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While China and the DPRK were arguing over whether to continue their southward advance, the US military and political leaders were also struggling to explore the question of what would be the way out after successive defeats on the battlefield.
1. Who is "and mud"?
On January 9, 1951, with the approval of President Truman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally rejected MacArthur's proposal for large-scale retaliatory action against China and again instructed MacArthur:
"defend every position" on the premise of "taking into account first of all the safety of your army and your basic task of protecting Japan", "inflict maximum damage on the enemy army in Korea"; "You may withdraw your forces from Korea to Japan when, in your judgment, it is clearly necessary to withdraw in order to avoid significant loss of men and materiel."
MacArthur argued that Washington's directive was "a trap" because it "cowardly evaded" responsibility for making the "unpleasant decision" to withdraw from North Korea.
He immediately called back with two cross-examinations:
First, when the current strength of the U.S. military is insufficient to accomplish the task of defending Korea and protecting Japan, which one should be emphasized?
Second, while Washington says it authorizes him to decide if necessary at his discretion to withdraw from North Korea to prevent significant losses, it does not define what constitutes a "significant loss."
Obviously, there are different interpretations of this, and it is not for him to decide.
In this way, MacArthur threw the "ball" back to Washington.
He suggested that it should be up to Washington to decide whether to withdraw from North Korea.
It is nothing more than three cases:
The first is to strive to maintain a position in the DPRK for a long time; the second is to stay in North Korea for a limited time; The third is to leave the peninsula quickly so as to minimize the losses.
Washington, he demanded, should give an accurate message and "choose one of the three scenarios above."
The Joint Council replied:
Based on what we know, "we have to think that under the current conditions, coupled with the CCP's incessant offensive, it is impossible to occupy a position in North Korea for a long time."
At the same time, Truman also wrote a long letter to MacArthur "in his personal name", on the one hand, emphasizing the persistence of fighting in Korea and listing the ten major political objectives of persisting in Korea; On the other hand, it also acknowledges the possibility of a forced withdrawal from the DPRK militarily.
The letter was sent directly to MacArthur by Army Chief of Staff Collins and Air Force Chief of Staff Vandenberg, who had gone to Tokyo to deliver orders.
In the letter, Truman gave MacArthur such a "bottom":
If it is no longer possible to hold an important area in the Korean mainland, and you consider some of these important purposes to be appropriate and practicable, then you can continue to resist in support of these purposes in the coastal islands of Korea, especially Jeju Island.
In the worst-case scenario, it is important that if we have to evacuate North Korea, we have to show the world that we are compelled to do so out of military necessity, and that we will not recognize the consequences of withdrawal politically or militarily unless the aggressor's behavior is corrected.
Acheson commented that the "slickly worded" letter was "a cordial, thoughtful letter written by the president to his theater commander using his imagination," while other Americans called it "a typical example of hypocrisy" and that it was "ambiguous and ambiguous."
2. The "reason" for retreating
In fact, Truman made his intentions clear in his letter, which is:
On the premise of not expanding the war, the United States still has to persist in fighting on the Korean battlefield, which is of great political significance to the United States and even the entire Western world. Unless there is an extreme situation in which the military is really unable to hold up, the US military must not withdraw from the DPRK.
In this regard, MacArthur expressed his understanding of this: "We will do our best to carry it out." ”
At the same time, tell his subordinates:
"Gentlemen, the question of whether we should evacuate North Korea or not has finally been resolved. No more retreat. ”
However, MacArthur's understanding of the war never reached the level that Truman had expected.
During the Third Campaign of the Volunteer Army, MacArthur's rhetoric was always a keynote: unless the war was expanded, it would not be possible to hold the positions in Korea. This is in stark contrast to Washington's position that it cannot abandon North Korea and is trying to avoid an extended war.
For some reason, MacArthur himself thought that his position was "completely consistent" with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This greatly displeased Bradley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who accused him of "brazenly twisting our noses" and talking to himself.
Although MacArthur declared that he was "not retreating," his command still did not stop planning for the retreat. According to MacArthur's instructions, the staff officers of Far East Command drew up an evacuation plan, including the location of the evacuation, the time required to complete the evacuation, the number of personnel to be evacuated, and the resettlement place after the evacuation, and determined which U.S. unit would be responsible for the cover of the last line of defense.
