The author | Zhao Xin and Wan Muqiao
On March 28, on the day of the announcement of the 2021 financial report, a fire incident occurred in Xiaopeng Motors, which made Xiaopeng Motors, which had just boarded the crown of the new car-making force, really embarrassed. Since December 2019, Xiaopeng Automobile has had a total of 5 fire incidents, and some of the causes of the fire have not been announced, and some views believe that it is inseparable from its power battery.
A judgment shows that Shanghai Delangeng Power Battery Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Delangeng") was once the power battery supplier of Xiaopeng Automobile, which supplied Xiaopeng Automobile's 18650 cylindrical battery, but the battery power supplied by the company was not up to standard, so it was required to return by Xiaopeng Automobile.
The study found that Delange was originally one of the top ten suppliers of new energy batteries in China, but after the introduction of strategic investors, the performance did not meet the standard for three consecutive years, and the investors were compensated for two years of expenses according to the VAM agreement, and then the company changed internally, the chairman and general manager were dismissed, and they have been displaced overseas so far, and the company is in a state of loss of control.
What is even more lamentable is that the listed companies that invested in Delangen also fell into losses due to a number of investment mistakes, and eventually ended up delisting. In the face of the new energy outlet that can now blow pigs into the sky, both Delangeng and investors who are savvy in calculation have missed the opportunity to let them soar.
The embarrassment of new energy vehicle sales
On March 28, Xiaopeng Motors released its 2021 financial report showing that Xiaopeng Motors' total annual revenue was 20.99 billion yuan, an increase of 259.1% year-on-year; the total delivery of new cars in the whole year was 98,000 units, an increase of 263% year-on-year, ranking first among the three new car-making forces of Weilai, Xiaopeng and Ideal.
It is worth noting that in the fourth quarter of 2021, the revenue of Xiaopeng Automobile was 8.56 billion yuan, an increase of 200.1% year-on-year, and its growth momentum was strong.
But what is embarrassing is that on the night of the financial report on March 28, a news of Xiaopeng Automobile catching fire again was really abrupt.
According to the Phoenix Network, on the evening of March 28, the parked vehicles in the Longhua District of Shenzhen City suddenly caught fire, and the firefighters carried out on-site fire extinguishing, although the fire was controlled, the whole vehicle was still burned and scrapped, fortunately there were no casualties. On March 29, Xiaopeng Motors officially responded, confirming that the model involved was the 2019 Xiaopeng G3, and the cause of the accident was under investigation.
According to the official website of Xiaopeng Automobile, there are currently six models on sale of Xiaopeng G3, with a price range of 168,900 to 203,900, equipped with two kinds of batteries, lithium iron phosphate and ternary lithium batteries. In addition, there are two models of Xiaopeng P7 and P5. According to the data, Xiaopeng delivered a total of 98,000 new cars in 2021, of which Xiaopeng G3 accounted for nearly 30%, about 30,000 units, Xiaopeng P7 was 60,600 units, and P5 began to deliver in October last year was 78.65 million units.
It is reported that since December 2019, There have been 5 fire incidents in Xiaopeng Motors' products, including 4 in the G3 series and 1 in the P7 series.
In December 2019, a Xiaopeng G3 in Guangzhou spontaneously combusted, and Xiaopeng officially responded that "spontaneous combustion" was not true, but an open flame appeared in the tail. According to the statement of Xiaopeng Automobile, after testing the accident vehicle, the battery pack was found to be intact and still working normally. Through the investigation of the accident scene, more burning charcoal and lighters were found on the ground at the rear of the car, and it was judged that the accident was caused by an external fire source.
In August 2020, a Xiaopeng G3 in Guangzhou had a smoke and fire, and Xiaopeng's official response found that there were obvious serious bumps and bruises at the bottom of the battery box, resulting in serious damage to the battery, and the preliminary judgment was the cause of the accident.
