ability, and deliberately transferred Du Yuming from the northeast to Xuzhou to serve as Liu Zhi's deputy.
For his own private salt business in Haizhou, Liu Zhi actually let Huang Baitao wait in Xin'an Town for three days, and was finally surrounded by Huaye. Du Yuming proposed that Huang Baitao hold the mill and contain Huaye's main force; he personally led Qiu Qingquan's corps and Li Mi's corps to pinch the field with Huang Wei's corps, and then turn back to fight Huaye after breaking through Nakano. Du Yuming's suggestion was very clever, at that time, Nakano had just transferred out of Dabie Mountain, and his strength was greatly damaged, and it was difficult to withstand the attack of several heavy army groups of the enemy.
However, Liu Zhi rejected Du Yuming's suggestion, believing that Huang Baitao could not persist for 7 days at all (in fact, Huang Baitao insisted for more than ten days), so he advocated saving Huang Baitao first. As a result, Huang Baitao was not rescued, and Huang Wei's army was still surrounded by Nakano, and the defeat of the Nationalist army on the Huaihai battlefield was decided. Fu Zuoyi and Bai Chongxi, the four commanders-in-chief of the Nationalist army, and Lao Jiang were not at all the same heart; Wei Lihuang was constrained by Lao Jiang everywhere and had no power; Liu Zhi was incompetent and selfish. Old Chiang kai-shek made these four men commander-in-chief, and it is not surprising that he lost the war of liberation.