The Battle of Songhu was the largest battle in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the beginning of China's all-out War of Resistance. China mobilized almost all available troops, totaling more than 700,000. The Japanese army dispatched more than 300,000 troops. According to He Yingqin, the Chinese army suffered more than 300,000 casualties. Moreover, because the Battle of Songhu did not grasp the best time to retreat, it was pursued by the Japanese army all the way, and the troops did not have enough time to make up for it after retreating to Nanjing, which eventually led to the easy fall of Nanjing. There have always been many different views on the gains and losses of this battle.
Temporary
As a witness to the war, Chen Cheng, then the former commander-in-chief of the enemy in the Third Theater and the commander-in-chief of the Left Army, commanded the troops that had been fighting in the most fiercely contested area between China and Japan. Many years later, he commented in his memoirs: "The Battle of Songhu is superfluous and lost", and I briefly summarized his views:
I. Lost in the Battle of Songhu
1. Due to the huge difference in equipment between China and Japan, China dispatched more than 700,000 troops, only pinned down more than 300,000 Japanese troops, and the number of Casualties of chinese troops was more than twice that of the Japanese army.
2. At the beginning of the Battle of Songhu, the morale of the Chinese army was strong, but after the rout, the morale plummeted, resulting in the easy fall of Nanjing.
3. When the army is transferred, weapons, equipment, grain, and logistics materials are discarded everywhere on the roadside.
4. The decision of the War of Resistance was a protracted war and a war of attrition, but the Songhu Campaign was a defensive war. It shows the confusion of high-level decision-making and is easy to arouse people's suspicions.
2. Proceeds from the Battle of Songhu
1. The use of troops in China is invincible from north to south, and the Battle of Songhu turned the invasion of the Japanese army from north to south into an upward attack from east to west, and achieved strategic success.
2. The Battle of Songhu eliminated the local division of the southwest and northwest, and unified China's military and politics.
3. Due to the long resistance to the Battle of Songhu, China's economic materials and industrial equipment had time to shift to the southwest.
4. The heroic resistance of the Chinese army has broken the dream of a quick battle and a quick decision of the Japanese army and enhanced China's reputation in the world.
The elite German mechanic division of the Nationalist army fought on the front line
Personally, I think that Chen Cheng's summary is not in place, and there is even a suspicion of hindsight and whitewashing defeat.
First of all, I am sure that due to the huge difference in strength between China and Japan, the Battle of Songhu will not change the outcome of defeat if anyone is changed. However, the magnitude of the consequences of the failure seems to be manageable.
Before the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the government had already formulated a strategy of protracted war and war of attrition. However, the Battle of Songhu was tactical: at first, it was tried to preemptively clear the Japanese strongholds, but it was unsuccessful. After the Japanese army launched a large-scale anti-landing operation after the large-scale reinforcement landing, it failed. After switching from attack to defense, most of the generals on the front line believed that Shanghai could not be defended and should retreat. However, they still resisted step by step, and every inch of land was in contention, and they increased consumption in vain. By November 5, after more than 100,000 Japanese troops had landed in Hangzhou Bay, Chiang Kai-shek still ordered another three days to wait for the outcome of the international convention meeting. In the end, it was a hasty retreat, a total rout, and many casualties were actually caused by the confusion of the army on the way to the rout. The last two defense lines did not work, and Nanjing was easily breached.
Reinforcements marched into Shanghai
Tactical errors have had extremely serious consequences, which cannot be summed up simply as a loss of personnel and equipment.
The elite German mechanic divisions of the Nationalist army were exhausted, and the local troops also suffered heavy losses and their morale plummeted, resulting in a difficult situation in the future War of Resistance. If it were not for the vast depth of China, the Japanese army would very likely achieve the goal of a quick battle and a quick decision. If a protracted war is carried out according to the strategy already formulated, it is not blindly hoped for the mediation of the great powers. At least the casualties of the Nationalist army can be reduced a lot, and the retreat to Nanjing can be resisted one after another, so as to maximize the depletion of the Japanese army. Joining Nanjing will have more time to evacuate, and it is likely to avoid tragedy.
Changing the Japanese strategy from north to south from east to west is actually an hindsight statement. Consulting the relevant historical documents, the government has never developed a similar strategy. The earliest version is that on January 11, 1938, after the end of the Battle of Songhu, Chiang Kai-shek's speech at the Kaifeng Military Conference mentioned:
Why are we fighting in Shanghai this time? It is to break the enemy's strategy so that they cannot concentrate their forces on invading our northern China according to the predetermined plan
。 ”
More widely quoted is Chen Cheng's oral memoirs made in 1945: "
The enemy's southern entrance must be attacked, and at the same time it must be defended by us, and the expansion of the war in North China is inevitable. If the enemy succeeds in North China, he will certainly use his rapid troops to attack south along the Pinghan Road and go straight to Wuhan; if Wuhan is not defended, the Chinese battlefield will be cut off into two, which will be greatly unfavorable to us. It is better to expand the war in Songhu to contain it.
”
Chen Cheng's statement was widely cited and publicized on the other side, so that many scholars on the mainland later also widely quoted it, and eventually formed the saying of "luring the enemy to attack from east to west." Most people who study history know that historical materials such as memoirs are second-hand materials and are often unreliable, because the parties will often revise past memories according to the actual situation in the future. In terms of motivation, it is entirely possible that Jiang and Chen created a statement to whitewash the great defeat in the Battle of Songhu, giving people the feeling that the two are playing a big game. This statement actually contradicts the strategy formulated by the government at that time.
Four-row warehouse
At the end of 1936, the Military Commission formulated the "Twenty-six Years of the Republic of China (1937) National Defense Operation Plan", which mentioned: "The nationalist army in the lower reaches of the Yangtze River, at the beginning of the war, should first occupy Shanghai with all its strength, and in any case, it must extinguish the enemy forces in Shanghai, think of it as the core of all operations, and then directly along the river bank to prevent the enemy from landing, and then directly along the river bank to prevent the enemy from landing, and annihilate the enemy who landed." When they had no choice, they retreated one after another, and finally secured the line from Zhapu to Jiaxing to Wuxi to defend the capital. Judging from the process of the Battle of Songhu, it is also being carried out according to this plan. The purpose of extinguishing the Japanese army in Shanghai is nothing more than to solve the worries of the North China battlefield, protect the economic center, and attract the attention of foreigners, and it will not play a role in diverting the direction of the Japanese army's attack.
Judging from the actual battle situation, the Japanese army in the Songhu battlefield did invest more troops than in north China, but this did not affect the actions of the Japanese army in north China. On November 8, just as the Nationalist forces in the Songhu battlefield were preparing to withdraw, the Japanese army in North China captured Taiyuan, known as the Fortress of North China. Instead, in mid-September, 300,000 heavy troops of the Nationalist army were pinned down in Shanghai, and the Japanese army attacked as planned in the North China Battlefield. As for the guarantee of industrial transfer, it is even more impossible to talk about it, if there is no war in Shanghai, there will be a lot of time to transfer.
The Japanese army landed in Hangzhou Bay
If the Battle of Songhu objectively caused a change in the direction of the Japanese army's attack, it was only an unexpected gain, and the greatest credit should be the soldiers who fought desperately on the front line. In general, the argument that the Battle of Songhu was greater than the loss was very reluctant.
The above is a personal humble opinion, not necessarily accurate. Do you think that the Battle of Songhu will be more than the loss or the loss will be greater than the gain? Feel free to leave a message in the comments section.
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