In fact, in January 2021, the State Administration of Market Supervision issued the Notice on the Recall of Some Xiaopeng G3 Electric Vehicles, requiring the recall of a total of 13,399 Xiaopeng G3s. According to Xiaopeng's official statement, the reason for the recall is due to defective internal structure of the G3 inverter and easy short circuit, which may cause the inverter to have no high voltage power supply, resulting in the downtime of the vehicle in motion.
Some media reports show that G3's inverter supplier, from Jingjin Electric, is not a small brand. Zhu Yulong, a technology giant in the industry, analyzed that the root cause of this recall is Xiaopeng's cost reduction consideration.
The Anti-Short selling research center noted that although more than 13,000 Xiaopeng G3s were recalled, the fire accidents of Xiaopeng cars continued to occur one after another.
In February 2021, a Xiaopeng P7 in Zhaoqing, Guangdong Province, caught fire and burned on the highway, and smoke rose from the scene. The accident is said to be the first fire accident since the listing of Xiaopeng P7, when media reported that Xiaopeng officials had intervened in the investigation, but the anti-short research center did not find the cause of the accident given by Xiaopeng later.
In April 2021, a Xiaopeng G3 in Guangzhou spontaneously combusted during charging next to the charging pile, and later a number of media called Xiaopeng and replied that they were looking for the cause of the accident, and the anti-shorting research center did not find the report of the cause of the accident given by Xiaopeng.
Although the cause of the multiple fires in Xiaopeng Automobile is unknown, what can be seen from combing the accident is that many fire incidents seem to be inseparable from its power battery.
In fact, not only Xiaopeng, in recent years, Tesla, Weilai, BYD, Ideal, Weima and so on have been exposed to fire incidents.
According to public information, from 2011 to 2019, there were 127 publicly reported explosion and fire accidents of new energy vehicles, involving 38 companies and 48 models. From the state in which the fire occurred, 29% of them were parked, 39% were accidents that occurred while driving, 23% were accidents in charging, and some accidents occurred after parking or charging after charging.
For consumers, every "out of control" event such as a fire and a broken shaft in a new energy vehicle will exacerbate consumer distrust. As one of the three core components of new energy vehicles, the safety of power batteries has attracted much attention.
Strange Xiaopeng battery supplier
On July 12, 2021, a judgment of the Guangzhou Intermediate Court was made public, allowing people to know about Xiaopeng Automobile's battery supplier. The plaintiff in this judgment is Guangzhou Xiaopeng Automobile Technology Co., Ltd. (XPEV.US; 09868.HK, hereinafter referred to as "Xiaopeng Automobile"), and the defendant is Shanghai Delangeng Power Battery Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Delangeng"), and the cause of the case is a dispute over the sale and purchase contract of lithium-ion batteries.
The court found that from September 2017 to February 2018, Xiaopeng Automobile and Delange signed the "Supply Guarantee Agreement", stipulating that Delange could supply Xiaopeng Automobile with lithium-ion battery INR18650-320. However, after testing, the battery cell attenuation of Delangeng battery is serious; the battery module has leakage; the cell pressure drop is abnormal; the shipping cell has the risk of internal micro short circuit, and there is a certain proportion of light points in the use of the diaphragm that may be broken down to form a tiny perforation, which is a risk to the high self-discharge of the battery; due to management problems, there are external short circuits in the shipped battery cells, quality problems such as steel shells and terminal pits.
After consultation, Xiaopeng Automobile returned the battery with quality problems, but Delange did not return the corresponding payment. The court confirmed that the total number of orders for Xiaopeng Automobile was 563,410 pieces, the number of returned orders was 438803, and the actual delivery quantity was 124607 pieces, with a total amount of 1,651,361.6 yuan. Accordingly, in the absence of other evidence to prove it, it was determined that Xiaopeng Automobile still had 124607 batteries that had not been returned to Delangen. In the end, the court ruled that Delange could refund the purchase price of 930,000 yuan and interest, and pay a total of 1,926,950 yuan in economic losses.
