I am Tang Di, a history buff. Welcome everyone [attention] I, let's talk about the past and the present, and discuss the general trend of the world. Gentleman I, just to learn and make friends!
Before and after the CPC Central Committee led the main force of the Red Army to the Shaanxi-Gansu Region, the situation in the whole country was undergoing drastic changes. Following the april 1934 statement of attempt to monopolize China, the Japanese government launched the "North China Incident" in 1935, intensifying its aggression against China.
The Kuomintang government continued to pursue a traitorous policy and successively signed with Japan the new "He Mei Agreement" and the "Qin-Tu Agreement" that humiliated the country, handing over most of the sovereignty of Hebei and Chahar provinces to Japan. Subsequently, the Japanese Kou also created the "Five Provinces Autonomy Movement in North China" in an attempt to separate the five provinces of Hebei, Shandong, Shanxi, Chahar, and Suiyuan from China and to implement the so-called "specialization" under its control. The Kuomintang government went so far as to promise to set up a "Jicha Administrative Affairs Committee," effectively recognizing the disguised "autonomy" of the two provinces.
The intensification of the invasion of Japanese imperialism seriously threatens the survival of the Chinese nation. The national contradictions between China and Japan have risen sharply to become the main contradictions. Under these circumstances, new and important changes have taken place in the political attitudes of all classes and political groups in the country.
I. The reasons for the Red Army's crusades
The Communist Party of China and the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army have always stood in the forefront of the anti-Japanese resistance against traitors and are the backbone of the Chinese national revolutionary stronghold. As early as 1931, after the "918 Incident", the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China made it clear that it resolutely opposed Japanese imperialist aggression and the Kuomintang government's policy of traitorous capitulation, and decided to organize a nationwide anti-Japanese popular movement and carry out guerrilla warfare in the northeast region; on April 15, 1932, the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic issued a declaration on war against Japan, "officially declaring the war against Japan, leading the whole Chinese workers' and peasants' Red Army and the broad masses of the oppressed people to expel Japanese imperialism from China with a national revolutionary war." In order to seek the complete liberation and independence of the Chinese nation. ”
On January 17, 1933, our Party also issued a declaration in the name of the Provisional Central Government of the Soviet Union and the Revolutionary Military Committee of the Red Army, declaring that under the conditions of stopping the attack on the Soviet areas, protecting the people's democratic rights and arming the people, the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army was willing to conclude an agreement on war against Japan with any armed force to jointly oppose the aggression of Japanese imperialism; on August 1, 1935, it also issued the "Letter to All Compatriots for Resisting Japan and Saving the Country", that is, the "August 1st Declaration", which put forward the Ten Programs for Resisting Japan and Saving the Country. It advocates the organization of the national defense government and the anti-Japanese coalition army, and calls on the general mobilization of compatriots throughout the country to defeat Japanese imperialism.
After that, the main force of the Red Army, under the direct leadership of the Party Central Committee, successfully completed the Long March, enabling the Party to establish the base camp of the national revolution in the great northwest close to the anti-Japanese front; the Second and Sixth Armies of the Red Army were engaged in the Long March; the Red Fourth Front army suffered some losses in its march southward, but still maintained considerable strength; the guerrilla warfare of the Red Army in the eight southern provinces had shifted from setbacks to recovery and development; and the anti-Japanese guerrilla war in the northeast and eastern Hebei was also flourishing.
The above situation shows that in the winter of 1935, China was on the eve of a major change in the political situation. How to bring together all kinds of anti-Japanese and revolutionary forces to form a unified national revolutionary front is the key to the development of a new situation in our Party and our army.
