Author: Hu Xianda
In 1948, the northeast war situation underwent a gratifying change. Wei Lihuang's troops were isolated by Lin Biao in Changchun, Shenyang, Jinzhou and other places, and adopted a strategic defensive position, and more than 700,000 troops in Dongye were rested and looked for fighters.
From Du Yuming to Chen Cheng to Wei Lihuang, Jiang Shi repeatedly changed horses and generals, but he still could not save the decline of Jiang Jun. From the determination to compete for the northeast to the growing strength of the People's Liberation Army, Chiang Kai-shek also had to consider the retreat of the Chiang Army in the northeast.
Looking at the national war situation, Chiang Kai-shek plans to abandon the northeast and first withdraw all of Wei Lihuang's 550,000 Chiang kai-shek troops to the Huai River and the Yangtze River, and then wait for the opportunity to go north and chase deer in the Central Plains, or stationed in Beijing, Shanghai and Hangzhou, stick to half of the rivers and mountains, and rule the river with our side.
Chiang's calculation was clearly seen by the chairman. The chairman's layout was to let Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan lead their army south to attack Jinjin, cut off the enemy's retreat, close the door and fight the dogs, and never let Jiang Biao's army flee to Guannei with one soldier or one pawn, but increase the pressure on other strategic areas.
Retreating from the northeast to Guannei, Wei Lihuang had two routes to follow, one was to take the land route from Shanhaiguan on the Jinzhou line, retreat to north China, and join forces with Fu Zuoyi. One is to take the sea route from Huludao on the Yingkou line and withdraw to Jianghuai or the area south of the Yangtze River.
Wei Lihuang's northeast expedition had a total of 550,000 troops, including chiang kai-shek's two elite forces: the New First Army and the New Sixth Army. If they retreated to north China or the Jianghuai region, they would form a local superiority in troops, which would bring great military pressure to the strategic areas where Nie Rongzhen, Chen Yi, Liu Bocheng, and others were located.
In the layout of the chairman's strategic decisive battle, the northeast is the place of the first battle. After winning the northeast, there will be a solid foundation and a strong backer. Attacking Jin from the south and closing the door to fight dogs was to prevent one soldier and one soldier from Wei Lihuang's army from escaping to Guannei. Ignoring the enemies of Changchun and Shenyang, Qianli leapt into Jinzhou, the key place connecting the northeast and northern China, with the intention of eating the 550,000 Jiang bandits trapped in the northeast. Such a big appetite, such a magnificent annihilation battle, was beyond Lin Biao's imagination.
In the contest with Du Yuming, Chen Cheng, and Wei Lihuang, Lin Biao's appetite was the greatest than one of their corps. For example, in the decisive battle in the northeast, Lin Biao's initial appetite was to suddenly eat the Zhengdong State Department that was alone in Changchun. At that time, Lin Biao held more than 700,000 field troops in his hands and took more than 100,000 people and horses from Zhengdong's state department, which was almost a matter of ten to nine. Whether it was a siege or a reinforcement, his strength was more than enough. There is also Lin Biao who fights wars, is extremely cautious, and does not fight battles that have no greater chance of winning, does not fight battles that are not fully prepared, and does not fight battles that do not have the advantage of troops.
Therefore, abandoning Changchun and not fighting, and driving south to attack Jin, Lin Biao was unwilling and reluctant. First of all, with their backs to the rear, concentrating their forces to fight Changchun is a victory in their hands; then starting from Changchun, all the way to the south, attacking Zhangwu, Shenyang, and other places one by one, so that they can always have a stable rear and supply line. If Changchun is abandoned and not fought, and the long drive south to attack Jinjin, the logistical supply of hundreds of thousands of troops will always be cut off by the enemy.
On the way south to attack Jin, when he heard that Liao Yaoxiang's corps had captured Zhangwu, Lin Biao was also very nervous, worried that his logistical supplies would be cut off by Liao's troops, and the attacking Jin troops would be attacked on all sides, and there would be no support for them. After advancing west from Shenyang and capturing Zhangwu, Liao Yaoxiang was also very excited, saying that he had cut off the back road of Lin Biao's attack on Jin, which would cause it to fall into a three-sided attack. These three-sided attacks were liao yaoxiang's rear blow, Fan Hanjie's out-of-town strike, and Huludao's enemy's flank strike.
After receiving the news that Zhangwu was captured by Liao Yaoxiang's troops and Jiang's reinforcements to Huludao, Lin Biao, who was worried that the rear road would be cut off, also had the idea of abandoning the attack on Jin, withdrawing the army, and fighting Changchun again. He always insisted on fighting Changchun first, gradually advancing south, which was relatively prudent, and driving south to attack Jinjin was a military adventure with little chance of victory. Lin Biao's idea made him hesitate all the way.
After seeing clearly our intentions, Jiang Shi's eyes were also red. On the one hand, he ordered Liao Yaoxiang's troops to march west from Shenyang to aid Fan Hanjie's troops in Jinzhou, and on the other hand, he also persuaded Fu Zuoyi of Northern China to advance north from the Shanhaiguan line in an attempt to join forces with reinforcements from Huludao to attack dongye's jin forces. If such a situation is created, then the chairman's southward attack on Jinjin and the closure of the door to fight the dog can really be suspended.
