Author: Shi Qian
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"Siege and reinforcement" is a method of play in which a force encircles or attacks an enemy's city or important stronghold, induces the enemy in a neighboring area to come to reinforcements, and concentrates the main force to annihilate and aid the enemy in the movement. "Siege and reinforcement", the siege of the city is virtual, and the reinforcement is real. In this regard, Chairman Mao pointed out: "... The operational policy should focus on annihilating the enemy's living forces, and then the enemy's occupation of various strongholds will naturally be easy for us to recover.
In order to achieve this policy, a siege and reinforcement approach should be adopted. The purpose of besieging the city is not to get the city, but to fight for help, but the siege is not vain, if the siege force can not reach the purpose of knocking on the mountain and shaking the tiger, mobilizing the enemy, the aid is also an empty word. The general gist of "besieging the city and providing aid" is: "Those who attack the enemy must be saved, and those who attack the enemy must be destroyed, and those who attack the enemy must retreat, and those who retreat will be eliminated." ”
The tactics of "besieging the city and attacking reinforcements" must be carried out in the following three points: First, correctly select the target of siege. The target mentioned here mainly refers to the key parts of the enemy army, and if I attack it, the enemy must save it. The choice of siege targets generally includes the strategic campaign points deployed by the enemy, transportation throats, communication hubs, logistics bases, enemy head organs, etc. Once I launch a siege on the above targets, I can generally mobilize the enemy to come to support, creating conditions for us to destroy and aid the enemy in the movement;
The second is to correctly choose to fight and aid the battlefield. "In the area of assistance, it is natural to select the middle of the route from the enemy to the aided area, so that the enemy and the two places cannot respond; and it is necessary to be slightly farther away from the place of assistance, because the troops of the place of assistance are more than those of the aided area, and the strategy is also flexible, which is the correct deployment of troops (the purpose of the siege is to provide assistance, therefore, the deployment of the troops of the besieged city is relatively small, it can confuse the enemy, put pressure on the enemy, and make him deceived, and the focus of the deployment of troops should be on the reinforcement, and the focus of the deployment of troops should be on the reinforcement, and the absolute superiority of the troops should be concentrated to strike at the reinforcement of the enemy. In order to ensure that there are enough troops to quickly detour and encircle one or more ways to help the enemy, and to seek total annihilation.
In mid-October 1947, in accordance with Chairman Mao's instructions to "mobilize the enemy to fight a mobile war", the Jin-Cha-Ji Field Army adopted the method of besieging Xushui to attract reinforcements from the enemies on both the north and the south and annihilating the enemy of the movement, and annihilated the main force of the Kuomintang 3rd Army from Shijiazhuang to the north in one fell swoop in the Qingfengdian area.
On October 13, the 2nd Column of the Jin-Cha-Ji Field Army launched a fierce attack on Xushuicheng. After fierce fighting throughout the night, before dawn on the 14th, the southern and northern city passes were occupied and the city walls were tightened. Xu Shui was in danger, and the enemy quickly dispatched 5 infantry divisions and 1 tank regiment to advance hand in hand to relieve the siege of Xu Shui.
Yang Dezhi, commander of the field army, and Luo Ruiqing, political commissar, and Yang Chengwu, the second political commissar, ordered the 4th and 5th brigades of the 2nd Column to continue to besiege Xushui to further mobilize the enemy.
At this time, Chiang Kai-shek believed that our army was insufficient in strength, had fallen into passivity, and that the time had come for a decisive battle with the communist army, and urgently ordered Luo Lishu, commander of the 3rd Army stationed in Shijiazhuang, to lead the main force of the army to immediately march north of Baoding, attack from north to south, and encircle and annihilate the communist army.
After comprehensively analyzing the situation, the commander of the Jin-Cha-Ji Field Army held that the main force of the 3rd Army was moving north alone and was in a state of motion, which would help us annihilate the enemy. At the same time, some of their troops were still disguised as the main force of the field army to besiege Xushui, resist the reinforcements of the enemy's 94th Army and 16th Army, drag the enemy, and buy time for the main force to gather and annihilate the enemy.
On the morning of the 18th, the commander of the field army personally led the 4th Column, the 4th and 6th Brigades of the 2nd Column, and the 9th Brigade of the 3rd Column, a total of 6 brigades, and galloped south at night and starry night, marching for 200 to 250 miles, and arriving at the designated area on the morning of the 19th, completely blocking the way for the enemy's 3rd Army to go north.
