In the second campaign to resist the United States and aid Korea, the volunteer army won a brilliant victory on the western front, and the US ace 2nd Infantry Division suffered a annihilating blow. This was the biggest victory of the Volunteer Army during the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, which the Americans called "the biggest fiasco in the history of the US Army." However, not long after the end of the battle, on December 15, 1950, Colonel Gorachev, a Soviet military adviser in Korea, wrote a "Report on the Operations of the Chinese Volunteer Army" to Moscow and complained to Moscow.
In this report he actually said that Peng Dehuai would not fight, and he wrote:
1. The volunteer army did not organize a powerful assault in the weak links of the enemy, did not organize a surprise group, and each army made a surprise attack in its own independent direction, and the strength and weapons were evenly distributed on the entire front.
2. The purpose of the campaign was not achieved, because there was no second campaign echelon, so the results achieved by the first echelon could not be further developed.
3. The frontal offensive forces were not resolute in their actions, allowing the U.S. forces to retreat without resistance, so that the U.S. troops could be redeployed.
4. At the most critical moment of the US military, the attack was stopped.
All in all, this Colonel Gorlachev said a bunch of bad things about Peng Dehuai in front of Stalin.
The Soviets were full of funny, and it seemed that this so-called military adviser had no idea how the Volunteers fought. Since he still said this in the case of an unprecedented victory for the volunteer army, let's analyze how he really wanted to fight.
At that time, on the Western Front, the strength of the volunteer army was indeed deployed on the first line, and there was no second echelon. The Soviet colonel was right about that.
So why didn't Peng Dehuai deploy the second echelon at that time?
Then you have to know, what was the way the Soviet advisers played? That is, according to the textbook, one board at a time. The formation of teams, the first echelon, the second echelon, the firepower team, the combat service team, the communications support team, and so on, will not be described in detail.
There is a premise for playing like this.
First, the volunteers must have sufficient firepower
At that time, the frontal width of the battlefield on the Western Front reached more than 200 kilometers, and according to the textbook style of Soviet advisers, it was impossible to fight without strong, armored and artillery units. Throughout the second campaign, the Volunteers fired 539 rounds of artillery shells, a number that also included the Battle of Chosin Lake on the Eastern Front. The entire campaign fired no more shells than the U.S. army fired at a company of Volunteer positions (more than 1,000 rounds). As for the armored forces, there is none. Marshal Peng Dehuai knew very well how weak the volunteer firepower was, so his solution was to deploy all his troops and press them all up to make up for the lack of our surprise forces.
At that time, the firepower of the volunteer army was so weak that this Soviet adviser did not know what he was doing all day. The U.S. military knows better than he does. The battle summary of the US 2nd Infantry Division reads: Grenades are the heavy weapons of the Chinese army. In combat, the Chinese army always tries to get closer enough to be able to use grenades. When attacking the company positions, the Chinese army used no more than two machine guns, usually only one mortar, and the shells were sparse.
As can be seen from the report of the US army, the volunteer army can only rely on grenades to attack the strong positions of the US army. How helpless and sad this is. But the Soviet colonel actually wanted to let the volunteer army fight according to the textbook.
If you give the aircraft, artillery, and tanks to the volunteers, you can fight according to the textbook.
Second, the volunteer army must have strong air cover and a strong extension of long-range firepower.
Ten thousand steps back, even if the volunteer army has more artillery, even if a echelon can open a breakthrough. So how does the second echelon cross the first echelon to develop the attack? The sky is American, during the day the volunteer army can not be a large-scale movement of troops, how to assemble the second echelon? Where is the gathering? How do I move forward?
In real combat, the volunteers opened a breakthrough in the night attack, but when the day came, the volunteer attacking troops had to go into hiding. When the volunteers were hidden, the U.S. troops could either regain their positions or retreat calmly.
This required the volunteers to settle the battle at night. If the battle cannot be resolved, a siege must also be formed. When the troops are divided into several echelons, the strength of one echelon is insufficient, and it is certainly impossible to do so. The reality is that even if we have sufficient troops, it will be difficult to solve the encircled US forces overnight.
That's because there's no air power.
At that time, although the Soviet Air Force participated in the war, it did not support the front-line combat, and we could not use these aircraft.
Not only is the sky American, but on the ground, the Americans have countless heavy artillery, and long-range fire can also be used to block the shooting. That is to say, even if there is no threat of enemy aircraft overhead during the day, when one echelon is attacked, the US military can block the next echelon with long-range firepower. We don't have this kind of heavy firepower to suppress.
Playing as this Soviet adviser envisioned, the first echelon of the Volunteer Army was unable to open the gap. Since you are determined to hit the Americans hard, you have to start with full force, as Patton said, with all the power you can use, open an opening, and rush in. Because after rushing in, the rear of the Americans was also very empty.
Third, there is sufficient maneuverability.
Although the Volunteers were the most capable of marching on two legs in the world, the U.S. Army was far more mobile than the Volunteers. Except in a few cases, the U.S. military was able to easily disengage from the Volunteers.
In addition to using aircraft and heavy artillery to carry out battlefield blockade, the US military also has a way to use tanks to cut off the rear. The Volunteers simply did not have the ability to break through the armored units, and it was very difficult to face these tanks to attack. The US tanks fought and retreated, and by the time the US tanks also began to leave the battle, the main US troops had already withdrawn. How to chase with the two legs of the volunteer army? So Peng Dehuai pressed the whole army up, so that there were enough troops to carry out bold interspersed divisions to entangle the American troops. The reason why the second battle was able to achieve great victory was that the 38th Army made a great contribution. According to the style of soviet advisers, there were not enough troops to intersperse.
Not only combat troops, but also the mobility of logistics support, fire support and other units? It's also a truth. A large amount of equipment and materials were carried by manpower and mules and horses, and the speed of forward maneuvering was very slow. Without their support, combat troops would lack sufficient material and ammunition to fight. The artillery and logistics units of the Volunteer Army were difficult to effectively support the front under the serious threat of us aviation.
From the above, it can be seen that this Soviet military adviser simply scribbled the report regardless of the actual situation on the battlefield. So his end is simple. The report was brought to Stalin's desk, and Stalin could not laugh after reading the report. Stalin, in his capacity as Supreme Commander, sent an unprecedented telegram reply to a colonel, reprimanding Gorlachev fiercely. Clearly tell him that Peng Dehuai is a modern genius military man, you should stop talking nonsense, and order the colonel to immediately get back inside the Soviet Union.