At that time, the CPC Central Committee, the Red Army, and the Shaanxi-Gansu Region, where they were located, were still facing some practical difficulties. The strength of the Red Army was only more than 10,000 people. The area of the Soviet Union was small, the population was sparse, there was a shortage of grain and industrial products, the Red Army had difficulties in supplying, and it was not easy to expand the army. The enemy situation around the Soviet zone was still quite serious: to the south and west, there were more than 10 divisions of infantry and cavalry of the Kuomintang Northeast Army, the Northwest Army, and the Ningxia warlords, and part of Chiang Kai-shek's "Central Army" was also concentrating on both sides of the West (An) Lan (Zhou) Highway; to the north, there were the 84th and 86th Divisions of the Kuomintang Army originally stationed in northern Shaanxi and 5 brigades of Yan Xishan's newly transferred yan xishan department from Shanxi.
These enemies are stepping up their economic blockade and political sabotage against us and are actively preparing for a new military siege. Therefore, it was more difficult for the Red Army to develop to the south, west or north. In the east, Shanxi Province is the closest to the anti-Japanese front, and although the enemy forces are large, they are relatively scattered, which is conducive to the development of revolutionary forces.
In order to adapt to the changes in the situation at home and abroad and develop revolutionary forces, the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee held a meeting for nearly 10 days on December 17, 1935 at Wayao Fort (now Zichang) in northern Shaanxi Province, to discuss and formulate in depth the Party's policies and strategic guidelines under the new situation.
The meeting heavily criticized the closed-door tendency of the Chinese national bourgeoisie to unite with the Chinese workers and peasants to resist Japan and the acute illness of the revolution, adopted the Resolution of the Central Committee on the Present Political Situation and the Tasks of the Party, further decided on the general policy of building an anti-Japanese national united front, and adjusted the specific policies accordingly in order to unite all those who could be united to participate in or support the anti-Japanese struggle. This is a major shift in the political line of the Chinese Communist Party.
There were many opinions at that time on the issue of the Party's military strategy in the new situation, especially on the course of action of the Red Army. Some people advocate that the Red Army should "consolidate and move forward," focusing on consolidating the Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet Region, gradually developing to the north of Weishui, and seeking to fight with chiang kai-shek's army and the Northeast Army and the Northwest Army; others advocate immediately leaving Ningxia or Wuyuan and Baotou to compete with the Japanese army for the lead; Mao Zedong advocated that the Red Army should take advantage of the current vigorous anti-Japanese situation to actively develop toward Shanxi and seek the consolidation of the Soviet region in the course of development.
When expounding this proposition, Mao Zedong pointed out: The current situation is on the eve of great changes in the whole country, which is conducive to the development of revolutionary forces, the Soviet zone must develop rapidly outward, and the Red Army must be rapidly expanded, and the favorable conditions and advantages of the eastern expedition to Shanxi have been expounded in detail.
After repeated discussions, the meeting accepted Mao Zedong's proposal and adopted the Central Committee Resolution on Military Strategic Issues. The resolution clearly states that the Party's strategic policy in the present situation is: Under the general task of opposing the Japanese imperialist attack on China with a resolute national war, the Party and the Red Army must "integrate the civil war with the national war" in political, military propaganda and practical action, and in 1936 they should "prepare the strength for direct combat against Japan" and "violently expand the Red Army." Under this policy, the operational deployment of the Red Army should be based on the two tasks of opening up the anti-Japanese line and consolidating and expanding the existing Soviet zone, with the former as the central task.
According to this, the red army's operations and the development of the Soviet zone should be mainly oriented towards Shanxi and Suiyuan. The resolution proposes that the Red Army should develop and consolidate the Shaanxi-Gansu-Suzhou region in three steps:
The first step is to strike at the invading enemy on the northern and southern fronts of Shaanxi, to ensure the security of the rear at the time of the next eastern expedition, and to make political, military, and organizational preparations for crossing the Yellow River; the second step is to carry out the eastern expedition and enter Shanxi to fight, in order to break the main force of the Jin Sui Army in Yan Xishan, which is in collusion with the Japanese army, open up the areas above the five counties of western Jin to become the initial Soviet zone, expand the troops and raise supplies, and ensure the necessary boats to cross the river needed to return to Shaanxi if necessary; the third step, according to the situation of the Japanese army's attack on Suiyuan, turn from Shanxi to Suiyuan at an appropriate time.
