Li Zuopeng, a founding lieutenant general and former chief of staff of the Northeast Democratic Coalition Army, recalled that I was fighting in the northeast during my years of fighting.
The Battle of Siping was extremely fierce, and the enemy continued to attack across the board, focusing on the area east of Siping.
The enemy's New 1st Army and the New 6th Army charged at us side by side, and many positions were repeatedly fought by the enemy and I, and the enemy used bullet rain and man-sea tactics to rush into our positions like a tide.
Our fighters fought back with rows of grenades and white-knifed combat to drive the enemy off their positions.
The enemy used tanks to shock, and at that time we did not have decent anti-tank weapons, only a few mines and some small packages of explosives and explosive canisters, and the soldiers fought with such simple weapons against the behemoths of steel.
One fell, the other rushed up until the enemy tanks were blown up or driven away, but even that simple weapon was not sufficient, and sometimes ran out.
Soldiers fought with enemy tanks with cluster grenades, or lit quilts and straw mats poured with gasoline and kerosene, and the soldiers rushed to the enemy tanks with them and attacked them, resulting in some tanks being frightened and running.
The fierce battle for positions was unfolding across the board, and the enemy east of Siping had occupied our army's 331.5 heights and Hafutun positions on the 17th.
The enemy, supported by a large number of aircraft, artillery and tanks, suffered heavy casualties, and on the 18th occupied the position of Our Tower Hill.
Tazi Mountain is the focus of my left wing defensive line, more than twenty miles away from Siping, the top of the hill is not large, but it is condescending, overlooking all the positions in the northeast of Siping.
After the enemy occupied Tazishan, it was very unfavorable to us, and the situation on the eastern front was urgent, and the situation was extremely serious.
Lin Biao immediately decided to use the 359th Brigade of the General Reserve to counterattack the enemy on the line of Hafutun and Flint Ridge, but the result was not ideal, and the enemy was not defeated.
Some positions in the siping front and the Erdao forest were also breached by the enemy.
On the morning of the 18th, after deep thinking, Lin Biao asked me to take a radio station and a few staff officers and immediately rush to the Eastern Front by car.
Before leaving, Lin Biao told me: "We must calmly observe and judge the situation on the battlefield on the Eastern Front, and consider how likely it is to continue to hold out." If it is really difficult to continue to hold on, send me a telegram immediately.
In the morning, I rushed to the Eastern Front, and after inspecting the situation of the enemy and us on the spot, I sent a telegram to Lin Biao, to the effect that:
"At present, the positions lost by our army are all important positions, and although our troops have repeatedly counterattacked tenaciously, they have achieved little success, while the casualties and attrition of the troops are large, and the existing positions have no danger to defend, there are no fortifications, and there are no ammunition, and the casualties of the troops are very large, so it is very difficult to continue to hold."
On May 18, Lin Biao sent a telegram to the Central Committee and the Northeast Bureau: "The positions east of Siping have lost several places, and at this moment the enemy is attacking fiercely, and the situation is critical. ”
In the afternoon, with the loss of Tazi Mountain, Lin Biao did not wait for the central government to reply, and immediately decided to withdraw from the battle, and that night, the troops took the initiative to withdraw from Siping City.
While arranging for the transfer of troops, Lin Biao called the Central Committee and the Northeast Bureau: "The enemy is covering the infantry on this day with aircraft, artillery, and tanks. The main position northeast of the city was lost and could not be recaptured, and the defending troops were under the threat of being cut off by the enemy and were now preparing to withdraw from the battle. ”
On May 19, a telegram from the central authorities was received: "Siping our army has held out for a month and resisted ten divisions of the enemy, showing the highly tenacious heroic spirit of the people's army, and this struggle is of historical significance." ”
"If you feel that it is impossible to continue to hold Siping, you should take the initiative to abandon Siping, delay the enemy in the front with one unit, withdraw the main force to the two wings to rest, and prepare to change from position warfare to mobile warfare."
According to Zheng Dongguo's recollection, on May 14, an all-out attack on Siping Street began.
Du Yuming said that when launching an all-out offensive against Siping Street, Chiang Kai-shek was worried about the success or failure of this campaign, and on May 17, he sent Deputy Chief of Staff Bai Chongxi to Shenyang to inspect, and Bai and Du Yuming studied in detail the situation between the enemy and ourselves that night.
On 18 May, when Bai and Du inspected Kaiyuan, they knew that the right wing corps had swerved back to the east of Flint Ridge and continued to attack Princess Ridge.
At this time, both Bai and Du thought that there was no problem in capturing Siping Street, but Bai Chongxi still had doubts about whether he could enter and occupy Changchun, and said that Nanjing and the Communists had agreed that the Nationalist army would not enter Changchun, and if they were not very sure, that is, until Gongzhuling, there was no need to continue to advance towards Changchun.
Du said: The purpose of attacking Siping Street is to retake Changchun and Jilin in one fell swoop; otherwise, it would be very difficult to abandon the previous achievements, orders would have been given, and the deployment would have been changed in the middle of the way; on the contrary, it would be very difficult for the troops to be confused, and there would be a crisis for the enemy to take advantage of the opportunity to counterattack and break through each one.
Moreover, after hitting Jilin, it was possible to confront the communist forces across the Songhua River, and the situation was more favorable. And it can receive small plump hydropower stations and supply electricity to Changchun and Jilin, otherwise the electricity consumption in the northeast will become a problem.
Bai repeatedly asked Du if he was sure, and Du said, "Absolutely sure." ”
Finally, Bai said, "If I am sure, I agree." I will immediately return to Nanjing and report to the Chairman. ”
Zheng Dongguo also recalled that on May 17 and 18, with the cooperation of aircraft and tanks, they attacked the outer positions of Siping such as Yahupao, Pololinzi, and Sandaolin held by the Democratic Coalition Army, and fought fiercely with the 1st Brigade of the Democratic Coalition Army, the 7th Division of the 7th Column, and the 7th Brigade of the 3rd Division.
On May 15, Du Yuming mobilized the strength of ten divisions, organized them into three corps, and relaunched the attack.
Sun Liren, with the support of the New 6th Army, occupied an important position southeast of Siping Street- Tashanzi on the 18th, and entered Siping on the 19th.
As a result, the enemy and us fought for the Siping Offensive for about a month, and due to the strategic retreat of our army, the Battle of Siping came to an end.