In his later years, Su Yu once recalled that he had fought countless battles in his life, and three times made him most nervous. The first was the Battle of Subei, the second was the Battle of Eastern Henan, and the third was the Battle of Huaihai.
In the East China Battlefield of the War of Liberation, the battles of Eastern Henan and Huaihai were invested by both the enemy and us, and the scale was grand, and success or failure had a bearing on the overall situation; in particular, the Huaihai Campaign was a decisive battle of strategic significance between the Kuomintang and the Communists. But the scale was much smaller, and why did the Subei Campaign, which annihilated 20,000 enemy troops, also make Su Yu feel highly nervous?
Chen Yi and Su Yu
Before the Battle of Subei, the situation faced by the Shandong and Central China Field Armies was embarrassing. Commander Chen Yi of Yamano said at a meeting: After winning the "celebration meeting" and not being able to hold the "struggle meeting," I beat to death the "memorial service."
In July 1946, Chen Yi led the Shandong Field Army to attack Sixian County and lost, although the nationalist 172nd Division of the Gui clan annihilated more than 3,000 people, but our unit also suffered heavy losses, the 8th Division of The Mountain Field, which has always been known for its strong points, suffered more than 2,700 casualties, plus hundreds of casualties in the second column and the ninth column, with a total of more than 4,000 people. After the war, Song Shilun, the chief of staff of Yamano who first proposed to attack Si County, resigned, and commander Chen Yi also suffered severe accusations and criticism from some comrades in the party, and was in a difficult situation.
Then, the main force of the Central China Field Army defended Huaiyin and Huai'an, because the Shandong Field Army did not go south in time to reinforce, Huaye was outnumbered, first lost Huaiyin, and then lost Huai'an three days later. There was no way, the main force of the Central China Field Army was forced to abandon the two Huai base areas and withdraw north, the entire area of the Liberated Area of East China was reduced by half, and for a time there were many complaints and depression among the troops, and even the saying that "Chen Yi will not fight" was also spread among the top brass of the troops.
Beginning in late October 1946, the Shandong Branch bureau and the Central China branch held successive meetings in Chen Shi'an, a small town northwest of Lianshui, at which everyone severely criticized Chen Yi, the commander of the mountain field, such as insisting on fighting the Gui clan, rescuing the two Huai in a timely manner, and ineffective operational command leading to the passive overall situation. In the context of repeated defeats on the battlefield, it is understandable that everyone has more or less emotions. At a meeting, Chen Yi said excitedly: "Others are good students of Chairman Mao, I Chen Yi is also a good student of Chairman Mao, others can win the battle, I Chen Yi can win the battle, I Chen Yi can also win the battle!"
Prior to this, Chen Yi and Su Yu also had serious differences on the issue of whether to transfer the main force from central China to Huainan, which led to the inability of our army to concentrate its forces on annihilating the enemy in large numbers in the East China Battlefield. Therefore, in the East China Battlefield in the early stage of the Liberation War, except for Su Yu commanding the Central China Field Army in the "Seven Battles and Seven Victories" in central Jiangsu, and Chen Yi commanding the Shandong Field Army to win the Victory in the Chaoyang Ji Battle, the other battles were lackluster.
From left to right: Ye Fei, Ding Qiusheng, Wei Guoqing, Deng Zihui, Chen Yi, Tang Liang, Su Yu, Chen Shiqu, Tan Zhenlin
According to Ding Qiusheng, the founding lieutenant general of the political commissar of the 8th Division at the time, he recalled:
"Since the outbreak of the Liberation War, the Shandong Field Army and the Central China Field Army have taken Huaibei and central Jiangsu as their main battlefields. Due to the fact that both Lunan and Huaibei were taken care of, the mountain field was insufficient, and the enemy attacked by Xuzhou east mostly adopted a dense formation. Therefore, in the first few months, in addition to gathering and annihilating an enemy brigade in Chaoyang, many wars of attrition were fought. In particular, the battle in Sixian County was lost, Huaiyin was hastily lost, the troops were not replenished in time, and morale and the entire war situation were affected to a certain extent.
