As far as the Xuzhou battlefield is concerned, there is also a big issue that is both important and specific, that is, who will quickly come to Xuzhou to help Liu Zhi command the troops, and who will be the deputy commander-in-chief of the Xuzhou "suppression general".
In the beginning, Chiang Kai-shek sent Song Xilian. After repeated consideration, Song Xilian decided to disobey the order and not go to Xuzhou, so on the 26th, he refused the appointment on the pretext that he was actively realizing his military deployment in western Hubei on the pretext that he was not aware of the situation in Xuzhou.
The next day, Chiang Kai-shek sent another urgent telegram, asking him to go quickly. Song Xilian did not dare to push back any longer, and arrived in Shashi on October 31, preparing to take the boat to the east. Who expected, Chiang Kai-shek told him to change to Du Yuming.
This appointment of commanders to hundreds of thousands of troops has reached the point of change, which shows that the supreme ruling clique of the Kuomintang is uncertain and full of contradictions, and has foreshadowed the end of the upcoming great war.
Why did Chiang Kai-shek already decide to appoint Song Xilian and suddenly change his name to Du Yuming? No relevant documentation is found in specific materials, but it is likely to be related to the following two reasons:
First, the northeast battlefield has become a foregone conclusion, Du Yuming is powerless to return to heaven, he can not play any role in the northeast, he has been engaged in Xuzhou for several months in the past, the situation is familiar, of course, it is better to return to Xuzhou to command;
Second, Chiang Kai-shek was not at ease with Bai Chongxi in Wuhan, and Song Xilian, as Bai Chongxi's deputy commander-in-chief, continued to be placed in Wuhan to "suppress the general", which could play several roles, of course, it was better to stay there.
On November 3, when Chiang Kai-shek sent Xu Langxuan to Huludao to seek Du Yuming's opinion on the Xuzhou Campaign, he brought Du Yuming a handwritten letter saying, "If my brother agrees to this plan, he will immediately go to Bengbu to take command."
Du Yuming could not shirk Chiang Kai-shek's orders; first, the northeast had completely failed, and he could only leave; second, he was suddenly pulled from Xuzhou to the northeast by Chiang Kai-shek, and it had been almost 20 days since he left, and the Ministry of National Defense had not yet announced the dismissal of him as deputy commander-in-chief of Xuzhou; third, he was one of Chiang Kai-shek's most trusted students, and he could only obey.
However, at this time, Du Yuming also had his own little nine-nine in mind, and he understood that the preparations for the Battle of Xuzhou at this time were much more important than the retreat of Huludao, but according to Chiang Kai-shek's plan, xuzhou's troops should retreat immediately, and if he went to Xuzhou immediately to command now, he could only direct the retreat, and as soon as he took office, he would become the commander of the retreat, and it was very likely that in the future, Chiang Kai-shek would bear the charge of "abandoning Xuzhou" and be accused by the Kuomintang public opinion.
Therefore, on the one hand, he expressed his willingness to obey the order, and on the other hand, he said that Huludao's affairs were inseparable, and he could not go to Xuzhou until Huludao was completed. In fact, he wanted to wait for the Kuomintang troops near Xuzhou to retreat to the huai river line, and then he went directly to Bengbu and took over the command at Bengbu. In this way, whether he wins or loses the future war, he will not bear the responsibility of giving up Xuzhou.
In any case, Du Yuming, the actual commander of the Kuomintang troops on the battlefield in the Decisive Battle of Huaihai, decided to take the battle. However, he was a late commander, and he was supposed to take the stage and play the role he was supposed to play before the opening of this colorful drama, but he was deliberately late.
On November 8, Du Yuming completed the defeat of the remnants of the Kuomintang northeast battlefield in Huludao and returned to Beiping. At noon on the 9th, Fu Zuoyi invited him to dinner, and Du Yuming clarified the specific situation of Xuzhou during the banquet: Xuzhou's army did not withdraw to Bengbu, the great battle had begun 3 days ago, Huang Baitao's corps had been surrounded, and He Jifeng and Zhang Kexia had already "defected." That is to say, Chiang Kai-shek's "Battle Plan for Xu Beng" has not been implemented at all, such a major policy decision has become a child's play, and the Xuzhou battlefield has become a chaotic chess game without layout arrangements.
When Du Yuming arrived in Nanjing, what he saw and heard were all ominous omens: what he saw was that the streets and alleys were everywhere grabbing rice and grabbing faces, and what he heard from Gu Zhutong's mouth and from Liu Zhi's phone was that Xuzhou did not have any comprehensive military deployment, and "the division was destroyed before the battle." So in a very contradictory way, he took a measure that only he understood, and he asked He Yingqin for the best new jeep. He Yingqin was afraid that he would not go to the front line, so he immediately agreed and gave him his chartered car. Du Yuming ostensibly said that in order to facilitate command on the battlefield, in fact, his plan was to "use it when escaping, so as not to drop anchor and be captured."
In the early morning of November 11, 1948, Du Yuming flew to Xuzhou. In his own words, it was "going to war with the heart of going to the execution ground."