Yang Di recalls the retreat of the 180th Division after the 5th Campaign

The enemy's counterattack against our army was unusually rapid, which we did not expect

On May 21, after General Peng issued the order to end the 2nd phase of the 5th Campaign. The information we received from all sides not only did not stop attacking the US and South Korean troops that counterattacked us, but the enemy accelerated its all-out attack on us on the eastern and western fronts after completing the full unfolding of the entire front, and also moved extremely quickly in an attempt to split our army.

After studying the study, our Operational Department immediately suggested to the chief of staff of the Liberation Side that the corps and corps of our retreat should begin to move in advance on May 22, otherwise it is likely to be entangled or disrupted by the enemy, causing unnecessary casualties and losses. General Peng and the other chiefs of the Volunteer Army agreed with us and ordered the corps to start moving backwards in advance.

In accordance with General Peng's order to move in advance, the Operations Department quickly urged all corps and armies by telephone to disengage from the enemy on the night of 22 May, quickly cover the rearward transfer in echelons, and pay attention to various methods to delay the enemy's insertion along the road into our depths.

Just as the corps and corps of our army withdrew from the battle ahead of schedule on the evening of 22 May and moved backwards, because our army had no air superiority and could only operate at night, just before dawn on 23 July, when our army had just moved to a new position and was preparing to rest and cook, the enemy began to counterattack on our entire front in the daylight of 23 May.

The enemy's mechanized equipment moved rapidly, and there were few roads for our army to retreat, which was extremely unfavorable to the rearward transfer of our army. I also reported to the chief of staff of the Liberation Party on the opinions studied by the Operations Division: (1) The second echelon of each corps should quickly occupy favorable positions, hold the main traffic routes, and block the enemy's counterattack; the first echelon should avoid the main road and quickly retreat from the trail; (2) the commanders of all armies, divisions, and regiments should have a real grasp of the troops, strengthen radio contact with their superiors, and personally lead the troops to move backwards; (3) the Zhisi reserve should quickly occupy the positions near the "38th Line" as the last line of defense, and resolutely resist the enemy's counterattack. Stabilize the situation on the battlefield and buy time to facilitate another battle.

Regarding the rapid changes in the enemy's situation and the opinions put forward by the Operations Department, General Peng and other chiefs of the Volunteer Army conducted a serious study and formed a specific action plan for adjusting each corps and army, and the Operations Department quickly issued the determination and orders of the chiefs to the corps and the relevant armies.

At that time, the situation on the battlefield was extremely complicated, and the situation between the enemy and us was changing rapidly, and the comrades of the Zhisi Operations Department worked day and night to collect and study the situation, put forward timely suggestions for organizing defense and carrying out local counterattacks, and supervised, inspected, and mastered the implementation of the zhisi orders of all corps and armies, so as to ensure the implementation of the determination of General Peng and other chiefs of the volunteer army, and strive to quickly reverse the situation unfavorable to our army.

The tragedy of the defeat occurred. The 180th Division was cut off by the Americans behind enemy lines, and only a few of the division survived

Regarding the tragedy that occurred after the 180th Division of the 60th Army was cut off by the enemy, decades after the end of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, there were many reports, writings, and statements, as well as long documentary reports.

The tragedy of the 180th Division, published by the Academy of Military Sciences, reads in the summary of the second chapter: "While the 180th Division was surrounded by the enemy, the division commander did not actively organize forces to resolutely lead the whole division to break through, but took the wrong measures, resulting in serious losses." It is impossible to write too much and too fine in the history, so the words are already very heavy.

As for what I know about the defeat of the 180th Division, is it written according to the real situation at that time? I called and asked one of the editors-in-chief, Comrade Meng Zhaohui (who was formerly the chief of the operations section of the Shiji Operations Division, and has now retired from the Academy of Military Sciences).

He said: "We can only point out the history of the war, and now there are many kinds of statements. You know the real situation at that time best, and I hope that you can write it truthfully and return history to its original appearance. He added, "I have the information at that time now, and if you need it, I can tell you." "I told him what I remembered, and he said, 'You remember exactly, that's what it was."

