1. Fierce battle for 23 hours, liberation of Siping
At the beginning of 1948, Chiang Kai-shek changed horses for the third time in the northeast region, announced the abolition of the northeast line, the establishment of the Northeast Bandit General Command, and the appointment of Wei Lihuang as the commander of the northeast "suppression general". On the third day that Wei Lihuang flew to the northeast, Lin Biao's troops were in Xinlitun and completely annihilated the Twenty-sixth Division of the Enemy's Forty-ninth Army.
The day after Chen Cheng flew to Shenyang, Lin Biao's People's Liberation Army captured Liaoyang and completely annihilated the enemy's Provisional Fifty-fourth Division.
Subsequently, the People's Liberation Army took advantage of the victory to attack baita fort south of Shenyang, and the seventy-ninth division of the enemy's forty-ninth army abandoned its position and fled to Shenyang.
On February 19, the Northeast People's Liberation Army lianke faku and Anshan completely annihilated the 62nd Division of the New Sixth Army and the 25th Division of the Enemy 52nd Army.
Less than a month before and after Yi Shuai in the northeast, the Kuomintang was eaten by Lin Biao for 5 whole divisions.
On 27 February, Chiang Kai-shek ordered Wei Lihuang to execute Wen Li, commander of the 72nd Division, who had abandoned his position and fled. Wei Lihuang understood that Wen Li's move was not a bad thing, at least it preserved his strength, and the generals stationed in Liaoyang, Faku, and Anshan tried to hold out for help, and as a result, Lin Biao was eaten. When Lin Biao's troops turned to attack the above-mentioned cities, Chiang Kai-shek ordered Wei Lihuang to send troops to relieve the siege, but Wei Lihuang ignored them and concentrated his troops in Shenyang and did not move.
Of course, Wei Lihuang was not a timid and fearful of death, he was also a famous anti-war general. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Battle of Xinkou and the battle to open up the Indo-Burmese communication line made him famous at home and abroad, and even the Americans admired his talent. Wei Lihuang had his own reasons for not saving himself when he saw death: the daily tactics of the communist army were to besiege the city and fight for reinforcements, and they could not get into Lin Biao's trap.
Wei Lihuang's tactic was to collect troops and stick to the big stronghold, and when the time was ripe, when it was really certain, the connection between the various points would be opened, and then the third step was to expand the occupied area. This is his so-called "fixed point - line - expansion" strategic policy.
Taking advantage of the fact that the ice and snow had not yet thawed, Lin Biao decided to seize the strategically important siping area, and ordered the first, third, and seventeenth columns and the artillery directly under them, under the unified command of the commander of the first column, to take on the task of besieging the city; the second, eighth, and tenth columns and independent divisions blocked the enemy's reinforcements in the north and south of Siping.
Under the pressure of this large army, the jilin defenders saw that the situation was not good, and hurriedly abandoned the city and fled to Changchun. Our independent division immediately pursued, annihilated the enemy, and on March 9, liberated Jilin.
On March 12, the siege army encircling Siping began to launch a general offensive, and after 23 hours of fierce fighting, it completely annihilated 18,000 people including the 88th Division of the 71st Army and liberated Siping.
The winter offensive launched by Lin Biao, which began on December 15, 1947 and ended on March 15, 1948, lasted three months, annihilating 8 enemy divisions, totaling more than 150,000 people, recovering 18 important cities such as Siping, Jilin, Liaoyang, and Anshan, and compressing the troops under Wei Lihuang's command into 12 strongholds in the isolated areas of Shenyang, Changchun, and Jinzhou.
In the three major offensives in the summer, autumn, and winter, Lin Biao commanded hundreds of thousands of xiongshi divisions to gallop across the northeast land, swept through thousands of troops, successively annihilated 400,000 troops under the three famous generals Du Yuming, Chen Cheng, and Wei Lihuang of the Kuomintang, recaptured 77 cities, expanded the liberated area to 86 percent of the total population in the northeast and 97 percent of the entire territory of the northeast, captured a large number of American-style equipment, and forced Jiang Jie to take charge of the northeast division of the right three yi.