It can be seen that both the decision-makers in Washington and the Far East Command in Tokyo were preparing to withdraw from North Korea, which was a realistic option at that time.
3, Li Qiwei's "accident"
But the debate over whether or not U.S. troops should withdraw from North Korea took place at the top political-strategic level outside of North Korea, and in the eyes of North Korean battlefield commander Lee Chi-wei, it did not exist at that time, and there will never be a worst-case scenario in which U.S. troops would have to withdraw from North Korea.
Although Ridgway himself deployed a series of retreats after the Chinese army launched the offensive, including withdrawing from Seoul and abandoning positions on the south bank of the Han River, he never really considered the issue of withdrawing from North Korea, but has been trying to find a position that would allow the American troops to gain a foothold and launch a counteroffensive again after a little respite and regrouping.
At the beginning, he drew an oblique line from southwest to northeast, along Suwon, Yangpyeong, and Hongcheon, as the expected positional line, but soon found that the opponent had torn a big gap in the direction of Hongcheon, so he took a step back and based on the "D line" drawn by Walker, along Pyeongtaek-Anseong-Janghowon-ri-Wonju, and extended eastward to the coast, drawing a new positional line, allowing the US 1st Army to occupy positions on the line from Pyeongtaek to Anseong, and the 9th Army to occupy positions on the line from Jusan-ri to the north side of Janghowon. Li Qiwei decided to repel the attack of the Chinese army on this line.
To Ridgway's surprise, the Chinese army did not continue to move south, but disengaged from the "United Nations Army".
Ridgway, who had a keen sense of smell on the battlefield, immediately sensed the meaning of this movement.
He determined:
The Chinese army's offensive may have reached the limit of its unsustainable. In his words, the Chinese army's offensive is like a "bulging balloon" that "will immediately deflate if you look at a place that can only bulge for a week or so, and puncture it a little with a pin."
Among the generals of the US military, Li Qiwei can be said to be the first person who really discovered the weakness of the Chinese army, firmly grasped it, and took advantage of the situation to make a big fuss.
The repeated setbacks suffered by the Volunteer Army in later battles were all directly related to exposing their weaknesses in front of the opponent and being unable to effectively make up for them for a while.
4. The U.S. "Choice" at the United Nations
It was also at this time that a meaningful drama was staged on the UN stage around the issue of the Korean ceasefire.
The drama began with a new proposal from the UN's three-member North Korean Ceasefire Commission.
The three-member committee, also known as the three-member committee, was established on 14 December 1950 and is composed of Andy (Iranian), the current President of the United Nations General Assembly, Lloyd's Register, the representative of India, and Pearson, the representative of Canada.
According to the UN General Assembly resolution, the committee is tasked with deliberating on "the possibility of preparing appropriate and satisfactory conditions for an armistice in Korea" and then making recommendations to the General Assembly.
On 11 January 1951, the three-member committee presented to the Political Committee of the General Assembly a plan for a cease-fire in Korea, the main points of which were:
(1) Immediately arrange a ceasefire in the DPRK; (2) Once a ceasefire has been achieved, further measures to be taken to restore peace should be considered; (3) The phased withdrawal of all non-DPRK troops from the DPRK and the making of appropriate arrangements to enable the Korean people to express their free will towards the future Government; (4) to establish appropriate temporary measures for the administration of the DPRK and the maintenance of peace and security in the DPRK; (5) After the ceasefire agreement is reached, a conference will be convened with the participation of Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China to resolve the Far Eastern question, which includes the question of Taiwan and the question of China's representation in the United Nations.
This plan reflects the will of the majority of countries, including Britain and France, to end the Korean War as soon as possible, and also takes into account to a greater or lesser extent certain conditions for the settlement of the Korean issue that the Chinese Government has put forward, such as the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the DPRK and the convening of an international conference with China's participation to discuss the settlement of the Taiwan issue and the issue of China's representation in the United Nations. In hindsight, if the content proposed in this plan can really be realized, it will be beneficial to the Chinese side.