According to what I knew and mastered at the time in the Operations Office of the Volunteer Command, the course of the defeat of the 180th Division was as follows:

On May 21, 1951, Peng Zong and the Sino-Korean Joint Command (hereinafter referred to as "Joint Division", because this battle was attended by four regiments of the Korean People's Army, so the telegram was sent in the name of "Joint Division") decisively decided to stop the offensive and end the second phase of the 5th Campaign. (KPA Corps) began to retreat on the 23rd. After the telegram to stop the offensive was issued, the US counterattack was unusually rapid, and the "Joint Division" immediately sent a telegram ordering all corps and corps (corps) to retreat one day in advance on the evening of May 22, and stipulated the methods and steps for the retreat of each unit.

However, after dawn on May 23, the US military took advantage of its mechanization and rapid motorization speed to concentrate the strength of 13 divisions and, with the support of the Air Force, along various roads and small rural roads that could pass cars and tanks, penetrated our army in an attempt to cut off the road of our army's retreat. The enemy's frenzied counterattack caused great difficulties to the retreat of our army.

On May 24, the enemy in the north forced our 65th Army to resist the enemy on its own initiative and the Qingping River, and by the 25th, except for some at Qifeng Mountain and Haidu Mountain, the main force of the army withdrew to the area north of the Hantan River on the evening of the same day, which further widened the gap between the joint department between the 3rd Corps and the 19th Corps. The 60th Army of the 3rd Corps was ordered to cover the rear movement of a large number of wounded and did not enter the designated defensive area on time, and the 180th Division of the army still insisted on blocking the enemy in the area of Khan Valley on the south bank of the North Han River and Zhengping Mountain (south of Chuncheon), and the two wings of the division were completely exposed. At this time, the enemy had taken control of the ferry port of the North Han River, and the division's route of retreating north was threatened, but the division still used the night of the 24th to sneak across the North Han River, and on the morning of the 25th, it all reached the areas of Jiguan Mountain, Mount Chadeok, and Beipei Mountain in the northwest of Chuncheon.

After Zhiji learned of the above situation, General Peng and the other chiefs of Shiji decided that in order to quickly stabilize the war situation and stop the enemy's crazy counterattack, even if the 60th Army quickly moved to the area of Huiwangfeng and Shilunli southwest of Huachuan, to resolutely block the enemy in the north.

The 180th Division was supposed to continue its retreat north on the evening of 25 May, but the division's main leaders saw during daylight the road from Jinping to Huachuan to the west and the chuncheon to Huachuan road to the east, and the enemy's mechanized forces advancing northward. Under these circumstances, the main leaders of the division could not calmly analyze the situation and could not correctly judge the situation, but mistakenly believed that the division was surrounded by the enemy, resulting in fear, hesitation, and wavering. They forget that the mechanization of the enemy seems to be very fierce during the day, but at night the enemy is afraid of us, and will surely shrink to the cave and the village (the name of the village and town in Korea) to defend against the sneak attack of our army at night. The US army is a young master and a veteran soldier, and they cannot bear hardships, and they still have to sleep and rest at night. The characteristics of our army are that they are good at night warfare, and they can march continuously; they are enemy during the day and our army at night. If the main leaders of the 180th Division can calmly and correctly analyze these situations, use the night of the 25th to cross the Jiaping-Huachuan Highway, and continue to retreat northward, it will be completely possible to withdraw, even if the worst situation occurs, at least the main force of the division can be withdrawn. The division missed the night of May 25, the most critical and crucial night of life and death, victory and defeat.

At that time, when the comrades of our Zhiji Operations Department received the report of the 60th Army, they believed that the enemy was advancing along the road during the day, and as long as our army was well concealed and not detected by the enemy, it was completely possible to continue to retreat by road at night, because at that time the enemy did not know that a division of our army had been cut off. At that time, the chief of staff and the comrades of our Combat Division were working together, and after we studied it, we immediately reported to the chiefs of the Zhi Division, who immediately sent a telegram to the 60th Army, ordering the 180th Division to use the night of the 25th to continue its retreat north across the road from Kaping to Huachuan.

The division commander did not carry out the order to quickly retreat in time to seize the favorable opportunity on the night of the 25th.

