From the perspective of changes in strategic geography, Liu Bei is much more difficult than Liu Bang, not that Liu Bei is inferior to Liu Bang, but that the strategic pattern of Liu Bei's era has undergone great changes. Therefore, judging the gap solely from the geographical location occupied by the two people and the results achieved is not in line with the law of historical development.
The reason why Liu Bei and Liu Bang are compared together is mainly because both of them have worn the hat of "King of Hanzhong" for a certain period of time, and both are based on Bashu and Hanzhong. Apart from that, I'm afraid there's nothing that can link the two together. Therefore, this comparison needs to start from the strategic geographical changes and analyze the different characteristics of the era in which the two are located.
Liu Bang's strategic model and the reasons for its success
Liu Bei and Liu Bang spent the first half of their lives in turmoil and displacement, and neither of them had any record of taking a shot when it came to marching and fighting. Liu Bang followed the tide of the peasant revolt at the end of Qin, grew his strength in the anti-Qin struggle, and took advantage of the opportunity of Xiang Yu's battle with the Qin army to enter Guanzhong and accept the surrender of zi bao. According to the agreement of the "king of the first entry into Guanzhong", Liu Bang should be sealed in Guanzhong, but Xiang Yu obviously suppressed Liu Bang in the sub-sealing and drove him to Bashu.
Under the plot of the strategist Zhang Liang, Liu Bang once again found Xiang Bo, who had helped him at the Hongmen banquet, and at this time Liu Bang had become a son and daughter with Xiang Bo, and would help say something good no matter what. This time, xiang bo was asked for help, mainly to persuade Xiang Yu to divide the land of Hanzhong to Liu Bang. According to Zhang Liang's planned strategy, it was to gain a foothold through Bashu and Hanzhong, wait for an opportunity to seize Guanzhong, and achieve the strategic posture of the Qin state in that year. Why is this strategic posture so attractive to Zhang Liang?
At the heart of this strategic gesture is not Bashu and Hanzhong, but the Guanzhong region. In the hundreds of years from the Spring and Autumn Warring States to the Qin Sweep Liuhe, the mainland has generally presented two core areas in the east and west, one is the Central Plains and the other is Guanzhong, which is the two strategic centers of the Yellow River Basin in its heyday.
These two central areas are important agricultural production areas, grain is the most important strategic resource in ancient times, with grain there is a concentrated population, taxation, recruitment is also guaranteed, this is the place where civilization originated, but also the place where civilization developed.
Compared with the Central Plains, Guanzhong has no convenient transportation, but it has a closed structure that the Central Plains do not have. It is known as the land of the four plugs, surrounded by mountains on all sides, and a natural defense system is formed by the four major dangerous passes of Hangu Pass, Wuguan, DashanGuan and Xiaoguan. Therefore, the Guanzhong Plain has a more stable agricultural development environment than the Central Plains and the North China Plain.
In addition, there were two more special areas during the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period, one was the Jianghuai region occupied by the Chu state, and the other was the Sichuan region. The Jianghuai region has been compiled into a stable production base with a water system, and in a certain period of time, the degree of prosperity is no less than that of Guanzhong and the Central Plains; the Sichuan region is not valued because it entered the field of civilization later, and is often regarded as an area outside of indoctrination, but Bashu was also a closed and independent structure during the Spring and Autumn Warring States period, and the Sichuan Basin is also a natural high-quality grain producing area.
The founder of the development of the Qin state should be Qin Mugong, during his reign, the Qin state completely dominated the Guanzhong region, which was the capital for the Qin state to enter the list of powerful countries. However, the limitations of the Guanzhong region were not enough to support the Qin state to dominate the east, so the Qin state needed to absorb more nutrients to support its ambition to go east, and the supply of this nutrient came from Hanzhong and Sichuan.
Hanzhong was called Southern Zheng during the Spring and Autumn Period, and under the control of the Shu people, Qin and Shu were constantly at war around this area, changing hands several times during the period. In 387 BC, the State of Qin borrowed the east wind of the Shang Martingale Transformation Law, sent troops to attack Shudi, firmly controlled the Hanzhong region, and set up Hanzhong County within a radius of 600 miles with Nanzheng as the center. With the annexation of Badi by the Qin State, a pattern of Sichuan, Hanzhong, and Guanzhong was formed.
