Signing of the Armistice Agreement at Panmunjom
MaterialCarrot
Some thoughts that come to mind:
Numbers of course. The Chinese attacked US/UN forces with tremendous strength of numbers. According to the Chinese, at peak strength they had about 1.5 million men in Korea. Peak strength for the US was 330,000. In 4 years of combat 35,000 Americans died in Korea. In the less than two years of combat that China was involved they, according to the Chinese government, sustained over 180,000 deaths, with speculation that the number could be much higher.
Other than material and logistical inferiority, the Chinese army fought very well and were generally well led. Chinese soldiers were largely very motivated and able to withstand much privation, and were excellent at infiltration and close infantry combat.
Allied overconfidence. The US (MacArthur in particular) ignored clear indications that the Chinese were going to intervene. This hubris resulted in US/SK/Allied forces being caught off balance when the Chinese attacked. Much of the second half of the Korean War was the Allies recovering from being knocked off balance.
Logistics. Despite what I said about Chinese logistics problems (and they definitely had them), the Korean War was fought right next to China, whereas outside of SK, the US and most of its allies were fighting at the end of a several thousand mile long logistics chain. The US had and used very effectively it's massive firepower advantage, but in no reality could the US put millions of US troops in Korea the way the Chinese could walk them in.
Political motivation. Related to the point above, China viewed the Korean War as directly related to its interests, perhaps even an existential threat. The US and Allied reasons for being there were much more tenuous. Even if the US could have put a million soldiers in Korea as I wrote above, there's no way in hell the American public would have supported it. The US Administration was under constant domestic political pressure to keep US involvement in the Korean War limited, and that's what they did. This was a war that in the US largely nobody wanted. There's a reason it to this day it is referred to as "The Forgotten War."
In Mortal Combat: Korea, by Tolland is a great overview of the war. On Desperate Ground, by Sides is an excellent and riveting history of the US fighting China at the Chosin Reservoir.
Some thoughts came to my mind:
Quantity, of course. Chinese attacked the United States/United Nations forces with enormous forces. According to Chinese, they had about 1.5 million people at the peak of North Korea. The U.S. military strength is 330,000. In 4 years of fighting, 35,000 Americans died in North Korea. According to Chinese statistics, their death toll exceeded 180,000 in less than two years of fighting, and there is speculation that this number may be even higher.
In addition to the disadvantages in terms of materials and logistics, the Chinese army has fought very well and led well overall. The Chinese soldiers were largely highly motivated, able to withstand most of the difficulties, and excellent at infiltrating and close-quarters infantry combat.
Allied overconfidence. The United States, and MacArthur in particular, ignored clear indications that China was ready to intervene. This arrogance caused the U.S./South Korea/Allies to lose their balance when China attacked. Much of the second half of the Korean War was spent recovering from a disrupted equilibrium.
logistics. Despite what I've said about China's logistical problems (and they certainly have them), the Korean War was fought right next to China, and outside of South Korea, the United States and most of its allies fought at the end of a logistics chain thousands of miles long. The United States has used its powerful firepower superiority very effectively, but in reality, it is unlikely that the United States will send millions of American troops to North Korea as China did.
Political motivation. Related to the above view, China believes that the Korean War is directly related to its interests and may even be an existential threat. The reasons for the U.S. and allies there are much weaker. Even if the United States could deploy a million soldiers in South Korea, as I said above, the American public would never support it. The U.S. government is under constant domestic political pressure to limit U.S. participation in the Korean War, and that's what it did. It's a war that basically no one in America wants. There's a reason this war is still called the "forgotten war."
In The Fight to the Death: The Korean War, Tolan gives a brilliant overview of the war. "Desperate Land" tells the wonderful and fascinating history of the United States fighting China on Chosin Lake.
Emperor-Commodus -> MaterialCarrot
How would you rank The Coldest Winter by David Halberstam? I read it a long time ago and was thinking about re-reading. IIRC he puts much of the blame on MacArthur for having a terrible intelligence corps and ignoring political realities in favor of constantly being on the offensive.
How would you rate David Halberstam's The Coldest Winter? I read this book a long time ago and am now considering rereading it. I remember putting most of the blame on MacArthur because he had a terrible intelligence corps that ignored political realities and was preoccupied with constant attacks.
MaterialCarrot -> Emperor-Commodus
Have not read it, but I know it's well regarded. Yes, what I have read on balance lays a lot of blame on MacArthur for being caught so flat footed.
Since you've read a general history book about Korea, I'd recommend On Desperate Ground. It's just about the Chosin Reservoir battles, but really puts you in the minds and bodies of the guys fighting it, as well as putting the battle in a greater strategic context. Fascinating stuff.
