What is history: it is the echo of the past to the future, the reflection of the future on the past. - Hugo
After the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, because the Kuomintang troops neglected political work for a long time, incidents of disturbing the people occurred from time to time, which deepened the contradictions between the military and the people. In the face of the indifference of the people, Feng Yuxiang could not help but be very confused: "Why is it that during the Northern Expedition, our soldiers were fighting on the front line, and the people in the rear sent tea, water, and porridge, and they were very attentive?" Why are we now fighting the enemy on the front line, and the soldiers in our trenches have not seen food for a day or two, and the people in the rear always ignore it? And Chiang Kai-shek also realized: "The efficiency of political work is too poor to give accurate and useful assistance to the war ahead."
In January 1938, Zhou Enlai proposed to the Kuomintang to improve the political work of the army. He pointed out: "The most important part of the transformation of the army is to establish a revolutionary political work system. Only by realistically establishing political work in the army of the War of Resistance can we enhance the combat effectiveness of the national War of Resistance and link the officers and the soldiers and the army and the people into one heart." Specifically, it should be done from several aspects:
(a) to carry out revolutionary political education to all officers and men of each unit;
(b) to strive to pay attention to the improvement of the treatment and livelihood of soldiers;
(3) to establish a conscious revolutionary military discipline in the revolutionary army;
(4) To ensure the implementation of military commanders' military administrative orders;
(5) The exemplary role of all political staff in leading by example.
Zhou Enlai's suggestion hit the nail on the head, so it was accepted by the Kuomintang. In February 1938, the Military Commission of the Nationalist Government reorganized the Sixth Department (The People's Organization and Training Department) and the Political Training Department into the Political Department, with Chen Cheng as the minister and Zhou Enlai and Huang Qixiang as the vice ministers. After the Restoration of the Political Department, it began to improve the establishment of political work organs at all levels of the armed forces, stipulating that "all the political training offices of the original units shall be changed to the Political Department, and additional political instructors will be added to each company to popularize political work." In November, Chen Cheng more clearly defined the object and purpose of political work: "The purpose of the army should be to improve morale, raise the wounded and sick, and prevent flight." The principle of winning the hearts and minds of the people, going into exile, not disturbing the people, and not pulling out the people should be the principle. The purpose of eliminating traitors, destroying puppet organizations, disintegrating puppet armies, and shaking the enemy army should be the enemy's enemy. ”
During this period, the political work organs at all levels of the whole army were set up in a short period of time, and the contingent of political workers also developed rapidly. By 1940, the number of political workers had soared to nearly 30,000, an increase of nearly ten times more than before the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, and the quality of the contingent had also improved to a certain extent. In many units, the concept of political workers and officers has changed, "from the contempt and hatred of officers and men to political workers to the importance they attached, from the confrontation between military and government to the integration of military and government, the status of political workers has been raised compared with before the war." Therefore, "the enthusiasm of political workers is also relatively large, which has played a certain role in improving morale and inspiring people's hearts." In particular, with the active participation and impetus of the Communists, the political work of the Kuomintang army in the early stage of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression made great progress. At this stage, "there has never been a betrayal or surrender of the enemy and hypocrisy in the national troops", "most of the troops have sacrificed a lot, the officers and men are willing to obey, and countless stories of loyalty and courage have been produced."
But soon, the Kuomintang army political workers were tired again. This is mainly due to the following reasons.
First, the Communists in the Political Department were purged. At the beginning of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the addition of Communists brought vigor and vitality to the political workers of the Kuomintang army, but because they occupied most of the positions in the political department, they aroused envy. He Zhihan once said: "In the past, because the Political Department accommodated all parties and factions to participate in the work, the elements of different parties had the tendency to make a fuss and seize the lead, counting more than 670 people in the headquarters and only 148 Kuomintang members, accounting for only a quarter of them. This, of course, could not be tolerated by the Kuomintang, so the Communists in the Third Department of the Political Department were ordered to withdraw. Since then, the quality of Kuomintang political workers has declined sharply. In February 1939, Chiang Kai-shek criticized the political workers of the Ninth Theater at the Nanyue Political Workers' Conference for teaching soldiers to struggle and sacrifice in peacetime, but "when they came to the front line and the situation was urgent, they were afraid and frightened, and even hid!" In June, Xu Yongchang, minister of military command, also accused political workers of "having no patriotic central idea, let alone work efficiency." At that time, there was even such a thing: the political workers of a certain unit often borrowed money from the commander of the unit to which they belonged, causing them to be infinitely disgusted and resentful, and once they "borrowed money in their hands, they squandered it at will, and even blackmailed prostitutes and traveled, and were expropriated for drinking and eating." Such acts are sufficient to arouse the contempt of the officers and men of the unit in which they are located." The inferiority of its quality can be seen here.
