The Zuo Zhuan records four hundred and ninety-two wars, the most detailed of which is the Battle of Chengpu between Jin and Chu. The Battle of Chengpu was not only related to the ownership of the famous "hegemon" in the Spring and Autumn Period, but also the process of dividing forces between the two major powers in the Central Plains and the Yangtze River.
In this war, the monarchs, generals, and strategists of the two countries have shown their abilities and given full play to their talents, and the other countries involved in this war have also appeared. It can be said that the Spring and Autumn War before the Battle of Chengpu was still only a traditional "righteous war", starting from the Battle of Chengpu, the way of war in the entire era and the diplomatic, political, economic and other aspects involved began to become the consideration that truly determined the direction of the times.
I. The "international" situation before the Battle of Chengpu
In the Spring and Autumn Period, although Zhou Tianzi still had the title of co-lord of the world, no princely state really obeyed his orders, and the so-called "government decree does not go out of Luoyi" is a true description. In particular, the State of Chu, which is located in the south, has repeatedly directly threatened the status of Zhou Tianzi, and even appeared in the situation of "trying to ask the weight of the ding", which shows that many princely states represented by the State of Chu are very covetous of the status of Zhou Tianzi.
The first overlord of the Spring and Autumn Period, Duke Huan of Qi, played the slogan of "Honoring the King", attacked Shanrong in the north and attacked the Chu state in the south, ensuring the safety of the central plains including Zhou Tianzi, and was jointly regarded as the "chief of the princes". However, with the death of Duke Huan of Qi and the civil strife of the State of Qi, there was no situation in the Central Plains without the leadership of the major powers, and the State of Chu took the opportunity to attack the Central Plains again, and many small states were forced to become vassals of the State of Chu. With the song kingdom completely defeated by the Chu state, king Cheng of Chu's desire to drink the Yellow River seems to be just around the corner.
Second, the reason for the outbreak of the Battle of Chengpu
Ostensibly, the final outbreak of the Battle of Chengpu was due to the fact that the State of Chu attacked and besieged the capital of the State of Song, and the State of Song asked the State of Jin for help, which triggered a series of major wars that followed. However, in fact, the ancestors of the Jin state had already told Jin Wengong the true nature of this great war: "Repay the rescue of the sick, take the danger and determine the hegemony, so it is in the end." That is to say, repaying the kindness of the Song State to the Jin Wengong in the past can be used as an excuse for this military dispatch, and the real purpose is to establish the supremacy of the Jin State through this war.
In fact, Duke Wen of Jin spent nineteen years in exile in various countries, and in many countries he was entertained by the monarch and discriminated against by some countries. For a monarch these things may not be taken to heart, but when these situations can be used for a certain purpose, they can naturally be used. Duke Wen of Jin accepted Xianxun's suggestion, agreed with him, and prepared for a major battle with the State of Chu.
III. The status of the Battle of Chengpu in the Zuo Zhuan
The Confucian classic "Zuo Zhuan", which has always cherished words such as gold and praised and deprecated, devotes a lot of space to a detailed description of the Battle of Chengpu, which shows that this war had an extremely far-reaching impact on the direction of the overall situation at that time, and even people at that time could feel it. The description of the strategy of the two countries before the war, Jin, and Chu, also highlights the importance of the two countries to this war and the contest between the two sides, which can be said to be wonderful.
Why are Confucians, who have always advocated the cultivation of benevolence, so interested in the plot of the Battle of Chengpu in the classic Zuo Zhuan? In fact, the plots recorded in the "Zuo Biao" abound, and the Jin Wengong in the Battle of Chengpu not only used the power plots and moral religion, but also gained the upper hand in strategy, and also occupied the highest point in morality, and it was the rational use of the previous grievances by the Jin Wengong and his subordinates that made the Jin state become a "moral model" while winning the war.
Fourth, the process of the Battle of Chengpu
1. Jin Wengong's concerns and the admonitions of King Cheng of Chu
Before the Battle of Chengpu, Duke Wen of Jin was very worried about the prospects of war. Jin Wengong even dreamed that he and Chu Chengwang had a direct duel, and that he was defeated and knocked to the ground by King Chu Cheng, who pressed Jin Wen's mouth and directly sucked his brain juice. The jin ministers Hu Yan, Xianxun, Luan Zhi, and others successively advised them from the angles of interest and auspiciousness, which strengthened the confidence of Jin Wengong.
When King Cheng of Chu sent a large army, he once warned the commander Ziyu that if the Jin army retreated, he should never pursue it. Ziyu did not follow King Cheng's admonition in the course of the subsequent war, which was regarded as the cause of the defeat. In fact, this is the anxiety and worry caused by the fact that neither country has the certainty of victory before the war. Because the two countries have been in a state of almost equality militarily through joint alliances and alliances.
2. War breaks out
The State of Chu attacked the State of Song on the grounds that the State of Song did not obey the orders, officially opening the curtain of war. The Strength of the State of Song itself was not enough to resist the State of Chu, and after the defeat of the Song Xiang Army, it was even more difficult to sustain itself, so it had to ask the State of Jin for help. On the one hand, Duke Wen of Jin accepted the suggestion of Xianxun, while actively contacting other princely states to seek foreign assistance, on the other hand, he sent troops to attack the Chu state's subordinate states in the Central Plains, Wei and Cao.
Because of its hatred for the State of Chu, the State of Song desperately defended the capital. The State of Jin formed an alliance with Qin and Qi and successively captured Wei and Cao. When the Commander of the Chu Army, Zi Yu, after learning that Wei and Cao had been destroyed, occupied favorable terrain on the one hand, and negotiated with the Jin state on the other hand, hoping to restore the Jin state to Wei and Cao on the condition of lifting the siege of the Song state. Duke Wen of Jin privately contacted the wei and cao monarchs, saying that as long as they agreed to unite with the Jin state, they would restore the country.