I haven't read it, but I know it's well received. Yes, in general, a lot of what I read accused MacArthur of being caught off guard.
Now that you've read the general history books about North Korea, I recommend Place of Despair. It's just about the battle of Chosin Lake, but it really gets you into the mind and body of the soldiers, as well as putting the battle in a larger strategic context. Fascinating.
pokefisk -> MaterialCarrot
I've seen many people mention the first book, but I'll read both. Just wonder which one should I start first?
Should I get wider picture first?
I've seen a lot of people mention the first book, but I'll read both. Just don't know which one to start with?
Shouldn't I start with a broader context?
MaterialCarrot -> pokefisk
Personally, I would start broad with the general overview, then read about Chosin Reservoir after that.
Personally, I would start with an overview of the general and then read the article about Lake Chosin.
Thank you, I have no knowledge of this war, and close to zero background for anything related. Just spent last years reading ww2,then little about soviet-Afghanistan conflict(s), then it was turn for reading up about French troops and Dien Bien Phu.
Thank you, I know nothing about this war and hardly any background knowledge of it. Having just spent a few years reading the materials of World War II, then some of the conflicts between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, it is now the turn to read about the French army and the Battle of Dien Bien Phu.
librarianhuddz -> MaterialCarrot
That book made me coooooold. Just reading it I could feel my hands starting to freeze.
That book made me feel very cold. Just reading it, I could feel my hands starting to freeze.
MaterialCarrot -> librarianhuddz
Agree 100%. I grew up in the Midwest and am familiar with cold winters, but some of those chapters made me practically miserable just to read.
Totally agreed. I grew up in the Midwest and was familiar with the cold winters, but some of the chapters were painful just to read.
Commodify -> MaterialCarrot
According to the Chinese, at peak strength they had about 1.5 million men in Korea. Peak strength for the US was 330,000. In 4 years of combat 35,000 Americans died in Korea. In the less than two years of combat that China was involved they, according to the Chinese government, sustained over 180,000 deaths, with speculation that the number could be much higher.
Good post but on this part you can't forget the South Koreans, who constituted the majority of both UN personnel and casualties. When they are thrown in, both force numbers and casualties between the Chinese and UN are far more even. More, it explains a lot of PVA success because the majority of the front was being covered by troops that were no more heavily armed than themselves.
Quoting "According to Chinese, they had about 1.5 million people at the peak of North Korea. The U.S. military strength is 330,000. In 4 years of fighting, 35,000 Americans died in North Korea. According to Chinese statistics, their death toll exceeded 180,000 in less than two years of fighting, and there is speculation that this number may be even higher. ”
Nice post, but at this point, you can't forget the South Koreans, who make up the majority of UN personnel and casualties. When they joined, the number of troops and casualties between China and the United Nations was more evenly balanced. More importantly, it also explains the success of many of the People's Volunteers, as much of the front line was covered by troops less equipped than they were.
Thtguy1289_NY -> Commodify
If you include South Koreans, then you need to include North Koreans as well. And we see an even greater casualty disparity, rather than an equalization
If you include South Koreans, then you also need to include North Koreans. What we see is a larger casualty gap, not an average.
Well, it's not like the ROK faired great in the beginning either. They lost 70k+ men before the UN even got there!!
However, South Korea did not perform very well at the beginning. Before the UN troops arrived, they lost more than 70,000 people!!
Jemnite -> MaterialCarrot
It's a bit strange to mention the logistical issues and yet cite logistics as an advantage. Supply lines for the PVA were absolutely horrendous with the rail-lines completely destroyed by the time that the PVA crossed the Yalu and the PVA had to resort pack animals and carrying much of their food and equipment with them (on foot). In addition, they were unable to transport supplies except for the dark hours of the morning/night thanks to overwhelming task force air superiority. The PVA couldn't even secure airspace above their own headquarters, which led to the death of Mao's son by airstrike. By the time the PVA launched the Third Phase Offensive, they had effectively outrun their supply lines despite only marching around 600-700 miles south of the Yalu.
There's a tendency to mistake the astounding strategic mobility of the PVA to logistics. However the ability of the PVA to shift large amounts of troops around to the complete surprise and bafflement of the UN task force was not because of logistics, but despite them. The PVA applied extremely rigorous march and discipline, and displayed superior strategic capabilities which allowed them to seize and maintain the advantage of initiative despite being in a markedly inferior logistics position.