As the commander of the Shandong Field Army, Comrade Chen Yi not only assumed the responsibility, but also felt distressed. I remember that after the Mid-Autumn Festival in 1946, when he ordered the Eighth Division to return to Lunan and prepared to concentrate the First Column and the Eighth Division and other units to fight a battle in Lunan, he once said at a cadre meeting: After winning the "celebration meeting", it is not good to open the "struggle meeting", and I have killed the "memorial service". This statement is a good reflection of his situation at that time, and it also left a deep impression on us. ”
At the crucial moment, Mao Zedong decided to merge the Shandong Field Army and the Central China Field Army into the East China Field Army, with "Chen Yi as commander and political commissar, Su Yu as deputy commander, and Tan Zhenlin as deputy political commissar." "Under the leadership of Chen, the major policies and principles were jointly decided, and the campaign command was handed over to Su to be responsible."
The situation in central China changed drastically, and the situation in central China became more and more unfavorable to our army; Xue Yue attacked from the north, Li Mo'an from the south, and the north and south combined, forming a semi-encirclement of the mountains and the wilderness, and Suzhong completely became the rear of the enemy. Chen Su's main force was compressed in a narrow area east of the canal, such as Muyang, Lianshui, Yancheng, and Dongtai, and the situation was very grim.
Under the oppression of the enemy, Yamano and Huaye formed a de facto situation of meeting the division. Therefore, the Central China Sub-Bureau sent a telegram to Yan'an to suggest: "Concentrate the two field armies of Central China and Shandong to capture Suqian, and then expand the results of the battle to the west after winning the battle." Mao Zedong quickly replied, agreed with the proposal of the Central China Sub-Bureau, and instructed the two field armies to concentrate their operations and merge the two headquarters into one.
Mao Zedong explicitly telegraphed Chen Yi, Su Yu, Tan Zhenlin, and others:
(1) The mountains and the wilderness should concentrate on fighting and carry out the war situation, "do not divide the troops to fight two enemies, we must concentrate on fighting one enemy."
(2) The first battle after meeting the division must be won, so it is necessary to carefully select the target of annihilation, master the fighter, and carefully organize it.
(3) In order to ensure the consistency of action, the two headquarters of Shanye and Huaye "should also be unified" and suggested that "Chen Yi be the commander and political commissar, Su Yu as the deputy commander, and Tan Zhenlin as the deputy political commissar"; "under the leadership of Chen, the major policies and principles shall be jointly decided, and the campaign commander shall be handed over to Su to be responsible." Mao Zedong also told Chen Yi, Li Yu, Tan Zhenlin, and leaders of the Central China Sub-Bureau and the Central China Military Region, Zhang Dingcheng, Deng Zihui, and Zeng Shan: The leaders' "unity and harmony are extremely necessary," so "the six of you are often together, so as not to miss the fighter plane when traveling to and from e-commerce."
(4) The place where the troops should assemble and rest should be selected in an area farther away from the enemy, so as to lure the enemy deeper and create an opportunity to take advantage of it, and then concentrate all their efforts on annihilating it.
(5) The operations of the Jinji-Hebei Luyu Field Army were mainly based on the principle of dragging the Kuomintang Fifth Army and the reorganized Eleventh Division from joining Lunan in order to alleviate the difficulties of operations in East China.
Chen Yi
Su Yu wrote in his memoirs: "I assisted Comrade Chen Yi in commanding the Subei Campaign, and I felt a heavy responsibility and a nervous mood. This battle was the first coordinated operation after the rendezvous between Yamano and Huaye, and it was also a key battle to turn passivity into initiative on the battlefield in East China. ”
The Battle of Sixian was severely frustrated, and the two Huaihuai were lost consecutively, "the progress of the war was not smooth, and some comrades had some complaints and doubts." Su Yu, who has just taken over the unified command of Shanye and Huaye (Central China), knows better than anyone that in this special period, ideological and political work alone cannot solve the problem, and the only way for everyone to get out of the haze of failure and sweep away the emotions of complaining and accusing is to fight a victorious battle as soon as possible.
At this time, the battlefield situation was: Zaozhuang, with Ma Liwu as the main force, Feng Zhi'an's reorganized 33rd Division directly pointing directly at Linyi; Suqian, with Hu Lian and Dai Zhiqi as the main force, rushed to Xinyi and Lianghuai; Zhang Lingfu made a comeback to attack Lianshui after the failure of the first attack on Lianshui; And Li Mo'an's reorganized Sixty-fifth Division, the Eighty-third Division, and the Twenty-fifth Division, with a total of six brigades, attacked from Dongtai to Yancheng and Funing.