In the three major offensives, the well-known expeditionary generals and love generals of the Chiang Kai-shek clique at home and abroad fell one after another under the blows of Lin Biao, and lost Maicheng, and the ironclad army they led threw away their armor and collapsed. The northeast army led by Lin Biao became stronger and stronger and stronger. After the summer offensive of 1947, the eighth, ninth, and tenth columns were formed. In March 1948, towards the end of the winter offensive, the 5th, 11th, and 12th Columns were formed. Thus, with the addition of artillery columns, railway columns, 15 independent divisions, and 3 cavalry divisions, by August, the regular troops reached 700,000, and with the addition of ground troops, Lin Biao's northeast army reached a total of 1.05 million.
Second, do not fight Jinzhou, fight Changchun
Seeing that the situation in the northeast was critical, Chiang Kai-shek was bent on opening up the Shenjin Line and transferring the main force of Shenyang to Jinzhou, so that in order to cooperate with Fu Zuoyi in Northern China, he could retake the northeast and retreat to Guannei, so that he would not be blocked by Lin Biao and eaten in the hinterland of the northeast.
Wei Lihuang, on the other hand, advocated sticking to Shenyang and preserving the northeast, waiting for the change. He was mainly unwilling to bear the responsibility of "losing the northeast" and became Chiang Kai-shek's "scapegoat". Because once the main force withdraws to Jinzhou, Shenyang and Changchun will not be protected, even if they can hold Jinzhou, after all, the northeast is basically lost.
Chiang Kai-shek summoned Wei Lihuang to Nanjing and said: "Shenyang and Changchun have been cut off from transportation, hundreds of thousands of troops have relied on air transport for supplies, our transport planes and gasoline are not enough to sustain us, and in the long run, the government will be dragged down by the northeast!"
Wei Lihuang said: "As long as the main force is not withdrawn from Shenyang and the supply in the northeast is my responsibility." ”
Chiang Kai-shek had no choice: "Since this is the case..."
Wei Lihuang immediately found the supply commander Liu Yaohan and said: "During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, you worked as an interpreter in the Foreign Affairs Bureau and had a close relationship with the US army. Tomorrow, please take me to the U.S. Military Advisory Board and ask them to help me transport supplies. ”
Early the next morning, Accompanied by Liu Yaohan, Wei Lihuang visited Ba Dawei, head of the US military advisory group. Liu Yaohan said in English:
"The northeast is rich in materials and has great potential, Chen Cheng has made a mess of the northeast, and when Mr. Wei first went, he was passively bombarded and beaten every day." Now that the situation has stabilized, Mr. Wei is very methodical. ”
David Bardavi said he would do his best to help, saying:
"General Wei led the Chinese garrison in India to open up the Burmese communication line in 1944, and was commended by the Allies, and his command ability was very outstanding. I have great admiration for General Wei, and I am willing to help him. ”
After the end of the winter offensive campaign, there were no small battles to fight in the northeast, and it could only choose a big battle to fight at 3 o'clock in Changchun, Shenyang, and Jinzhou. At this time, Lin Biao's opponent, Wei Lihuang, was a general with an older qualification than Chen Cheng. Wei Lihuang's total strength was 4 corps, 14 corps and 44 divisions, plus local miscellaneous troops, totaling 50,000 people. He adopted the principle of "concentrating troops, focusing on garrisoning, ensuring that Shenyang, Jinzhou, and Changchun, and opening up the Beining Line with cameras," concentrated heavy troops in the three areas of Chang, Shen, and Jin, and made specific arrangements as follows: Changchun, garrisoned by Zheng Dongguo, deputy commander-in-chief of the Northeast "Suppression General" and commander of the First Corps; 300,000 troops in Shenyang and its satellite cities of Benxi, Fushun, Tieling, and Xinmin, directly commanded by Wei Lihuang; and 150,000 troops in Jinzhou and Jinxi, under the deputy commander-in-chief of the Northeast "Suppression General" and director of the Jinzhou Command Post. Led by Fan Hanjie, commander of the Jireliao Border Region.
These three pieces are all hard bones, from which piece to bite? Lin Biao repeatedly compared and pondered in the Twin Cities Command Post.
The central government's opinion is to hit the south first. As the winter offensive was underway, Chairman Mao telephoned Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and Liu Yalou on February 7 to "foresee the possibility of the enemy's withdrawal from the northeast." As far as the strategic interests of our army are concerned, it is advantageous to seal the regiment of Chiang Kai-shek's army in the northeast and annihilate them in various ways."
Chairman Mao's idea was to cut off the connection between the Wei Lihuang clique in the northeast and the Fu Zuoyi clique in north China, so as to create a situation of "closing the door and fighting dogs," and to seal off the enemy in the northeast and annihilate them on the spot. Chairman Mao's proposition is obviously to strike Jinzhou first.
