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After the founding of the People's Republic of China, the US Government refused to recognize it on the one hand, and on the other hand, it wanted to retain its official foothold in China.
Although Stuart has left China and the U.S. consulates in Wuhan, Qingdao, Guangzhou, Chongqing, Kunming, Urumqi, and Shenyang have closed, embassies and consulates in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Nanjing still exist and are planned to remain for as long as possible.
1. U.S. diplomats who don't leave
However, the United States will inevitably pay a price for its hostility to New China, and one of the costs is that it will not be able to stay in Chinese mainland for a long time.
On January 6, 1950, the Beijing Municipal Military Management Commission issued a proclamation announcing the resumption of barracks occupied by certain foreign countries that had "taken advantage of the so-called 'right to garrison troops' in unequal treaties" and would requisition their ground buildings seven days later.
The Military Control Commission ordered the former consuls of the United States, France, and the Netherlands to vacate the diplomatic relations on schedule, and there should be no mistake.
On January 9 and 10, in accordance with the instructions of the State Council, Consul General of the People's Republic of China in Beiping, Mr. Coleb, sent letters to Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, saying that the possession of the barracks was a right derived from international treaties and that the barracks had long been used as part of the office space of the U.S. Consulate General.
At the same time, the State Department proposed to Truman that treaty rights should be upheld, and that once the expropriation order was enforced, all official offices in China should be closed down and all official personnel in China should be withdrawn.
It is clearly hoping that by threatening to withdraw completely, China may retreat.
Truman immediately approved the State Department's claim. On January 12, Coleb expressed this threat to the Chinese Foreign Ministry through British officials in China, and the Chinese government remained unmoved.
The Beijing Military Control Commission imposed requisition orders on January 14 and 16, and the U.S. State Department had to announce the withdrawal of all official personnel from Chinese mainland.
However, the United States acted surprisingly slower than its statements. The vast majority of US officials have not applied to the Chinese government to leave the country for a long time, and US embassies and consulates have been slow to stop their activities. The State Department has not finally given up hope of retaining a foothold in Chinese mainland.
According to Kolb, China's action was aimed at seeking early recognition from the United States, but it did not expect to cause "serious consequences that backfired."
In his view, China has political and economic demands on the United States, and may therefore acquiesce in the continued detention of American officials or even return to barracks. He suggested that the relevant test should be made to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
However, just as the State Department was considering the proposal, a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement saying that the so-called Chinese stay in the United States was a fabrication, and that the Chinese government would not prevent U.S. officials from leaving the country, "on the contrary, based on the experience of former U.S. consuls in Shenyang and Dihua (Urumqi) engaged in espionage activities, we would rather hear that all U.S. officials will be able to leave China sooner." ”
At repeated urgings by the Chinese government, all U.S. officials were evacuated by April 30.
This is a major event in the history of Sino-US relations. It symbolizes the eventual expulsion of the United States in China, which had been formed over a century.
After this incident, the United States Government dismissed a certain reconsideration of the issue of recognition that had been in place since the fall of 1949 and, in fact, changed its attitude towards the question of China's representation in the United Nations.
Since then, the U.S. government will no longer be able to observe China on the spot, nor will it be able to probe China's intentions more directly through certain informal contacts, which will make its policy more blind and adventurous. Moreover, the withdrawal of all U.S. officials from China has eliminated a factor that has helped constrain the Truman administration's actions: the safety of U.S. officials in China.
It can be less scruples about being an enemy of China and less scruples about considering military intervention against China.
2. Why don't you leave?
One reason why the US government is unhappy about the withdrawal of personnel stationed in China is that it believes that Sino-Soviet relations are in a delicate state. In the words of Consul General Coleb in Peiping, the Chinese people's disillusionment with the Soviet Union is expected to grow, and the "nationalist clique" within the Communist Party of China will also be shocked by the "Machiavellianism" that the Soviet Union will probably display, so the United States should delay and wait.
This refers to Mao Zedong's visit to the Soviet Union from December 16, 1949.
