On January 27, 1045 BC, King Wu of Zhou sent troops from Hojing to start the second battle to destroy the Shang since his succession.
Compared with the cautious order to withdraw troops after the first Mengjin Alliance, this military operation was a risk. The first is that the previous Huimeng has "fought the grass and frightened the snake", so that the trust of the King of Zhou Wen in exchange for serving Yin's Taoguang Yang obscure in the era of King Wen of Zhou has disappeared. Secondly, and most deadly, King Wu of Zhou was short of troops.
In the heyday of the Western Zhou Dynasty, there were two main armies, one was the "Yin Eighth Division" guarding the east, and the other was the "Western Sixth Division" guarding Hojing, and the strength of each division in the Western Zhou Period was 2,500 people, a total of 35,000 people.
Of course, this strength is the number of the Western Zhou Dynasty during its heyday.
At the time of King Wu's cutting, the country under his rule was only a western state, far from being the co-lord of the world. Both the Pastoral Oath and the Lü Shi Chunqiu record that King Wu of Zhou had three hundred chariots (72 people per car) and three thousand tigers. The Chronicle adds that King Wu of Zhou also had 45,000 soldiers, who should have belonged to the combined forces of the princes, not to the Zhou army.
So what is the strength of the King of Lu? The "Historical Record" says that it is 700,000, this number should be copied incorrectly when copying the Western Zhou literature, but it is actually 170,000, and the Yizhou Book also says that king Wu of Zhou "beheaded more than 170,000 people" and "beheaded more than 170,000 people".
Whether it was 700,000 or 170,000, the strength of the King of Lu was absolutely more than that of the Zhou army. But strange things happened, from January 27 to February 22 with the combined forces of the princes at the Mengjin Division, and then to the 28th arrival in the Yin suburb of Muye, in the course of the 32-day march, the Shang Dynasty did not have any military deployment, until the soldiers came to the city, the King of Sui found out, hurriedly sent prisoners to meet the battle.
Even more strange was a series of abnormal actions during the march of King Wu of Zhou. On February 27, heavy rain fell, and the Zhou soldiers fell ill a lot, and the military divisions all advised: "If you are sick, please rest", but king Wu of Zhou not only categorically refused, but instead ordered a rapid march, and after arriving in Makino in the early morning of Jiazi Day (28th), he ordered an attack on the Shang army without repairs.
As a result, the Zhou army's attack was unusually smooth, and at dawn, King Wu of Zhou was already sitting on the Chaoge Hall. If we regard the King of Wu as a long-distance raid, then the suddenness of king Wu of Zhou's rapid march in the rain is indeed in line with the art of war.
Unfortunately, this possibility does not exist.
First of all, after arriving in Makino, King Mizhi of Zhou Wu confidently confessed to the soldiers: "You must not violently kill the runners of the Master, and you should think that the Battle of Zhou is also." King Wu of Zhou, who had not been repaired on a long march, seemed to have predicted in advance that the Shang Dynasty army would have "runners".
Secondly, King Wu of Zhou explained why he marched in the rain: "I have ordered the rubber mane to repay its master with the date of the nail, and now the nail does not arrive, which is to make the rubber mane unbelieving." When the Zhou army arrived in Kunshui, the rubber mane in charge of monitoring the movements of the Zhou people specially came to meet king Wu of Zhou.
So there was the following conversation: Glue Mane: "Where is Siber going?" King Wu: "Go to Yindi." Rubber Mane: "When is it coming?" King Wu: "Jia Zi Ri to the outside of Yin City."
When there were still 6 days to go before Chaoge, King Wu of Zhou not only truthfully informed Minister Yin Shang of the itinerary and arrival date, but even braved the rain to arrive on time. This wave of operations is obviously not a rhythm of a surprise attack on Yin Shang.
Could it be that King Wu of Zhou was really trying to fulfill his promise, as he himself said, so that the rubber mane would not be killed by the King of Qiu? Obviously not, the Book of Yi zhou records that when King Wu cut down the silk, he not only caused Makino to "bleed and drift the pestle", but also cruelly tortured the bodies of the king and his wife, and then cut off the heads of the two and placed them on the flag. Such a brutal treatment of the kings of the previous dynasty, I am afraid that few people in history can do so.
So what is the truth? This has to start from the details of a "lower three abuses" before the Wu King's cutting.
Western Zhou got a jade plate, and when King Wen heard about it, he sent a rubber mane to beg for it, but King Wen of Zhou did not give it; later, King Huan sent Fei Zhong to ask for it, but King Wen gave it very happily. Jiao Mane was the sage of the time, while Fei Zhong was a courtier. This wave of operations of King Wen, Han Feizi's explanation can be described as a phrase: "The Zhou Evil Sage's Zhiye, so give it to Fei Zhong." (Reluctance to be virtuous)
It was through this incident that the King of Qiu thought that the ability of the rubber mane was inferior to That of Fei Zhong, so he gradually alienated the rubber mane. However, King Wen of Zhou duly adopted the method of "adding wealth to the third class and ranking the officials" to win over the rubber mane.
Therefore, when Jiao Mane came to meet with King Wu of Zhou, the essence was to agree on the date of military action with King Wu of Zhou in the identity of Neiying, which was also the reason why King Wu of Zhou desperately wanted to rush to Makino on Jiazi Day.
Judging from the hasty military deployment of the King of Yin, Jiao Mane did not truthfully report to the King of Zhou the news that Jia Zi Ri had arrived outside the city of Yin, but instead when the Yin Shang army was in formation, a sudden defection occurred in the Shang army. Therefore, the Zhou army only took a few hours to complete the military victory against the Shang army, which also explained why king Wu of Zhou deliberately told him not to kill the "runners" before the war.
Therefore, "Chinese" once said: Glue mane is worse than death Yin. Wei Zhao, a famous historian of the Three Kingdoms, further commented: King Jiaohai Zuowu died yin ye. From this point of view, the defeat of the King of Lu was indeed too unjust.