Public information shows that among the earliest battery suppliers of Xiaopeng Automobile G3, PACK (lithium battery) is supplied by Sunwoda (300207.SZ), and the battery cell comes from BAK battery, which uses cylindrical ternary lithium battery type 18650. But in fact, due to the supply of batteries, the old Xiaopeng G3 on the market has two battery suppliers at the same time: the NEDC version with a range of 351 km is supplied by BAK, and the version with a NEDC endurance of 365 km is supplied by Linkage Tianyi. Linkage Tianyi contracted the 18650 production line of Panasonic's Wuxi factory, and the batteries supplied were basically the same as Tesla's.
The new Xiaopeng G3, which was launched in July 2020, is divided into two models, G3520 and G3400, and the NEDC cruising range can reach 520km and 401km respectively. Among them, the G3520 uses an NCM811 square battery from the Ningde era (300750.SZ). G3400 uses cylindrical batteries, the official did not disclose the supplier, only indicated that it is other domestic battery suppliers.
But then some media found that the mysterious supplier of 18650 cylindrical batteries was Shanghai Delangen. Red Star Capital Bureau asked Xiaopeng Automobile for verification, and the other party did not deny it.
In addition, PACK also comes from two manufacturers, namely Sunwoda and Lion Technology (002684.SZ). After the G3, Xiaopeng Automobile's battery suppliers are mainly CATL and EWELL Lithium Energy (300014. SZ), no longer use batteries from Delunen.
Image source: Sohu.com
How much trouble Droneng's battery has caused to Xiaopeng Motors is not known at present, and it can only be known through the court's judgment that the two companies have torn their faces at Bo Gongtang because of the battery problem.
The introduction of new shareholders has a problem with the battery
Shanghai Delangeng Power Battery Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Delangeng), established on October 20, 2009, legal representative Wu Jiangfeng, registered capital of 176 million yuan. Deqing Meidu New Energy Technology Partnership is the largest shareholder.
According to public information, Delangeng mainly produces 18650 cylindrical lithium-ion batteries, and has been the champion of domestic power battery ratio capabilities. The company has three major production bases in Shanghai, Ningbo and Zhangjiagang, and has a production capacity of 3.5Gwh in May 2017, which is in full production.
General Manager Chen Yao said in an interview with the Research Group of the People's Publishing House "Looking for a Hidden Champion Made in China" that the company was founded by three doctors studying in the United States, Japan and Australia, and the battery supply domestic low-speed electric vehicles and new energy vehicles, and half of them are exported to the United States. However, the company's three founding doctors lacked operational capabilities and the benefits were not ideal, so strategic investors were introduced.
According to public information, in November 2016, The delisted Meidu Energy acquired 49.597% of the equity of Delange for 397 million yuan, becoming the largest shareholder and actual controller of the company. When Meidu Energy entered Delanger, it signed a VAM agreement, and the Delange team promised that the net profit attributable to the parent company after deducting non-recurring gains and losses would be no less than 100 million yuan, 125 million yuan and 156 million yuan in 2017, 2018 and 2019, respectively.
However, from 2017 to 2019, according to the calculation basis of the promised profit, the non-net profit attributable to the mother was -19.4091 million yuan, -120.3941 million yuan and -75.95 million yuan, which was negative for three consecutive years and did not meet the performance commitment. According to the announcement, Meidu Energy received two performance compensation payments of 59.7 million yuan and 121.7081 million yuan from Delonneng in 2017 and 2018, but did not receive performance compensation in 2019.
It is worth noting that in 2017, Delangern ranked tenth in the list of new energy passenger car battery installed capacity in China. Its customers include Dongfeng Motor (600006. SH), NANQI Group, Chengdu Dayun, Zhongzhi Yike, Xiamen Jinlong, Space-time New Energy, Shandong Jihai New Energy, Shandong Kaima, Dayun Automobile, etc.
Image source: Ecological environment viewpoint
However, after Meidu Energy acquired 49.597% of the equity of Delange, the performance commitment of Delangeng was not completed, and there were problems such as not releasing production capacity on schedule, the product qualification rate was not high, and the depreciation of equipment was to be accrued, which can be said to be a problem. Even the first quarter report of 2020 shows that Delange has not reached the total promised net profit (381 million yuan), but Zhejiang Aden Investment Management Co., Ltd., the original shareholder of Delangeng, has not replied after receiving the notice of equity repurchase of the listed company.