The resolution also states:
It is necessary to enable the Red Second and Sixth Red Armies and the Red Fourth Front to play their strategic role in weakening and containing the Kuomintang army; to restore guerrilla warfare in the north and south of the Yangtze River to a situation of development, and to wage and carry out guerrilla warfare in all provinces, especially in the Japanese-occupied areas, the "autonomous" areas, and their neighboring provinces; and all guerrilla units should appear in the guise of national war. The resolution also made specific stipulations on the work of carrying out the armed struggle between the Mongolian and Hui ethnic minorities, the revolutionary movement of the white army soldiers, and the implementation of the strategy of the "anti-Japanese coalition army."
The resolution reaffirms:
In strategic defense, it is opposed to pure defense and active defense; in strategic offensive, it is necessary to oppose both underestimation of the revolutionary situation and the policy of adventurism and adventurism. Whether defensive or offensive, basically it is to fight a mobile war and oppose a position war that does not give up an inch of land; to concentrate forces in the main direction, to practice strategic one-fist doctrine and to oppose two-fist doctrine; to practice campaign battles in the strategic inner line and to fight on the outer line of campaign battles in a protracted strategic way; to oppose strategic and general campaign defeat battles; to have a comprehensive plan in command, to oppose taking one step at a time, and to allow for division of command under unified determination. In order to strengthen the centralized and unified leadership of military operations, the resolution gives "the Military Commission full authority within the military sphere".
Why did the Crusade fail?
When the Red Army's eastern expedition to Shanxi severely damaged Yan Xishan, Yan Xishan repeatedly called Chiang Kai-shek to ask the Central Army to enter Jin for rescue. On the 24th, Chiang Kai-shek sent Chen Cheng to Shanxi to serve as the commander-in-chief of the "Central Army" that entered the Jin Dynasty and assist Yan Xishan in commanding the operation. Subsequently, the enemy began to organize a counter-offensive against the Red Army, in an attempt to first seize the crossings controlled by our army, blockade the Yellow River, and then separately encircle and annihilate our respective armies in the area east of the Yellow River.
On 22 April, the commander of the Red Army decided on 22 April that the course of action of our army in the future was: "Basically, in order to protrude the blockade line to the east or north and enter the southeast or northwest of Jin; specially, also for the sake of crossing the west to attack Yang Hucheng if necessary." The commander of the Front stressed that in any case, it was necessary to choose very favorable conditions for combat and to avoid uncertain battles.
On 28 April, after further analyzing the enemy situation in Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Gansu, Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai telephoned Zhou Enlai and the heads of various corps, pointing out: At present, on the Shanxi side, a total of 51 regiments of the Yan army and Chiang Kai-shek's army are adopting fortress doctrine and steadily advancing toward us; on the Shaanxi side, Chiang Kai-shek has forced the Northeast Army and the Northwest Army to attack north in an attempt to blockade the Yellow River; the Shenfu area, the trilateral area, huanxian county, Heshui, and the areas west of it are relatively empty.
"According to the above situation, the front army no longer has smooth conditions for combat in Shanxi, but in Shaanxi and Gansu, there have been smooth conditions, allowing us to carry out activities there in order to carry out tasks such as expanding the Soviet zone, training the Red Army, and training cadres. On the other hand, smashing traitors to disrupt the anti-Japanese rear plan is also an important task at present. ”
Therefore, "our army decided to cross the Yellow River in the west, and the first step was to assemble in the extended area."
On May 2, the commander of the front issued an order to cross the river, stipulating that the whole army should take advantage of the darkness of the night to cross the Yellow River in batches through Qingshui Pass and Tieluo Pass. In the evening, our army began to cross the west, and by May 5, all the crossings were completed, and we entered the Yanchang, Yanchuan, and Yongping areas for recuperation. The painstaking plan drawn up by Jiang and Yan Xu to encircle and annihilate our army on the east bank of the Yellow River was completely unsuccessful.