In the afternoon of the 19th, when the enemy entered Qingfengdian, Fang knew that our army had occupied the favorable terrain nearby in advance, realized the seriousness and complexity of the situation, and quickly gathered in Qingfengdian and more than 20 villages east of it to build fortifications and organize defenses.
After our army caught the enemy, it was determined to fight a quick battle early, make a quick decision, and avoid being caught between the enemy's north and south. At dawn on the 20th, taking advantage of the enemy's unstable foothold, he launched an attack on all sides until 12 o'clock on the 21st, and all of the enemy's more than 10,000 people were shrunk in this village with less than 400 households. At 3 o'clock on the 22nd, our army launched a final general attack on the enemy with the strength of 5 brigades. Under the cover of fierce artillery fire, the main force of our 6th Brigade attacked from north to south, the 4th Brigade and the 12th Brigade attacked from south and southwest to north and northeast, the 10th And 11th Brigade attacked from east and northeast to west and southwest, and the 9th Brigade attacked from west to east, so that the enemy was attacked from all sides and passively coped.
Seeing that the general situation was gone, the enemy commander Luo Lirong led the remnants of the defeated army to break through to the southeast with more than 300 people, and was annihilated by our 34th Regiment and the independent 8th Brigade on the way. By 11:30 a.m., our army had annihilated all the enemy's 3rd Army Headquarters, the 7th Division, and the 66th Regiment of the 22nd Division of the 16th Army. Luo Lirong, commander of the enemy's 3rd Army, Yang Guangyu, deputy commander, Li Yongzhang, commander of the 7th Division, and more than 11,400 officers and men were captured, more than 2,000 enemy were killed or wounded, and more than 17,000 enemy troops were annihilated along with the blockade battle north of Baoding.
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Sun Tzu said, "Soldiers, tricksters." "Chairman Mao deeply understood his way when he fought the movement war, and was the best at repeatedly maneuvering with the enemy's falsehood and reality, until he lured the enemy to make a wrong judgment and then took the opportunity to annihilate the enemy.
Chairman Mao believes that the greatest feature of mobile warfare is its "fluidity." This kind of flow sometimes does not necessarily have a comprehensive plan, but according to the situation on the battlefield, the enemy changes and mobilizes the enemy. Chairman Mao stressed that the troops "if they can fight a war, they will fight in the local area; if they cannot fight, they should lose no time in quickly moving to the other direction and sometimes for the sake of breaking the enemy in each direction, some have just destroyed the enemy here and immediately moved to the other direction to destroy the enemy; there are also those who are not conducive to fighting here and must immediately leave this enemy and go to the other direction to fight." If the situation is particularly severe, the guerrilla forces should not stay on the ground for long, but should move their positions as quickly as flowing water and winds. The transfer of troops is generally secret and rapid. It is often necessary to adopt ingenious methods to deceive, lure and confuse the enemy, such as attacking the west with sound, the south and the north, the fight and the departure, and the night action."
The four crossings of chishui are chairman Mao's most successful examples of using virtual reality to maneuver around.
On January 19, 1935, the Red Army departed from Zunyi and was divided into three parts. The road is headed in the direction of Chishui. On the 29th, the columns of the Red Army crossed the Chishui River for the first time to the west through Tucheng and Yuanhouchang.
At the beginning of February, the Sichuan Army, with more than 10 brigades and a part of the Qian Army, surrounded the Red Army in multiple ways, and the three brigades of the Dian Army also rushed in this direction, chasing and blocking on all sides, in an attempt to annihilate the Red Army on the border of Sichuan and Qian, in order to preserve military strength and wait for the opportunity to annihilate the enemy, the (present-day Weixin) area assembled. From February 18 to 20, the Red Army crossed the Chishui River for the second time at Taipingdu and Erlangtan, returned to Qianbei, and quickly advanced in the direction of Tongzi and Zunyi, completely unexpectedly, so that the pursuing enemy had fallen behind the Red Army for 3 to 4 days.