Lin Biao repeatedly thought about and weighed the stakes, believing that Jinzhou City was strongly defended, and there were 150,000 heavy troops defending the town, if it could not be attacked for as long as last summer's offensive against Siping, the enemy army rushed to help, I would be passive; the reason why Siping retreated unharmed was because the troops were basically lightly armed, and Jinzhou was not the same as Siping, Fan Hanjie's 150,000 strong soldiers were not the same as Chen Mingren's 20,000 defenders, and to fight Jinzhou Fan Hanjie, there was no need for large-scale heavy weapons and the logistical supply of 600,000 to 700,000 troops, such a huge supply, A large number of cars and fuel are needed, and if the fuel is exhausted or attacked by the enemy air, and a large number of mechanized equipment falls into the hands of the enemy, it will be difficult for the troops to evacuate safely. And then into a dangerous situation.
Lin Biao believes that attacking Jinzhou is very risky. The strength of Zhengdongguo in Changchun is relatively weak, and it is closest to the logistics base of the Songhua River area of the "homeland" of the People's Liberation Army, and five or six hundred fish from the Wei Lihuang base camp in Shenyang. Troops can also be deployed to eat this "water from afar". Therefore, he finally decided to fight Changchun, and consulted with other decision-makers of the Northeast Bureau on this and reached an agreement.
Third, swing the division of Jinzhou and prepare for a decisive battle
On April 18, Lin Biao telephoned the Central Military Commission, saying that it was currently difficult for the south to attack Jinzhou on The Beining Road, which was unfavorable to me, and proposed a plan to attack Changchun first and attract reinforcements from the enemy in Shenyang and annihilate it.
On April 22, the Central Committee sent a telegram, and Chairman Mao approved Lin Biao's plan.
In mid-May, Lin Biao transferred 2 columns to try changchun. On the 24th, a unit of the People's Liberation Army rushed to the outskirts of Zheng Dongguo to grab grain, and prepared to take advantage of the situation to attack Changchun. After the enemy was annihilated by 2 regiments, it quickly retreated into the city. After this battle, Lin Biao found that the enemy in Changchun was stronger than originally estimated, and the troops were not tactically and technically prepared for attacking the fortified big cities. Therefore, he put forward the idea of changing the strong attack to "long siege and long siege". On June 5, the Central Military Commission agreed to this policy.
A month later, after consulting with other leaders of the Northeast Bureau, Lin Biao realized that the fortifications in Changchun were strong, that the grain supply was aided by air transport, and that our army could not take into account both attacking Changchun and providing aid.
After receiving this telegram in Xibaipo, Chairman Mao wrote in a telegram to Lin Biao and the Northeast Bureau:
Since the attack on Changchun is uncertain, it is natural that this plan can and should be stopped and replaced by a plan to fight south early.
After Lin Biao received Chairman Mao's telegram, he immediately decided to leave a part of his troops to continue to besiege Changchun, and the main force went south, with the troops pointing to Jinzhou.
In order to meet the needs of large-scale operations, on August 14, the leading organ of the Northeast Field Army was established. Lin Biao served as commander. Luo Ronghuan served as political commissar, Liu Yalou as chief of staff, and Tan Zheng as director of the political department. There are 2 corps under it, the first corps is commanded by Xiao Jinguang and Xiao Hua as the political commissar; the second corps is commanded by Cheng Zihua and Huang Kecheng is the political commissar. The 2 corps of the Northeast Field Army have jurisdiction over a total of 12 columns from the 1st to the 12th Column, the Artillery Column, and the Railway Column, and the total strength of the field troops is more than 700,000.
At this time, Lin Biao held the following positions: member of the CPC Central Committee, member, standing committee member, and secretary of the Northeast Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, and commander-in-chief and political commissar of the Northeast People's Liberation Army. Commander and Political Commissar of the Northeast Military Region. Commander of the Northeast Field Army.
Lin Biao sat on the first chair of our party and our army in the northeast region, although he was not in good physical condition, his face was thin, and he was not tall at all. However, it was really a resourceful, brave and fierce "Northeast Tiger" that could recruit good warriors, so that the famous expeditionary forces could make the principals, teachers, and brothers of the Whampoa Military Academy lose their nerve one by one and fell under one of his heavenly swords.
