Author: Lao Kaizhun, Hong Xiaoxia
Originally published in Archives Spring and Autumn, No. 7, 2014
The rare Pan Hannian is in the same frame as Mao Zedong
On February 23, 1953, Chairman Mao toured Jinling in the south, visiting the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum and observatory. Take a nap on the way and take this photo. From left, Zeng Shan, Chen Bojun (vice president of the Military Academy), Song Shilun (principal of the Senior Infantry School), Yang Shangkun (director of the CPC Central Committee Office), Luo Ruiqing (minister of public security), Zhang Aiping (chief of staff of the East China Military Region), Chairman Mao, Chen Yi (commander of the East China Military Region), Pan Hannian (vice mayor of Shanghai), Zeng Xisheng (fat man sitting on the ground, secretary of the Anhui Provincial CPC Committee), and Chen Pixian
One of the most common ways to collect intelligence is to "penetrate in", infiltrate the other side's internal intelligence collection, also known as infiltration. And infiltration is often you have me, I have you, forming a double or even multiple spy, which is not only not surprising in the intelligence community, but also the norm.
During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, CCP underground workers successfully infiltrated the Japanese top brass and Japanese intelligence agencies. The Japanese authorities did not know much about the CCP's intelligence work until the "CCP Spy Group" case in 1942 that they learned that the CCP's intelligence work was so powerful that it actually infiltrated the Japanese prime minister.
Pan Hannian
"CCP Spy Corps"
The "CCP Spy Corps" case was a case in which Soviet intelligence officerSoul Zorg and others were implicated in the Shanghai CCP intelligence group after their arrest in Tokyo. In October 1941, after the arrest of Sorge, Hideshi Ozaki, and others in Tokyo, a number of CCP members in Shanghai, including Xi Gong, Xili Ryufu, Cheng Hesheng (Zheng Wendao), Li Desheng, Chen Yifeng (Ni Zhaoyu), and other CCP members in the CCP intelligence group in Shanghai, were implicated and arrested in June and July 1942. These CCP members are members of a CCP intelligence group hidden within Japan's intelligence agencies and belong to the leadership of the CCP's Shanghai Intelligence Section.
The CCP members were able to break into Japan's intelligence agencies because Wang Xuewen, a member of the CPC Central Committee's Special Branch, joined the Communist Party of China in the early 1930s when he was a professor at the Shanghai Tongwen Academy, and developed a number of Japanese students from the Tongwen Academy, such as Nakanishi Gong, Ryūo Nishiri, Hirotoshi Teshima, and Yukiyuki Shirai. Founded by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the original intention was to train Japanese spies who were proficient in Chinese, but it was not expected that a group of students in the Tongshu Academy would become CCP members with communist beliefs and internationalist spirit.
Zhongxi Gong joined the Communist Youth League of China when he studied at the Tongwen Academy in April 1931, and became a full member of the Communist Party of China when he went to China again in May 1938. He joined the "Mantetsu" headquarters in 1934 and became the director of the Shanghai office of Mantetsu in May 1938. Through his connections, from April 1940 onwards, Mantetsu successively established the "Current Affairs Investigation and Research Office" and the "Special Investigation Class". Cheng Hesheng (real name Zheng Wendao) was transferred to the Shanghai Intelligence Section of the Communist Party of China in the autumn of 1939 as a liaison officer, responsible for liaison with Zhongxi Gong and several Chinese comrades. Implicated in the Sorge case in Tokyo, Nakanishi was arrested in June 1942, and Cheng kazusei was arrested in July, and the intelligence group ended its activities.
The members of this intelligence group were: Nakanishi Gong, Ryūo Ryūfu Ozaki, Yukiyuki Shirai, Cheng Hesheng, Li Desheng, Xu Qiang, Li Yun, Chen Yifeng, Wang Jinyuan (Wang Jingwei's personal secretary), Fang Zhida, Ni Zhipu, Qian Ming (Liu Shaowen), Ji Gang, Zhang Min (Ji Gang's wife), Chen Ruzhou, Zhang Mingda, Zhang Zijing, Wu Shuguang (Wu Chengfang), Sun Quan, Ji Zhongxia, Pan Hannian, Weng Fumian, Chen Charter, Chen Shuliang, Qiu Linxiang, Chen Sanbai, Qin Mingjun (Qin Hongjun), and others. It belongs to the category of the Pan Hannian intelligence system.
