After the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression in the autumn of 1945, the kuomintang military and political officers issued a large number of "national hardships and wealth" and, under the banner of "receiving," wantonly "plundered and collected." For a time, forty or fifty receiving institutions of different kinds suddenly appeared in major cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Ping, and Han, bringing a new round of catastrophe to the industry and commerce in the received areas.
The people gave these receiving officers a portrait of the "Five Sons Dengke", which was extremely accurate: "gold, houses, tickets, cars, women (the wives and concubines of traitors)". "What floats in the river is not as good as what rolls in the ground, what rolls in the ground is not as good as what comes from the sky, what flies from the sky is not as good as drilling out of the ground, and it is better to sit still than to drill out of the ground."
All these things have enabled the restored National Government to gain its homeland and lose the hearts and minds of the people. At its peak, there were about 2,300 receiving committees across the country. In order to enrich their own pockets, the receiving officers do not hesitate to dump each other, and the big officials are greedy, the small officials are greedy, and the officials are not greedy.
Later, when Chiang Kai-shek came to Taiwan to sum up why he failed, he said, "When we fail, we fail in the word 'reception.'" ”
At that time, most of the senior Kuomintang generals held two positions, one was to direct operations, and the other was to do business. For many of them, the military is just a side hustle.
This is also blamed on Chiang Kai-shek himself, who often meets with some senior generals, likes to ask about the situation at home, and then say give you a sum of money, the family to do a business. It is unimaginable on the side of the Communist Party to win over the generals in this way.
Grasping the military with one hand and his own business with the other, can such a general still win the battle?
After the liberation war began, the high-ranking generals of the Kuomintang army became corrupt, and it was common for officers and men to be paid underpaid. Most of them were hyped up by the governors in shanghai's gold exchanges. Therefore, in just three years, Chiang Kai-shek was defeated and left the mainland, and he had no choice but to spend it.
Before the outbreak of the Huaihai Campaign in the autumn and winter of 1948, there were four main corps under the Kuomintang Xuzhou General Battle Sequence, as well as four units of the Appeasement Zone, scattered along the railway line centered on Xuzhou. In the eastern part of Xuzhou alone, from west to east, there are three military forces, including Li Mi's 13th Corps (stationed in Nianzhuang), Huang Baitao's 7th Corps (stationed in Xin'an Town), and Li Yannian's 9th Appeasement District (stationed in Haizhou and Lianyungang in northern Jiangsu).
During the first phase of the Huaihai Campaign, the Kuomintang regime's Ministry of National Defense ordered Li Yannian's troops in Haizhou to rapidly shrink along the Longhai Railway to Xuzhou, but this operation was extremely dangerous, because the large army of the East China Field Army was pressed north of the Longhai Railway, and it was absolutely impossible to leak the wind. Therefore, the Kuomintang's internal secrecy of this operation was very strict. How strict is it? The next day was about to leave, and the commander did not know the first day.
The day before the departure, that is, on the night of November 5, 1948, Li Yannian was about to go to bed to rest, when a common man knocked on the door and came in, saying to him: "Commander Li, you must not go, you must not go, you must not go, you must take me!" ”
Li Yannian felt inexplicable, so he replied: "The principal let us stay in Haizhou, where can I go?" ”
Afterwards, feeling that something was wrong, Li Yannian called the Nanjing side to inquire, only to learn that this was indeed the case, saying that the order would arrive at dawn.
In his memoirs written in Taiwan in his later years, Li Yannian wrote the following sentence on this matter: "It is strange that the Kuomintang is undefeated!" ”
It is difficult for anyone to accept such a ridiculous situation, and Li Yannian's anger can be imagined. As the commander of the theater, he did not know that there were military changes, how did this common man know such a big military secret? It's so weird.
Later, after investigation, it was not ordinary people who came to see Li Yannian, but the agent of Liu Zhi, the commander-in-chief of Xuzhou, in Haizhou, who was engaged in haiyan business.
Liu Zhi's greed for money was well known in the Kuomintang, and he knew very well the stakes of this military operation, but he still preferred not to inform the commander of the theater and to inform his business agents first.
Li Yannian's popularity came to a large extent from the saying in the military circles at that time that "three Li are not as good as one king".
"Three Li and One King" refers to the four Shandong people who graduated from the Whampoa Military Academy, the three Li are Li Xianzhou, Li Yutang, and Li Yannian; the first king is Wang Yaowu.
Wang Yaowu was a native of Tai'an, Shandong, Li Xianzhou was from Changqing County, Shandong (present-day Changqing District, Jinan), and li Yutang and Li Yannian were both from Guangrao County, Shandong (present-day Dongying County).
Why is it said that "three plums are not as good as one king"? Because San Li was born in Huangpu Phase I, seniority, Wang Yaowu was born in Huangpu Phase III, with shallow seniority. However, by the time of the Liberation War, Wang Yaowu was already chairman of the Shandong Provincial Government, commander of the Second Appeasement District, and a feudal official of the Kuomintang regime, while at this time, Li Xianzhou was only the deputy commander of the Second Appeasement District and a subordinate of Wang Yaowu; Li Yutang was only the commander of the reorganized 27th Army, and Li Yannian was only the deputy director of the Xuzhou Appeasement Office, and his position was lower than that of Wang Yaowu.
Of course, in terms of the level of fighting, Li Xianzhou, Li Yutang, and Li Yannian were also far inferior to Wang Yaowu.
Wang Yaowu was also a well-known general who was greedy for money. In the Battle of Jinan, which was fought from September 16 to 24, 1948, the East China Field Army completely annihilated more than 104,000 people under the enemy Wang Yaowu,000 troops, and Wang Yaowu himself was also taken prisoner of our army.