The United States learned of the contents of the "three-member committee" proposal only a few hours before it was submitted, and for a time it was in a dilemma.
The United States is in favor of the arrangement of the plan proposing to first achieve a cease-fire and then consider other issues, because in the current battlefield situation, this will help the US military stabilize its defensive line and clean up the defeat. However, the arrangements other than the ceasefire in the plan are unacceptable to the United States, especially the Taiwan issue and China's representation in the United Nations, which are within the scope of the United States' decision not to be discussed at any time.
In this way, American policymakers are faced with what Acheson called a "fatal choice."
In his memoirs, Acheson described the dilemma as follows:
The choice between supporting or opposing the plan is tricky, and either option is dangerous: on the one hand, it will lose the confidence of North Koreans and provoke the wrath of Congress and the debate circles; On the other hand, there is the loss of our majority and support in the United Nations.
5. The "trap" of the armistice
Acheson thought twice "with his lawyer's head" and finally decided to take the risk of setting a diplomatic trap.
He concluded that the Chinese would certainly not accept this plan, and in that case, the United States might as well vote in favor first, so as to accommodate the opinions of its allies without causing the United States to accept the conditions it did not want to accept, and more importantly, to completely shift the responsibility for rejecting peace to the Chinese.
It should be said that Acheson's psychological assessment of the Chinese side is accurate, and the diplomatic trap he set up has really achieved results.
With regard to the "three-member committee" of the United Nations, the Chinese side showed great distrust from the beginning.
When the committee was established, Zhou Enlai announced:
The Chinese representative did not participate in the discussion or agree to the establishment of this committee by the United Nations, so it is illegal and the Chinese Government is not prepared to make any contact with it. Not only that, Zhou Enlai also naturally thought of the historical lesson that after the end of the War of Resistance Against Japan, the United States sent General Marshall to form a "three-person team" to mediate the conflict between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, which eventually led to the Kuomintang launching a full-scale civil war.
Regarding the ceasefire plan of the "three-member committee", the judgment of the Chinese leader is:
The United States does not have the sincerity to achieve peace in Korea, it is only playing a cease-fire deception, trying to use the plan of first ceasefire and then negotiation to stop the attack of the Chinese and North Korean troops, save the declining situation, ensure that some areas in South Korea are maintained, and arm Japan; As for the proposal for a ceasefire and then a negotiated settlement of other issues, the United States will certainly adopt an attitude of indefinite delay and will not produce any substantive results.
The Chinese leader telegraphed this judgment to Stalin for advice. Stalin replied with a telegram in support of the Chinese Government's proposals and suggested that the North Korean side should also be made aware of these proposals.
On the evening of January 13, the meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided:
On the DPRK issue, we can hold talks, but our proposition is to talk first and then stop, and we cannot "stop first and then talk" as the US imperialists think.
On the 14th, Zhou Enlai drafted a memorandum to the DPRK government, explaining to the DPRK side China's position:
At present, due to its defeat in Korea, the United States is desperate to find a way out, and it is better to have an "honorable truce," otherwise, it will be a "war with limitations."
But the former is not allowed by us, and the latter is feared by Britain, France, India and other countries. Therefore, it was not until 11 January that the three-member Korean Armistice Committee of the United Nations put forward a proposal for an armistice first and then negotiations. The U.N. Political Committee is likely to pass the bill, because a truce would make it possible for the United States to preserve its strength and keep Rhee in some areas and armed capital, while negotiations could drag on indefinitely.
If the UN Political Committee adopts this bill, we intend to take the initiative to put forward a four-point proposal for a peaceful settlement of the Korean issue, after rejecting the idea of armistice first and then negotiating.
Zhou Enlai instructed Chai Junwu to explain this memorandum when he sent it to Kim Il Sung:
The memorandum reads: "It has been agreed and supported by the Soviet government, and Chairman Mao is deeply willing to know the opinion of Prime Minister Kim."
The memorandum was also sent to Peng Dehuai at the same time. While agreeing with the policy stance explained in the memorandum, Peng Dehuai also expressed his own views.