At that time, Nakanishi's cover identity was that of an adviser to the "General Headquarters of the Imperial Japanese Army's Indochina Dispatch Army"; Ryūo's cover identity was that of the chief reporter of the Nanjing Branch of the Japanese "Allied Society" and the "Central News Agency" and the "Guidance Officer of the Central News Agency"; and the "Reporting (Intelligence) Department of the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army" was the leader of the "Special Investigation Squad" attached to the "Mantetsu Shanghai Office Investigation Office" in Japan; and ni Zhipu and more than a dozen other people were investigators of the investigation squad.
In this way, the members of the CCP intelligence group have legitimate identities as a cover and can infiltrate japan's intelligence services to collect intelligence. They collected a lot of valuable strategic intelligence, such as the minutes of the Japanese Imperial Council, the base camp sweeping operation plan, the Wang pseudo-peace movement and other important top-secret intelligence.
The CCP's Shanghai Intelligence Group,décoached on Japan's pacific war campaign decades later, and the film "East Wind and Rain," released in 2010, was based on the CCP intelligence group that infiltrated Japan's intelligence agencies.
Group photo taken during the "Salvation Daily" in Guangzhou in the early days of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. Front row from left: Mao Dun, Xia Yan, Liao Chengzhi. Back row: Pan Hannian (first from left), Yu Feng (middle), Situ Huimin (first from right)
The war was decided to start on December 7
In early 1941, a debate began in Japan over the southward and northward advances.
The Chinese Communists attach great importance to Japan's strategic trends. If Japan attacks the Soviet Union from the north, the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists armed forces fighting against Japan in North China will face great pressure; if Japan attacks the United States from the south, the United States will join the ranks of the Anti-Japanese Resistance, which will bring a turning point to China's War of Resistance Against Japan. The Soviet Union called the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China several times, asking the Eighth Route Army to go north to assist the Soviet Union in resisting the northward advance of the Japanese army. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has asked all intelligence systems to investigate Japan's strategic movements.
In July 1941, Japan conducted a special exercise by the Kwantung Army, showing signs of attacking the Soviet Union. Nakanishi was tasked with investigating Japan's movements. He took the opportunity sent by Mantetsu to Tokyo to attend the third meeting of the "Indochina Anti-Japanese Forces Investigation Committee" and contacted Hidemito Ozaki, a Soviet intelligence officer who was then the secretary of the Japanese prime minister. Hidemito Ozaki told Nakanishi that the policy set at the Japanese Imperial Council on July 2 was to prepare for a southward offensive while actively preparing for war against the Soviet Union in the north.
Based on the information provided by Hideshi Ozaki and his own observations in Manchuria, Nakanishi came to the conclusion that the special exercise of the Japanese Kwantung Army was an exercise of southward expansion, and Japan's strategy was to advance south rather than north.
In October 1941, Japanese secret services arrested Hidemito Ozaki and Sorge in Tokyo. Nakanishi, who has ties to Hideshi Ozaki, is in danger. Previously, some people in Japan had issued an alarm to Zhongxi Gong, advising Zhongxi Gong to "go west", that is, to tell Zhongxi Gong to go to Yan'an.
At this time, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China asked the Shanghai Intelligence Group to find out the specific time of Japan's southward advance. Pan Hannian, who was in charge of intelligence work in Shanghai, once again entrusted this arduous task to Zhongxi Gong.
After receiving the task, Nakanishi disregarded his personal safety and returned to Tokyo to collect intelligence. In Tokyo, Nakanishi heard that the deadline for U.S.-Japan talks was at the end of the month. In order to verify this information, Nakanishi collected information in the "Mantetsu" data room, and finally found the information in the "Compilation Reference" of November 6, 1941: negotiations acceptable to Japan, until November 30. Combined with what he saw in the "Imperial Army Operational Compendium" that "the end of November is limited", Nakanishi believes that Japan is ready to go to war with the United States, the navy has been assembled, and as soon as the negotiations between the United States and Japan end in early December, war will definitely begin against the United States immediately.