Second, the relationship between political workers and military commanders has not been straightened out. During this period, although the status of Kuomintang political workers improved and their relations with some military generals improved, there were still hidden internal tensions. Because the military's political work is self-contained, directly under the leadership and management of higher-level political work organs, and has no subordination to the commander of the army, "in terms of class, political personnel are on a par with the commander of the army, and in terms of authority, it is determined that political workers have the privilege of participating in orders and circulars, military law review, and fund review." However, the commanders of the armed forces often engage in corrupt behaviors such as doing business, smuggling, and eating short amounts, so they are wary of and even hate political workers. However, in order to avoid suspicion, Chen Cheng repeatedly restrained political work. On February 7, 1939, he asked the political workers to introspect themselves, "We political workers have a bad relationship with the commanders of the troops, and we are responsible for at least half of the responsibility." On the 12th, he reiterated that "the attitude of opposing the commander of the unit should not be taken." In November, Chen Cheng also ordered political workers to warn: "All levels should accept the command and guidance of the commander-in-chief of the same level, such as the director of the military political department, and there should be no friction with the military commander," and "the military's political work should be based on training officers and men and serving the society as the only work, and it is absolutely forbidden to use the secret service work method to report specially." All that is said is a constraint on political workers.
This concept is also prevalent among the top echelons of the Kuomintang military. For example, Xu Yongchang also advocated that "military political workers should pay attention to political work, should not pay attention to monitoring the troops, and should be given the responsibility of supervising political work to the commanders of the troops." Therefore, under this situation, the Nanyue Political Workers' Conference in 1939 adopted a resolution stressing: First, political workers at all levels should advance and retreat in unison with the chief officers of the troops, and must have the courage to risk and make difficulties, and must not be afraid of difficulties. 2. They shall be guided by the commander-in-chief of the unit at the same level. Third, the target of political work personnel should have a clear understanding, should be for the purpose of serving the society, and should not be specially reported to the situation of the troops. Fourth, comrades should have the spirit of mutual love and sincerity, and must not attack each other. Obviously, these regulations are mainly restrictive to political workers.
In view of the contradiction between the political workers and the military commanders, Chiang Kai-shek adopted the method of playing fifty big boards each, believing that on the one hand, it was due to the suspicion of the leading officers, and on the other hand, it was due to the shortcomings of the political workers themselves. Therefore, although he asked the commanders of the army to respect the political workers, they did not guarantee the status of the political workers from the system.
Under such a difficult situation, the effectiveness of the military's political training work will naturally be greatly reduced. When carrying out their work, political workers can only be responsible for conveying their demands on soldiers because of their status and the demands of soldiers, but have no right to directly resolve them, and often disappoint soldiers because they cannot fulfill their words, and lose their faith. This has seriously affected their enthusiasm for work and led to a slippery slope in political work.
Faced with this situation, Chiang Kai-shek was extremely dissatisfied. In March 1940, he telegraphed Chen Cheng: "Now that the efficiency of political work has achieved real results and has no special performance, then if it has nothing, it has no intention of setting up political work, and it is necessary to try to improve it." In July, he again sternly rebuked the National Political Workers' Conference: "To be honest, our political work is as loose and lax as it is now, and if it continues for a long time and does not make corrections, it will lose credibility to the army, officers and soldiers, the people, and even to ourselves.
In September 1940, Chiang Kai-shek replaced Chen Cheng as head of the Political Department with Zhang Zhizhong. Zhang Zhizhong pushed the administrative work reform system, withdrew the political departments of all armies, re-established the division political departments, and restored and enriched the company instructors. Although in the early days of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, it was stipulated that company instructors should be set up, but because a large number of cadres were difficult to complete training for a while, they were not generally established. Even though some units had company instructors, they concentrated on working at the regimental headquarters and did not educate soldiers politically. This time, it is clearly required to "increase the number of company instructors in stages, and select them with military academy origin or excellent company attached and platoon commanders."