From the outset, U.S. officials have closely followed the visit, speculating about it in the hope that it will exacerbate Sino-Soviet tensions.
State Department officials believed that Mao's visit was the result of pressure from Moscow, which was dissatisfied with the state of the Chinese Communist Party's loyalty to the Soviet Union.
According to Koleb, the Soviet Union is likely to demand that China be completely turned into a satellite state by a certain agreement with a secret clause. As a result, Mao may return disappointed, which could lead China to "reach out" to the United States.
Acheson speculated.
He later said about Mao Zedong's visit to the Soviet Union:
"You can't be sure that the USSR will not use tough means and thus create opportunities for us".
At that time, a piece of news from Shanghai intrigued Acheson, who thought that he had found signs that the CCP leadership might split over the Sino-Soviet negotiations.
Thus, Davis writes: Soviet extortion, coupled with food shortages, will prompt nationalists in the CCP leadership to rise up against the pro-Soviet faction.
The U.S. government did not sit idly by and wait for the outcome of the Sino-Soviet negotiations. On the contrary, it has made a big effort to drive a wedge between China and the Soviet Union, between the Chinese Communist Party, and between the CCP and the Chinese people. During Mao Zedong's visit to the Soviet Union, Document No. 48/2 of the National Security Committee stipulated:
"Take advantage of any rift between the CCP and the Soviet Union, between the Stalinists and other elements in China, while being careful not to make a façade of interference." Where appropriate, both overt and covert means are used to achieve these ends. ”
The means of publicity were mainly Acheson's speeches at the National Press Club.
In response to the Sino-Soviet negotiations, he declared that the Soviet Union was seizing Chinese territory and "is making all those who have declared their allegiance to Moscow and have made themselves used as puppets of Moscow bear the most terrible responsibility." ”
3. The disillusionment of American "hope".
In order to provide a "factual basis" for his remarks, the State Department published so-called background material, saying that China had secretly ceded a large number of new privileges to the Soviet Union.
At the same time, Acheson was secretly spreading rumors.
He sent two secret telegrams to David Bruce, the ambassador to France, instructing him to spread the large number of rumors he had wholesaled as soon as possible to Suzberg, the Paris-based correspondent of the New York Times, and others, who would then poke them out by invoking "well-informed people in Eastern Europe."
However, the speculation of American officials is reasonable on one point: the Sino-Soviet negotiations did not go well.
The purpose of Mao Zedong's visit to the Soviet Union:
The first is to strive for the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet alliance, the second is to strive for the Soviet Union to give up the privileges previously granted by the Kuomintang in Northeast China at an early date, and the third is to seek economic assistance from the Soviet Union.
On all three fronts, China is experiencing difficulties. After Mao Zedong arrived in Moscow, the Soviet side delayed talking about the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance.
The reason for the hesitation of the USSR was, first of all, that it still doubted that China would take the "Yugoslav road". It also wanted to take advantage of the privileges of the treaty issue to remain in the Northeast for a long time, and even to obtain new interests. The Soviet Union was also not active in providing economic aid.
However, the basic strategic interests of China and the Soviet Union at that time were identical, and their basic views on world politics were also the same. At the talks, Stalin reaffirmed the victory of the Chinese revolution in spite of his faulty interference. This shows that he has an understanding of the general principle of autonomy of the Communist Party of China and the necessity of treating China with a more equal attitude.
After negotiations, the two sides finally signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance and related agreements on February 14, 1950.
As one American scholar put it, on the whole, they are more generous to China than the treaties and agreements that China's governments have signed with foreign countries in modern times.
This is a major achievement of New China's diplomacy, and it is of great significance for strengthening China's ability to deter foreign attacks, consolidating China's independence and sovereignty, and restraining US interference in the whole of East Asia.
America's expectations were dashed.
