"Questions and Answers on the Knowledge of the History of the Communist Party of China", compiled by the Teaching and Research Office of the Party History of the Communist Party of China at the Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
Due to the failure of the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaign, the main force of the Central Red Army was forced to carry out a strategic shift, which later became known as the Long March. At the same time, some cadres and troops were left behind to persist in guerrilla warfare. In the past, there was a long-term saying that Bogu, dissatisfied with Mao Zedong, originally did not intend to let Mao Zedong participate in the Long March, but it was Zhou Enlai's repeated suggestions to inform him to accompany the army at the moment before departure, and the cadres who were left to insist on guerrilla warfare at that time had a large proportion of sacrifices, and if Mao Zedong was left behind, the history of the Chinese Communist Party might have to be rewritten.
Bogu's theory that he was not prepared to let Mao Zedong accompany him appeared earlier in the memory of Wu Xiuquan, who worked as an interpreter for Li De,[a military adviser sent by the Comintern to the CCP]. Wu Xiuquan said that although the core leadership had long been prepared for such a major strategic transfer, the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee did not discuss it, but on the contrary kept it strictly secret, so that Xiang Ying and Chen Yi, who were later left behind to persist in guerrilla warfare, "did not know this major strategic intention at that time." Not only that, but for cadres who bogu and others did not like, they were thrown off by chance and stayed in the Soviet zone to fight guerrillas, "At first they also planned not to take Comrade Mao Zedong with them, but at that time they had already expelled him from the core of the central leadership and were sent to Yandu to conduct investigations and studies. Later, because he was the chairman of the Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet and enjoyed a high prestige in the army, he was allowed to march together." His claim was embraced by the American writer Salisbury's long march— an unheard-of story, which said: "Wu Xiuquan, who was working as an interpreter at the time and thus knew the inside story, believed that some people did not want Mao Zedong to participate in the Long March. 'Mao was deliberately excluded,' Wu said, "going to Yudu to investigate is just an excuse not to allow him to participate." ’”
In recent years, some writings have put forward another theory, arguing that it was not Bogu who asked Mao Zedong to stay, but Mao Zedong himself asked to stay and fight guerrillas. It is said that in June 1934, after Mao Zedong learned that the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee had decided to transfer the main Force of the Red Army to western Xiang'e, he found Bogu and persuaded Bogu not to let the Central Red Army leave the Central Soviet Region, on the grounds that the establishment of this base area was not easy to come by, and if Bogu decided to leave, he would not leave, but would stay. At the beginning of October of that year, Mao Zedong sent two guards, Hu Changbao and Wu Jiqing, to send a letter to Bogu overnight, once again demanding that the elderly, pregnant women, seriously injured and sick people in the central organs, and those who were unwilling to follow the great transfer of the Central Red Army could be left behind, but he needed to leave Luo Binghui and the Twentieth Division of the Red Ninth Army behind, and said that there were also some cadres and fighters in the First Army who were willing to follow him and ask the Central Committee for approval. The letter also ended with a pledge that in two or three years' time, both the Central Soviet Zone and the remaining Red Army would welcome the Central Bureau back to the Soviet Zone with a new look. After receiving Mao Zedong's letter, Bogu consulted with Zhou Enlai, who disagreed, on the grounds that the Central Committee had decided that Xiang Ying would stay, and if Mao Zedong were to stay now, Xiang Ying's work would not be easy to do, and it would involve many people's personnel arrangements, because the main cadres left behind were asked for by Xiang Ying's name, and it was too late to adjust now. Moreover, Mao Zedong proposed to leave Luo Binghui, the commander of the Red Ninth Army, and the Twentieth Division of the Ninth Army, so that the Red Ninth Army would be divided into two, leaving only one Fourteenth Division. Bogu agreed that Zhou Enlai would talk to Mao Zedong. The next day, Zhou Enlai rode to Yandu and returned to tell Bogu that Mao had agreed to move with his troops.