Due to the arrival of the rainy season and the need for logistical preparations, Lin Biao and the Northeast Bureau decided to postpone it for more than ten days, and after the rainy season, they marched south in September and launched a large-scale autumn offensive (later the Liaoshen Campaign), bearing the brunt of the attack on Jinzhou.
In early September, the Northeast Field Army issued an all-army mobilization meeting. subsequently. Lin Biao waved his division south to Beining Road. In order to continue to paralyze the enemy, bluff the momentum of Changchun, create public opinion, and actively carry out activities. He also ordered the troops to advance from the Siping area to Changchun from Tiantian and return at night, and the main force secretly advanced to the designated area. During this period, Wei Lihuang was unaware of the actions of Lin Biao's army, and was still clinging to the "three points" to delay the change, and there was no sign of new deployment in all departments.
The clouds of war were secretly densely packed over Liaoshen, and an unprecedented fierce armageddon was imminent.
Fourth, "focus doctrine": I only want to fight wars
Lin Biao himself did, as he said, "It doesn't matter if you eat badly and dress badly." "He wears whatever clothes he wants." Never consider the length and short size of the fit or not, the style is not beautiful, wear on the body is not dashing. He ate very simple, two dishes and a soup, green vegetables, tofu, and the only snack usually was fried soybeans. Work and living in simple farmhouses. He often went deep into the line of fire, and it cannot be said that he was afraid of death.
Before the battle of Jishui Hezi, in Faku, a landlord heard that there was a "commander-in-chief" and invited him to eat, and there was a sauerkraut fried white meat on the table. The skinny Lin Biao never ate fat meat, and was persuaded to try to eat it. Lin Biao, who had never talked about eating and drinking, unusually said that it was delicious and delicious after he came back, and said that he could no longer eat it, which meant that he could no longer eat at a rich man's house.
In fact, Lin Biao's mind was not at all on eating, wearing, and living these things. He was fascinated by the mystery of commanding combat and the art and technology of studying war. Fighting and not sleeping night after night is commonplace. Which unit hit what position. He could find it on the map at a glance, and he could dictate several combat telegrams in one breath. In order to fight every battle, he was always trapped in the cycle of pacing, thinking, thinking, pacing, especially when thinking about problems, and everything other than combat did not exist in his mind.
He concentrated on fighting, or rode on a wooden chair, or faced a map full of walls, sitting and standing for half a day. This is his daily "compulsory lesson". He weighed the deployment and stakes of the operation with great precision and extremity. However, all matters, big and small, such as interpersonal relations and life that have nothing to do with the military, are not asked. Indifferent, uncaring.
Luo Ronghuan was well aware of this characteristic of Lin Biao and humorously called it "Lin Zong's key doctrine".
Lin Biao is not good at talking, and he is not born with humor. Never joke with people. But occasionally he came up with a humorous sentence or two, such as the analogy of the "second-rate son" he played in Harbin.
Lin Biao does not smoke, does not drink, is not sociable, and does not like to play. He also can't play, and he has no hobbies other than fighting. In the Twin Cities, Chief of Staff Liu Yalou saw that he was busy with military affairs and was too tired to do it. I dragged him to hunt 2 times. Sometimes he was dragged to Harbin to dance, and he sometimes went, sometimes he didn't go. His dancing style is mediocre, and his dancing skills have not improved at all.
Once, the Consulate General of the Soviet Union in Harbin held a grand ball, specially invited from the twin cities to invite the famous "General Lin Biao" to "add luster and color" to it. During this period, Lin Biao invited a Soviet woman, but she rejected lin biao as a "third-class cripple". Lin Biao himself did nothing, General Changsheng had nothing in her mind, people liked a handsome man who was strong and strong, that was also the woman's own business, just as I Lin Biao was good at fighting, and had no interest in "eating, drinking and having fun", it was my own business, people, each has its own good, she did not want to jump with me, she frankly refused. Just as Lin Biao, who does not like to interact with people, frankly does not socialize with people, it does not matter.
However, other senior officials on both sides of the Chinese and Soviet unions who were present felt extremely embarrassed to see this scene, and the ball was extremely awkward. The Consul General of the Soviet Union was furious and utterly scolded his fellow females.
Since then, Lin Biao has basically stopped dancing.
In addition, Lin Biao liked to read books, especially in military and philosophical aspects, and was fascinated. Many places in the book were filled with ditches and ditches with red and blue pencils, and the dots were densely packed.