The main leader of the division panicked and frightened, hesitated and wavered, made a wrong judgment on the enemy's situation, and thought that he had been divided and surrounded by the enemy; the division commander Zheng Qigui made up his extremely wrong determination and disposition to put himself to death, ordered the cadres at and above the platoon level of the regiments to break through, and even ignored nearly 10,000 soldiers who were as close as brothers, and ordered the radio to be smashed and the telegram code to be burned. In this way, the communication between the upper and lower levels was interrupted, and the division interrupted contact with the army, the corps, and the Zhisi, so that the regiments and battalions lost their unified command, and some company and platoon cadres each brought a small number of soldiers to the regiment to concentrate, and some company and platoon cadres still led the troops to fight, thus causing great chaos in the troops. The enemy soon discovered that a large number of volunteers had been cut off by them (but the enemy never knew to cut off 1 division of our army). The enemy immediately began to organize the siege and blockade of the troops of the 180th Division, and some regimental and battalion cadres led some troops to fight very bravely, especially the battle with the enemy at Eagle Peak on May 27, which was very heroic and tragic, but in the end, due to the mistakes of the main leaders of the division, the small detachments that broke through the division were fighting for themselves, and the people fought for themselves, so they could not become a powerful force and rush out.

Peng Zong and other commanders of the Zhi division ordered the leaders of the 60th Army to quickly organize troops to meet the 180th Division, but because the 180th Division had smashed the radio and burned the code, the radio between the 60th Army and the 180th Division could not be contacted since the afternoon of the 25th.

At that time, our Shiji Operations Department and the chief of the Shiji Division were in the same mood, extremely anxious and worried about the situation of the 180th Division, and at this critical juncture, the headquarters of the 3rd Corps encountered enemy aircraft bombing during the transfer, and the communication between Shiji and the 3rd Corps and the 60th Army and the 3rd Corps and the 60th Army failed for one day. Mr. Peng and the other chiefs of the Zhi division were extremely anxious.

In this critical situation, I immediately asked the Chief of Staff to send me to the 60th Army to find out the situation and to find out the whereabouts of the 180th Division. Xie Chief of Staff immediately disagreed, saying: "The 60th Army can't be contacted, can you find it if you go?" Now the battlefield is very chaotic, and even you have to lose contact if you don't do well. ”

I said: "1 division can not be contacted and can not be found, this is too serious, we as a staff officer can not do to watch the chief in a hurry to get on fire, we must act quickly, I have been to the 4th battle in that area, the terrain I am familiar with, in case of situation will be handled well, please chief let me go!"

Chief of Staff Xie still insisted on disagreeing, saying: "The 3rd Corps is a new unit into the DPRK, we have only met once with the cadres of the corps and the army, the cadres below the division level have not yet met, they do not know each other, you go to them, they do not know you, you do not know them, you can not find them, so you can not find it, the troops in the area are already very crowded and chaotic, and there will be misunderstandings if they are not good, so you cannot go." ”

I heard the chief of staff say this, calmed down, and thought about it seriously, and it was right for the chief of staff not to let me go. At that time, the battlefield was intertwined with the enemy and us, the situation was indeed very chaotic, if I went, it would take time to find the 3rd Corps and the 60th Army, I just knew them and did not know each other, it was not good to ask them to assist me. And they have no time for themselves and are incapable of helping me. After I crossed the front line, the car could not drive, I had to walk on foot, which also needed time, even if I reached the area where I knew in advance that the 180th Division had entered, the division might leave; I did not bring a radio (nor could I bring) and could not get the new situation and new instructions of Shiji, and the 180th Division was already scattered and chaotic, and the main leader of the division could not be found, and all kinds of unexpected situations would occur, not only could I not complete the task of retrieving the 180th Division, but I would probably not be able to return, but I would definitely not be a prisoner, This is what I thought about in advance. Decades have passed, but whenever I think of the emergency situation at that time, my mood is difficult to calm down, and I deeply feel the care and love of the commander for me; I am deeply saddened that the commanders and fighters of the 180th Division have suffered great shame and humiliation because of the wrong decision and handling of the main commander of the division.

Until the morning of May 28, Zheng Qigui, commander of the 180th Division, broke out with only two dozen cadres and soldiers. Regiments and battalions sporadically broke through and ran back to a small number of personnel. It was known that the 180th Division had lost nearly 8,000 men, and that some of the wounded who had retreated backwards under the cover of the division had not been evacuated. This was the greatest loss suffered by our army on the Korean battlefield. The losses of the 180th Division also added difficulty and time to the issue of the exchange of prisoners of war in the future Panmunjom armistice negotiations.