According to the former version, Bogu originally did not want Mao Zedong to participate in the Long March but let him stay, and it was only after Zhou Enlai's struggle that Bogu agreed to Mao Zedong's conquest with the captain. Bogu and others originally had contradictions with Mao Zedong, and once they arrived in the Central Soviet Region, they repeatedly squeezed out and attacked Mao Zedong, and Bogu did not want Mao Zedong to move with the team at first, indicating that Bogu intended to throw Mao Zedong away as a burden. At that time, Qu Qiubai, who was ill, also hoped to accompany the captain and put forward this request, so he also found Mao Zedong and Zhang Wentian to reflect, but Mao and Zhang Xiangbo were to no avail, and finally Qu Qiubai had to stay, and was soon arrested and sacrificed. If Mao Zedong were left behind, the consequences would be unpredictable, and history could be rewritten. Bogu's move, if not killing people with a knife, was narrow-minded and acted according to personal will rather than the revolutionary cause. As for the latter theory, it is not That Bogu wants to leave Mao Zedong behind, but that Mao Zedong took the initiative to ask Mao Zedong to stay and create a new situation, and it is also just that Bogu they are worried that once Mao Zedong stays, Xiang Ying will not be able to control him, so that Mao Zedong may make a comeback, make a comeback, and then create a big situation, and then become a system of his own, and the tail will not fall, rather than this, it is better to let Mao Zedong follow the captain to control and let him lose his foundation. In short, either way of saying it means that whether Mao Zedong was left behind or agreed to his march with the captain, it was related to Bogu's selfishness.
In 1937, Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong and Bogu were in Yan'an
Before and after the beginning of the Long March, the highest decision-making and leading organ of the Party and the Red Army was the highest "three-man regiment" composed of Bogu, Li De, and Zhou Enlai. Although the Long March departed in some hurry, the "Three-Man Regiment" made certain preparations before the departure of the main force, including the determination of the list of personnel to be transferred with the main force and left behind. Li Weihan once recalled the question of the departure and retention of important cadres on the eve of the Long March: "Before the Long March, the question of the retention of cadres was not decided by the Organization Bureau. Cadres who belong to the management of the provincial party committee shall be reported to the central committee by the decision of the provincial party committee; the party Central organs, governments, troops, the Communist Youth League, the federation of trade unions, etc., shall be reported to the central committee by the responsible persons of the party groups and administrative leaders of each unit. Those who decide to go are then formed by the Organization Bureau. The secretary of the central government party group is Luo Fu, the chairman of the federation of trade unions is Liu Shaoqi, and the secretary of the party group is Chen Yun. The retention of troops was decided by the General Political Department, for example, Deng Xiaoping's Long March with the army was decided by the General Political Department. The Members of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Central Committee decided to leave a leading organ and persist in the struggle, called the Central Sub-Bureau. The members are Xiang Ying, Chen Yi, Qu Qiubai and other comrades, and Xiang Ying is responsible. On the issue of retaining people, I did not participate in the opinions, nor did I ask any questions, but it was discussed and decided by the members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. ”
At that time, Li Weihan was the director of the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee and the director of the Central Organization Bureau, and he was an insider of this period of history. Since the issue of retaining people was "discussed and decided by the Members of the Politburo Standing Committee", it is obviously not Bogu's personal decision. At that time, the politburo standing committee members in the Central Soviet Region included Bogu, Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, Xiang Ying, and Chen Yun. Before the Long March and at the beginning of the Long March, major decisions were decided by the "three-man regiment," which was mainly engaged in the preparation of the military aspects of the transfer, and only met twice, once in Li Defang and once in the Central Bureau. In practical work, Bogu is in charge of politics and Li De in military affairs; Zhou Enlai's supervision of the implementation of military preparation plans cannot be related to all things." "When studying the list of retained personnel, military cadres consulted Zhou Enlai's opinion, and other parties only told him a number." Since Bogu consulted Zhou Enlai's opinion on the departure and retention of military cadres, at least it showed that who left and who stayed in this area of cadres was not a black-box operation by Bogu alone. Mao Zedong was a member of the Politburo elected by the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and chairman of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic; if he was not a military cadre at this time from the perspective of the position he held, and he was basically in a position of "sideline" before the Long March, he still had a major influence in the Central Red Army and the Central Soviet Region.
