In May 1853, Hong Xiuquan and Yang Xiuqing decided to send an army to the Northern Expedition, so Lin Fengxiang and Li Kaifang were transferred from Zhenjiang back as commanders, and Ji Wenyuan and Zhu Xikun fought together. The Taiping Army broke through the Yangzhou defense line of the "Jiangbei Camp" and entered Anhui, with a total strength of 20,000 troops, which is the origin of the 20,000-strong Northern Expedition said by later generations. The 20,000 Northern Expedition, the smallest number of which was the largest in the Northern Expedition of all dynasties, was really pitiful compared with the Northern Expedition of Zu Ti, the Northern Expedition of Huan Wen, the Northern Expedition of Liu Yu, the Northern Expedition of Yue Fei, the Northern Expedition of Xu Da, and other troops who could not move at all, such as the hundreds of thousands and hundreds of thousands of troops. However, the achievements of these 20,000 people were impressive, breaking the Yangzhou defense line in May, Keshangqiu in June, attacking Huaiqing in July, entering Shanxi in September, passing through Pingyang, Hongdong, and Licheng, defeating the governor of Zhili, Nar Jing'e, and in October successively taking Xingtai, Shenzhou, and Cangzhou, and the forward arrived on the outskirts of Tianjin, looking at Beijing. In just half a year, 20,000 Northern Expeditionary Troops ran rampant through the Central Plains as if they were in no man's land, and the soldiers were directly approaching Gyeonggi, and the monks Greenqin and Shengbao only dared to follow them and did not dare to intercept them head-on. The Northern Expeditionary Army was eventually defeated by insufficient supplies, but its combat effectiveness was unquestionable and first-class.
In March 1862, Zeng Guoquan led the Jizi battalion from Anqing to the east, opening the prelude to the attack on Tianjing. In May, the Xiang army captured Dangtu, Wuhu, Banqiao, Moling Pass, Dasheng Pass, and Sanfen River; at the end of the month, Peng Yulin led his water division into the Jinling Moat, and the Jizi battalion killed the Yuhuatai in the south of Tianjing City and set up a large camp. At the same time, Zeng Zhengan led an army into Wuhu, Bao Chao attacked and occupied Ningguo, and there were no barriers to the west and southwest of Tianjing. At this time, the Soldiers and Horses of the Xiang Army were not particularly numerous, zeng guoquan was about 20,000 troops, Peng Yulin's water division was 4,000, Zeng Zhen's cadres were 4,000, and Bao Chao's troops were 6,000, and the real threat to the safety of Tianjing was Zeng Guoquan's Jizi battalion and Peng Yulin's water division. However, the Hong Xiu family had no available talents, and more than 100,000 soldiers and horses in Tianjing could not repel the attack of the Xiang Army, and the key places outside the city were lost one after another, and the situation was extremely critical. To this end, Hong Xiuquan decided to let Li Xiucheng abandon the Eastern Expedition to Shanghai, three holy wills a day, and forced him to return to the division to rescue Tianjing and protect the safety of the Heavenly King.
At first, Li Xiucheng was reluctant to lead troops back to tianjing, but could not withstand Hong Xiuquan's urging, so he held a military conference in Suzhou and deployed a mission to rescue tianjing. In October 1862, Li Xiucheng personally led Li Shixian, Yang Fuqing, Huang Wenjin, Chen Kunshu, Tan Shaoguang, Gao Yongkuan and other thirteen kings, a total of 300,000 troops (known as 600,000), from Suzhou to aid Tianjing, down Lishui, Keliyang, Yue moling Pass, directly to the south of the city Yuhuatai, hundreds of battalions, layered, gun-like forest, and the Taiping Army in Tianjing City sandwiched the Xiang army in the middle. At this time, Li Xiucheng's reinforcements and the defenders in the city totaled more than 400,000; the number of Xiang troops was not much, and coupled with the epidemic of plague in Jiangnan, the estimated 20,000 people who could start a war with the Taiping Army were really pitiful. However, the result was a big surprise, forty-four days after the battle, Li Xiucheng was still unable to break through the Xiang army's defense line, forced to stop attacking Yuhuatai, and had no choice but to lead his army around the city; Li Shixian directly retreated to Moling Pass, Dongba, and then returned to Jinhua base. The Battle of Yuhuatai ended in the defeat of the Taiping Army.
Many people believed that the loss of logistics was caused by the lack of logistical supplies, the Taiping Army lacked food, did not prepare winter clothes, and could only withdraw when the ammunition ran out of food. This has its own certain reason, but the 400,000-strong army has been fighting fiercely for 44 days without being able to handle the 20,000 sick brigades that go deep into the lone army, how can this be said, the combat effectiveness of the Taiping Army in the later period is really worrying, and it is not comparable to the 20,000 Northern Expeditionary Army that swept through the Central Plains ten years ago. Then, from 20,000 sweeping through the Central Plains to 400,000 frustrated Rain Huatai, why did the Taiping Army's combat effectiveness decline so much?