It's a bit strange to mention logistics issues and yet take advantage of their (China's) logistics. The supply lines of the People's Volunteers were absolutely bad, the railway lines were completely destroyed when the volunteers crossed the Yalu River, and the volunteers had to take most of their food and equipment (on foot) with the help of transported livestock. In addition, due to the overwhelming air superiority of the task force, they were unable to transport supplies, and could only transport them in the early morning or in the dark hours of the night. The Volunteers were unable to even protect the airspace over their own headquarters, which led to the death of Mao's son in an air raid. When the Volunteers launched the third phase of the offensive, although they had only traveled about 600-700 miles south of the Yalu River, they had actually exceeded their supply lines.
The astonishing strategic mobility of the Volunteers is often mistaken for a logistical factor. However, the Volunteers were able to mobilize large numbers of troops, completely surprising and confusing to the United Nations contingent, not because of logistics, but despite the logistics. The Volunteers adopted extremely strict marching and discipline and demonstrated superior strategic capabilities, which enabled them to seize and maintain the advantage of taking the initiative in the event of a significant logistical disadvantage.
MaterialCarrot -> Jemnite
I don't disagree, but to understand my point, take China as it existed in 1950 and the US as it existed in 1950 and then have them fighting in Oregon, rather than Korea. A completely different situation that would afford the US an ENORMOUS advantage.
That's my point. The strategic logistical situation for the Chinese compared to the US with the war being fought on the Chinese border was highly favorable, even though on a operational level the Chinese struggled mightily with logistics.
I'm not against it, but to understand my point, let's take China in 1950 and the United States in 1950 and let them fight in Oregon instead of North Korea. A completely different situation would give the United States a huge advantage.
That's my point. Compared with the United States, China's strategic logistics situation is very favorable, although at the operational level, China has encountered huge logistical difficulties.
I think that analogy sort of falls apart when you consider that China in 1950 couldn't even make it to Japan let alone fight in Oregon. But I get your point. I just don't think it's a decisive factor in PVA performance considering it was the bare minimum for them to even enter the war.
I think the analogy is a bit untenable when you consider that China in 1950 couldn't even reach Japan, let alone fight in Oregon. But I see what you mean. I just don't think that's a decisive factor in the excellent performance of the volunteers, considering that this is even the minimum level of configuration for them to join the war.
FlashbackHistory -> MaterialCarrot
There are a lot of problems with this take.
Numbers...
The Chinese numerical advantage often gets overstated as part of the "Red Chinese Hordes" mythos. Let's look at some more relevant numbers.
During the war, the Chinese sent 2.4 million troops to Korea (1.9 million, plus another 500,000 sent as replacements), with another 500,000-600,000 militia in rear-area support roles.
During the war years, 1,789,000 million American personnel served in the Far East (mostly in Korea, with some in Japan and the Philippines). But ... the UN Command wasn't just Americans. When it came to foreign troops, there were Brits (55,000), Canadians (25,000), Turks (15,000), Australians (8,500), Filipinos (7,500), Thais (6,000), Dutchmen (5,000), Colombians (5,000), and more! On top of that, you have the massive numbers of South Koreans. Getting numbers for total ROKA and ROKMC enlistments during the war is tricky, plus overall numbers are muddled by the use of policemen and student-soldiers. But to give some idea of the manpower we're talking about consider that by July 1953, South Korea had 554,000 men in its army. At this point point, almost 25,000 of these men were serving in American and British units as KATUSAs and KATCOMs, making up as much as 10-20% of some nominally "American" units. Large numbers of Koreans were also working as porters and in other support roles. And when you look at South Korean military losses (187,000 dead is the official figure), they actually end up being comparable to China's admitted losses (180,000, although the actual number is likely higher).
UN forces and Communist forces had surprisingly comparable troop levels in-theater for much of the war. Communist forces did outnumber UN ones for much of the war, but the overall odds weren't 10:1 or 5:1 and there were plenty of periods where the odds weren't even 3:1 or 2:1. Indeed, by the time the war ended in 1953, the Chinese-North Korean side had about 1.5 million men versus 1 millon South Koreans, Americans, and other UN troops.
Logistics…
I'll just reiterate what I said the last time you tried to argue this.
In virtually all cases, UN forces were much better supplied than the Chinese. American ships alone mover over 30 million tons of cargo into Korea during the war. The entire Chinese logistical effort moved a little over 5.5 million tons. The Communists had to deal with shortages of trucks that forced them to carry a lot of tonnage with coolies and oxcarts to move. On top of that, there was constant interdiction from aircraft and warships that made daylight operations suicidal. The UNC had none of those constraints. If you look at things like the disparity between shells fired, the scale of the Chinese logistical disadvantage is blatantly obvious.