The relationship between the cadres left behind at the time of the Long March and Bogu can be said to be close and distant. Before the main force of the Central Red Army set out, the Provisional Central Committee of the CPC decided to form the Central Sub-Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, whose members were Xiang Ying, Qu Qiubai, Chen Tanqiu, He Chang, Chen Yi, Wang Jinxiang, Liang Baitai, Zhang Dingcheng, Deng Zihui, Tan Zhenlin, Gong Chu, Mao Zeqin, and Li Cailian. Among them, although there are people like Qu Qiubai, He Chang, and He Shuheng who want to act with the main force, but those who are left behind because Bogu has prejudices against him, Xiang Ying, as the secretary of the Central Bureau and also the supreme leader who insists on guerrilla warfare, is close to Bogu. Xiang Ying is a party member from a worker background, has always held important positions in the party, he and Wang Ming, Bogu originally have no historical origins, after the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China Wang Ming gained power, Xiang Ying changed quickly, won the trust of the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, therefore, "After the Fourth Plenary Session, Wang Ming ruled the Party Central Committee, sent Ren Bishi and other comrades to Jiangxi to attack Comrade Xiang Ying. As a result, Xiang Ying was captured by Wang Ming's line." Therefore, contrary to Mao Zedong's snubbing and exclusion, Xiang Ying was still reused after the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and from May to December 1933, he also acted as chairman of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, and was elected as a member of the Politburo Standing Committee at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in January 1934 (at that time, the Politburo Standing Committee was also a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee), which shows that Xiang Ying and Bogu had a very close relationship. Those senior cadres who remained to persist in guerrilla warfare did have quite a few sacrifices, such as Qu Qiubai, He Chang, Liu Bojian, He Shuheng, Liang Baitai, Mao Zeqin, and so on, while the senior cadres who accompanied the brigade, including Dong Biwu, Lin Boqu, Xie Jueya, and Xu Teli (known as the "Four Elders of the Long March", and the above four people plus He Shuheng, known as the "Five Elders of the Central Soviet Region"), all arrived in northern Shaanxi safely. Therefore, people naturally have the association that a sick and infirm person like Qu Qiubai may not be sacrificed if he accompanies the captain's march; on the contrary, if Mao Zedong stays without the captain's march, his end may be the same as Qu Qiubai's.
At that time, for senior cadres, whether they participated in the Long March or stayed behind to persist in guerrilla warfare, it was quite difficult. In contrast, insisting on guerrilla warfare is more arduous and more dangerous. Because the Long March was after all acting with the main force and the time of the Long March was only one year, in the whole process of the Long March, although the Central Red Army was seriously attrition, it still paid attention to the protection of cadres, and the number of people who arrived in northern Shaanxi was less than one-tenth of that of the departure, and the senior cadres accompanying the team were basically preserved, including both the elderly like the "Four Elders of the Long March" and the marchers who could only sit on stretchers because of their injuries, and finally arrived in northern Shaanxi safely. Insisting that guerrilla warfare must disperse its actions, and that it is dangerous at any time when the Kuomintang army is heavily encircled and strengthens its rule of armor protection, and that guerrilla warfare in the south lasts for three years, so that all the high-ranking cadres left behind cannot be protected by large troops, and their danger is undoubtedly much greater than that of those who act with the main force, especially those who are weak and sick like Qu Qiubai and He Shuheng, and it is even more fierce to leave them to carry out guerrilla warfare. Of course, staying and insisting on guerrilla warfare does not mean that they will definitely die, and Xiang Ying, Chen Tanqiu, Chen Yi, Wang Jinxiang, Zhang Dingcheng, Deng Zihui, and Tan Zhenlin, who are members of the Central Sub-Bureau, have persevered. It can be said that both those who participated in the Long March and those who persisted in guerrilla warfare for three years made great sacrifices for the Chinese revolution. Relatively speaking, the proportion of cadres who participated in the Long March was large, and the proportion of cadres who persisted in guerrilla warfare was sacrificed, which shows that the environment for guerrilla warfare was more difficult, but whether they participated in the Long March or left guerrillas behind, it was the need of the revolution.