Huang Baitao, commander of the 7th Corps of the Kuomintang Army, who was preparing to reinforce Jinan at that time, had judged that Wang Yaowu could not defend Jinan. Huang Baitao said this afterwards: When Jinan was surrounded, we could hear Wang Yaowu telling his family in Nanjing over the wireless telephone that this matter should be done and how to do that matter for half an hour. Under such an urgent situation as the war, how could Wang Yaowu, as a commander-in-chief and so concerned about family affairs, devote himself wholeheartedly to commanding?
During the Battle of Huaihai, the actual commander of the Kuomintang army, Du Yuming, deputy commander-in-chief of the Xuzhou "Suppression General", also suffered the same painful feelings as Li Yannian.
On November 22, 1948, Huang Baitao's corps was completely annihilated at Nianzhuang, and the first phase of the Huaihai Campaign came to an end. The hundreds of thousands of Kuomintang troops stationed in the Xuzhou area were in a state of panic. They felt that there was no danger in xuzhou's surrounding areas. If you continue to stick here, you will be wrapped in dumplings like Huang Baitao.
Chiang Kai-shek was also reluctant to lose these troops! He ordered the Ministry of National Defense to formulate an opportunity to retreat, and asked Du Yuming to take a special plane to Nanjing for an interview.
After returning to Xuzhou, Du Yuming immediately deployed the Xuzhou evacuation.
Du Yuming held that this matter is very serious and must not be known to the East China Field Army in advance. Therefore, the troops were about to withdraw the next day, and they were still singing the night before, pretending to be a birthday for Du Yuming's mother, in order to confuse Hua Ye.
That night, Du Yuming issued only one order to The Xuzhou garrison commander Tan Fulie, asking for the vaults sealed in the Xuzhou Bank and Qianzhuang that night, because there was some gold in them that needed to be transported.
But the commander of the garrison, Tan Fulie, quickly returned and reported: "Don't talk about the treasury, all the managers and treasurers of the money houses and their families left Xuzhou three days ago." ”
Many of the senior officials of the Ministry of National Defense in Nanjing have business in Xuzhou! It's strange not to leak secrets.
Later, Du Yuming wrote in his memoirs: "It seems that we have no hope anymore. ”
On January 10, 1949, the Battle of Huaihai ended, annihilating 550,000 people under the command of the Kuomintang army Xuzhou "General Of Suppression", and Huaye and Nakano achieved a comprehensive victory.
The Battle of Huaihai was 600,000 people's liberation army against 800,000 Kuomintang troops, only 550,000 Kuomintang troops were annihilated, and where did the 250,000 or so Kuomintang troops go? It turned out that the 800,000 Kuomintang troops included two regiments of the Kuomintang army, Li Yannian and Liu Ruming, who were stationed in the southern front of the battlefield and Bengbu at that time.
However, during the entire Huaihai Campaign, Li Yannian and Liu Ruming's two corps followed the Kuomintang tradition of "friendly troops are in difficulty and do not move like mountains", watching the friendly troops being surrounded and annihilated by the Platon Army, and without really participating in the battle of the Huaihai Campaign, they were naturally not annihilated by the PLA on the Huaihai Battlefield.
Before the Battle of the People's Liberation Army across the river began, Li Yannian was appointed by Chiang Kai-shek as deputy commander-in-chief of the Beijing-Shanghai-Hangzhou Garrison Headquarters and commander of the 6th Corps, stationed in Puzhen and Pukou, and was Tang Enbo's main deputy.
On April 23, Nanjing was liberated. Li Yannian retreated from Nanjing to Hangzhou, and once again became the director of the Jinhua Command Post, commanding more than 100,000 troops in a unified manner.
In late June, Chiang Kai-shek entrusted the heavy task of holding fujian to Li Yannian, who had retreated again and again.
In mid-August, the People's Liberation Army launched an attack on Fuzhou, and the 70,000 troops under Li Yannian's command were completely destroyed. In the panic, Li Yannian only took a dozen people from the Corps Headquarters to a plane and fled to Pingtan Island.
Chiang Kai-shek attached great importance to the strategic position of Pingtan Island, so he specially sent Chen Cheng to Pingtan Island and entrusted Li Yannian with the task of defending Pingtan Island in person.
At this time, the Kuomintang army on Pingtan Island was Li Tianxia's 73rd Army.
Li Tianxia, who had pit Zhang Lingfu, pit Li Yannian again. Pingtan Island was liberated.
After Li Tianxia and Li Yannian fled to Taiwan one after another, Chiang Kai-shek was furious and immediately detained them on the charge of "retreating without authorization and dereliction of duty." Subsequently, during the military trial, Li Tianxia insisted that he had retreated to Pingtan Island on li Yannian's orders. Sun Mingyu, chief of staff of the 6th Corps (the commander was Li Yannian), also fell into the well, saying that Li Yannian had verbally ordered Li Tianxia's army to retreat. As a result, both Li Yannian and Li Tianxia were sentenced to 12 years in prison.
Both were held for a short period of time. Li Tianxia was appointed by Chiang Kai-shek as deputy commander of the Penghu Defense Command, and lived a life of drunkenness and gold fans.
Since then, Li Yannian has lived idly in the suburbs of Taipei, with no military position and no occupation, and his life is very difficult, and he can only live with chili salt water dipped in steamed buns for three meals a day, and even the money for smoking has to be borrowed from the old ministry. On November 7, 1974, Li Yannian died of illness in extreme poverty.
Straight as a string, dead side. Qu ru hook, anti-feudal marquis.