The Crusade of the Red Army was a strategic offensive campaign. During the 75-day operation, a total of about 7 regiments of the enemy were destroyed, more than 4,000 enemy personnel were captured, more than 4,000 guns (guns) of various kinds were captured, and more than 20 guns were captured, which gained important experience in river operations, improved the combat effectiveness of the troops, and forced the Jin Sui Army that "advanced and suppressed" northern Shaanxi to withdraw to Shanxi, so that the Northern Shaanxi Soviet Region could be restored and developed.
During this period, our army expanded its recruits to about 8,000 new recruits, raised more than 300,000 yuan, and carried out mass work in more than 20 counties in Shanxi, publicizing the party's anti-Japanese ideas, expanding the political influence of our party and our army, and promoting the development of the anti-Japanese national united front and the anti-Japanese salvation movement in north China and even the whole country.
Third, the decision-making of the Western Expedition
Stalin's proposal in the summer of 1935 not to oppose the Red Army's proximity to Outer Mongolia and Xinjiang was the result of a long and in-depth investigation by the Comintern and the Soviet Union and consideration of the question of concrete assistance to the Ccp and the Red Army.
Also in September 1934, the head of the Far East Bureau of the Comintern stationed in Shanghai explicitly proposed that the Northwest Bureau of the COMMUNIST Party of China, jointly composed of the military and political leaders of the Communist Party of China and the personnel of the Liaison Department of the Communist International, should be organized as soon as possible in Almaty, Central Asia, the Soviet Union, to immediately investigate the possibility of sending personnel to the northwestern provinces of China through Xinjiang, Outer Mongolia and other places, directly assisting the Red Army in northern Shaanxi, and connecting the Red Army in Sichuan through northern Shaanxi.
In early November, Piyanitsky, deputy general secretary of the Comintern and head of the Liaison Bureau, also wrote to Pilkin, director of the Intelligence Bureau of the Red Army of the Soviet Union, asking him to try to assist in the investigation of the situation in China's northwest frontier in order to consider the possibility of concrete assistance to the Chinese Red Army through China's northwestern border.
In April 1935, the Eastern Secretariat of the Executive Committee of the Communist International had clearly stated that a strategic base should be created in the northwest region, near the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia. The Soviet Ministry of Defense, the Soviet Military Intelligence Service and the Liaison Office of the Communist International formed a trio devoted themselves to the future development plans of the Chinese Red Army in northwestern China and Soviet assistance.
The Communist International was so painfully agreed to provide military assistance, which greatly encouraged the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. In accordance with the request of the call from the Comintern, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China immediately made specific operational arrangements. On September 14, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China formally informed the leaders of the First, Second, and Fourth Fronts of the Red Army, saying: "The international telephone agrees to occupy Ningxia and western Gansu, and our army can help us after it occupies the Ningxia region." In order to resolutely implement the international directives, it is prepared to occupy Ningxia in two months. “
To this end, the CPC Central Committee put forward the "Jing (Ning) Hui (Ning) Campaign Plan", requiring the Second and Fourth Fronts to go all out to the north, join forces with the First Army to seize the Longde, Jingning, Huining, and Tongwei areas, and the Four Fronts army and the Second Front Army in turn control of the Sealand Avenue; then the First Front Army first captured the northern part of Ningxia, and the Fourth Front Army immediately captured the southern part of Ningxia.
At this time, the Red Second Front had suffered too many attritions and was already difficult to undertake combat tasks; the Fourth Front, which had been fighting all the way, was incessant and exhausted, was in serious shortage of clothing, food, and ammunition, and felt arduous about the task of competing with the Central Army for the Sealand Avenue, so it hesitated to implement the "Jinghui Campaign Plan" of the CPC Central Committee.
