introduction
"Han Sheng Gao Cai crossed the first life, Liu Xiang survived and turned his hands and ears." To the effect that Han Xin's talent is more outstanding than that of his peers, "turning hands" can determine who wins and who loses between Liu Bang and Xiang Yu, and is the key person to make the two win. Although Huang Tingjian exaggerated Han Xin's influence and considered him to be the core influencer in the Chu-Han dispute, his description of his talent was indeed just right, or a little inadequate.
Before he met Bole Xiao He and was tried to be reused by Liu Bang, Han Xin was only a small person and suffered humiliation from his crotch; after the outbreak of the anti-Qin uprising, he defected to Xiang Liang's command very early, and was not reused until Xiang Liang's death, but only held the position of Lang Zhong, equivalent to serving as a cook and a gatekeeper, with no future.
After meeting Xiao He and being urgently chased back to Hanying by him, Han Xinzheng's life in the sense began. In the first year of the Han Dynasty (206 BC), Liu Bang was determined to compete with Xiang Yu for the world, and appointed him as a general to implement the first step strategy of capturing the Hanzhong region, and he adopted the strategy of repairing the Ming Shu Dao and secretly crossing Chen Cang, successfully capturing Chen Cang, and opening the prelude to the Chu-Han War.
What made him famous and was "canonized" was not this battle, it was the very famous "Backwater Battle" that occurred in Jingxing later, he defeated 200,000 Zhao troops with 30,000 soldiers, and the military technique used was called "Genius Art of War", Ma Mo had boldly tried, but it ended in failure, and no one dared to use it again. So, how strong is Han Xin in this battle?
I. The "Battle of the Backwaters" in the Battle of Jingxing
The Battle of Jingxing took place when the Han army was at a disadvantage, and the elite of the Han army led by Liu Bang had just been defeated by Xiang Yu at Pengcheng, so they had to withdraw all the elite troops from Han Xin, leaving Han Xin as a general in an embarrassing situation where there were no soldiers to use.
Even under such circumstances, Liu Bang still gave Han Xin the order to attack zhao guo, and when the TV series "Legend of Chu Han" interpreted this paragraph, it was described as a test of Liu Bang on Han Xin. Han Xin made two preparations separately, one was to adjust the original old, weak and disabled soldiers, and at the same time actively expand the source of troops; the other was to study the opponent Chen Yu and wait for Chen Yu to reveal flaws.
In terms of expanding the number of soldiers, he invented an unprecedented method, which is considered to be the "pyramid scheme" in ancient times, that is, to issue corresponding travel fees to the old, weak and disabled soldiers, calling on them to return to their hometowns to gather their relatives and friends to join the army, and if they can bring back five people, they will be named captains (captains), and more people will be named centurions and centurions.
Under such temptations, the enthusiasm of the repatriated soldiers increased greatly, so that Han Xin could not take long to gather as many as 30,000 troops. Such a unit seems to be very chaotic, but because the army is mixed with various blood relations, the combat effectiveness has been greatly improved.
As an opponent, Chen Yu not only had the Zhao army, which claimed to be 200,000 troops, but also occupied favorable terrain and had sufficient logistical supplies. In contrast, Han Xin's troops could only be regarded as temporary, with no continuous supply of materials and no numerical superiority, and the army was not professionally trained. If the two were to engage in a face-to-face decisive battle, even Han Xin's general military style of sun wu would rebound and be weak, and he was doomed to lose the battle.
Despite this, Han Xin was still confident that he would "touch the stone with an egg." His troops had to walk in two steps, the first step was to send a small number of troops around the rear of Chen Yu's troops, waiting for an opportunity to raid its logistical position and base camp, and plant the banner of the Han army; the second step was to personally cross the river with his troops, and then destroy all the ships, leaving only a certain amount of rations, that is, the famous "Backwater Battle" in history.
Step 2 is quite poisonous and considered a "shady move". If the troops who raided Chen Yu's base camp were not successful, and the troops in the battle of the backwaters were defeated one after another, then being completely annihilated was the inevitable result. So, how did Han Xin win?
Second, borrow Xiang Yu's "broken cauldron and sink the boat", but much wiser than Xiang Yu
All the troops crossed the river, and then broke the boat to "fight a battle on the back of the water", with the shadow of the great battle between Xiang Yu and the Qin army in that year. Although the two martial arts of "putting the ground of death and being born later" are derived from sun tzu's art of war, the operational steps and the degree of certainty of victory are completely different.
First of all, Xiang Yu let all the troops fight backwaters and sink the boat, and if they did not win, then they would all be killed. However, even if they died in battle, they did not cause much damage to the enemy. Han Xin was different, even if the warriors who had a direct conflict with Chen Yu's troops were defeated, the troops who sneaked into Chen Yu's base camp would definitely bring heavy losses to Chen Yu. Therefore, in terms of destructive power, Han Xin was superior to Xiang Yu.