In particular, on September 30, 1948, Lin Biao received a very bad news on his way south to Jinzhou, saying that 7 divisions urgently mobilized by Jiang from North China and Shandong had begun to land from Huludao and were also preparing to rush to Jinzhou. This news made Lin Biao very nervous, saying that he only prepared a table of meals, but two tables of guests came, how can he entertain them?
In this situation of enemy and enemy, Lin Biao became even more worried about the chairman's layout of attacking Jinjin in the south and closing the door and fighting dogs, and even suggested that he return halfway and fight Changchun instead.
Lin Biao, who weighed it up again and again, sent a telegram to the headquarters that greatly annoyed the chairman, saying that it was estimated that it would take quite a while to completely resolve the battle when attacking Jinjin, and that the enemy of Changchun had been besieged by us for several months and demoralized. Therefore, at present, if we attack Changchun, our grasp will be greatly increased.
Late on the night of October 2, Lin Biao dictated another telegram, which was sent after being read by Luo Ronghuan and Liu Yalou, proposing two plans: First, if Jinzhou could be quickly captured, it would still be better to attack Jinzhou, saving the troops the time to delay back and forth. However, there are many difficulties in achieving this programme and uncertainty. The second is to return to the division to fight Changchun, and the certainty of winning the battle against Changchun has been greatly increased. The message concluded that the above two options are under consideration and please consider both with instructions.
Although Lin Biao proposed two plans, his basic tendency was very clear, that is, he wanted to give up the attack on Jinjin and return to the division to fight Changchun.
In the early morning of October 3, 1948, the angry and annoyed chairman immediately called Lin Biao back: Now that the deployment of the attack on Jinjin has been completed, you have not dared to fight because of a change in enemy situation that is not very big! We think this is highly inappropriate.
After 2 hours, the unfinished chairman sent another telegram, instructing Lin Biao, "As long as you take Jinzhou, you will have the initiative in the battle, and laying down Changchun will not help you gain the initiative, but will increase your difficulties in the next step." ”
Under the repeated emphasis of the chairman, Lin Biao gave up the idea of returning to changchun and adopted the strategy of besieging the city to fight for reinforcements, arranging for the tenth column and the first column to block Liao Yaoxiang's westward advance corps on the front line of Black Mountain and Dahu Mountain, and arranging for the fourth column to block the eastward advance army sent by Du Yuming from Huludao on the first line of Tashan.
On October 23, Liao Yaoxiang attacked the positions of the Tenth Column and the First Column in turns with four or five divisions per day, and the corpses were scattered all over the field, and the blood flowed like a river. At the height of the blockade battle, Liu Yalou strictly ordered Liang Xingchu's troops to hold out for 3 days and not let the enemy advance.
On the Tashan line, the resistance pressure of the four columns is very large. On October 10 alone, Du Yuming's Eastward Advance Corps launched nine chargebacks against our positions. When the battle was scorching, the impatient Lin Biao instructed the four columns to replace the mobile defense with the position of the dead defense, and the echelon defense to reduce the enemy's casualties. On October 13, the enemy launched a frenzied attack with the tactic of dense charging of the human sea, trying to break through Tashan and Fan Hanjie in Jinzhou City to attack our attacking forces under Jiancheng.
Judging from the fierceness of the blockade battles in Montenegro, Dahushan and Tashan, at that time, Lin Biao drove south and directly took Jinzhou, and there were indeed great risks and variables. Jiang's east-west advance and the second-way aid to Jin, and the chairman's southward attack on Jinjin and the closing of the door to fight the dog, all belong to a relatively superior strategic game. If these two blockade battles were lost, and Lin Biao, who was placed under the Jinzhou Fortified City, would really be defending the enemy on three sides, and there would be less fierceness. Therefore, Lin Biao's hesitation and wavering in the long drive straight in and the south to attack Jinjin cannot be said to be unreasonable. The most fundamental reason why the situation he was worried about did not appear was the resolute implementation of the decision-making instructions of the headquarters on our side and after Lin, Luo and others reached a consensus on attacking jin. Another direct cause was the appearance of Chiang Kai-shek, Wei Lihuang, Liao Yaoxiang, Du Yuming, Fu Zuoyi, and others on the issue of multi-way aid to Jin, as well as the mental decadence and low morale of Chiang Kai-shek's army in fighting the civil war.
I have to say that the chairman's southward attack on Jinjin and the closing of the door to fight the dogs are much more far-sighted than Lin Biao's first attack on Changchun and one attack after another. If Lin Biao's style of fighting was adopted in the Liaoshen Campaign, first attacking the Zhengdong National Corps in Changchun, then the Liao Yaoxiang Corps in Shenyang, the Fan Hanjie Corps in Jinzhou, and the Northeast Suppression General of Wei Lihuang would most likely be successfully withdrawn to Guannei through the Jinzhou and Shanhaiguan lines in an organized manner under the strict orders of Chiang Kai-shek. If such a situation were to be formed, whether Peiping could be peacefully liberated and whether the chairman could realize the chairman's strategic concept of wiping out the main force of Chiang Kai-shek's army north of the Yangtze River would still be a huge question mark.
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