Based on the Japanese Navy's sailing time, Nakanishi judged that japan's war against the United States was December 7. Because December 7 is a Sunday in the Western Hemisphere of the United States. This is a good time for Japan to attack the United States. From the United States, at this time, the United States has not yet entered the war, December 7 Sunday is a day of rest, not only government personnel do not go to work, but also the officers and men of the army are on holiday, which is very conducive to Japan to launch an offensive.
Pan Hannian in his youth
As far as Japan is concerned, it has been in the war for a long time, and it is urgent to go south to replenish it, and Japan will never delay it any longer. Because the Japanese Navy consumes 40,000 tons of oil per day, the Army consumes 12,000 tons of oil per day. Oil is a strategic material urgently needed by the Japanese army and the navy, and Hideki Tojo will never wait until he suffers from petroleum anemia to attack. To this end, Nakanishi deduced that the time of Japan's attack on the United States was December 7, 1941 in the Western Hemisphere, and December 8, in the Eastern Hemisphere.
Nakanishi reported this information to Wu Chengfang, the head of the CCP's Shanghai Intelligence Group. Due to the lack of intelligence exchange channels between the Ccp and the United States. Pan Hannian deployed the secret Communist Party member "No. 21" who transferred this information to the Shanghai Station of the Military Command, who forwarded it to the Chongqing Military Command Headquarters, and then the Nationalist Government relayed it to the United States. But the Americans did not trust Chinese intelligence, so much so that the War in the Pacific began to be battered.
Nakanishi judged the specific time of Japan's war with the United States, reflecting his outstanding talent in intelligence.
For a long time, the Chinese Communist Party's outstanding intelligence achievements were little known, and the CCP members who personally engaged in this intelligence work have always avoided talking about it out of the need for secrecy, so most people only know the information transmitted by the Kuomintang to the US Government about the outbreak of the Pacific War, but do not know the source of the Kuomintang's intelligence.
There are other accounts of Information on Japan's Pacific War. It is well known that the Kuomintang deciphered Japanese secret telegrams and learned of Japan's military deployment. Five days before the Pearl Harbor incident in 1941, Chi Buzhou of the Technical Research Office of the Kuomintang Military Commission deciphered Japan's diplomatic secret telegrams and learned that Japan would be preparing to attack Pearl Harbor.
In fact, this statement is doubtful. According to scholars' research, Japanese diplomatic secrets have different levels and use different passwords. The Japanese Consulate in Honolulu uses the J-19 "Purple Secret", which is a machine code that cannot be deciphered manually, and Chi Buzhou did not reach such a high level of decipherment that year.
During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, Zhang Lingyuan, who worked in the Sixth Group (Intelligence Group) of Chiang Kai-shek's Attendant Office, was specifically responsible for reviewing the information transmitted from the Technical Research Office of the Central Military Commission, and he also pointed out that the Kuomintang side did not decipher the secret telegram of the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor.
According to Huang Mulan, who was engaged in intelligence work under the leadership of Pan Hannian, Wu Tiecheng, minister of overseas affairs of the Kuomintang Central Committee, sent Li Fang to pretend to be the enemy and serve as the "ambassador" of the Wang puppet government in Romania. Soon after Li Fang's fraudulent surrender to Japan, members of the CCP intelligence group received top-secret information from him that Japan would launch a War in the Pacific. At the same time, the Kuomintang Central Committee received this important information.
In this way, the Kuomintang also provided strategic information on Japan's plan to launch a Pacific war to the Communist Party. But the information provided by the Communists to the Kuomintang and derived from Zhongxi Gong was more specific.
Pan Hannian and Dong Hui
The mysterious Pan Hannian system
Pan Hannian was one of the long-term leaders of the CCP's hidden front, leading many intelligence organizations. The Pan Hannian system is a relatively unique branch, established after 1939, under the leadership of the Social Department of the CPC Central Committee, independent of other intelligence organizations, responsible for intelligence work in Shanghai, Ningbo, Guangdong, Hong Kong, Nanyang and other places.