According to the Tianyancha APP, as of April 20, 2022, Deloneng Power Battery Company's own risks were as high as 293, 387 peripheral risks, 367 judicial risks, 115 court announcements, and 73 legal proceedings. The amount involved in the lawsuit is 122.42 million yuan, and the company and its legal representative Wu Jiangfeng have received a total of 11 consumption restriction orders, with 6 pieces of information on the judgment debtor and 17 pieces of information on the historical judgment debtor, and the total amount of the executed person and the total amount of the historical execution total of about 200 million yuan; the existing judicial assistance application for 7 pieces of information, 4 pieces of historical information, and a total of 1.1 billion yuan of frozen equity.
The current situation of DeLangen is surprising.
Today, the 18650 large cylindrical batteries produced by Delange can no longer meet the requirements of electric vehicles for battery performance, the market is shrinking, and the installed capacity of Delange only occupies a small share. In response to the situation that the 18650 large cylindrical battery has been exhausted, coupled with domestic overcapacity, a large number of 18650 cylindrical battery companies have turned to electric bicycles, low-speed cars, power tools and energy storage and other fields, but Delange has no intention of transformation.
In recent years, there have been a number of electric vehicle fires in various places, and the relationship with Delanger may not be easy to say, but the fire of Xiaopeng Automobile and the status of Delanger Company are indeed confusing.
Equity hazards and betting cast a defeat
In fact, Meidu Energy, which invested in Dronneng, had a hard time. According to media reports, Meidu Energy cashed out due to investment mistakes, the company received multiple inquiry letters and regulatory letters from the Shanghai Stock Exchange as early as 2020, and finally issued an announcement on the night of August 13, 2020, announcing the delisting the next day.
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According to public information, Meidu Energy was formed by Meidu Group in 2002 through the backdoor Hainan Baohua Industry, and its main business includes oil and gas extraction and sales, new energy, commercial trade, real estate, quasi-financial business and graphene research and development. From public information, the company changed its name to Meidu Holdings after borrowing Baohua Industry, and changed its name to Meidu Energy again in 2014.
In the development process of Meidu Energy, the most highlight is that it fills assets through mergers and acquisitions and makes a high market value, in the 2015 bull market, Meidu Energy's highest market value reached 28.7 billion yuan before the stock market crash in June. However, after this, in order to transform new businesses, Meidu Energy indulged in mergers and acquisitions, laying a solid foundation for delisting.
Let's look at the merger and acquisition of Meidu Energy. In November 2016, September 2017 and October 2017, Meidu Energy announced that it would acquire or increase its capital for 397 million yuan, 240 million yuan and 2.906 billion yuan to acquire or increase its stake in 49.597% of the equity of Delange, 60% of the equity of Haichuang Lithium Battery and 98.51% of the equity of Shandong Ruifu Lithium Industry.
However, these acquired enterprises did not complete their performance commitments in 2018, and the performance of Deloneng, Haichuang Lithium Battery and Ruifu Lithium promised that the performance of 2018 should be 125 million yuan, 30 million yuan and 420 million yuan, respectively, but the net profit attributable to the mother after deduction was -120 million yuan, 18.5509 million yuan and -280 million yuan respectively. Although Delang was able to pay the performance compensation twice, for Meidu, the loss of principal was far more than the compensation received, and this investment was a loss-only transaction.
In addition, in December 2016, Meidu Energy increased its capital by 714 million yuan through its subsidiary Meidu Financial Holdings and acquired 34% of the shares of Xinhehui Internet Financial Services Co., Ltd., becoming the second largest shareholder of Xinhehui, a 100-billion-level P2P platform. However, Xinhehui was eventually investigated by the public security for suspected illegal absorption of public deposits, and the requirement that Xinhehui's performance pledge party perform compensation obligations also became far away because of the investigation and handling of the case.