"The kingdom of the great kings has the benefits of Bashu and Hanzhong in the west, hu raccoons and horses in the north, Wushan and Qianzhong in the south, and Wushan and Hanzhigu in the east. The fields are fertile, the people are rich, the chariots are multiplied, the millions are fighting, the wilderness is thousands of miles, the accumulation is abundant, the terrain is convenient, this so-called heavenly palace, the majestic country under the world. ——" Warring States Policy, Volume III
The three regions of Sichuan, Hanzhong and Guanzhong can only be independent in the state of separation, but if they are combined, they will form a strategic complex with a large scale, overall closure and internal interconnection.
From a defensive point of view, the communication between the Bashu region and the east is almost isolated, and it can only be handed over to Guanzhong through Hanzhong. Legend has it that the king of the ancient Shu kingdom, Turtle Ling, was once a Chu national, and one day after accidentally falling into the Yangtze River, he did not go down the river, but went up against the current, rushing all the way to Pi (Chengdu), and after being salvaged, he could be revived, which opened up the connection between the Chu state and Bashu. From this mythical story, it can be seen that under the navigation technology at that time, it was difficult for the outside world to enter the Bashu region by water, and only through such legends could the yearning and curiosity of Bashu be pinned. After Bashu was connected to Guanzhong, it was only used as a subordinate area of the Guanzhong regime, providing it with a steady stream of food and resources, without worrying about pressure from the east.
The four-sai terrain in the Guanzhong region has become a dangerous pass that is difficult for the Kwantung princes to overcome. During the Spring and Autumn Period, in order to thank the State of Qin for its military assistance, the State of Chu ceded the strategic area of Shang in the southern foothills of the Qin Mountains to the State of Qin for 600 miles, where the State of Qin built Wuguan and erected the Great Wall of Nanyang along the ridge of Funiu Mountain, cutting off the route from the Nanyang Basin into Guanzhong. After the Battles of Danyang and Lantian, the State of Qin took the Shangyong region from the State of Chu, and at this point, the entire territory of Hanzhong was returned to the State of Qin, and the State of Chu was unable to cross the Daba Mountains into Sichuan.
From an offensive point of view, after the Guanzhong regime drew a large amount of resources from Hanzhong and Sichuan, it had capital to go east. The overall trend of the continental landform is high in the west and low in the east, and when the Guanzhong regime attacked the eastern plains, it has always maintained a subductive posture, which is particularly important in the era of cold weapons. After the Qin state occupied Shangyong, it opened up the Han River Basin and the Yangtze River Basin, both of which provided the basis for Hanzhong and Sichuan to march east. Therefore, when Sichuan was connected with Hanzhong and Guanzhong, the regimes of the Central Plains and Jianghuai could not compete with it without forming a united whole.
Zhang Liang's strategic vision was thus used by later generations of Mobike, and whenever the monarch praised the chief strategist, he always used the analogy of "my son's room". With reverse thinking, he planned the strategy of marching from Bashu and Hanzhong to Guanzhong, thus making Liu Bang the hegemon of the crowd.
This strategy was successful, also thanks to Xiang Yu, who not only agreed to seal Liu Bang's land in Hanzhong, but also sealed three Qin states as kings in Guanzhong. Among them, only the Yong King Zhang Handan was a general, but he once led 200,000 Guanzhong disciples to surrender, and then was buried alive by Xiang Yu, and the people of Guanzhong hated him. When Liu Bang reached Guanzhong, Zhang Handan, the only one who could fight, was instantly abandoned by the people; Sima Xin, the king of Sai, and Dong Feng, the king of Zhai, who could not fight, surrendered without even resisting.
Liu Bang was able to complete the unification, and Zhang Liang's strategic planning was the decisive factor, so when the 560,000-strong army was defeated by Xiang Yu at Pengcheng, he was able to establish an effective defensive line at Xingyang, facing Xiang Yu with his back to the base area, and achieved Han Xin's great detour tactics. It can be said that the Han army copied the template of the unification of the Qin state, and the strategic geographical factors from the Spring and Autumn Period to the Qin and Han Dynasties determined the direction of the Chu-Han struggle.
Liu Bei's strategic model and the reasons for his failure
Liu Bei also had a "strategic planner", this person is the household name Zhuge Liang, and the "Longzhong Pair" he proposed is considered to be the strategic plan of the Shu Kingdom, but many people do not understand this strategic plan.