In the face of four-way attack, which one should be chosen as the first target? Su Yu decided to choose the Suqian road, because Suqian was preparing to block the connection between Shandong and northern Jiangsu on the Longhai Line, which was the greatest threat to our army, and at the same time, the enemy had just arrived on this road and had not yet fought with our army, and the enemy did not know the depth of our army.
Before the war, Su Yu came almost alone to meet Chen Yi, shouldering the heavy trust of Mao Zedong and the central authorities and the expectations of the whole army, and he felt great pressure and responsibility.
This was the first battle after the merger of the Shandong Field Army and the Central China Field Army, and it was also a key battle to turn passivity into initiative on the East China Battlefield. The Central Military Commission has long demanded that "the first battle between the two armies must be won." Judging from the situation on the battlefield at that time, it was necessary to win this battle, and it was even more necessary to win this battle from the perspective of boosting morale and boosting confidence.
Su Yu said many times afterwards that he had three of the most tense battles in his campaign command of the Liberation War: the Battles of Subei, Eastern Henan, and Huaihai. The Battle of Subei was the first. He once said with a heavy heart: I assisted Comrade Chen Yi in commanding the Subei Campaign, and I felt a heavy responsibility and a nervous mood. In fact, at this time, in addition to having to overcome this pressure, Su Yu still had many difficulties in campaign command:
First, they are not very familiar with the warring opponents. There is a way: Know thyself and know oneself, and never lose a battle. But for him, "many of the troops are new to him." In particular, before the reorganized 69th Division and division commander Dai Zhiqi, Su Yu had never faced each other before.
Second, the environment of the battlefield is unfamiliar. Since the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, Su Yu has been fighting in southern Jiangsu, central Jiangsu, and Jiangsu and Zhejiang. After the Liberation War, he fought in the Soviet Union and basically did not understand the "people's conditions and terrain in the Huaihai area".
Su Yu
Third, the command organ is not familiar with it. "After the merger of the two field armies, the command organs have not yet been unified." Su Yu came "alone," relying entirely on the command organ of the Shandong Field Army to direct the operation, and "was also unfamiliar with the comrades working in the headquarters."
Fourth, the troops to be commanded are not familiar with them. "The troops who directly participated in the battle this time were basically the Shandong Field Army." Su Yu, who had been in the New Fourth Army, generally lacked understanding of these units. Even Ye Fei's 1st Column, which he had commanded, had been going north to Shandong after the victory of the War of Resistance, and it had been more than a year.
Fifth, many of Yamano's generals are old and have strong personalities, and they are not necessarily as handy as Su Yu, who did not have the qualifications and advantages in their previous experience, and su yu is not necessarily as handy as he was in the central Soviet region before, and this is reflected in more detail in the TV series "General Su Yu".
Su Yu lived up to the expectations of the people, made meticulous plans, organized conscientiously, and with the full support of Chen Yi and other leaders, Yamano and Huaye cooperated with each other, and all the soldiers fought bravely, and finally won the first big victory in the battle of annihilating 1 reorganized division of the Kuomintang army after the Shandong Field Army and the Central China Field Army met with the division.
Su Yu later recalled: However, considering the interests of the overall situation of the war and the heavy trust of the Central Military Commission, we can only dispel all our worries and resolve to fight this battle well. If this battle is won, there will be a sense of trust between the fraternal forces, between the leading organs and the subordinate units. On the contrary, if the battle is successful or lost, the fraternal troops and between the superiors and subordinates may complain to each other, and it will take a long time to make up for it.
In the end, Su Yu withstood the pressure, he scrupulously fulfilled his duties, lived up to the expectations of the people, through meticulous planning, conscientious organization, and gave full play to his accustomed battlefield command art of seeking victory in danger, coupled with the full support of Chen Yi and other leaders, The mountains and Huaye cooperated with each other, and all the soldiers fought bravely, and finally won the victory in the Battle of Subei, creating a new record of annihilating the enemy in the Liberation War.
In this battle, a total of 3 entire brigades and 1 regiment of the enemy were annihilated, a total of 2. More than 10,000 people, Dai Zhiqi, commander of the 69th Division of the Kuomintang Army, committed suicide, and deputy division commander Rao Shaowei was captured. This was the first major victory for the Shandong Field Army and the Central China Field Army to annihilate 1 reorganized division of the Kuomintang Army after they met. This campaign not only enabled our East China troops to initially gain experience in large corps operations, but also was of great significance to the subsequent development of the war situation in East China.
