"Reading the Long March", edited by the Military Museum of the Chinese People's Revolution, Jiangsu People's Publishing House, October 2016
Although the Red Army passed through three blockade lines, it also exposed its own weaknesses: First, it was slow to move, and it was difficult for the troops to adopt a mobile and flexible way of fighting. Because the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China brought with it a large number of bulky camp tools and factory machinery, the troops marched for 160 miles and could only walk 20 to 30 miles a day. And there are always two legions on the left wing, two legions on the right wing, one behind the legion hall, and the central organ is centered, which is called "lifting the palanquin" type of transfer, "Yongdao style" march. Second, it exposed the strategic intent of the transfer, allowing Chiang Kai-shek to judge that the Central Red Army was going to join the Red 2nd and 6th Armies in northwestern Hunan Province. Third, he is indecisive and not good at changing the direction of operations in a timely manner in light of changes in the enemy's situation. When the Red Army entered the Shonan region, Mao Zedong once suggested organizing forces to counterattack, taking advantage of the fact that the Kuomintang army was unstable in its various routes, to seek to annihilate one or one of them, and change the passive situation. Peng Dehuai also proposed to quickly advance to Xiangtan, Ningxiang, and Yiyang to avoid falling into a desperate situation. However, Bogu and Li De, who only cared about passively avoiding war and blindly advancing westward, refused to adopt the correct suggestions of Mao and Peng.
Blood on the Xiang River, breaking through the fourth blockade line
Entering Shonan, there are two large rivers in front of it, Xiaoshui and Xiangjiang, and continuing to move forward is equivalent to drilling into the pockets that the enemy has already laid. Chiang Kai-shek believed that the opportunity had come to encircle and annihilate the Red Army, so he ordered about 400,000 people from the Xiang, Guangdong, Guizhou, and Central Armies to form a chasing and encircling trend against the Red Army, in an attempt to strangle the Central Red Army in the area east of the Xiang River.
On November 25, 1934, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission decided to cross the Xiang River between Xing'an and Jeonju. The greatest vicious battle began after the Central Red Army left the base area. On November 27, the vanguard of the Red 1st Army had successfully crossed the Xiang River and controlled the crossing point between Jieshou and Jiaoshanpu. On the 28th, the Red 3rd Army also crossed the Xiang River and took control of parts of Xinwei south of Jieshou. The Red 8th and Red 9th Armies on the flanks had already occupied favorable areas, while the Red 5th Army behind the palace was holding a key position to block the pursuing Nationalist army.
Oil painting of the Battle of the Xiangjiang River
The main army of the Red Army has set up a safe passage to cover the passage of the central column. At this time, the central column was only 80 kilometers away from the crossing point, and if it was lightly loaded and rushed, it could quickly cross the river. However, Bogu, Li De, and others still refused to abandon the heavy belongings brought out of the Soviet area, and spent four precious days on the road. At this time, the kuomintang armies rushing toward the Xiang River were already approaching the river. In order to ensure the safety of the central column, all the Red Army of all sides fell into the passive situation of fighting more with less and fighting with the weak against the strong, and waged a bloody battle with the superior enemy for five days and nights, and the degree of fierceness was indescribable. Under the cover of aircraft and artillery, the enemy launched one attack after another. On the positions that the enemy and we repeatedly fought for, we saw the corpses of the enemy and the Red Army soldiers rolling together, and the blood stained every hillside red. In the battle to hold Guanghuapu, the 10th Regiment of the 4th Division of the Red 3rd Army was killed within the first day, and two regimental commanders were killed. By December 1, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and most of the Central Red Army had crossed the Xiang River. However, the 34th Division of the Red 5th Army and the 18th Regiment of the 6th Division of the Red 3rd Army, which were blocked east of the Xiang River for cover, most of them died heroically.
At this point, the heroic Central Red Army broke through the fourth blockade line carefully set by Chiang Kai-shek at the cost of blood.
The Battle of xiangjiang, the red army suffered the heaviest losses
The Battle of the Xiangjiang River was the most arduous and costly battle since the Red Army's Long March. The Central Red Army fell from more than 86,000 men at the time of departure to 30,000 men. This is a serious consequence of "Left" adventurism and escapism, which has caused tremendous losses to the Chinese revolution. After that, the First and Second Field Columns of the Central Military Commission were merged into one column, with Liu Bocheng as commander, Chen Yun as political commissar, and Ye Jianying as deputy commander. The Red 8 Corps was abolished and the troops were incorporated into the Red 5 Corps.
Bogu
The defeat of the Fifth Anti-"Encirclement and Suppression" Campaign and the heavy losses in the Battle of the Xiangjiang River made the commanders and fighters of the Red Army at all levels gradually realize that the line represented by Mao Zedong was correct. Doubts, dissatisfaction with the current line, and positive demands for a change in leadership among the troops reached their peak after the Battle of the Xiangjiang River, and the differences between many leaders of the Party and the army and Li De and Bogu grew.
Small archives
How big were the picks of the Central Red Army at the beginning of the Long March, with each corps having 1,000 or 800 picks. The central column had all the supplies to be carried by porters, a total of 5,000 people, so someone joked at the time: "The central column is marching in a palanquin carried by 5,000 people." ”
Faced with a dangerous situation, Bogu pointed his pistol at his head. The Battle of the Xiangjiang River was like a nightmare. In the face of the quiet flow of the river, Bogu felt a heavy responsibility and a helplessness. Helplessly, he pulled out his pistol and pointed it slowly at his head. This scene was discovered by Nie Rongzhen, who hurried to stop him and said, "Calm down, don't joke." ”
——Excerpted from "Reading the Long March", published by Jiangsu People's Publishing House, with abridgements
Edit: Wang Bumi