Despite repeated explanations by Mao Zedong and others, Zhang Guotao insisted that the Ningxia region was too small and that the First and Fourth Fronts should not be concentrated in Ningxia. He suggested that the four fronts should cross the Yellow River with two armies from the area of Yongjing and Xunhua west of Lanzhou to seize the area around Yongdeng and Hongchengzi; one army should stay at the crossing port for defense, and two armies should be deployed in the Zhangxian area to attract and contain Hu Zongnan to complete the task, and all three fronts would be transferred to liangzhou and Yongdeng, with one unit moving toward Jingyuan and Zhongwei, and cooperating with the other army to cross the Yellow River from the Ningxia section of Jingyuan.
Since there was no diversion of the Second and Fourth Fronts in the south, and the task of capturing Ningxia could not be completed by relying on one side alone, the CPC Central Committee had to change its original plan and propose that the main force of the First Army could be sent south, and the Second and Fourth Fronts could jointly complete the task of attacking the south of Huzong with the Second and Fourth Fronts, and then turn around and capture Ningxia. Zhang Guotao and others still opposed this, insisting that the four fronts crossing the west alone and cooperating with the first army could cause the Red Army to attack the enemy forces in the Ningxia section on the east and west banks of the Yellow River, which would be more favorable to the operation.
By this time, however, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China had already established relations with the Comintern and had obtained official recognition of the Comintern. Although Zhang Guotao and others insisted that their plans were more secure militarily, after all, they had great responsibilities and did not dare to act arbitrarily.
Therefore, while insisting on his own views, Zhang Guotao still could not but express his willingness to abandon his differences with the CPC Central Committee and act according to orders. The telegram said: "It is extremely important to unify leadership, and there should be no more disagreements in today's unified implementation of the international line and arduous struggle."
Therefore, we propose that Comrades Zhang Wentian and others be asked to guide everything in the name of the Central Committee. Including the plan of the four fronts to the west, if the brother and others still take the northward advance as a matter of necessity, please stop it immediately, and tell the future course of action, the brother and other immediate obedience. Since Zhang Guotao expressed his recognition of the authority of the central authorities and his willingness to act in accordance with the central orders, the CPC Central Committee naturally stopped taking a consultative attitude and decided to make a decision. On September 27, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China ordered the four fronts to go north immediately, join the first army, cross the river from Ningxia and Lanzhou, and seize Ningxia and Ganxi.
The Second Front Army should temporarily restrain the enemy on the outer flank in order to facilitate the action of our main force. At this point, the controversy between Zhang Guotao and the CPC Central Committee over the operational policy of capturing Ningxia came to an end, and Zhang Guotao said that he would follow the order of the CPC Central Committee to stop the plan of the four fronts' westward crossing, and formulated the "Tong (Wei) Zhuang (Lang) Jing (Ning) Hui (Ning) Campaign Plan" and turned to the north.
On the same day that the CPC Central Committee ordered the Four Fronts to go north to join forces with the First Front to capture Ningxia, the Comintern also sent a further telegram to the CPC Central Committee that the Soviet Union would provide assistance to the Red Army from the direction of Outer Mongolia, and that the Red Army must seize the Suiyuan Dingyuan camp and reach forward to the outer Mongolian border to receive supplies.
Subsequently, in response to the proposal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to transport the materials to the vicinity of Dingyuan Camp as much as possible, the Comintern further informed the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China that the Soviet side would provide the Red Army with 300 trucks and about 550 to 600 tons of military supplies. But these trucks cannot go deep beyond the border of Outer Mongolia 100 kilometers away, otherwise it is tantamount to aggression against China.
The Red Army had to find a way to subdue possible harassment by King Suiyuan and other warlords, ensure that the cars would not be attacked by the Air Force, and be able to send enough troops to receive the goods, and since the Soviets were ready to deliver supplies, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China could not wait to change the original plan for The Yellow River to freeze in December before attacking Ningxia. At this time, it happened that the four fronts lost their campaign plans, and Chiang Kai-shek hurriedly dispatched the two divisions of Guyuan to the south and urged Hu Zongnan and other central armies to advance rapidly.