After the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941 and the fall of Hong Kong, the focus of Pan Hannian's system shifted from Hong Kong to Shanghai. Its members come from four sources:
(1) The Ministry of Social Affairs of the CPC Central Committee sent about 10 people, including Dong Hui and Liu Shoushou, to Shanghai to take up the internal work of the Pan Hannian system.
(2) Liu Xiao, secretary of the Jiangsu Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China, dispatched more than 10 people to support the Pan Hannian system. For example, the Jiangsu Provincial Cpc Committee transferred He Ji from the Work Committee and Zhang Zhengbing from the Academic Committee to assist Pan Hannian in political transportation.
(3) Comrades in the Huyuan intelligence system participate in the Pan system. For example, after the end of the Intelligence Work Committee of the Jiangsu Provincial CPC Committee, the intelligence personnel Shi Yong, Zhao Zheng brothers, and Cai Bingxian were all transferred to the Pan Hannian system; after the end of the "Eighth Office" (director Liu Shaowen), the intelligence personnel to which they belonged were also assigned to the Pan Hannian system.
(4) The relationship developed by the Pan Hannian system itself.
Pan Hannian's intelligence system had a total of about 100 participants in each period, and about 30 or 40 staff members during the same period; the system first took Liu Renshou, Qiao Liqing, Meng Shuxian, and others as the backbone, and then added Tan Chong'an, Wu Chengfang, Zhang Jianliang (i.e., Hua Kezhi) and others, and established several intelligence work bases; the important leader in the later period was Zhang Shuang.
As early as the central special section period, Pan Hannian was engaged in intelligence work. In April 1931, Gu Shunzhang, the head of the Central Special Branch, was arrested and defected. The CPC Central Committee transferred the former special section cadres who were familiar to Gu Shunzhang from Shanghai and sent Chen Yun, Kang Sheng, and Pan Hannian to the central special section to take over the work. In June, the Central Special Committee was reorganized, and Pan Hannian was appointed as a member of the Special Committee and the chief of the Second Special Section (i.e., the Intelligence Section) (succeeding Chen Geng). After the "1.28" in 1932, the work of Special Branch was actually taken care of by Pan Hannian until 1933, when Pan Hannian left Shanghai and entered the Soviet Zone.
In April 1936, Pan Hannian left the Soviet Union to return to China, participated in the kuomintang-communist cooperation negotiations and liaison work, arrived in Hong Kong in May, went to Shanghai and Ningbo in July to discuss work with Feng Xuefeng, and in October became the director of the office of the CPC Central Committee in Shanghai, responsible for the negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and also responsible for intelligence work. In August 1937, Pan became the director of the "Eight Offices" in Shanghai.
In 1938 in Yan'an. From right, Chen Yun, Pan Hannian, Teng Daiyuan, Li Fuchun, and Xiang Ying
After the fall of Shanghai, Pan withdrew to Hong Kong in December of the same year to assist Liao Chengzhi in presiding over the work of the "Eight Offices" in Hong Kong and presiding over some of the secret work. In September 1938, Pan Hannian went to Yan'an to attend the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China; after the meeting, he stayed in the Central Social Department to work. Soon, Pan Hannian became the director of the first office of the Central Social Department.
In April 1939, Pan Hannian returned to Hong Kong to treat eye diseases and participate in intelligence work; in late September, he arrived in Shanghai from Hong Kong to establish a Shanghai intelligence work team. In October, he was officially appointed deputy director of the Social Department of the CPC Central Committee and was ordered to establish the South China Intelligence Bureau to preside over the intelligence work in central and south China.
After that, Pan traveled back and forth between Shanghai and Hong Kong, leading intelligence work in Shanghai, Ningbo, Guangdong, Hong Kong, and Nanyang. After the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941 and the fall of Hong Kong, the focus of Pan Hannian's system shifted from Hong Kong to Shanghai. In November 1942, Pan and the Jiangsu Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China simultaneously moved to the Huainan base area of the New Fourth Army.
