In the "Songhu War of Resistance" that broke out in 1932, the peak strength of the two sides was about 60,000 Chinese troops to meet more than 90,000 Japanese troops, the ratio of strength was about 2:3, and more than 10,000 Japanese were killed in the battle. And in the "Battle of Songhu" launched in 1937, the peak strength of the two sides was about 700,000 Chinese against the Japanese army of 250,000 people, the ratio of troop strength was about 3:1, the entire battle killed and wounded more than 80,000 devils, the number is listed here very clearly, which battle do you think is better?
It is necessary to distinguish between the time and nature of the two battles, the "Songhu War of Resistance" originated from the "128 Incident" on January 28, 1932, neither China nor Japan was ready for a full-scale war, strictly speaking it belonged to a "military conflict"; and the "Battle of Songhu" began with the "August 13 Incident" on August 13, 1937, at this time the Lugou Bridge Incident in Beiping had already broken out for more than a month, and China and Japan were actually fighting in an all-round way, but the battlefield was temporarily divided into two major blocks, North China and East China.
Victory or defeat on the battlefield actually depends on two outcomes, the first is the final strategic posture formed, and whether the two sides have achieved their own campaign goals; the second is the cost exchange ratio on the battlefield. In a general sense, readers seem to think that the Songhu War of Resistance was won, but in fact, if it is really won, why sign the "Songhu Armistice Agreement", which requires all the chinese regular troops to withdraw from Songhu and can only leave the security forces and police?
It is simply a great shame that a sovereign country cannot garrison troops in its own cities, so the end of the Songhu War of Resistance is actually not satisfactory, and the reason for everyone's delusion is that the Japanese army finally withdrew, and Shanghai did not fall. After the defeat at the Battle of Songhu more than five years later, the Japanese army completely occupied all the Songhu area except the concession until the surrender was announced in 1945, so strictly speaking, both battles were lost, but the first defeat was not so complete.
As for the comparison of casualties, during the Songhu War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the Chinese army suffered more than 14,000 casualties, and killed and wounded 10,000 Japanese troops, this exchange ratio is very impressive, if the War of Resistance Against Japan has such a record in every battle, the Japanese will not be able to sustain it for a long time; and during the Battle of Songhu, the Chinese army suffered more than 200,000 casualties and killed and wounded more than 80,000 Japanese troops.
Judging from the comprehensive situation in all aspects, the Songhu War of Resistance in 1932 should be said to have fought more beautifully, and it boils down to the following reasons:
First, the main body of the Chinese side participating in the war is indeed the elite who dares to fight.
When the "128 Incident" broke out in 1932, it was during the second period of Chiang Kai-shek's departure from the field that Wang Jingwei and Sun Ke were in charge, so the 19th Route Army of the Guangdong Clan had the opportunity to garrison the rich Songhu area. Among the miscellaneous armies, the Guangdong army (which was basically counted as a collateral unit of the central army in the back) was indeed quite capable of fighting, and judging from the process of the Northern Expedition, the Guangdong army was not at all inferior to the Huangpu army. Who is Cai Tingkai? Former deputy commander of the 24th Division of the Eleventh Army, this division was based on the Independent Regiment of the "Fourth Army" of the Iron Army, and Cai was actually the deputy of General Ye Ting.
The division also participated in the Nanchang Uprising, but later in the process of going south, Cai Tingkai led his troops to leave the army, that is to say, Cai's troops were the old foundation of the Northern Expeditionary Army, and their combat effectiveness was quite strong. The commander-in-chief of the Nineteenth Route Army was Jiang Guangnai, the "Lu Army" was only an organizational level, in fact, it only had jurisdiction over one 19th Army, and Cai Tingkai was the commander of the army, and at that time there were more than 33,000 people in three divisions under its jurisdiction, which was fully loaded and equipped, and it had to be regarded as one of the most capable units at that time.