In fact, the UN supply lines for some items were much shorter than the Chinese ones. The US had the huge advantage of being able to use Japan as a staging area and production center. Everything from napalm tanks to boots were made in Japan and shipped the short distance to Korea. Meanwhile, any Soviet-made supplies had to be shipped hundreds and hundreds of miles.
The idea that the US couldn't support large numbers of troops in Asia is also pretty absurd, given that it had already supported a much, much bigger and much more active force in the area just five years earlier...
There are many problems with your view.
About "Quantity"...
As part of the rumors of a "red Chinese army," China's numerical superiority is often exaggerated. Let's take a look at some of the more relevant numbers.
During the war, China sent 2.4 million troops (1.9 million, another 500,000 as a substitute) to North Korea, with 500,000 to 600,000 militiamen providing support in the rear.
During the war, 1.789 million Americans served in the Far East (mostly in Korea, but also in Japan and the Philippines). But... The Un army is not only the Americans. Speaking of foreign troops, there are British (55,000), Canadians (25,000), Turks (15,000), Australians (8,500), Filipinos (7,500), Thais (6,000), Dutch (5,000), Colombians (5,000) and so on! In addition to this, there are a large number of Koreans. It was difficult to get the total number of South Korean troops and South Korean Marines during the war, and with the addition of police and student soldiers, the total number was very vague. But to give us an idea of the number of people we're talking about, let's look at july 1953, there were 554,000 soldiers in South Korea. At this point, about 25,000 people served in the U.S. and British forces, as an annex to the Rokk army, accounting for 10-20 percent of some nominally "U.S." troops. A large number of Koreans also work as porters and other auxiliary workers. If you look at South Korea's military losses (the official figure is 187,000 deaths), they actually end up being comparable to the losses acknowledged by China (180,000, although the actual number may be higher).
For most of the war, the level of United Nations troops and volunteers on the battlefield was strikingly equal. For most of the war, volunteers did outnumber the United Nations army, but the overall ratio was not 10:1 or 5:1, and in many cases the ratio was even less than 3:1 or 2:1. In fact, by the end of the war in 1953, there were about 1.5 million people on both sides, compared with 1 million in South Korea, the United States and other United Nations forces.
About "logistics"...
I'm just repeating what I said the last time you argued about this.
In almost all cases, the logistics of the United Nations force were much better than those of the Volunteers. During the war, U.S. ships alone carried more than 30 million tons of cargo into North Korea. The logistics volume of the entire China is slightly higher than 5.5 million tons. China has had to deal with a shortage of trucks, which has forced them to use coolies and ox carts to carry large tons of cargo. In addition, constant obstruction by aircraft and warships made it impossible to move during the day. Unaffiliated forces do not have these restrictions. If you look at the gap between the shells fired, China's logistical disadvantages are obvious.
In fact, some of the UN Army's supply lines are much shorter than China's. The United States has a huge advantage in being able to use Japan as a rallying ground and production center. Everything from napalm tanks to boots is made in Japan and then shipped to north Korea not far away. At the same time, any Soviet-made supplies had to be transported hundreds of miles away.
The idea that the United States cannot support a large number of troops in Asia is also quite absurd, because just 5 years ago, the United States already supported a much larger and more active army in the region...
Wenuven -> MaterialCarrot
Allied overconfidence. The US (MacArthur in particular) ignored clear
indications that the Chinese were going to intervene. This hubris
resulted in US/SK/Allied forces being caught off balance when the
Chinese attacked. Much of the second half of the Korean War was the
Allies recovering from being knocked off balance.
I'd argue that the hubris was thinking he could win the PR war sacrificing American lives for the sake of drawing the US into a full scale war with China a la Thermopylae and Sparta/Persia. Believing that Americans wouldn't swallow losing to their "inferiors".
Remember this is the generation of military leaders that bought into their own divinity and racial / sociocultural divides were still very real.
"The United States , and MacArthur in particular — ignored clear indications that China was prepared to intervene." This arrogance caused the U.S./South Korea/Allies to lose their balance when China attacked. Much of the second half of the Korean War was spent recovering from a disrupted equilibrium. ”
I think his arrogance is to think that he can win a PR war and sacrifice American lives in order to draw the United States into an all-out war with China, like the Battle of Spa Pass and the Spartan/Persian War. It is believed that Americans will not tolerate losing to someone "inferior" to them.
Remember, this generation of military leaders is convinced of their own divinity, and the racial/socio-cultural divide remains very real.
CanadaJack -> Wenuven
This is also the particular military leader who fought tooth and nail to just nuke them.