The victory of the Battle of Subei was not just a nominal victory, but of great significance and far-reaching influence, and it could be said that it was a landmark victory of symbolic significance.
Su Yu recalled in his later years:
A comrade asked me, why are the Battles of Subei and Lunan so famous?
My answer is that it was blocked by other bigger battles, but these two battles were very important and well fought. The main force of the Central China Field Army went north to join the Shandong Field Army in northern Jiangsu, and the initial operation came to an end, and the battlefield turned from the front to the depth, which can be said to be the beginning of the first turning point in the East China Theater. The Battle of Subei was a sign of victory in achieving this turn, and the Battle of Lunan was a continuation of the Battle of Subei. ”
"The command of the Subei Campaign and the Lunan Campaign was characterized by caution, and as far as my personal feelings are concerned, the Subei Campaign was more tense."
After the victory in the Battle of Subei, the Central Organ of the Communist Party of China, Liberation Daily, reported passionately:
"This is an unprecedented victory in the Soviet-Anhui Liberated Areas that surpassed the previous eleven great victories, and it is also an unprecedented victory in the entire patriotic self-defense war since July this year."
It is not difficult to see that the victory in the Battle of Subei is not only a nominal victory, but also of great significance and far-reaching influence, which can be said to be a landmark victory with symbolic significance.
The Suwan Liberated Area mentioned by the Liberation Daily is also the Central China Theater under the command of Su Yu, and the so-called "Eleven Great Victories" are all the victories that Su Yu has won since the Seven Victories of the Seven Wars and Seven Victories of The Soviet Union.
The victory in the Battle of Subei reversed the passive situation to a certain extent and opened up a completely new situation for the war situation in East China. At the same time, after this campaign, it has effectively promoted the integration of the two units of Shanye and Huaye, tempered the combat effectiveness of various units, and in particular greatly enhanced the confidence and morale of the troops in daring to fight and win, and swept away the defeatist mood of mutual resentment and accusation that pervaded the troops some time ago.
Su Yu once commented on the Subei Campaign: "After the self-army abandoned the two Huai, both the enemy and us were rearranging and brewing a new and greater contest, when the enemy pressed on us in four ways, and I was in a passive position on the battlefield. The victory in the Subei Campaign crushed the enemy's four roads, which posed the greatest threat to us, so that the enemy not only failed to realize its attempts to cut off the ties between our two field armies in Shandong and central China and carry out various attempts to 'quickly end the war in northern Jiangsu,' but instead our army cut off the north-south ties and divided them into two lumps, Shandong and northern Jiangsu, exposing its flanks and under threat of being attacked by our army. At that time, the Kuomintang's puppet congress had not yet ended, and the Battle of Subei gave Chiang Kai-shek, who boasted of so-called "victory", a resounding slap in the face. ”
For Su Yu personally, the Battle of Subei was his maiden battle under the unified command of Yamano and Huaye. The battlefield is also an examination room, there is no doubt, Su Yu passed this exam and achieved excellent results. Previously, Su Yu created one brilliant glory after another through his outstanding performances on the battlefield in southern Jiangsu, northern Jiangsu, central Jiangsu, and western Zhejiang, and laid the status of a generation of military masters. The victory in the Battle of Subei gave the officers and men of the East China Field Army, including the Shandong Field Army, an insight into Su Yu's outstanding military command ability, and some mountain commanders were swept away from his observation and suspicion at first because they did not understand or were unfamiliar with him.
On this point, the ninth episode of the TV series "General Su Yu" has a wonderful performance.
There is such a plot, after the victory of the Battle of Subei, the mountain wild general Hu Yanbao (nickname), who has a very old personality, meets Chen Yi and Su Yu on the road and begins the following dialogue:
……
Chen: Well, I still look at what Commander Su told you, otherwise a squad leader wouldn't be a squad leader.
Hu: I lead the affection of Commander Su
Chen: Did you take it?
Hu: I took it
Chen: Duplicity, right?
Hu: Absolutely not, absolutely not, I am convinced. Commander Su not only understands strategy and commands, but also tactics are screaming.