Acheson, after the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, could not but argue:
"The Soviet Union and its most ardent supporters in China may have temporarily succeeded in convincing the Chinese people:
These agreements refuted the non-communist world's notion that an alliance with the Soviet Union contained a bad omen of imperialist domination. ”
McConauch, one of the most vocal advocates of Sino-Soviet relations, was disappointed to conclude that there would be no split between China and the Soviet Union in the foreseeable future, nor would there be a split within the Chinese Communist Party.
Charles Pollon, an expert on the Soviet Union, as a representative of the State Department, told the Anglo-French side:
Despite the fact that there may still be certain contradictions between China and the Soviet Union, China followed the Soviet line on all issues of foreign policy in general.
This understanding of Sino-Soviet relations will inevitably affect the US policy toward China and East Asia. Less than 10 days after the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet treaty, the heads of propaganda affairs of the US diplomatic missions in East Asia met in Singapore and agreed that "recent developments in China confirm that appeasement and attempts at reconciliation are ineffective against the relentless advance of the Communists toward the ultimate goal of world domination" and recommended a "more forceful, active, and straightforward counteroffensive" against China. The State Department agreed.
In fact, it did much that in the coming months.
Second, the U.S. government will be more worried about the so-called communist expansion in East Asia. Policymakers believe that China has unequivocally become a loyal ally of the Soviet Union and will be used as a base for advancing into other "weak locations." In their view, the polarization of international relations has never been more pronounced, and the danger of communist domination of the Asian continent has never been more serious.
Finally, the policy of not using US force on the Asian continent and Taiwan has lost a justification. It was portrayed in the past by Acheson and others as aggressive and aggressive, because it was said to have helped to promote the Sino-Soviet split and Asian nationalism, turning the finger at the Soviet Union, but the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet treaty made it difficult for American policy to maintain such a appearance.
It cannot but expose the real reason, which is the lack of strength and determination of the United States on the Asian continent. Given the domestic political climate in the United States and the state of mind of policymakers at the time, sooner or later this policy would have to be replaced by military intervention that showed strength and determination.
4. "Containment" from Southeast Asia
Southeast Asia is a major link in the U.S. containment line on the Asian continent.
Roosevelt had hoped to stop European countries and resume colonial rule in Southeast Asia after the war. On several occasions between 1942 and 1943, he told the Allied leaders that after the war there should be an international trusteeship of the colonies of European countries as a transitional measure for their eventual independence. In particular, he stressed that France must not return to Indochina.
However, Roosevelt visibly wavered as the Southeast Asian theater counteroffensive against Japan began, Britain gained strategic leadership in the theater, Charles de Gaulle's status as a Free France rose, and the question of postwar American cooperation with Britain, France, and the Netherlands became more prominent. Shortly before his death, he even indicated within the government that France might be allowed to function as trustee of Indochina alone, as long as it promised to eventually make the region independent.
After Truman succeeded to the presidency, the tendency to accommodate the European colonial powers developed further. During the Potsdam Conference, the United States made concessions to Britain and divided Indochina, which originally belonged to the Chinese theater of operations, into two according to the 16th parallel, and the south of the line was occupied by the Supreme Command of the Allied Forces in Southeast Asia, which was under the responsibility of Britain, thus opening the door for France, which was supported by Britain, to return to Indochina.
After Japan's surrender, the British and Chinese Nationalist armies, who had surrendered in southern and northern Indochina, had to occupy Indochina in different ways, while the British troops who had surrendered in Indonesia had helped the Dutch who were trying to re-establish their colonial rule. Far from objecting, Truman tacitly allowed Britain, France, and the Netherlands to use the aid given to them by the United States for the purpose of colonialism.
The years 1947 and 1948 were important periods in the development of U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia, especially its Indo-Chinese policy.
With the withdrawal of British and Chinese Nationalist governments from Indochina, the United States was directly confronted with the question of how to deal with the French colonial war.