It also refers to the military leader who is desperate to attack them with nuclear weapons.
PandaBearShenyu -> MaterialCarrot
Numbers of course.
Uh, no. I can't believe this hUMAn WAvE talking point got dug back out of the grave where it belonged.
No the Chinese did not have "tremendous strength of numbers", nor did they ever have 1.5 million troops in Korea in remotely relevant terms. When you have basically no logistics, you need to field a much larger number of troops because most of them will be in transit. See battle of Shanghai where on paper the KMT fielded 3-4 times the number of troops as the IJA but in actual combat the number of actual fighting KMT troops were a fraction of the IJA's deployment where it mattered because most of the KMT troops were in transit.
When you have actual logistics, you need to field much fewer troops on paper to match your adversary in actual combat.
The peak PVA deployment in the area of fighting is at best comparable to UN forces. The Chinese never had the logistics to support a prolonged deployment of troops in combat zones remotely close to the UN due to the latter enjoying complete air superiority.
The PVA employed very sophisticated short attacks that used multiple highly mobile small squads to attack UN positions from multiple directions to seem like large numbers, they also use this to cut off UN positions from each other.
Quote "Of course it's a quantity..."
Uh, no, I can't believe this idea of "man-sea tactics" was dug out of the grave where it was supposed to be.
No, China doesn't have a "huge numerical superiority," and they have never had 1.5 million troops stationed in North Korea. When you're basically out of logistics, you need to send more troops because most of them are in transit. Looking at the Battle of Shanghai, the Kuomintang deployed 3-4 times the strength of the Japanese army on paper, but in actual combat, the actual deployment of the Kuomintang troops was only a small part of the Japanese Imperial Army, because most of the Kuomintang troops were transported.
When you have actual logistical support, you need to throw fewer troops on paper to compete with your opponents in real combat.
The peak of the deployment of volunteers in combat areas is at best comparable to that of United Nations forces. Because the United Nations enjoys complete air superiority, China has never had logistical support for the long-term deployment of troops in theaters close to the United Nations.
The Volunteers used very sophisticated short assault attacks, using multiple highly mobile squads to attack United Nations positions from multiple directions, which looked like they were numerous, and they also used this method to cut ties between United Nations positions.
This is complete intellectual dishonesty or hopefully just pure ignorance. UN airplanes bombed everything that moved in Korea, and that is not an exaggeration, every village, road, town, city, in North Korea was bombed and up to 30% of the North Korean civilian population were killed. Of the 7000 trucks the CHinese had, they lost more than half of that in the first month. They had no logistics lines. The vast majority of Chinese casualties came from starvation, freezing, and disease, not combat.
After the first months, the Chinese had no ability to launch any large scale assault or change the tide of the war. Even then holding the 38th parallel for 3 years is nothing short of a miracle. Throwing literal rocks down a mountain slope at American troops was not at all uncommon for the PVA and many units straight up had no ammo and had their bayonets permanently attached.
Reference to "Logistics." Despite what I've said about China's logistical problems (and they certainly have them), the Korean War was fought right next to China, and outside of South Korea, the United States and most of its allies fought at the end of a logistics chain thousands of miles long. The United States has used its powerful firepower superiority very effectively, but in reality, it is unlikely that the United States will send millions of American troops to North Korea as China did. ”
This statement is entirely academic dishonesty, or hopefully just pure ignorance. United Nations aircraft bombed everything in North Korea, and it is no exaggeration to say that every village, road, town, and city in North Korea was bombed, and as many as 30 percent of the civilian population was killed. Of the 7,000 trucks owned in China, they lost more than half in the first month. They have no logistical support. The vast majority of casualties Chinese came from hunger, cold and disease, not from fighting.
After the first few months, China did not have the ability to launch any large-scale offensive or change the tide of war. Even so, it is a miracle to maintain the three-eighth line for up to three years. Throwing stones at U.S. troops from hillsides was not uncommon for volunteers, many of whom simply ran out of ammunition and carried bayonets with them.
The Chinese had no relevant logistics capability. Being closer to China doesn't mean you can use some kind of magic anime power to will supplies across hundreds of miles of a country with no functioning bridges, roads, rail that are being patrolled by the biggest deployment of U.S. air power ever 24/7. Chinese troops famously only ever moved at night when American planes couldn't see them. This is not make believe land where you point to a map with your crayon and go "this close, have supply, this far, no supply."
The intellectual dishonesty part comes from the wilful ignorance of how logistics works, we could ship a birthday cake into Germany during world war II and supply our troops better than Nazi troops in their own homeland. Distance is not a factor when you:
* Have the supplies
* Have the production
* Can transport all this shit to the field of operation.
