introduction
For the Kuomintang, the fall of Jinzhou and the collapse of Liao Yaoxiang's corps eventually led to the defeat of the northeast. Throughout the campaign, the contradiction between Chiang Kai-shek and Liao Yaoxiang between teachers and students also reached its peak. Chiang Kai-shek wanted to hold Jinzhou, and even though Jinzhou had been breached by the Northeast Field Army, he still demanded that Liao Yaoxiang try to recover it with all his might; Liao Yaoxiang wanted to flee the northeast, and even though Chiang Kai-shek repeatedly ordered reinforcements of Jinzhou, he was still ready to retreat to Yingkou and escape from the sea at any time.
Liao Yaoxiang did not want to save Fan Hanjie, had his own selfish intentions (to preserve strength), and also had an estimate of the situation: abandoning the northeast might be the best strategic decision. Chiang Kai-shek did not hesitate to reinforce Jinzhou at all costs, ostensibly because he was bound to jinzhou, but in fact he was ready to abandon the northeast.
From this point alone, Chiang Kai-shek and Liao Yaoxiang's goals are the same.
But why did the end result was that hundreds of thousands of elite Kuomintang troops were wiped out by the Platon?
Liao Yaoxiang
The decisive battle in Jinzhou can reduce the pressure on the battlefield in Guannei
Can the Northeast still be defended? This was something that every Kuomintang officer would have considered in the winter of 1948. Although Chiang Kai-shek also knew that the three isolated cities (Changchun, Shenyang, and Jinzhou) could not be saved, he had to fight a decisive battle with the Northeast Field Army before withdrawing from the northeast to relieve the pressure on Fu Zuoyi in north China. In addition, in Xuzhou, the big war is also on the verge of breaking out. If the victory of the Higashino army is too easy, it is bound to continue to advance towards Kannai, and the consequences are very serious.
After the fall of Jinzhou, around which direction to retreat, Chiang Kai-shek and Liao Yaoxiang and even Wei Lihuang and Du Yuming all had serious differences. There are three paths in front of Liao Yaoxiang:
Article 1: Withdraw to Yingkou and retreat from the sea, this is the opinion that Liao Yaoxiang has always insisted on.
Article 2: Withdraw to Shenyang and stick to waiting for assistance, this is what Wei Lihuang resolutely advocated.
Article 3: Retake Jinzhou and withdraw from the northeast by land was Chiang Kai-shek's order from beginning to end.
Except for Chiang Kai-shek, everyone felt:
Hitting Jinzhou again was tantamount to sending Liao Yaoxiang and the Ninth Corps to the guillotine.
However, this is not entirely unjustifiable. Chiang Kai-shek needed to consider not only Liao Yaoxiang's five armies, but also hundreds of thousands of soldiers and horses in Changchun (Zeng Zesheng had not yet revolted at that time) and Shenyang.
Even if the Kuomintang had the support of the Navy, it was not capable of transporting so many people by warship in a short period of time. The army was crowded in the relatively narrow liaodong region, with its back to the sea, and it was difficult to defend itself if attacked. If you continue to attack Jinzhou, although it will cause great losses, Dongye will also pay a huge casualty price. This not only achieved the purpose of a strategic decisive battle, but also enabled the Kuomintang troops in Changchun and Shenyang to have a safer environment for retreat.
Jinzhou was Chiang Kai-shek's political bargaining chip for aid from the United States
In addition to military considerations, Jinzhou also had political significance for Chiang Kai-shek. According to Du Yuming's recollection, Chiang Kai-shek once said to him:
If the Kuomintang lost Jinzhou, the U.S. government would probably abandon Chiang Kai-shek completely, let alone any military assistance...
As military commanders, Liao Yaoxiang, Wei Lihuang, and Du Yuming considered military gains and losses, which was understandable. However, they have to think too much about how to save their troops and how they can not spread the responsibility for the defeat on their own heads, which is the problem of the Kuomintang army itself. In addition, the officers and men at all levels of the Ninth Corps were not active in reinforcing Jinzhou, and they thought more about the lights and greenery in Shenyang.
Wei Lihuang
Liao Yaoxiang, Wei Lihuang and others only consider military influence, and it is difficult to say that they did not know Chiang Kai-shek's true intentions, at least Du Yuming made it clear in his memoirs:
After the fall of Jinzhou, he knew that Chiang Kai-shek was ready to abandon the northeast.
However, these words must not come out of Chiang Kai-shek's mouth, because such political influence is not conducive to good relations with the United States.
epilogue
Also wanting to abandon the northeast, the internal friction of Chiang Kai-shek and Liao Yaoxiang and others led to the annihilation of hundreds of thousands of Kuomintang troops by the People's Liberation Army. In the final analysis, Chiang Kai-shek had lost control of this unit, and the Huangpu generals were no longer as united as they were during the Eastern Crusade, the Northern Expedition, and even the Anti-Japanese War. We can even make a hypothesis:
Whether it is reinforcements in the direction of Jinzhou or retreat to Yingkou, one of Chiang Kai-shek and Liao Yaoxiang is willing to compromise early and implement a battle plan from beginning to end, and the outcome may change.
On the other hand, the order is no longer important whether it is correct or not, the problem is whether and how to execute it. Therefore, this is the fundamental reason why the Plaster has been able to change from weak to strong, from the northeast to north China, the Central Plains, and finally to the liberation of all of China.