Not only was its attitude still seriously influenced by the need to accommodate its European allies, but it also took on a distinctly anti-Soviet character as a result of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. In a telegram to the embassy in France, Marshall expressed the position of the State Department:
Despite France's adherence to outdated colonial ideas and methods, "we should not lose sight of the fact that Ho Chi Minh had direct communist links; ”
It is true that the U.S. government wants France to grant Indochina as much autonomy as possible, but this is to enable France to be more high-sounding and more effective in dealing with the genuine national independence movement led by Ho Chi Minh.
The victory of the Chinese Revolution led the Truman administration to finally extend its containment policy to Southeast Asia.
At the end of 1948, the CIA, in its report to the president, said that the victorious advance of the Chinese Communist Party was creating a "tendency that could place the Soviet Union in a very advantageous position in the Far East" and thus increasing the strategic importance of Southeast Asia.
In March 1949, the State Council's Policy Design Office proposed that Southeast Asia should be valued as part of the Greater Crescent consisting of the South Asian subcontinent, Australia, and Japan. Soon after, the Ministry of Defense asserted that "the expansion goals of the communist forces in the Far East" posed an immediate danger to Southeast Asia, which bordered China.
On the basis of unanimity within the administration, Truman and Acheson made the "basic decision" to contain East Asia, with Southeast Asia as the focus of implementation.
In the words of the Department of the State Department's Far Eastern Division, the United States wants to "use all feasible and appropriate political, economic, and military measures to block communism on China's southern border." ”
The first is to allocate $75 million of congressional allocations for the "China region" to Southeast Asia in order to strengthen the non-communist government there through military aid. Document 48/2 of the National Security Committee identified the development of a specific plan for the use of the appropriation as a top priority for the United States Government.
Accordingly, on January 20, 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that Indochina be the most important recipient of aid in Southeast Asia, followed by Indonesia, Thailand, Malaya, and Burma, and proposed a rough plan for the distribution of aid.
On this basis, Truman approved $25 million in military aid to Indochina and Thailand on March 10. It was the first major post-war U.S. spending in Southeast Asia.
The Departments of Defense and State then considered $100 million in new aid to Southeast Asia, an idea that Truman largely agreed. On June 1, he asked Congress to allocate an additional $75 million for military aid to the "China Region" in fiscal year 1951. Acheson explained to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the new aid was necessary because "the Chinese Communist Party threatens the people of Indochina, Burma, Thailand, Malaya and the newly established Federation of Indonesia."
5. The "inevitability" of intervention in Vietnam
Economic aid is another component of containment policies in Southeast Asia.
In late January 1950, Acheson informed the U.S. embassies and consulates in Southeast Asia:
The Department of State, anxious to provide economic assistance to Southeast Asia, is considering sending an economic investigation mission there. In early March, Alan Griffin, former deputy director of the China branch of the Economic Cooperation Agency, led such a mission to Saigon, Singapore, Yangon, Bangkok and Jakarta. As directed by the State Department, the mission is to identify "most urgently" economic projects that are "of immediate political significance and will demonstrate U.S. interest in the region" so that assistance can begin quickly.
After a month-long journey, Griffin returned to the United States, saying that "a small group of talented people and a small amount of money can do miracles in that area." ”
Early June. At the request of the Executive Authority, the National Assembly passed the Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950, which provided for the allocation of economic aid to the "China Region".
At this point, the US containment cause in Southeast Asia can be said to have begun to take shape.
The Truman administration also tried to broker an anti-Soviet coalition in Southeast Asia. In early 1949, Philippine President Girino, who had advocated the establishment of the "Pacific Pact" system with Chiang Kai-shek, suddenly changed his mind and set aside Chiang Kai-shek in an open letter, declaring that the "free countries" of Southeast Asia should establish a collective security system as soon as possible with the support of the United States. This turn is playing into the hands of the United States.
The State Department immediately instructed the embassy in the Philippines to express its approval and asked the Philippine side to widely disseminate the open letter to Asian countries and the United States. A few days later, in a joint communiqué with Girino, Truman publicly supported the latter's claim in more general terms.
By the end of the year, encouraging the establishment of the Southeast Asian Anti-Soviet Alliance had been formally defined as an important link in the US East Asian containment strategy in Document No. 48/2 of the National Security Council.