The only disadvantage would be the opening of the war if you needed the first shipments to arrive, but after that, your apparently disadvantage from distance is functionally non-existent. Oh and we also outproduced the Chinese at that point to a factor of 300 to 1, more than the disparity with the Japanese by multiples.
China does not have the associated logistical capabilities. Being close to China doesn't mean you can use some sort of magical anime power to supply hundreds of miles in a country without bridges, roads, and railroads, and with the largest U.S. air power patrolling around the clock. As we all know, the Chinese military only operates at night when American planes can't see it. It's not like you point to a map with a crayon and say"So close, with supplies, so far away, without supplies." ”
Part of the academic dishonesty came from a deliberate neglect of logistics, and during World War II, we could have shipped birthday cakes to Germany to provide our army with better supplies than the Nazis had in their homeland. Distance is not a factor when you:
* With supplies,
* Productive,
* Ability to transport these items to the battlefield.
The only disadvantage is that at the beginning of the war, if you need the first shipment to arrive, but after that, the obvious disadvantage in terms of distance is gone. Oh, and at that time, we also surpassed China's production, reaching 300 to 1, which was several times larger than the gap with Japan.
UN on the other hand had no threat whatsoever to their logistics lines and were presented with none of the issues. The Chinese had an understanding that they basically had 20 minutes to fight before the UN troops basically erected a wall of flame around their positions.
Your argument seems to imply that the Chinese performed well because they were "politically motivated" and "had tremendous numbers", had no logistics when you wanted to talk down about them and suddenly had logistics when you needed them to seem like a credible threat that the UN overcame.
The real reason is:
Yes, the PLA troops are extremely motivated, and PLA doctrine to this day is to be hyper disciplined and to be extremely aggressive, much more so than their enemies in combat.
The PLA just came off of fighting multiple wars with ample experience in guerrilla fighting against the Japanese, and field battles including water crossing against the KMT. Their elite troops were comparable to alpines troops in terms of their ability to fighting in difficult terrain and harsh weather.
insane levels of discipline and political purity since those that weren't died during the long march, and as you said, the Chinese gauged correctly that allowing the U.S. to occupy all of Korea was an existential threat and they just finished their last century of humiliation from foreign invaders.
Having big numbers and being politically motivated don't win you wars alone, sorry to say but that wasn't the case since World War I when everyone found out the hard way. The Chinese were just excellent, albeit severely under and sometimes un-equipped and supplied warfighters.
On the other hand, the logistics line of the United Nations is free of threats and has not encountered any problems. Chinese understood that they basically only had 20 minutes of fighting time before the UN put up a wall of fire around their positions.
Your argument seems to imply that China excels because they are "politically motivated," "numerous," and they have no logistical support when you want to belittle them, and when you need them to make them look like a credible threat that the United Nations has overcome, they suddenly have logistical support.
The real reasons are:
Yes, the morale of the Chinese People's Liberation Army was very high, and to this day, the creed of the People's Liberation Army is still disciplined and extremely aggressive, even more than their enemies in battle.
The Platon had just finished many wars at that time and had rich experience in anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare, as well as field combat experience against the Kuomintang, including the four crossings of Chishui. Their elite units were able to fight in difficult terrain and bad weather conditions to match those of the Alps.
As you said, Chinese correctly judged that allowing the United States to occupy all of Korea was an existential threat, and they had just come to an end to a century of humiliation from foreign invaders, so their discipline and political purity had reached an unprecedented level.
A large number of people and political motivation alone do not allow you to win a war, sorry to say, but this has not been the case since the First World War, when everyone went through a difficult process. Chinese is excellent, despite a severe shortage of supplies and sometimes even a lack of equipment and supplies for combatants.
MightyVanguard -> MaterialCarrot
Adding into the logistical issues, the Chinese sent into Korea weren't as mechanized as the allied troops, and had access to the north Koreans who knew mountain paths that could be traversed on foot, but not easily with vehicles. With these advantages, they could march men on these paths past the allies.
Aside from logistical issues, the Chinese troops sent to North Korea were not as mechanized as the Allies, had access to the North Koreans, and they knew the mountain roads they could cross on foot, but the vehicles were not easy to pass. With these advantages, they could march on these mountain roads and bypass the Allies.