Fourth, the failure of the first phase of the Western Expedition
Therefore, on 11 October, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission officially issued the "Operational Program for October", and decided that the Four Fronts Army would quickly advance to the Jingyuan and Zhongwei areas with one army, choose the river crossing point that was conducive to attacking the Zhongwei and Dingyuan camps, complete all preparations for crossing the river by November 1, and at the same time rest in the tongwei, Mayingzhen, Jingning and Huining areas, and send detachments to force the enemies in Dingxi, Longxi, Wushan, Gangu, Qin'an, Zhuanglang, and Jingning, in an effort to keep the Sealand Avenue in our hands in October.
The Second Front advanced to the area south of Shipu, north of Tongwei and Maying Towns, and after a few days of rest, moved to the area north of the Jingning and Longde Lines, and prepared to take over the defensive tasks of the First Army north of Guyuan with the main force or one.
On the one hand, the main force of the Western Field Army of the Army maintained the Yuwang Fort in the hub of Tongxin City. On the one hand, all the Western Field Army and three armies of the Dingyan First And Fourth Fronts formed the attacking force and attacked by November 10.
As soon as the October Operational Program was first implemented, it had to be changed temporarily due to insufficient estimation of the speed of advance of the Kuomintang Central Army. Under the supervision of Chiang Kai-shek, the Kuomintang army marched from the three directions of east and south and west to the Jingning, Tongwei, and Huining areas where the four fronts were located, and the four fronts not only had no conditions for rest at all, but also had no possibility of calmly crossing the river.
As soon as the Four Fronts passed through the Sealand Avenue, the Kuomintang army entered and occupied Huajiapu, Huining, Tongwei, Jingning, Jieshipu and other places on the 23rd, and the Sealand Avenue fell under its control. As soon as the Sealand Avenue was lost, the situation immediately became very unfavorable to the Red Army. Although the Fourth Front Army rushed to Jingyuan and the Tarach area from 24 to 26 April, it successively transported the 30th Army, the 9th Army, and the General Headquarters of the Front Line across the river, but because the speed of Huzong's advance to the south was too fast, the Western Field Army of the First Army was under great pressure, and Peng Dehuai could not but demand that the Hedong troops of the Four Fronts Army coordinate with the main force of the Western Field Army of the First Front Army to attack the south of Huzong at Guo chengyi to ensure that the southern front was not lost.
Accordingly, the 4th Army and the 31st Army of hedong of the Fourth Front Were ordered to break away from the Four Fronts Army and come under the command of Peng Dehuai, the headquarters of the Red Army and the commander-in-chief of the front.
In fact, however, the battle at Guo Chengyi to lure hu zong south was not carried out; instead, the 5th Army, which had remained in Hedong to guard the ferry, was forced to withdraw across the Yellow River due to the oppression of Hu Zong's south.
The Kuomintang army then pressed large-scale to the areas of Guo Chengyi and Daluzi, and took control of the river banks near Jingyuan. The Red Army's action to cross the river to capture Ningxia was suspended, and the Red Army was cut into two parts, Hexi and Hedong, with 21,000 men of the Four Fronts remaining in Hexi, while more than 50,000 men of the three fronts were intercepted in Hedong.
Because the Kuomintang Central Army was advancing too quickly and the remaining area of Ganbei was too small to be a lethal campaign against the central army organization, the CPC Central Committee not only could not let the Hexi troops go north alone to seize Dingyuan, but also needed the latter to take on the task of containment, but also could not but turn to Zhang Xueliang for help, and urgently telegraphed Ye Jianying, the CPC representative who was in Xi'an: "The Ningxia plan Chiang Kai-shek is actively undermining, and we are thinking of countermeasures, please Yi (Zhang Xueliang's code name) also raise it for me... Ask Yi what is the way to stop the civil war when this country is at a critical juncture?"