From mid-December 1949 to mid-March 1950, Jessep visited 14 East Asian countries, among other purposes, to inquire about their attitudes towards the establishment of such an alliance.
At the same time, US diplomatic missions in relevant countries are also actively engaged in this regard. However, the overwhelming majority of countries expressed opposition or disinterest, so much so that Jessup and the American ambassadors had to believe that it was not appropriate for the United States to press or initiate such an alliance at this time.
The situation in Indochina is the most frightening to the United States. This was not only because the Vietnam War of Resistance against France was the most successful among the revolutionary movements in Southeast Asian countries, but also because China directly provided significant political, material, and advisory assistance to the Vietnamese resistance forces.
In January 1950, China was the first to recognize the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. At the beginning of the year, Ho Chi Minh made a secret visit to China and received a promise from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to provide strong assistance to the Vietnamese revolution.
In order to open up the communication line for aid to Vietnam, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China sent Chen Geng to lead a military advisory group into Vietnam in the middle of the year to assist in organizing the border campaign, and provided most of the weapons, ammunition, clothing and food needed for the campaign free of charge.
At about the same time, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China sent a political advisory group headed by Luo Guibo to help build the political power in Vietnam. China actually became the rear of Vietnam's War of Resistance Against France. Although the US government is not aware of the details of China's aid to Vietnam, it still has some foresight and understanding.
The prospect of "communization" of Indo-China with Chinese aid sent shivers down the shoulders of American officials.
The State Department considers:
"If Indochina were to be controlled by a Communist-dominated government, it might be expected that the balance of power in Southeast Asia would be in grave jeopardy if Thailand and Burma, neighboring countries, fall under Communist rule. ”
Chargé d'Affaires in Saigon, Edmund Gullian, even predicted that "if Vietnam were to be taken over, the vast majority of the world's colored people would sooner or later be enslaved by the Communists."
The military also held this notion that came to be known as the "domino theory."
In late December 1949, the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested military assistance to Indochina.
A month later, it proposed the first amount of military aid.
In order to make U.S. military aid "appear to be in line with the national interests of Asian countries in order to be welcomed by them" and to help disguise the colonialist nature of France's war effort, the U.S. government announced on February 7, 1950, that it would recognize the puppet government of Vietnam, as well as the independence of Laos and Cambodia. Twenty days later, the State Department proposed a platform for interfering in Indochina, Document No. 64 of the National Security Committee.
The document stresses that to keep Southeast Asia safe, communism must be contained on the northern border of Indochina, but France and the three Indochinese countries it has established are insufficient, so the United States must take swift steps to help them fight in order to protect American "security interests" there. This document was agreed to by Truman.
On March 9, in response to a series of requests for help from the French government, Acheson, on behalf of the State Department and the Ministry of Defense, formally proposed to send $15 million in military aid to Indochina, which was immediately approved. He then demanded that economic aid be sent as soon as possible to strengthen "the ability to resist the encroachment of communism," which was also quickly satisfied.
On May 8, Acheson announced in Paris that the United States would provide military and economic assistance to the French Indochinese authorities. In the words of the famous secret Pentagon report: "The United States has since been directly involved in the tragedy that unfolded in Vietnam".
The Truman administration's initial intervention in Southeast Asia, especially in Indochina, shows that it is increasingly intolerable to "lose" China and then "lose" any other part of East Asia.
The East Asia Strategy, developed in late 1949, distinguished the Western Pacific "defensive belt" from the continental containment line, but this distinction was far less pronounced psychologically and emotionally than it was theoretically.
The State Department and the military give political and strategic importance to Southeast Asia as much as they do to Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, and the Philippines when they consider the world as a whole and East Asia.
While intervention in Southeast Asia has been limited to material aid, it has included the possibility of U.S. advisers directing operations, clandestine U.S. military activities, and the use of U.S. armed forces.
The question has developed not so much as whether the United States will intervene militarily on the East Asian continent, but only when, where, and where it will do so.
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