Commodify
The single most important factor was terrain. Korea at the time was mostly forested. The PVA's victory in Korea was neither the first nor the most impressive victory of light infantry against a more heavily armed force in the forests. The Japanese and Finns had done even better as far as loss ratio was concerned ten years earlier. The terrain restricted the mobility of the round-bound Americans. It forced tanks to travel in column, and the PVA could destroy the columns by disabling the front and rear tanks. Forests further reduced aerial reconnaissance potential, safeguarded the PVA from airstrikes, and reduced visibility in general. That allowed the PVA to creep up on UN forces and attack at short distances, where artillery bombardment would lead to friendly fire.
Next, the UN's firepower advantage only applied to limited segments of the front. The majority of UN troops were South Korean, and they were no more heavily armed than the Chinese.
Third, the Americans suffered from maladaptive SOP. While the Marines (those of whom who had actually seen combat in the Pacific, that is) had experience with "short attacks" through fighting the Japanese, the army was used to big conventional battles in Europe. More, the marines had only defended against Japanese attacks in the confines of an island, with overwhelming naval fire support available at any time. They rarely had to consider the threat of a flanking attack, an envelopment, or a deep penetration into their rear areas. They further always were numerically superior to the Japanese, while in Korea the Chinese usually had numerical superiority. The end result was an American army that had no idea how to counter an enemy whose basic operational method was to leverage vegetation, dead space, night, and bad weather to attack at short distances. It preferred to create strongpoints along roads - what one would do if resisting a German offensive - instead of contesting the surrounding forests and mountains. It wasn't until late in the war that Ridgeway was able to create a geographically sound defensive line.
In Korean war histories much noise has been made about MacArthur's "stupidity" in pushing beyond the Pyongyang chokepoint and the brilliance of Chinese tactics, but the reality is that the UN could have won the war despite both those things. Chinese SOP was not impossible to counter, the US army of 1950 simply had all the wrong ideas of how to fight an unconventional enemy.
One of the most important factors is the terrain. Much of North Korea at the time was forested. The Victory of the Volunteers in Korea was neither the first nor the most impressive victory of light infantry against heavily armed troops in the forest. The Japanese and Finns did better in terms of loss rates a decade ago. The terrain limited the maneuverability of the Americans. Tanks were forced to march in columns, and the Volunteers could destroy the columns by paralyzing the tanks in front and behind. The forest further reduced the capabilities of reconnaissance aircraft, protected the Volunteers from air raids, and reduced visibility overall. This allowed the Volunteers to quietly approach the United Nations forces for short-range assaults, and shelling at this distance would result in the accidental wounding of friendly forces.
Secondly, the firepower superiority of the United Nations applies only to a limited part of the front line. Most of the UN troops are South Koreans, and they have no more weapons than Chinese.
Third, Americans are subject to unsuitable standard operating procedures (SOPs). While the Marine Corps,some of whom actually fought in the Pacific Theater, had experience with "short assaults" in battles with the Japanese, the Army had become accustomed to conducting large-scale conventional combat in Europe. What's more, the Marines defended against Japanese attacks within only one island range, and were overwhelmingly supported by naval fire at all times. They rarely consider flanking attacks, encirclements, or threats from the rear. They were always numerically superior to the Japanese, and in Korea, Chinese were usually numerically superior. The end result was that U.S. troops did not know how to deal with the enemy, and their basic method of combat was to use vegetation, dead ends, night and bad weather to conduct close-range attacks. It preferred to establish strongholds along the road, if it had resisted a German offensive, rather than fighting for the surrounding forests and mountains. It was not until the end of the war that Ridgway established a geographically reliable defensive line.
In the history of the Korean War, there has been much discussion about MacArthur's "stupidity" of crossing Pyongyang's throat and China's superb tactics, but the reality is that despite both cases, the United Nations could have won the war. China's standard operating procedures are not insurmountable, and the U.S. military in 1950 simply had the wrong idea of how to fight an unconventional enemy.
MaterialCarrot -> Commodify
Good post, I would just add on the terrain aspect is that Korea was (and of course still is) extremely mountainous. So as well as being heavily forested, the mountainous terrain further restricted and inhibited US forces that were built around firepower, mechanization, and mobility. The terrain gave a leg up to light infantry.
Great post, I want to add a bit about the terrain aspect, South Korea was (and of course now) very mountainous. Thus, in addition to being densely forested, the mountainous terrain further limited and inhibited the U.S. forces built around firepower, mechanization, and mobility. This terrain favors light infantry.
YooesaeWatchdog1 -> Commodify
Another thing to note is that the US consisted of 40%+ global GDP at that point while China was one of the poorest countries in the world on par with Congo today. this sort of upset would be like Afghanistan fighting the US to a standstill.