V. The Failure of the Second Phase of the Western Expedition
On 30 October, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission reported to the Secretariat of the Comintern on the defeat of the Red Army in the river crossing operation. A few days later, the Comintern also called to say that the method of aid from Outer Mongolia was invalid, and the Soviet side would instead provide assistance via Xinjiang from the Soviet Union, this time doubling the aid materials, and asking the Red Army to go to Hami in Xinjiang from the Ganxi Hexi Corridor to pick up and transport them.
In this regard, the CPC Central Committee explicitly replied:
"The method of transporting goods from Hami is no longer useful to our main Red Army, and this change is too late. The Red Army, of about 21,000 men, had crossed the river, and it would take a long time to advance in the direction of Hami, but it would take a long time to defeat the enemies and fortresses in this area through a distance of more than five thousand miles, at least next summer. And unless you send it to Ansi by car, it is impossible for the Red Army to pick it up in Hami. Because between Hami and Anxi is a desert that is uninhabited for 1,500 miles. “
The Battle of Ningxia failed. The Red Army was no longer able to reach a compromise with Nanking without Soviet aid. Under these circumstances, although the CPC Central Committee continued to strive to achieve political understanding with Chiang Kai-shek, it was well aware that military inferiority could only enable Chiang Kai-shek to further raise the asking price politically, and the result was that the two sides could not compromise, and Chiang Kai-shek would certainly seize the opportunity to intensify military "encirclement and suppression" and try to eliminate the Red Army in order to solve the problem once and for all. Therefore, after the defeat in the Ningxia Campaign, the CENTRAL Committee of the Communist Party of China must first make military preparations for the worst.
The Western Route Army fought for more than four months in western Gansu, wounding and capturing about 20,000 enemy soldiers, dealing a heavy blow to Ma Bufang and Ma Buqing's troops. The vast number of commanders and fighters of the Western Route Army, with the revolutionary heroism of being invincible and not afraid of hardships and dangers, fought bloody battles against the enemy under extremely difficult conditions, and created many heroic deeds that can be sung and wept. Their spirit of heroic dedication to the revolution will always be admired by future generations of the revolution.
On November 13, 1936, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China convened a meeting of the Politburo to discuss the direction of the Red Army's next move. Mao Zedong clearly said: Originally, there was not much certainty in attacking Ningxia, but in the past it was not seen as so serious. Now that the plan had failed, the Red Army must change course of action in order to survive. To this end, we should first go south to Pingliang, Jingchuan, Changwu, Ningxian and Zhengning, and then, according to the situation, either east into Shanxi, or south to Henan or Hubei, and jump to the outside line. After a long expedition of about a year, he managed to return to the northwest. On the same day, the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee adopted Mao Zedong's proposal and telegraphed the Comintern.
Under these circumstances, and as the CPC Central Committee had predicted, Chiang Kai-shek's mentality had changed markedly, and he did not even mention a political solution. Zhang Xueliang took advantage of the fact that Chiang kai-shek was in Xi'an at that time and boldly persuaded Chiang kai-shek to stop "suppressing the Communists," unite with Russia and the Communists, and conspire to resist Japan. Unexpectedly, Chiang Kai-shek refused: "Can the Communist Party unconditionally hand over guns and be manipulated?" Otherwise it doesn't matter. Even if "the Communist Party draws a pistol in front of its face, it will not compromise with it." Chiang said that the Comintern wanted the CCP to cooperate with the Nanjing Central Committee, while he wanted the CCP to surrender.
If the CCP does not agree, he will not resist Japan unless he destroys the CCP first: if Russia oppresses him and must tolerate the Communist Party in order to help him resist Japan, then he would rather not unite with Russia. Therefore, Chiang Kai-shek openly preached at this time in the Wang Qu Chang'an Officer Training Corps: "The red bandits are close enemies, Japan is a distant enemy, and the only task at present is to suppress bandits, otherwise they are reactionary." "The situation in the relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party is even worse than before.
(End of text)
If there are other topics or opinions on the field of history, you can [follow] my private chat, or you can leave a message in the comment area below and reply at the first time.
Friends who think the article is good, may wish to click a free follow, your support is my greatest motivation!