In the spring of 1943, the Central China Bureau Intelligence Committee was established, with Pan Hannian, Lai Chuanzhu, and Hu Lijiao as members, and Pan Hannian as secretary. At the same time, the Intelligence Department of the Central China Bureau was established, with Pan Hannian as the minister and Xu Xuehan as the deputy minister, until the victory of the Anti-Japanese War in September 1945. Among them, after Pan Hannian went to Yan'an in the winter of 1944 to participate in the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Liu Changsheng, director of the Central China Bureau's Urban Engineering Department, took charge of the central China Bureau's intelligence department.
After the victory of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the Central China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee was merged into the East China Bureau, and the Pan Hannian intelligence system continued to be responsible for intelligence work in Shanghai, Nanjing, Hong Kong and other places. In the summer of 1946, Pan Hannian returned to Shanghai from the base area and went to Hong Kong to continue to lead the intelligence work of Pan Hannian's system until the liberation of the whole country.
In the early days of the liberation of Shanghai. From left, Liu Shaowen, Pan Hannian, Liu Renshou and Wu Kejian
It should be noted that there are many intelligence organizations led by Pan Hannian, but the intelligence organizations led by Pan Hannian cannot be called the Pan Hannian system. After 1931, the second branch of the Central Special Branch that Pan Hannian was responsible for did not belong to the Pan Hannian system, but belonged to the Special Branch of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.
During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the organizations directly led by Pan Hannian were: the Shanghai Office of the CPC Central Committee, the Shanghai Office of the Eighth Route Army, the South China Intelligence Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, and the Intelligence Department of the Central China Bureau of the CPC Central Committee. These can't all be called the PanHannian system.
The Shanghai Office of the CPC Central Committee and the Shanghai Office of the Eighth Route Army were led by others for a time during their existence. For example, Feng Xuefeng and Liu Xiao were in charge of the Shanghai Office of the CPC Central Committee; at the beginning of the establishment of the "Eighth Office", Li Kenong served as the director.
Therefore, when combing through the organizational system of intelligence during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, it is necessary to distinguish between the open office and the secret Pan Hannian intelligence system.
An underground worker in the Iwai Mansion
After the "CCP Spy Regiment" case in 1942, the CCP intelligence group hidden in Shanghai Mantetsu was destroyed. Undaunted by hardships and dangers, Chinese intelligence personnel continued to infiltrate the intelligence department of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The special investigation team of the Japanese Consulate in Shanghai, which is called "Iwai Mansion" and is responsible for collecting intelligence and carrying out special agent activities. The squad leader of the special investigation squad was Vice Consul Eiichi Iwai, but the actual person in charge was Yuan Shu, a secret member of the CCP and a multi-faceted spy.
In 1984, Yuan Shu (right) took a group photo with Pan Hannian's sister Pan Yuqin at The Former Residence of Pan Hannian
In September 1939, Liu Renshou, the backbone of Pan Hannian's intelligence system, infiltrated the "Iwai Mansion" and served as a confidential officer of the secret radio station. After Liu Renshou's retreat, in early 1942, Yun Yiqun continued to break into the "Iwai Mansion" on the orders of Pan Hannian and served as the president of the "China Compilation Society", providing manuscripts for the "New China Daily" and "Political Monthly" and other newspapers and periodicals run by the Iwai Mansion.
In his special capacity, Yun Yiqun used euphemisms to expose the ugliness of the Japanese and the anti-communist nature of the Diehard Kuomintang faction, and to refute the theory of surrender; he even disseminated the Yan'an radio content included in the Iwai Mansion Radio station in a light and derogatory and implicit way through a special article. After the fall of Shanghai, the Japanese army tightly controlled the news, and the Japanese and pseudo-propaganda of peace theory in the environment undoubtedly occupied a position.
Most importantly, through this special identity, Yun Yiqun can also collect a lot of intelligence on Japanese politics and economics. Yun Yiqun worked until he was arrested by The Japanese Gendarmes in October 1944.
CCP members have also infiltrated puppet regimes and pseudo-institutions to collect intelligence.
