The revolutionary road is full of difficulties and obstacles, and if you are not careful, you will lose everything, and at this time the secrecy work in the revolutionary ranks is particularly important, and if the enemy learns of the intention of the revolution or the next line, he will lay down a net of heaven and earth, wait for the rabbit, and extinguish the flame of the revolution in one fell swoop.
Just in March 1947, after the failure of the Kuomintang's all-round offensive strategy, it launched a key offensive against our liberated areas in a vain attempt to concentrate superior forces to eliminate the main force of our army and "capture the head of the Chinese Communists." For this reason, the enemy did everything possible to conduct radio reconnaissance of our Party in an attempt to find the specific location of the Party Central Committee.
For the sake of security and secrecy, during the Liberation War, everyone in the central leadership gave himself a code name, when Lin Biao's code name was 101 and Su Yu's code name was 502, these simple numbers made the enemy unpredictable, effectively protected the safety of the chiefs, and indirectly promoted the victory of the liberation war.
As we all know, the key to winning a battle is not only the number of troops, the strength of weapons and equipment, but more importantly, the secrecy of military operations. In the early days of our Party's revolution, due to the extremely disparity between the forces of the enemy and ourselves, and the extremely difficult environment of the revolutionary struggle, secrecy also became the most concerned issue of our people's army.
Whether or not military secrets can be kept is not only related to the victory of the battle, but also closely related to the survival and development of our army and the future and destiny of the Chinese revolution.
During the red army period, Chairman Mao set an example by telling people what it meant to "keep secrets is to ensure survival and victory," and in 1931, in the third anti-"encirclement and suppression" battle in the Central Soviet Region, more than 30,000 people of the main force of the Red Army needed to use the cover of night to "jump" out of the gap of about 20 kilometers between the two enemies.
The success of this military operation depends on whether our army can keep this secret and not be known to the enemy, and after the operation began, Chairman Mao had great trust in the secrecy of the soldiers, and the only thing he feared was that the radio signal might expose the whereabouts of the Red Army.
So Chairman Mao called for the radio personnel and asked them to personally keep the electronic tube of the radio, and when he learned that the electron tube was extremely easy to damage, Chairman Mao gave up the idea of taking away the electron tube, and instead handed over the radio signal key to his own guards, and asked the guards that no one could take the signal key until the destination.
Chairman Mao did not distrust the radio personnel, but that this military operation needed to be extremely confidential, and the lives of thirty thousand Red Army officers were at stake, and Chairman Mao needed to be foolproof.
On the eve of the Long March of the Central Red Army, the Party Central Committee put forward specific requirements for guarding military secrets: "Vigilance should be strengthened, information should be blocked, all unit organs should use code names, and efforts should be made to conceal the original names; the direction of action should be absolutely kept secret; before departing every day, we must inspect the garrisons and must not leave behind words about military secrets." It was precisely because our Party paid attention to secrecy that the Red Army's intention to carry out the Long March was not detected by the enemy.
During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, our army's secrecy work was facing severe challenges; in addition to using technical means to steal our army's intelligence, the Japanese army and the Kuomintang invaded China also sent a large number of traitorous agents to infiltrate our army's base areas to spy on military intelligence and find the location of the eighth route army's command system.
As a result, our Party has enriched the organization of secrecy work, set up a secretarial department, specialized in the management of important documents and telegrams of the troops, and is responsible for drafting, transcribing, proofreading, and transmitting all kinds of official documents. During this period, the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army and various anti-Japanese base areas successively promulgated a number of military secrecy regulations and directives, which to a large extent guaranteed the secrecy of our army's military operations.
After the beginning of the War of Liberation, because the liberated areas were not geographically connected, radio communication became the most important means of communication between the Party Central Committee and the major liberated areas and troops. In order to ensure the smooth command of the Party Central Committee over the War of Liberation, the Central Military Commission and field troops at and above the brigade level have successively established a sound radio network, which has also exposed its own huge defects while facilitating the PLA command system.
Because radio stations rely on radio waves to transmit messages, but air waves are most easily detected and cracked by the enemy, so the security and secrecy of radios has become the top priority of the PLA's secrecy work during the Liberation War.
After the outbreak of the all-out civil war, under the leadership of the Party Central Committee, our army smashed the Kuomintang's all-round offensive against the liberated areas after more than half a year of fighting, and when reviewing the reasons for the military defeat, the Kuomintang believed that the main reason was that it did not understand the situation of our army, resulting in its failure to respond in a timely manner, thus causing the Kuomintang army to lose frequent defeats on the battlefield.
Therefore, the Kuomintang stepped up its intelligence and reconnaissance work against our army, paying special attention to the detection of radio waves, in a vain attempt to learn about our army's next military operations, and in March 1947, the Kuomintang army launched a key offensive against the Liberated Areas, in a vain attempt to concentrate its forces to eliminate the main force of the People's Liberation Army and "capture the head of the Chinese Communist Party."
Using the radio direction finder aided by the United States, the enemy tried every means to strengthen reconnaissance against china in order to determine the location and whereabouts of the command organs of the CPC Central Committee and the Liberated Areas, to guide the aircraft of the Air Force to bomb and to guide the ground troops in pursuit, thus posing a great threat to the command system of our army.