At this time, the 1st Column of Chiang Kai-shek's concubine troops reinforced Zunyi at night and in the middle of the night. Its 59th and 93rd Divisions acted as vanguards and were close to our forward positions. Chairman Mao immediately decided to take advantage of the enemy's lone army to advance, the formation was scattered, and the enemy who was chasing after him was blocked at the favorable opportunity north of Loushan Pass, and concentrated the main force to annihilate the enemy in the area south of Zunyi.
On the 28th, the Red Army held its position with some troops to resist the enemy's attack, and the main force of the Red 1st Army carried out a fierce counterattack from the gap between the enemy's combat formations, and directly inserted itself into the command post of the enemy's 1st Column. The commander of the enemy column, Wu Qiwei, was so panicked that he left the 59th Division behind and led about 1 regiment of the remnants of the 93rd Division to flee toward the indiscriminate bench (place name), and the Red 1st Army pursued it relentlessly, capturing more than 1,800 enemy personnel and a large number of weapons, and the enemy remnants would flee across the Wujiang River in defeat.
Within 5 days, the Central Red Army company of Tongzi, Loushanguan, and Zunyi defeated and annihilated two enemy divisions and 8 regiments, captured more than 3,000 enemy soldiers, captured more than 2,000 guns, and won the biggest victory since the Long March.
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Sport defense means that when the enemy attacks us, I am defensive in depth. Resisting step by step, not fighting the enemy to the death in one position, gradually delaying and depleting the enemy's movement defense, which is more flexible and fluid than sticking to the defense and exclusively defending the defense, it is not to hold on to a fixed location or line, not to defend a certain town or a certain position as the combat goal, but to eliminate the enemy's living forces as the main purpose Chairman Mao said: "Regarding the question of losing land, there is often such a situation, this is only by losing can it not be lost, this is' If what we lose is the principle of going to the land and what we have gained is the victory over the enemy, the restoration of the land, and the expansion of the land, this is a profitable business. ”
As a result, the initiative and flexibility shown by sports defense is unprecedented. It can change due to changes in the enemy situation, it can advance in a big stride, it can also retreat in a big stride, it is not stuck in a certain area, as long as it can catch the fighter in motion and annihilate the enemy, that is, to achieve the purpose of defense.
After the Chinese Volunteer Army entered the DPRK, in less than three months, it carried out three consecutive battles without rest. Therefore, after the end of the third campaign, except for a few troops who remained on the front line to take vigilance, the main forces of the Volunteer Army and the People's Army retreated to the area north of the first line of Seoul and Hengcheng to recuperate and prepare for the spring offensive.
At this time, the U.S. authorities were extremely pessimistic about the situation in the Korean War, fearing that if the Volunteers launched another offensive, they would drive the U.S. 8th Army out of Korea, and they also feared that the Soviet Union would take the opportunity to attack Japan, and that the only U.S. troops that could be used to defend Japan was the 8th Army fighting in Korea. In view of this fear, they had to consider that the US 8th Army would have to withdraw to Japan once the battlefield situation forced it. U.S. policymakers are wringing their heads.
On the battlefield, Matthew Ridgway, who succeeded Walton Walker as commander of the U.S. 8th Army in late December 1950, who had died in a car accident, reorganized his forces.
In order to discover the strength and deployment of the Chinese and DPRK armies, a tentative offensive was launched on January 15, 1951, and when he discovered that the first line of the Volunteer Army was insufficient, the material supply was difficult, and the attack would not be launched in a short period of time, it began on January 25, concentrating 16 divisions and 3 brigades and 1 airborne regiment of the "United Nations Army" ground force totaling more than 230,000 people, mixing the US And British troops and the South Korean Army, with the US army as the main force.
Taking the western front as a heavy truck, under the support of the air force, a full-line counterattack was launched In order to crush the enemy's attack, the volunteer army and the people's army immediately stopped resting and turned to the fourth campaign, the strength of the volunteer army was not replenished, the difficult situation of material supply was not improved in any way, and the first line of the Chinese and DPRK troops totaled 280,000 people, which had little advantage over the enemy army. Commander Peng Dehuai, in consultation with Prime Minister Kim Il Sung, determined "the policy of striving to stop the enemy's advance, steadily opening up the war situation, stepping up preparations from all aspects, and still making long-term plans."