The Fifth Army, which was reinforced later, was composed of the 87th Division, the 88th Division, and the Teaching Corps (which was still a reinforcement regiment at the time), and the commander of the army, General Zhang Zhizhong, had a strength of about 25,000 to 26,000 troops. These three units were the absolute elite of the Huangpu Department, and the enthusiasm for resisting Japan was also relatively high; song Xilian, the brigade commander of the 87th Division, personally led all the brigade officers to the Military and Political Department to ask for war after the Shanghai side was launched, while Yu Jishi, the commander of the 88th Division, because he was a hardcore concubine, simply called Lao Jiang directly and took the initiative to ask Miao Chi to help Shanghai.
The original text of the old Chiang Kai-shek's reply was: "When your division acts, once you listen to Minister He's orders, such as the Shanghai campaign, you should strive to strengthen yourself in order to protect your honor." In a sense, this is basically the strongest lineup in the Northern Expedition period, of course, enough for the devils to drink a pot.
Second, Japan did not attempt to occupy Songhu in an all-round way.
In Japan in 1932, the military forces and fascism have not yet fully realized the "rampage", the civilian government still has a lot of say, including the previous attitude towards the occupation of northeast China "918 Incident", the contradictions and differences between the Japanese military department and the cabinet are very large, the military department wants to engage in armed expansion, the cabinet is not willing to violate the "Washington Convention", so the internal has been pinching. However, with regard to doing things in Shanghai, both the civil and military circles are relatively supportive, and the main purpose is to divert the attention of the international community from the Japanese invasion of northeast China.
Itagaki and Toihara were the people who planned the "128 Incident," that is, the main culprits of the invasion of Northeast China; under the situation that international public opinion was very unfavorable to Japan, they urgently needed to provoke incidents in the distant Songhu region in order to divert the attention of the international community. Hirohito's civilian henchman, the Eleven-Man Club (whose members are all heavy subjects), also advocated that Japan needed to have a political "thinking gap" before completing its entire occupation of Tohoku to deal with many new problems at home and abroad, for which Japan needed to launch a "fake war" in Shanghai.
During Itagaki's order to return to Tokyo to report for duty, according to the instructions of the Japanese high command, Tanaka Takayoshi, who had sent a telegram to the military attaché at the legation in Shanghai, said: "The Manchurian Incident is developing as expected, please take advantage of the current tension between China and Japan to carry out the planned events, so that the eyes of the great powers will turn to Shanghai." Therefore, under the circumstance that Japan is not fully prepared for an all-out war with China and needs to digest the vested interests of the northeast, provoking an armed conflict in Shanghai is a local action and does not have a plan to completely occupy the Songhu area, which means that the Japanese will not really play with their lives, but will almost accept it when they see it is good.
However, old Chiang Kai-shek and the Nanjing government were serious about the battle, and they misjudged the Japanese's intentions, thinking that the Japanese army really wanted to covet Shanghai, which was the core ruling area of the Nanjing government, and unlike the northeast, it was easy to lose, so the strategic purposes of the two sides were different from the beginning.
Third, the combat effectiveness of the Japanese army was not so strong in 1932.
From the Russo-Japanese War to 1932, the Japanese army did not participate in any large-scale war, including participating in the First World War, that is, mixing in Qingdao, so although its army training was strict, its actual combat experience was really average. Especially since 1925, the Japanese civilian government is still engaged in disarmament and budget cutting, so that the equipment level of the Japanese army has not been improved for a long time, and what we are familiar with is the Type 92 heavy machine gun and the Type 92 infantry gun that we are familiar with were only officially installed in 1932 (look at the model to understand), so during the Songhu War of Resistance, the equipment of the Japanese army was also a hodgepodge.
Needless to say, in the northeast, because the Japanese army did not encounter strong resistance at all, so the military adventure was successful, but in Shanghai, in the face of the resumption of the 19th Route Army and the resolute attack of the Fifth Army, the Japanese were initially beaten quite ignorantly, and there was a "temple victory" that killed and wounded more than 3,000 devils. In other words, in the absence of the threat of the Absolute Superiority of the Japanese Army in sea and air, the elite units of the Chinese army really did not fear the Japanese army in 1932 at the tactical level, and from Cai Tingkai to General Zhang Zhizhong, their attitude towards Japanese operations was also very resolute.