On the northwest battlefield, Hu Zongnan relied on superior troops to occupy Yan'an, the holy land of our party, and just when Hu Zongnan was overwhelmed, he found that he could not find the main force of the People's Liberation Army and the cpc Central Committee, and the Kuomintang army could not get the support of the masses along the coast, so he could only rely on the radio to find the direction.
As a result, the Kuomintang hastily set up a second direction-finding task force in Xi'an, under the jurisdiction of four direction-finding sub-stations in Yan'an, Taiyuan, Zhengzhou, and Qingjian, in an attempt to find the location of the CPC Central Committee, and these direction-finding stations reported the information obtained to Hu Zongnan twice a day in the morning and evening as an important basis for their command of the army.
In October 1947, the command system of the Northwest Field Army had just entered the village of Horseshoe Ditch in Zizhou County, and the next day the leaders of the Northwest Field Army were holding a meeting, when suddenly the Kuomintang bombers attacked, and several shells landed right in the residence of Commander Peng Dehuai and the courtyard where the radio station was located, blowing up the radio antenna.
As a result, our army held two meetings on the secrecy of communications, looked for hidden dangers, formulated new secrecy measures, and even the commanders of the major field armies only used their own code names to make military arrangements, thus quickly reversing the unfavorable situation in which our army was located.
On January 23, 1947, the two major field armies of Nakano and Huaye were merged into the East China Field Army, with Chen Yi as commander, Su Yu as deputy commander, and Tan Zhenlin as deputy political commissar. HuaYe has only one commander, not two commanders."
Later, Huaye's warriors made up a code name for each of the chiefs, such as Chen Yi for 501, Su Yu for 502, tan Zhenlin for 503, and thus numbered by rank, all the way to 507, Su Yu felt that this name was very good, it sounded very smooth, it was easy to write, and it was still very confidential.
At that time, the Kuomintang army was fiercely attacked by the East China Field Army, and suffered heavy losses, so they aimed their spearhead at the command center of the East China Field Army, and while intercepting the intelligence of our army, the Kuomintang also sent a large number of agents to infiltrate the liberated areas to assassinate the senior commanders of our army.
In order to carry out military work, senior commanders like Su Yu often go deep into the grassroots, and if they are known to people with ulterior motives when they go out, then the personal safety of our commanders will pose a great threat.
The use of code names will avoid letting the enemy know the true identity of the commanders of our army, and use the number on the telegram, even if the enemy intercepts the intelligence of our army, it is not known which commander and fighter issued the instructions, so that the enemy cannot know the specific situation of our army.
The northeast region is the key to the war of liberation, so the Kuomintang and the Communists launched a fierce competition in the northeast, when the forces of the Kuomintang and the Communists in the northeast are intertwined, and the foundation of our party in the northeast is not solid, and the mass base is also very poor, so the secrecy work of the troops is even more important.
At that time, Lin Biao was the secretary of the Northeast Bureau and the commander-in-chief and political commissar of the Northeast National Coalition Army, so Lin Biao was equivalent to the core of our party in the northeast, and if the enemy knew Lin Biao's tracks, then he would definitely carry out a crazy attack on Lin Biao's location.
Therefore, in order to ensure the command system of the Northeast Field Army, Lin Biao gave himself the code name "101", later Luo Ronghuan as "102", and Liu Yalou as "103", so that when he telegraphed, Lin Biao also signed his code name.
Because of this, the Northeast Field Army never called Lin Biao, or the name or position of other chiefs, directly called him "Chief No. 101", over time, 101 represented Lin Biao, the person, 101 sent instructions, is the instructions sent by Lin Biao.
It can be seen that every senior commander of our army will have his own code name, so as the commander-in-chief of the War of Liberation, does Chairman Mao have his own code name? Chairman Mao can be said to be the core of our Party and the core of the entire Chinese revolution.
For the sake of safety, Chairman Mao naturally also has his own code name, not only has a code name, Chairman Mao also has his own pseudonym, for example, Chairman Mao once used the pseudonym "Li Desheng" when he evacuated Yan'an and evaded the pursuit of Hu Zongnan's army, and the harmonic sound "away from victory" means that only by leaving Yan'an and ensuring the security of the central authorities can we achieve the final victory.
Chairman Mao's code name is very mysterious, known as "B52", what is the deep meaning of which is unknown, and Chairman Mao in different periods, different places, its code name is also different, for example: in Beijing when the residence code name is called Beijing Xin6, in Nanchang called 828, in Shaoshan Dishuidong called 203, in Shanghai Xijiao Hotel called 414.
What exactly these code names mean, or what secrets they are, we still don't know, but it is certain that all the code names are protecting Chairman Mao's personal safety, and it can be said that this string of numbers represents the crisis moments that Chairman Mao experienced in the revolutionary years.
Whether it is the improvement of the secrecy work layer by layer, or the code names used by the revolutionary ancestors, they all subtly tell the people of the world about the difficulties and crises on the revolutionary road, if it were not for the wisdom and wisdom of the ancestors, persisting in the struggle, how could the flame of revolution burn all over China?