On this question, Bogu himself once said in the Yan'an rectification: "When the Central Soviet Region withdrew, due to insufficient estimation of the situation,-the situation of guerrilla warfare and its difficulties," a set of shelves was still preserved at all levels, and because of this, a number of cadres were left behind: Xiang Ying, secretary of the Central Bureau, Tan Qiu, Qiu Bai of Propaganda, Chen Yi of the military, and He Shuheng of the government. The rest of The secretaries of Jiangxi Zengshan, Wang Jinyang of Fujian, and Liu Bojian of Egan, these cadres will suffer sacrifices in the future, and this is my responsibility. As for the following decision to stay, Junromai (i.e. Li Weihan - the introducer) is responsible for handling. What is to be stated is the treatment of this group of people, and there is no intention to make them suffer sacrifices. But the right treatment should be brought out. Under the circumstances at that time, it was necessary to leave a group of troops and cadres to persist in guerrilla warfare, and it was precisely this group of people who persisted in three years of arduous guerrilla warfare after staying behind, retaining the revolutionary flames of the south, and only then did the New Fourth Army emerge.
But as Bogu reflected, there is no need to leave such a "set of shelves", but to bring out more those who are not adapted to the environment of guerrilla warfare, so as to reduce those unnecessary sacrifices, which is where Bogu is "responsible". However, it cannot be simply said that all the cadres who remain to persist in guerrilla warfare are people that Bogu and Li De do not like and want to exclude, or even take the opportunity to exclude dissidents and use the Long March to throw them away as baggage, still less can we say that "Bogu set up a conspiracy to eliminate political enemies by the hand of Chiang Kai-shek" and "killed people with a knife."
In order to promote "Left" dogmatism, After coming to the Central Soviet Region, Bogu and others carried out "cruel struggles and ruthless blows", but this struggle and crackdown were mainly reflected in the internal repression, and for senior cadres such as Mao Zedong, Bogu mainly snubbed and excluded them, but there was not yet a problem of wanting to go away quickly. He said that Bogu changed his mind and decided to let Mao Zedong follow the captain in the army, because he was afraid that after he stayed, he would make the situation bigger and then make an independent with the central authorities and thus end up in a big way, and even more he regarded Bogu as a person who only cared about his own selfish interests and did not care about the party's cause. There are indeed contradictions between Bogu and Mao Zedong, but after all, there are different views among the revolutionaries on how to carry out the revolution, mainly differences in ideology and understanding, and they are unanimous on the question of whether to revolution or not and strive for the victory of the revolution, and the difference lies in how to carry out the revolution. The contradiction between Mao Zedong and the Provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party headed by Bogu is mainly the difference in ideas, in what kind of revolutionary road to choose and what kind of revolutionary method to adopt.
When talking about the history of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Zunyi Conference, Mao Zedong once said, "We must emphasize the social causes that give rise to errors and not emphasize personal problems." This is a very important guiding principle for studying the history of the CPC. If we regard all the contradictions within the Party in history as enmity between individuals, it is not in line with historical facts and damages the image of the Party.
——Excerpted from "Questions and Answers on the Knowledge of the History of the Communist Party of China", published by the People's Publishing House
Author: Luo Pinghan
Editor: Zhou Yiqian