In accordance with this policy and in view of the characteristics of the enemy's offensive, Peng Dehuai decided to adopt the operational policy of putting the west to the east, with Deputy Commander Han Xianchu commanding the 38th, 50th Army, and the 1st Corps of the People's Army on both sides of the Han River in the eastern and western areas of Seoul on the western front, resolutely blocking the enemy's attack, containing the main force of the US army, and covering the main force of the volunteer army in seeking opportunities to annihilate the enemy on the eastern front; with deputy commander Deng Hua commanding the 39th, 40th, 42nd, and 66th armies to assemble in the area north of Hengcheng, with the cooperation of the 2nd, 3rd, and 5th corps of the People's Army, they lured the enemy to go deeper. Seek an opportunity to annihilate the enemy.
The volunteer army and the various units of the people's army commanded by Han Xianchu relied on field fortifications to carry out stubborn resistance under the condition of weak troops and difficulties in supplying grain and ammunition, and although the enemy army had strong support from aircraft and ground fire, the volunteer army and the people's army still held the basic position on the south bank of the Han River, and killed and wounded more than 10,000 enemy troops, effectively containing the main force of the US army and covering the deployment of the main force of the volunteer army on the eastern front.
From the evening of February 11 to the morning of February 13, the four main armies of the Eastern Volunteer Army, with the cooperation of the three corps of the People's Army, annihilated 3 regiments of the 8th Division of South Korea and 1 battalion of the 2nd Division of the United States in the area north of Hengcheng, and annihilated each of the 3rd and 5th Divisions of South Korea, annihilating more than 12,000 enemy troops. Subsequently, 3 corps of the People's Army and 2 corps of the Volunteer Army continued to develop southwards, and 6 regiments of the Volunteer Army surrounded and annihilated 1 regiment of the 2nd Division of the 2nd Division and the French battalion west of Hengcheng.
The volunteers attacked the enemy in Pingli for two consecutive nights, and although they inflicted heavy casualties on them, they were not completely annihilated. On the 15th, enemy reinforcements arrived, increasing the difficulty of the volunteer army's attack, and at the same time the enemy formed a new defensive line on the entire front and completed the defense in depth deployment, even if the volunteer army conquered Arbor Pingli, it was difficult to repulse the entire attack of the enemy In order to avoid fighting with the enemy army, the volunteer army took the initiative to withdraw from the attack on Arpingli before dawn on the 16th, and the volunteer army and the people's army all turned to the movement defense to cover the follow-up corps of the volunteer army to advance and assemble.
After the start of the fourth campaign, Chairman Mao and Zhou Enlai, in view of the fact that the enemy army on the battlefield retreated quickly after being hit by the volunteers, and the volunteers turned to counterattack quickly after stopping the attack, and did not allow the volunteers to rest, decided in mid-February that the volunteers would implement the policy of taking turns in Korea, with Yang Dezhi as commander and Li Zhimin as the political commissar of the 19th Corps (under the jurisdiction of the 63rd, 64th, and 65th Armies), and Chen Geng as commander and political commissar of the 3rd Corps (under the jurisdiction of the 12th, 15th, and 60th Armies, Chen Geng did not arrive at his post, led by Deputy Commander Wang Jinshan) and the 9th Corps resting in Korea as the second combat unit, ordered the 19th and 3rd Corps to enter the DPRK in mid-February and mid-March, and prepare to take over the first line of operations around mid-April.
In order to cover the advance and assembly of the second combat unit of the Volunteer Army and create favorable conditions for the next campaign, the volunteer army and the first-line troops of the People's Army exchanged space for time, and deployed three lines of defense from the south to the first line of Seoul and Hengcheng, and from the north to the area of the 38th line, each with a depth of 20-30 kilometers. Delayed the enemy's attack and stubbornly defended for two months. By 21 April, the 3rd, 9th, and 19th Corps of the First Combat Force of the Volunteer Army, which had been prevented from reaching the front line by the enemy forces, had completed the campaign and the fourth campaign had ended.
In this campaign, under extremely difficult circumstances, the volunteer army flexibly used various combat methods such as holding on to the blockade, campaign counterattack, and movement defense, and together with the people's army, annihilated more than 78,000 enemy troops, successfully completed the defensive task, and bought time for the follow-up corps to advance and assemble.
About author:Shi Kui, history teacher at colleges and universities, history researcher. He has been cultivating the history of the Party, the Military and the History of War for a long time. History lovers are welcome to exchange criticisms.