In these four acquisitions alone, the transaction price involved was as high as 4.257 billion yuan. However, the merger and acquisition not only failed to make the company's operation usher in a turnaround, but successively "stepped on the thunder", which directly led to the company's huge loss, and as a result, Meidu Energy made a goodwill impairment provision and inventory price decline reserve for these companies, which directly led to the company's first loss since its listing in 2018, and the net profit attributable to the mother was -1.096 billion yuan.
Since the second half of 2019, major shareholders, including the actual holding person Wen Zhanghua, have pledged almost all of the company's equity and cashed out. According to public information, the pledge rate of Wenzhaohua equity reached 99.99%, the pledge rate of Meidu Group was 94.76%, the pledge rate of Deqing Parkson equity investment was 98.89%, and the pledge rate of Hangzhou Five Lakes Investment, Hangzhou Zhiheng Investment, Shenzhen Fucai and so on reached 100%. The abnormality of Meidu Energy received a letter of concern and regulatory letter from the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and finally delisted.
Careful analysis of the investment of Meidu Energy will find that the investment of Meidu Energy occupies a large proportion of the equity of the target company, such as 49.597% of the equity of Delangeng, 60% of Haichuang Lithium Battery, 98.51% of the equity of Shandong Ruifu Lithium, and also requires these company teams to sign a performance betting agreement, after these equity possessions, the original management team of the company is almost impossible to re-finance, resulting in these companies once the funds are insufficient, can only resist hard, but only the same end.
People familiar with equity investment said that normal equity investment generally has a boundary, that is, it does not occupy more than 25% of the equity, in order to show respect for the original team and facilitate the decision-making of the original team. Of course, the VAM agreement is an effective means for investment institutions to require the original team to guarantee the performance, and it is generally necessary to sign to ensure the safety of investment funds, and even some require the use of fixed assets such as real estate as collateral.
However, Meidu Energy's investment method seems to pursue another profit model, that is, to make money by performance compensation. The basic feature of this model is: after occupying more than the normal proportion of equity, it can absolutely control the company and sign a performance betting agreement, if the performance is not up to standard, the original team is required to compensate for the loss, so that the invested company quickly loses blood, and then enters an irredeemable situation.
Investment observers believe that this practice seems to be thinking for itself everywhere and designing opponents everywhere, but the direct consequence is that the opponent is forced to die, and finally it is forced to die.
After seeing the news that Xiaopeng Motors sued Delanger, the anti-shorting research center consulted Wu Jiangfeng, the legal representative of Delanger, the leader of the entrepreneurship and the former chairman, who said that the reason why the quality of Delangeng batteries has declined is that the company is already out of control.
Wu Jiangfeng said that around 2020, the people of Meidu Energy, together with his assistants, "arranged to understand the things will take me out of class, do not allow me to face management, I have always had applications, they also ignored, there is no way", "I was taken down very wronged", "the results are lost, Ningbo has gone bankrupt". Although Wu Jiangfeng is no longer involved in the management, he has always been the legal representative of Delangern because the new team hopes that Wu Jiangfeng will continue to assume legal responsibilities.
The Anti-Shorting Research Center saw from Delangen's annual report that the company's 2020 annual report had only 12 employees who paid social security, 48 in 2019, 164 in 2018, 210 in 2017, and 245 in 2016. This shows that the company has almost gone silent.
The new energy outlet that can not be missed
Driven by the background of global carbon neutrality and the acceleration of carbon peaking process, the new energy automobile industry will develop in a spurt in 2021. The data shows that in 2021, China's new energy vehicle sales will be 3.521 million units, an increase of 1.6 times year-on-year, and the domestic retail penetration rate of new energy vehicles will rise rapidly from 5.8% to 14.8%. Due to the surge in demand, the new energy vehicle market has been hot, which has benefited the power battery industry chain of the core components of new energy vehicles.