As mentioned earlier, the Qin and Han dynasties were all unified by a template, that is, the use of Guanzhong, Hanzhong and Sichuan to successfully counterattack the Central Plains. But this template has weaknesses, and this weakness has become more and more obvious with the continuation of time and the economic development of Jianghuai. That is, any one of the three places of Guanzhong, Hanzhong and Sichuan alone has resources that cannot compete with the Central Plains, and only when the three are unified under one regime can they jointly deal with the Central Plains. Emperor Guangwu of the Eastern Han Dynasty took advantage of this weakness to take advantage of the fragmentation of Guanzhong, Hanzhong, Sichuan and other places to counterattack Guanzhong from the Central Plains, and this counterattack also indicated that Guanzhong's superiority had become a thing of the past.
However, the successful experience of Guanzhong's geographical strategy will always leave various illusions for future generations, so it is repeatedly used in the wars of later generations. This shows that the exploration of predecessors does not represent a strategic failure, and on the basis of the Guanzhong strategy, it is also possible to play an advanced version of it.
This advanced version had already sprouted after the Eastern Han Dynasty, and the Guanzhong strategy actually set the ultimate goal around the Yellow River, and the Yangtze River region was still in a subordinate position before the Qin and Han Dynasties. With the economic development of the Yangtze River region, the south is no longer willing to play a role of accompaniment, but hopes to participate in the deer race and break the wrist with the northern regime.
There is a turning point here, that is, the Eastern Han Dynasty Guangwu Emperor attacked Sichuan along the Three Gorges of the Yangtze River, opening sichuan and Hubei, pulling him into the southern camp, so that it no longer connects the north and even the central plains through Hanzhong. At the end of the Eastern Han Dynasty, Zhuge Liang's "Longzhong Pair" and Zhang Hu's planned Jiangdong strategy (Lu Su's "Jiangdong Pair" and Zhang Hu's views were much the same), invariably focused the strategy on the Yangtze River Basin, and planned a blueprint for the monarch to base itself in the south and then unify to the north.
Zhang Hu pointed out the importance of the Jiangdong region, taking Jiangdong as the foundation, going up the Yangtze River, taking the Ganjiang Valley (Jiangxi) and the Xiangjiang Valley (Hunan), and finally attacking Jingzhou and Sichuan, and completing the unification of the south, so that it could compete with the Central Plains.
Before Liu Bei met Zhuge Liang, he always regarded the Xingfu Han Room as an ideal. Zhuge Liang did not dispel Liu Bei's grand ideals, but first advised Liu Bei to turn his attention from the north to the south. Under the situation at that time, it was first necessary to affirm the superior position of Cao Cao and Sun Quan, whose southern strategy was just half completed and occupied Jiangdong and the Ganjiang Basin. Liu Biao's territory was in the Two Lakes region, which was Sun Quan's next goal, and the Jingzhou area was a strategic place that Zhuge Liang attached great importance to, so the basis of Sun Liu's alliance was the same goal at present.
Zhuge Liang believed that the goal of this period should be locked in Jingzhou and Yizhou (Sichuan), as long as these two places were occupied, it was possible to attack the Central Plains in the future and unify the whole country. On the contrary, as long as one of these two places is lost, the possibility of unifying all of China is basically lost.
At that time, there were only two roads to Sichuan, one was from Jingzhou to take a boat up the Yangtze River to enter the Sichuan Basin, and the other was from Shaanxi over the Qinling Mountains and Daba Mountain into Sichuan. Although the Yangtze River passage is navigable, it is very difficult for sailing ships to swim against the current in a narrow and turbulent environment. In history, only the Guangwu Emperor of the Eastern Han Dynasty successfully penetrated Sichuan from this road, because the opponent was the dim-witted Gongsun Shu. It was also extremely difficult to cross the mountains and mountains from Shaanxi to the ancient Shu Road, and the production damage in the Shaanxi region at the end of the Eastern Han Dynasty was extremely serious, and it was difficult to provide sufficient food for a large army, and it was difficult for the northern forces to launch a protracted attack on this route.
(Ancient Shu Province)
In addition, from Sichuan it was possible to attack Hanzhong, turn it into a large subordinate granary, and be able to form a strategically extended defensive line in the Qinling Mountains. However, Hanzhong and Sichuan were not enough to support Liu Bei's great cause of restoring han, and these two areas can only be said to be a good base area. Zhuge Liang believed that Jingzhou was the most important link in the completion of reunification, Jingzhou was the transportation hub at that time, the most mobile strategic place from the Yangtze River to the Central Plains, and it was only from Jingzhou that it was the fastest way to invade the Central Plains.