First, Li Xiucheng expanded the recruitment of the Heaven and Earth Association, and the quality of the army was low, the discipline was corrupt, and the combat effectiveness was worrying
The direct reason for the fiasco in the Battle of Yuhuatai was that the combat effectiveness of these 400,000 troops was too poor, and the large number of troops was not only not an advantage but a disadvantage, a burden, and a drag on the legs. In September 1856, the "Tianjing Incident" broke out, and more than 20,000 elites died in infighting; in May 1857, Shi Dakai went out alone in anger, taking away more than 100,000 elite soldiers and a group of brave warriors, and digging up the roots of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. After this great change, the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom was seriously injured, and there were very few elite soldiers available. At this time, the Qing Dynasty reorganized the "Jiangbei Camp" and the "Jiangnan Camp", and in the face of the heavy siege of the Qing army, Li Xiucheng could only expand the Heaven and Earth Society and twist the armed forces to solve the urgent need. According to the statistics of the remaining roster of the book department of Chen Kun, the protector of Li Xiucheng who was guarding Changzhou at that time, more than 3/4 of his officers and soldiers were recruited between 1860 and 1863, and there were a large number of miscellaneous people, including opening shops, serving officials, watching restaurants, watching horses, buying vegetables, planting vegetables, collecting firewood, carrying water, cooking food, and clothing. Although the number of troops recruited in this way is large, the discipline, quality, and combat effectiveness are worrying, the enemy is insufficient to kill, and there is more than enough disturbance to the people.
Second, in the long-term battle on the front, the Taiping Army ran back and forth, without time for rest and training
As the saying goes, "The experience that war gives to soldiers cannot be given to anyone, including commanders-in-chief", this is only half true, not completely correct. Without the strenuous training of peacetime, soldiers go to war with only one result, and that is death, not so-called "experience." After the capital was set in Nanjing, the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom never escaped the passive situation of fighting on the eastern and western fronts, the Xiang army was on the western front, and the "Jiangnan camp" was on the eastern front, and the Taiping army could only run back and forth, taking care of one or the other, and the strategic situation was very passive. After the "Tianjing Incident", the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom was not only so unlucky as a two-front battle, but even worse was the internal battle, facing the Qing army everywhere on its own turf. For this reason, Chen Yucheng and Li Xiucheng had to go back and forth for many years in the east and the west, in the south and in the north, and the Taiping Army did not have time to rest and train at all, which was not comparable to the army of Yang Xiuqing's era. As a result, it is only strange that the Taiping Army, which already had complex composition, loose discipline, and low combat effectiveness, failed to rest, train, and engage in ideological education in a timely manner. Shiren recorded: "I have not tasted technical shooting, I have not tried to divide the team, I have not tasted battle, and I am not very resistant to war." ”
Third, the command system of the Taiping Army failed, and the kings had a strong sense of territory and were reluctant to fight desperately
As the saying goes, "Unity is strength," and if we can unite and work together, any powerful enemy, any difficult circumstance, will surrender to us. The Taiping Army could not fight in the later stages, but the number was there, the number crushed the Xiang Army, if it was united and united, it should be able to burst out of strong combat effectiveness, and there would be no embarrassing situation in which hundreds of thousands could not make one or two thousand. So, can the Taiping Army unite in the later period? The answer is no, because after the death of Yang Xiuqing (who combines political power, military power, and religious power), the unified command system of the Taiping Army has failed, coupled with Hong Xiuquan's "indiscriminate sealing" and "real sealing", playing a balance between the princes and restricting each other, no one can command the whole army in a unified way. In this way, the princes and kings have a strong sense of territory, and they only care about their own acres and three points of land, unless they are fighting in their own territory, they will not work hard, let alone fight desperately. In the Battle of Yuhuatai, except for Li Xiucheng and Li Shixian, the other reinforcements all stopped fighting in the slightest setback and sat and watched.
Fourth, the belief in worshiping God collapsed, and the Taiping Army had no soul and no will to fight
Of course, the lack of faith and soul is the fundamental reason for the decline in the combat effectiveness of the Taiping Army, which has lost its "military soul" and has become a "bandit" who robs the house, which is no different from the style of the Eight Banners and the Green Camp of the Qing Dynasty. The "Tianjing Incident" broke out, the Heavenly Father killed the Heavenly Brother, the Heavenly Father and the Son killed each other, and the fourth son Yang Xiuqing, who enjoyed the "Heavenly Father's Rumors", died at the hands of his brothers, and the belief in worshiping God collapsed. After that, the Taiping Army was extremely confused, they did not know why they were fighting, and they may have been soldiers just to eat together, to make a fortune, to plunder more gold and silver treasures. The same is true of the soldiers, without their souls, without the spirit of hard work to create a "kingdom of heaven" in which all men are equal. When Li Xiucheng was passing through southern Jiangsu, he built a mansion and claimed that "except for the Heavenly King's Palace, it is the best and most beautiful building in the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom"; Li Hongzhang commented on his mansion: "It is really like the Immortal Cave House" and "a realm that has never been seen in his life", and he does not know whether it is envy, jealousy, hatred or reprimand. In addition, Li Xiucheng took the lead in making money, "putting the cash amount of 1.5 million yuan and countless treasures into his own pocket", which was completely corrupted.