So first the Japanese Marines were beaten to pieces, and then the Army came to reinforcements in batches, including the 24th Brigade, the 9th Division, the 11th Division, and the 14th Division, and by late March 1932, the Japanese army had three divisions, a mixed brigade, and about 90,000 Marines on the Songhu Battlefield. However, the 1st Division of Hu Zongnan, the 4th Division of Xu Tingyao, and the 9th Division of Jiang Dingwen mobilized by lao Jiang had not really reached the battlefield, and the Nationalist army was certainly becoming increasingly unfavorable under the inferior strength of only two armies, and soon the second line of defense was broken.
If the Nanjing side is resolute and the military transport capability is a little stronger, the above three elite divisions can be quickly put into the battlefield, and it is estimated that there is no problem in forming a battlefield stalemate with the Japanese army. As a result, these troops had not yet arrived, and negotiations had begun on the Songhu War of Resistance, and negotiations were conducted under unfavorable circumstances, and the final terms were of course unfavorable to China.
After the Songhu War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the divisions and regiments of the Japanese army have drawn mixed brigades and regiments to fight in the northeast, and the materials captured in the northeast have enhanced their equipment level, and by the time the outbreak of the all-out War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression in 1937, the combat effectiveness of the Japanese army was actually improved.
Fourth, the international situation at that time was also not conducive to Japan's acts of aggression.
In 1932, Germany's moustaches had not yet come to power, there was no German threat in Europe, and the Western powers were still paying more attention to the affairs of the Far East, especially their interests in China were mainly concentrated in major cities such as Peiping and Shanghai, and out of their own interests, of course, they opposed Japan's further expansion. Therefore, from 1932 to 1935, the old Chiang Kai-shek's strategy of "using yi to control yi" still had some effect, and after the outbreak of the Songhu War of Resistance, the US government formally warned Japan not to undermine the Washington Nine-Power Pact.
Including the Great Wall War of Resistance behind, after the Japanese army broke through along the Great Wall, the United States and Britain even made a posture of landing the Marines directly on Qinhuangdao, so Japan in this period still had some scruples, on the one hand, it did not complete the preparation for war, on the other hand, it was also afraid of the immaturity of the time to launch a war. Of course, there were also elements of the heroic struggle of the officers of the Nineteenth Route Army and the Fifth Army, and although the Japanese army gained a certain battlefield advantage after increasing its troops, these two Chinese armies still insisted on the Shanghai area, so that the devils could not all succeed for a while.
In such a stalemate on the front, under the strong mediation of the United States and Britain, an armistice was finally reached, and although the Chinese regular army was forced to withdraw from the Songhu area, the Japanese army troops in addition to some marines originally stationed in Zhabei also withdrew from Shanghai in batches, and the sovereignty was retained. Therefore, in general, the outcome of the Songhu War of Resistance in 1932 was better than that of the Battle of Songhu in 1937, and the regret was that the old Chiang Kai-shek's anti-war attitude was not too resolute here, a bit of a rat at both ends, hoping that the psychology of international intervention was more, and the Chinese army was more passive on the battlefield in the later stage.
The significance of the Songhu War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression is also relatively great; it not only preserves Shanghai's basic sovereignty, boosts the anti-Japanese confidence of the military and people throughout the country, not only has it won the Nanjing government more than five years of preparation time, but also ushered in the formation of a nationwide joint anti-Japanese united front, and has also enabled the regular army of the National Government to have a certain understanding of the characteristics of the Japanese army, because its campaign process is almost a miniature version of the future Battle of Songhu, so it is also of great benefit to how to defend East China in advance.
If you add a dog-tailed sable, if there are more troops participating in the battle, the effect will probably be better.