During the Three Kingdoms period, from the Central Plains to the Yangtze River Basin, due to the longitudinal mountains in the west and the dense rivers in the east, there were not many interconnected roads. Between Shaanxi and Sichuan and Hubei, the Qinling Mountains run through the east and west; between Henan and Hubei, a series of mountain ranges such as Waifang Mountain, Bears Ears Mountain, and Dabie Mountain stand tall; the Jiangsu region is too developed due to the water system, densely packed with swamps, after thousands of years of geographical changes, it has become today's alluvial plain.
Therefore, during the Three Kingdoms period, there were only three roads that could connect the north and the south: the first was the road from Guanzhong and Hanzhong to Sichuan; the second was from Nanyang and Xiangyang to Jingzhou. The third is the Huaihe Plain Corridor, which is divided into two branch lines, one is around Shouchun and Hefei, through Chaohu Lake to Ma'anshan near the Yangtze River, the other is from Xuzhou to the south, across the Huai River to near Yangzhou, and then across the Yangtze River.
These four north-south passages became the strongholds of Wei Shu wu's heavy army layout during the period of the establishment of the Three Kingdoms, and from the perspective of the State of Wei, there were three major war zones set up on these four routes. The western front, with Xiahou Yuan as the commander, was stationed in the Guanlong area; the central front, with Cao Ren as the commander, was stationed in the Jingxiang area; and the eastern front, with Xiahou Huan as the commander, was the largest theater of Cao Wei, divided into the Huainan Governor of Yangzhou and the Huaibei Governor of Xuzhou, stationed in the Yangzhou area.
(Along the Nanxiang Pass)
Among these four roads, the most meaningful is the second Nanxiang Pass, which is the road from the Central Plains to Jingzhou. This is also the focus of interests that sun and Liu competed for after the Shu state occupied Yizhou, who can occupy Jingzhou, who has one more way to the Northern Expedition.
Jingzhou in the Three Kingdoms period covered today's Two Lakes region, which is regarded as a whole, that is, a large basin, with the mountains of southern Henan in the north; in the west are huge mountain ranges such as Qinling, Dabashan, and Jingshan, which separate the two lakes from Shaanxi, Sichuan, Chongqing, and Guizhou; in the south is Nanling, which is separated from Liangguang; and in the east is the Luoxiao Mountains, separated from Jiangxi. The Yangtze River passes through the middle of the basin, which can communicate between east and west, and the Shu state occupies Yizhou and connects with Jingzhou, so it can completely go down the river and take Jianye (Nanjing). Therefore, even if Eastern Wu did not have Zhang Hu's plan, it was impossible to hand over the Jingzhou area to others.
(Topography of the Two Lakes Basin)
From the basin to the north, nanyang fangcheng (now Fangcheng County) has a smooth road to connect with it, to the north can extend to Xuchang, Luoyang area, to the west can enter Guanzhong. Therefore, the nine counties of Jingxiang, often said during the Three Kingdoms period, included the transportation hubs of Jingzhou, Xiangyang and Nanyang, which were the best springboards for attacking the Central Plains. It was occupied by each of the three kingdoms of Wei Shu and Wu, which was the most stable model of the three-legged standing.
Zhuge Liang just wanted to take Sichuan as the foundation and Jingzhou as the strategic frontier to form a strategic posture of Hanzhong, Sichuan, and Jingxiang. The only difference between this strategy and the Qin and Han templates was to replace Guanzhong with Jingzhou, and after this strategy was achieved, Liu Bei could have two routes to enter Guanzhong, one was from Hanzhong yue Qinling into the customs, and the other was from the Nanxiang Corridor into Shaanxi. The two roads formed a pincer-shaped offensive, and it was no longer an "impossible thing" to take guanzhong, which would also make the Shu Han regime occupy the four prefectures of Yong, Liang, Jing, and Yi, and it would be possible to attack the Central Plains under such conditions.
(Schematic diagram of the eastern route of the pincer route)
Liu Biao of Jingzhou, Liu Zhang of Yizhou, and Zhang Lu of Hanzhong did not show the ambition and strength to dominate the world, so Zhuge Liang's strategy was pragmatic, and Liu Bei also unswervingly implemented Zhuge Liang's strategy.