Wei and Cao accepted the request of the State of Jin and successively renounced the State of Chu. Ziyu was enraged and led his troops directly to the Jin army. Jin Wengong accepted Xianxun's suggestion and took the initiative to retreat. At that time, the first house was thirty miles, and the third house was ninety miles away. It was not until Chengpu that it was re-garrisoned. Ziyu pursued to the area, and the climax of the Battle of Chengpu was about to unfold.
3. The decisive battle of Chengpu
The combined forces of Jin, Song, Qi, and Qin confronted the Chu army. The Jin army divided the army into left, center, and right roads, and the Middle Route Army was defeated and took the initiative to attract the Chu army to pursue. The Chu army took the initiative to pursue after the plan, but was caught between the left and right sides, resulting in a major defeat. Fortunately, the Chinese army led by Ziyu did not participate in the pursuit, otherwise it would be a situation in which the entire army would be destroyed. After Ziyu quickly withdrew his troops, he committed suicide because he was angry with King Chu Cheng without face.
Duke Wen of Jin stayed in the camp of the State of Chu for three days, and after hearing the news of Ziyu's suicide, Duke Wen of Jin was overjoyed, believing that there was no one in the State of Chu who could treat the people well. After that, he built a palace for Zhou Tianzi and invited Zhou Tianzi to make an alliance with the princes. Previously, many states that supported the State of Chu, such as the State of Zheng, had all led to the State of Jin, and Duke Wen of Jin became the second overlord after Duke Huan of Qi to be both crowned by Zhou Tianzi and recognized by the princely states. Jinguo's career also reached its peak.
V. Why it is said that the Battle of Chengpu was a double victory of Jin Wengong's "moral religion" and "power plot"
From the very beginning, the Battle of Chengpu was used by Jin Wengong to carry out a series of planning and preparations such as diplomacy and strategy by Jin Wengong. Just like xianxun said, "repaying the sick and taking the danger and fixing the hegemony", the retribution is the grace accepted in that year, and the rescue of the patient is the highest moral behavior, and the purpose of these two moral evaluation standards is to achieve the goal of "taking the danger and determining the hegemony". The Battle of Chengpu ended with the final victory of the Jin State, which was the embodiment of Jin Wengong's transformation of "moral education" into "power plot".
1. Help allies under the pretext of helping the needy
The war did not involve the Jin state in the beginning, which made the Jin state have no suitable reason and excuse even if it wanted to directly participate in the war. However, this excuse appeared when the Song State asked the Jin State for help, because during the nineteen years of exile of the Jin Dynasty, the Jin Wengong had been warmly entertained by the Song Xianggong, and it was precisely at this time that he used the excuse of repaying the favor to directly participate in and even lead the war.
What's more, helping the dying countries can gain a sense of identity and belonging among a wide range of princely states, which is conducive to creating a significant reputation for the Jin state. If it is successful, it can make the Jin state jump up and directly become the hegemon. Even if it failed, as in Xianxun's analysis, the Jin state could fully rely on the dangers of the Yellow River and the Taihang Mountains, and the mainland would not be lost.
2. Use past exile friendships to contact allies
Objectively speaking, although the Jin state at that time had recovered its national strength under the administration of The Duke Wen of Jin, it was still difficult to directly confront the State of Chu. Therefore, Duke Wen of Jin used the foundation of his relationship with other friendly princely states during his past exile to build an alliance and joined other powerful countries at that time to resist the Chu state. For example, the State of Qi and the State of Qin also saw the aftermath of the chu state's dominance and could use the opportunity to form a good alliance with the State of Jin.
3. Use the means of rising and falling to win over the hostile forces
At the beginning of the war, the State of Jin did not directly send troops to the State of Song, but after stabilizing the determination of the State of Song to hold firm, it first captured the two vassal states of the State of Chu, Wei and Cao. Duke Wen of Jin hoped to attract the main forces of the Chu state through this strategy of "encircling Wei and saving Zhao". When the State of Chu did not make a plan, the State of Jin quickly changed its strategy, but took advantage of the opportunity of negotiations with the State of Chu to win over the monarchs of these two countries and bring them into their own camp.
This plot of power by The Duke wen of Jin was very clever, not only breaking the iron plate formed by the many belonging states that originally belonged to the Chu alliance, but also making the allies of the Chu state no longer trust the Chu state. At the same time, it also made its own alliance more solid, and also took the opportunity to win over the objects that could be co-opted, expanding the strength of its own side. For example, the State of Lu directly turned its back on the State of Chu and defected to the side of the State of Jin.
4. Retreat and slow down hostility
The most splendid plot of Jin Wengong was to "retreat from the three houses". The active retreat of the Jin army not only shortened its own supply line and lengthened the supply road of the other side, but also made the geographical advantages of the two sides interchangeable, and the Jin state could find favorable terrain for itself. What was even better was that the Chu state developed the psychology of light enemies, and thus was defeated by the Jin state's strategy of enticing the enemy in the course of the battle.
And the starting point of all this is the way that Duke Wen of Jin promised to repay King Cheng of Chu, that is, the two armies must retreat after the Jin state must retreat and then fight a decisive battle. This makes the jin and jin wengong's power schemes all used in the way of morality, everything is logical and unpretentious, and there is really no flaw in all aspects.
epilogue
Jin Wengong's plot was carried out using virtue, and morality implied power. The two complement each other, which not only makes it difficult for the local enemy to distinguish between true and false, but also makes jin Wengong usher in the victory of morality while winning the victory of power. Jin Wengong's power and morality were both pronged, and they were impeccable in both moral and strategic aspects, and truly achieved the perfect combination of mercury and taoism.