However, since 2021, the price of lithium carbonate, the upstream raw material of new energy vehicles, has risen from about 50,000 / ton to about 500,000 / ton. This has caused greater cost pressure on the entire industrial chain of new energy vehicles. As a commodity, lithium only accounts for 7% of the world's proven lithium ore, which cannot be monopolized, and its price control has led to a rather embarrassing situation in the new energy vehicle and power battery industry. It can be seen from the lithium grab war between the Ningde era and Ganfeng Lithium in 2021.
Under the pressure of the serious lack of lithium resources and the continuous soaring price of power batteries, since the end of 2021, to the second quarter of 2022, China's new energy vehicles have successively opened a price increase model. Xiaopeng Automobile announced on March 18 that due to the impact of the upstream original price, Xiaopeng Automobile will adjust the price of the models on sale, and the increase in the price before the subsidy will range from 10,100-20,000 yuan. The price adjustment will take effect from 00:00 on March 21. On the evening of April 20, Huawei Q&I M5 also sent a text message to inform customers that price adjustments will be made at 24:00 on May 5.
In addition to the upstream raw materials being pinched by foreign countries, there is no shortage of "monopoly merchants" in the supply chain of new energy vehicles, and the domestic power battery supplier can be described as a dominant one in the Ningde era. In 2021, the global installed capacity of CATL is 96.7GWh, with a market share of 32.6%, which is nearly one-third of the world's installed capacity, ranking first in the world. According to the data released by market research company SNEResearch, in the first two months of this year, the global power battery shipments totaled 53.5GWh, an increase of more than 100% year-on-year, and the shipment and market share of power batteries in the Ningde era were 18.4GWh and 34.4%, respectively, ranking first.
It is reported that CATL will officially release the "Kirin Battery" in April to call off tesla's 4680 large cylindrical battery. At the same time, the heat-free diffusion technology with a higher specific energy range of 1000 km will also be mass-produced in 2023. Other waist power battery companies, such as Ewell Lithium Energy and Fu Neng Technology, are also actively deploying around improving technology and reducing costs to resist the impact of rising raw material prices.
In order to cope with the rising upstream raw material prices, CATL once issued a suggestion that "car companies can reduce production costs and raw material costs by improving product performance and energy density, optimizing product design, improving production processes, improving product yields, achieving more efficient automated production, and reaching in-depth cooperation with the industrial chain." The car companies that are complaining about the pain directly amplify the move and invest in the upstream supply chain. On February 25, 2022, 19 companies increased their capital by 2.43 billion yuan to Sunwoda Electric Vehicle Battery Co., Ltd., including not only Wei Xiaoli, a new domestic car-making force, but also veteran car companies such as SAIC, GAC and Dongfeng.
However, the hustle and bustle of the industry in front of the company of DeLangen may be a passing light and shadow, the company seems to have completely laid flat, more and more litigation and judicial assistance, enforcement are concentrated on the head of this company, this company seems to be too lazy to argue.
We have seen that at present, the lawsuits, judicial assistance applications, and consumption restriction orders that Delange can suffer have all fallen on Delanger Company and Wu Jiangfeng, the legal representative. From the annual report of Delangen, it can be seen that the total number of employees who gave social security to employees in 2017 was 210, the total number of employees who went to social security in 2018 was 164, and the total number of employees who went to social security in 2021 was 12, indicating that the company has basically dispersed.
Wu Jiangfeng said that as early as 2020, after being dismissed from class, he has been stranded abroad, and more and more documents have lost the lawsuit, making it difficult for him to return to China, because he cannot solve the problem by returning, and may also be prosecuted and enforced by the judicial organs. It is not false that Meidu Energy, which invested in Delangeng, received two performance compensation payments, but its principal was completely lost, and Meidu Energy also withdrew from the stock market as early as August 15, 2021.
Observers said that Delang could have had the opportunity to become a good player in the field of new energy batteries, but the difficulty of market expansion and the different ideas of capital after obtaining investment, and finally became a passer-by in the tide of adapting to China's new energy vehicles, and this entrepreneurial team became a chicken that got up prematurely before dawn, starved and thinned himself, and finally ushered in the dawn that had nothing to do with himself.