In his reply to Zhou Enlai, he pointed out:
"If the armistice is extended until the end of March, it will not hinder the DPRK's operations, but will be beneficial in reducing the activities of enemy aircraft and facilitating various preparations."
It is not difficult to see that Peng Dehuai's views on achieving a ceasefire are not exactly the same as those of the memorandum.
As the commander of the army at the front, Peng Dehuai attaches more importance to the actual battlefield situation.
He believes that the ceasefire at this time is not only beneficial to the United States, but also to the volunteer troops who are in urgent need of recuperation; If a ceasefire can be achieved at this time, it can buy two or three months of rest and preparation time for the volunteers, which will be of great benefit to the next step of the operation.
However, Peng Dehuai's proposal from a military perspective failed to get the attention of the central authorities, because it was political considerations that played a leading role at this time.
On 1 February, Zhou Enlai sent a telegram to the United Nations on behalf of the foreign minister, declaring that the Chinese government could not agree to the principle of a ceasefire followed by negotiations, thus effectively rejecting the three-member commission proposal that had been adopted at the United Nations.
China's reaction can be said to be playing into the hands of the United States.
In his memoirs, Acheson wrote:
"It is our fervent hope and belief that China will reject this resolution (which they do) and that our allies will return to a more sober position (which they do)", thus "benefiting the United States in both the Eastern and Western worlds."
Acheson's diplomatic trap was a success.
Next, the United States took a series of actions:
In the United Nations, it manipulated the UN General Assembly to put forward a resolution slandering China as an "aggressor"; In Europe, accelerate the formation of an integrated NATO military force; In Japan, it stepped up planning to sign a separate peace treaty with Japan and accelerated the rearmament of Japan; Domestically, we should step up various measures to expand our armaments and warfare, and comprehensively strengthen the strength base for continuing the war.
6. Adverse consequences
During this period, Li Qiwei's work in reorganizing the DPRK also achieved remarkable results. The 8th Army not only gained a foothold in its existing positions, but also began to move to counteroffensive preparations.
China's inappropriate diplomatic response has caused many disadvantages. Although the Chinese side saw through the real intention of the United States to advocate a cease-fire first and then negotiations from the very beginning, it failed to firmly grasp the unfavorable side of the three-member committee proposal to the United States and "scheming" and "smashing diplomatic relations" and adopted a relatively simple approach.
However, when the Chinese Volunteers won the third battle, crossed the 38th Parallel and occupied Seoul, they did not immediately act in accordance with this judgment, and as a result, they not only failed to effectively take advantage of the internal contradictions in the Western camp and the desire of nationalist countries to hope for peace, but further created a diplomatic dilemma for the United States, but on the contrary eased the diplomatic crisis of the other side and plunged themselves into a certain isolated situation.
This cannot but be said to be a misstep.
From a military point of view, the adverse situation caused by the refusal of a ceasefire soon became apparent. China's leaders have repeatedly stressed that a ceasefire followed by negotiations would give the US military a respite, and that was therefore a conspiracy.
But under the circumstances, it was not only the U.S. military that urgently needed respite on the battlefield, and to a certain extent, the volunteer army that was almost at the end of the crossbow needed a chance to recuperate.
After the end of the third battle, there was a temporary silence on the ground battlefield due to the disengagement of the two armies, but the US air power strikes did not stop for a moment, and the rear transportation and troop movements of the volunteers faced major threats every day.
From the perspective of guiding ideology, the mishandling of this diplomacy has a great deal to do with the optimism that has been bred by the three successive victories of the Chinese People's Volunteers since they entered the DPRK. Although Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai repeatedly emphasized the protracted and arduous nature of the war, many people, including the main leaders, did not fully understand it. This pervasive tendency is the subjective reason for the mishandling of the ceasefire.
In any case, it cannot but be said that it is a pity that the Chinese side has lost an opportunity to strive for important diplomatic and military interests as a result.
American war historian Joseph Gurdon has the following to say about this:
For the Chinese, opposition to the ceasefire has caused great man-made disasters. Because they thought too highly of themselves, apparently believing that the majority of the United Nations would support their demands, the Chinese rejected an opportunity to end the war on far more favorable terms than they had accepted two and a half years later.
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