Chen Yifeng of the CCP's Shanghai Intelligence Group served as chief reporter of the pseudo-"Central News Agency" and adviser to the headquarters of the wang puppet Nationalist government agents.
Wang Jinyuan broke into the core department of the Wang puppet regime, and in early 1938, he was appointed secretary general of the puppet Shanghai Municipal Government; in September 1940, he was transferred to Nanjing as Wang Jingwei's secretary.
Zhang Mingda infiltrated the pseudo-"Central News Agency" as a liaison officer, and took advantage of the opportunity of serving as a messenger of telegrams and important letters between the pseudo-"Central News Agency" and the branches along the Line to Ningbo and Shanghai, and actually served as a liaison between the responsible person of the CPC's Shanghai Intelligence Group and the Nanjing Station of the CPC's Shanghai Intelligence Group.
When Chen Gongbo was appointed mayor of Shanghai, Li Shiyu accompanied Chen Gongbo to Shanghai as a "member of the Legislative Yuan" to be responsible for the establishment of the Shanghai Municipal Security Headquarters; Li Shiyu's party organization relations and working relations were transferred from the Social Department of the North China Bureau to the Intelligence Department of the Central China Bureau in the autumn of 1944, and began to be led by Yifu and led by Liu Life insurance in the spring of 1945. After Li Shiyu and The Pan Hannian system were in contact, he took the opportunity to install underground CCP members of the Pan Hannian system in the Pseudo-Security Headquarters: Ni Youzhai was appointed as the chief of the confidential section of the lieutenant colonel, Jiang Chunpu was appointed as the chief of the personnel section of the lieutenant colonel, and Zhang Weiguang was appointed as the chief of the clerical section of the major and the Translator of Japanese.
The two Zhao Zheng brothers, whom Shi Yong contacted, broke into the Headquarters of Wang Pseudo Secret Agent "No. 76". He also infiltrated Japanese and puppet institutions to engage in secret intelligence work.
Shut up
These intelligence workers who have infiltrated the puppet regime and the puppet organs are willing to bear the notoriety of traitors that are hated by the people, and disregard their own personal honor and disgrace for the sake of the interests of the country and the nation.
Pan Hannian's intelligence system, the team is short and capable, but the achievements have been very large. During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, Pan Hannian systematically reported a lot of important information. For example, in 1939, Britain and France attempted to sacrifice China's compromise with Japan in Munich in the Far East; after the outbreak of the German-Soviet War, Japan planned to advance south instead of north; Li Shiqun provided the Japanese army to "sweep" the area where the New Fourth Army headquarters was located; Zhou Fohai set up a radio station and Chongqing briefing; Chongqing's strategic activities against Japan; and so on.
In order to launch a war of aggression against China, Japan collected a large amount of intelligence from China. But in terms of intelligence against the CCP, little has been achieved. The Chinese Communists, on the other hand, have made important achievements in their intelligence work against Japan. Ccp intelligence agents are born and die on an invisible battlefield. Its penetration ability is quite powerful.
The intelligence agencies established by Japan to invade China actually included ccp organizations, and some communists still held important positions and held the core information of the Japanese puppet organizations: for example, hideshi Ozaki, the secretary of the Japanese prime minister, actually maintained close contact with the CCP members, and Wang Jingwei's secretary, Wang Jinyuan, was a member of the CCP intelligence group.
It can be seen that the CPC has made great achievements in "breaking in." The infiltration capability of the CCP's intelligence personnel was unmatched by Japanese and Kuomintang agents.
In April 1955, Pan Hannian was wrongly convicted of "internal adultery" and was arrested and examined. He was later sentenced and expelled from the party, and has suffered more than 20 years of grievances. This is the Huanjiang Tea Farm in Chaling County, Hunan, where Pan Hannian was once detained
Pan Hannian Cemetery in Shanghai
Friends who like this article can pay attention to my WeChat public account "Ancient Stories", which has more articles to share with everyone!
"Disclaimer: This article is reproduced from the Internet. The copyright of the graphic belongs to the original author, if there is any infringement, please contact to delete』