The biggest change in the current political work reform system lies in the integration of the military and the government in terms of system, stipulating that the chief officers of political work at all levels should be concurrently served by the deputy chief officer of the unit or the chief officer of the political work at the same time as the deputy chief officer of the unit.
In July 1943, Chiang Kai-shek commended: "In this Battle of Western Hubei, many of our army's political workers were born and died with the troops, advanced and retreated together, and when they reached a critical time, they were able to command the battle, charge into the battlefield, and showed many heroic and heroic deeds, which is really the most optimistic thing in the revolutionary army about the future of the war." He also said: "One of the things that I feel most happy about this time is that the general political workers, especially the low-level political workers, can struggle for self-improvement on the front line and can replace the commander of the troops to command the battle. ”
But not long after, Chiang Kai-shek was disappointed again. In December 1943, he said very angrily: "Where has the soul of our army been since the War of Resistance?" What is the core? Let's ask ourselves, we can say that there is no core at all, and there is no soul!" In March 1945, at the opening ceremony of the Lu DaJia general class, he said: "I want to tell you today: Since I led the army in the revolution, in the past twenty years, I have never suffered such a disgrace as today -- now ordinary foreigners are very interested in our army... Most of them are cold-eyed and have an extreme contempt for us! We even treat our Chinese army as a ragtag bunch, compared to bandits and beggars!" Obviously, Chiang Kai-shek was very dissatisfied with the mental state of the army. This also shows that the reform of the political work system has not achieved its expected effect.
The reason for this is that the reform of the political work system and the implementation of military-political exchanges only to enhance the prestige of political workers by holding military posts, but their powers have not been expanded. Under such circumstances, the military commander-in-chief has not changed his contempt for political workers in concept, and the reform of the political work system has not fundamentally changed the situation of political workers. On the contrary, political workers concurrently serve as deputy chief officers of the troops, and in the eyes of the chief officers of the troops, there is a possibility of replacing him at any time, which has aroused his vigilance. At the same time, the quality of political workers is declining day by day. Because the deputy division commander concurrently serves as the director of the political department, and most of the candidates for deputy division commanders are recommended by the division commanders, after the restructuring, the new deputy division commanders and directors of the political department are mostly transferred to political work cadres as military subordinates or subordinates in the army. In 1944, Chiang Kai-shek said: "The reason why the political work in the army is inefficient at present is because there are many political workers who are themselves unsound and their prestige cannot be established, so that their status is getting lower and lower, and the soldiers are naturally unwilling to accept their leadership." ”
It was not until 1945 that Zhang Zhizhong finally realized the drawbacks of the political work reform. He said: "The original intention of the reform of the political work system was originally to seek military-political exchanges and promote the role of metabolism in order to eliminate the shortcomings of the boss's twilight, but since its implementation, because of the accumulation of habits in the past, not only senior officers are reluctant to be transferred to political workers, that is, junior officers from military academies, but also regard political workers as work with no way out and despise them. He also sighed: "Although the political workers have a history of twenty years, so far the system has not yet been established, and the political workers have no clear status in the army... As a result, the longer he has been engaged in political work, the more bleak his personal future becomes, and ordinary officers regard political work as a fearful path. "In this case, the goal of the general company instructor cannot be achieved. As for the political work plans originally formulated, "after examination results, very few can be completed, and those that cannot be completed are the majority."
Regarding the setbacks in this reform of the political work system, Zhang Zhizhong later recalled: "As the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression grew to the end, the political workers themselves stirred up each other with each other for objective reasons, the contradictions deepened, and the difficulties became more and more extensive, so that the shortcomings were expos Chinese ed and the functions were exhausted. The chief officers of military and divisional political work are not limited to concurrently serving as deputy chief officers of the unit, but may also be appointed as personnel with non-officer backgrounds. This is tantamount to declaring the failure of the reform of the political work system, and the status of political workers has once again plummeted. The Kuomintang military discipline was also wiped out and corrupted to the extreme.