Secondly, in terms of the probability of victory, Han Xin also had more than Xiang Yu. Xiang Yu's troops only clashed head-on with the Qin army, relying on their enthusiasm and desire to survive. Han Xin's army was different, containing both enthusiasm and desire to survive, and more confident than Xiang Yu's troops in terms of military morale. Once Han Xin successfully dispatched the troops that secretly attacked Chen Yu, it would inevitably make Chen Yu and Yu ignore each other, which would lead to confusion in the military and give Han Xin's frontal army an opportunity to easily disintegrate the 200,000 Zhao army.
In this regard, before the battle, Han Xin already had a 60% chance of winning, and if the troops who sneaked into Chen Yu's base camp were successful, the odds would increase to 80%.
Once the sneak attacked troops, Han Xin's frontal army would seize the initiative of the war at this time and carry out an all-out attack in the chaos of the Zhao army, thus achieving victory. Later facts proved that the development of the war was indeed as Han Xin expected, and the Han army did not lose much and carried out a massacre in the chaotic process of the Zhao army and won victory.
In fact, ancient warfare relied on manpower, and no matter how strong the personal force, it was powerless on the battlefield. Just like Xiang Yu after the defeat, although he was able to pull out a thousand pounds, he was not the opponent of a steady stream of Han troops, and finally chose to commit suicide.
However, the numerical superiority must also be controlled within a reasonable range, otherwise it will be counterproductive, and the Yuan Shao army in the Battle of Guandu, the Cao army at the Battle of Chibi, and the Qin army at the Battle of Feishui are typical examples, although they have a great advantage, they are defeated in this chaotic process. It is not that the lord general has no command ability, but that he is powerless against chaos, and no one can control the situation.
After the victory, the "backwater war" created by Han Xin became a classic term and a successful war case in which less won more. This "poisonous trick" looks very good, so how will posterity use it? Matthew told the answer with practice.
Third, posterity does not dare to use it, and ma mo is a classic example of failure to cite
In the last years of the Warring States period, Zhao Kuo's theory of using troops belonged to the first level in the Zhao state, but it suffered setbacks in the process of actual combat. The main reason for this result is that he did not pay attention to the development of the actual situation, but only blindly followed the requirements and constraints of the art of war and theory, believing that it was the law of victory.
True militarists cannot conform to the rules and follow the originalism, they both grow up in actual combat and achieve the goal of victory in war by flexibly applying the experience and theories of the ancients. As Commander-in-Chief Zhu said: "The way to win the war is a good way!" ”
Ma Mo was very breakthrough in military theory, and was appointed by Zhuge Liang as his own army, accepting many of the strategies and tactics he proposed. In the sixth year of Jianxing (228), Zhuge Liang personally led the northern expedition of the army, and against the opinion of the people, he appointed Ma Mo as a forward, and asked Ma Mo to lead a large army to the Qilian Mountain area.
In order to block the Shu army, the Wei Ming Emperor Cao Rui had the general Zhang Gao lead his troops to the Jieting area to fortify and block the northward advance of Ma Chen's army. The two armies soon met at the street pavilion, probably in order to verify the correctness of their theory, try to lead the army independently, and establish prestige, Ma Mo openly disobeyed Zhuge Liang's orders and stationed alone on the street pavilion.
According to the analysis of the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, the reason why Ma Mo did this was to let the Shu army "fight a battle" and win victory in the predicament. In fact, this is a wrong application of the correct theory, the Shu army itself has a great advantage, there is no need to rely on the "backwater war" to achieve victory.
After the outbreak of war between the Wei and Shu armies, the situation became more and more out of control, which disrupted Ma Mo's extraordinary. Because what he did not expect was that Sima Yi's army only encircled but did not attack, so that the Shu army ran out of ammunition in the process of holding out, resulting in chaos, the army collapsed without a fight, and the Wei army won without a fight.
Therefore, the application of theory must be combined with practice, otherwise it will suffer a big loss. According to relevant records, this is the first time that Han Xin has been quoted after the "Backwater War", but it ended in failure.
Since Ma Chen, no one dared to use this poisonous trick of Han Xin.
epilogue
The changes in the war are like a storm, and no one can predict the outcome of its development. Like Napoleon's war at Waterloo, the early stages of the war were very favorable to France, but because they did not seize a good fighter, the French army quickly collapsed, leaving Napoleon with no chance to turn around. The reason why Han Xin was able to win the battle was the result of a variety of factors.
First, the opponent he encountered was not strong, although he had 200,000 troops in his hands, but before the war occurred, there was arrogance, and the inevitable result of the defeat of the proud soldiers; second, although the reorganized Han army was not strong in combat effectiveness, but the internal organization was strict, based on blood relations, the battle was quite rapid, coupled with the backwater battle, the probability of success was very high; third, Han Xin sent troops to sneak attack Chen Yu's base camp before the Backwater War, which can be described as making two-handed preparations. The probability of victory naturally increases.
Although it looks so easy, it is very difficult to operate, and future generations naturally dare not use the poisonous tricks of fighting against the water.
Resources
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Romance of the Three Kingdoms
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