In Liu Bang's period, Xiang Yu divided 18 princes and scattered the unified territory of the Qin state into various weak forces, and although the Chu overlord occupied the most fertile land in the Chu state at that time, he was also in the Great Plains region, during this period, no one had a national strategic pattern like Zhang Liang, so Liu Bang did not have much resistance to forming a strategic posture.
During the Three Kingdoms period, it was not only Zhuge Liang and Liu Bei who showed interest in Sichuan, Jingzhou, and Hanzhong, but also the Cao and Sun families. Especially in the south of the Sun regime, Zhang Hu's Jiangdong strategy was based on Jiangdong, then to occupy Jingzhou and Sichuan to the east, and finally to the north and into the Central Plains. This strategic idea was also recognized by Lu Su and Zhou Yu, and they made many attempts to do so.
For Cao Wei, if Sichuan and Jingzhou were occupied, the unification of the south would be smoother. Later, Sima Shi changed his strategy, first destroyed the Shu state, opened up a waterway attack route from Sichuan to the east, and completed the encirclement of the eastern and northern directions of the Wu state.
It can be seen from this that the strategies of the three countries have clashed, but Cao Wei is alone in the north, relatively speaking, he can be independent, and the Sun and Liu families have launched a long-term jingzhou competition in the south.
After Liu Bei occupied Yizhou and Hanzhong, as Cao Cao personally led an army to try to retake Hanzhong, Liu Bei finally compromised with Eastern Wu, redividing the pattern of Jingzhou after the Battle of Chibi, and reaching an agreement with Eastern Wu to demarcate the Xiang River. Among them, the eastern districts to which Jiangxia, Changsha, and Guiyang belong belong to Eastern Wu, and the western districts to which Nanjun, Lingling, and Wuling belong belong to Shu Han.
Since the Xiang River is not a natural danger, the border between the two sides is unstable, either the Shu State drove the Wu State into the Ganjiang Valley, or the Wu State drove the Shu State to Sichuan, it is possible to form a stable border, and later history is centered around this theme.
This destabilizing factor erupted with Guan Yu's Northern Expedition. Some people have always questioned Guan Yu's Northern Expedition, in fact, after the great victory in Hanzhong, there was also a rebellion within the State of Wei, and Guan Yu attacked the Xiangfan region, with the intention of being very obvious, that is, to seize the opportunity to control the main line of the Nanxiang Corridor and cooperate with the western battlefield to achieve a pincer-shaped encirclement of Guanzhong. Eastern Wu's perfidy is also understandable, because once Guan Yu succeeds, there will be no eastern Wu in the future history.
Lü Meng's crossing of the river in white not only deprived the Shu state of one of the most capable commanders, but also bankrupted the Shu state's Jingzhou strategy. The essence of Liu Bei's battle of Yiling was to restore the established strategic pattern, and even more to take advantage of the opportunity of Guan Yu's murder to infiltrate the east bank of the Xiang River, thus achieving a strategic posture of fully occupying the two lakes basin. This also touched the core interests of Eastern Wu, so the Wu lord would bow down and submit to the State of Wei to solve the crisis.
After the failure of Liu Bei's Eastern Expedition, the Shu state completely lost Jingzhou, which meant that the pincer offensive of the Shu state's Northern Expedition lost the most important pincer, and there was no longer any possibility of unifying the whole country. Later, Zhuge Liang's Northern Expedition could only attack Guanzhong from Hanzhong, and in a total of five ways for Hanzhong to attack Guanzhong, Zhuge Liang constantly tried and failed. It proves that at that time, it was almost impossible to attack From Sichuan and Hanzhong with one arm, and it was almost impossible to conquer Guanzhong, and the Qin-Han model was ineffective during this period.
In summary, the gap between Liu Bei and Liu Bang is not reflected in the ability and disposition of individuals, but in different eras and different backgrounds, whose strategic blueprint can be realized. Liu Bang's situation was easier than Liu Bei's, he was "born" to have the division of Sichuan and Hanzhong, and the three kings of Guanzhong could not restrain Liu Bang from advancing north, so his strategic foundation could soon be achieved. When Liu Bei saw hope in his heyday, the strategic conflict between the Eastern Wu regime and him also broke out, and after the failure of the Jingzhou strategy, Cao Wei placed outstanding military experts such as Cao Zhen and Sima Yi in the Guanzhong region, making it difficult for Shu Han to copy the model of Han Gaozu, so he was trapped in a corner.