It is also worth noting that the United States accounted for more than 40% of the world's GDP at that time, and China was one of the poorest countries in the world, on par with the Congo today. It's as uncomfortable as Afghanistan's battle with the United States is at an impasse.
civver3 -> Commodify
the US army of 1950 simply had all the wrong ideas of how to fight an unconventional enemy
Foreshadowing the Vietnam War, to simplify it excessively. Makes me think generations often have to relearn how to fight wars.
To quote " The U.S. military in 1950 simply had the wrong idea of how to fight an unconventional enemy. ”
Foreshadowing the Vietnam War, it was oversimplified. It strikes me that every generation often has to relearn how to fight.
FlashbackHistory
I've written answers here and here that get into this issue. The gist:
The Chinese achieved strategic surprise in the winter of 1950 and were able to launch two major offensives on largely unaware UN forces in northern Korea. The Chinese did some smart things to achieve these surprises, like mass camouflage and deception efforts. They also benefited from the willful ignorance of MacArthur and intel chief Charles Willoughby regarding the Chinese buildup on the Yalu. The Chinese also benefited from two limitations to UN air reconnaissance: Washington's ban on flights north of the Yalu and the pause on RB-29 flights caused by the appearance of Soviet-piloted MiG-15s in November 1950.
I've written down answers to this question in many places to the effect that:
China completed a strategic raid in the winter of 1950 and launched two large-scale offensives in North Korea against little-unwitting U.N. forces. In order to achieve these surprises, Chinese did some clever things, such as large-scale camouflage and set-up. They benefited from MacArthur and Intelligence Chief Charles Willoughby's deliberate disregard for China's build-up on the Yalu River. It also benefited from two restrictions on U.N. reconnaissance aircraft: Washington's ban on flights north of the Yalu River, and the advent of Soviet-piloted MiG-15 fighter jets in November 1950, which led to a suspension of RB-29 flights.
The Chinese were sprinters, not marathon runners. They could achieve spectacular short-term successes ... but they often couldn't follow up those successes. During the mobile phase of the war in 1950-1951, Chinese logistics took months to stockpile the supplies that would be exhausted in a week-long offensive. With better sustainment, the Chinese might well have wiped out UN forces in November-December 1950 or April 1951.
At the tactical level, the Chinese were generally good about playing to their strengths and their enemies' weaknesses. They often fought at night and used the cover of terrain and darkness to reduce the efficacy of UN heavy weapons and airpower. They combined frontal attacks with flanking pincers to pin and annihilate entire enemy units.
Chinese are sprinters, not marathon runners. They can achieve amazing success in a short period of time... But these successes are often not sustained. During the war maneuver phase from 1950 to 1951, Chinese logistics spent months stockpiling supplies that were depleted during a week-long offensive. With better logistical support, China would probably have wiped out uncommunicated forces from November to December 1950 or April 1951.
At the tactical level, Chinese are usually adept at exploiting their own strengths and enemies' weaknesses. They often fought at night and used terrain and dark cover to reduce the effectiveness of THE United Nations's heavy weapons and air power. They combine frontal attacks with flanking pinch attacks to lock in and destroy entire enemy forces.
panick21
Since there are so many experts here, what if the US had captured Pyongyang and then established defensive lines across Korea. This would have lead to North Korea basically being a rump state right? Unlikely that China could have dialoged them from there.
Now that there are so many experts here, what if the U.S. occupied Pyongyang and then established a defensive line throughout North Korea? That would lead to North Korea essentially becoming a ruined state, right? China is unlikely to be there to talk to them.
Trick_Ad3016 -> panick21
This is basically what every Korea expert since the Korean War says that the US and ROK should have done. PVA would not have been able to overrun this defense line, and PRC might not even have intervened. And a rump NK would absolutely have fallen after the Cold War, and we would be living in a world with a reunified and peaceful Korea.
Instead we have a Korea where its northern half and nuclear-armed on top of that.
I guess hindsight is 20/20.
That's basically what every North Korea expert since the Korean War has said the United States and South Korea should do. It was impossible for the volunteers to cross this defensive line, and China might not even intervene. After the end of the Cold War, a broken North Korea will absolutely fall, and we will live in a world of a unified and peaceful Korean Peninsula.
Instead, we are dealing with a nuclear-armed North Korea in the northern half.
I think it's easy to do things after zhuge liang.
Plethorian
I think even more crucial was the fact that in the initial push south the North captured tremendous amounts of US arms and other supplies. We had to basically start from scratch, while the North could use our own arms against us.
I think it's more important that during the initial southward advance, North Korea captured a large amount of U.S. weapons and other supplies. We basically had to start from scratch, and North Korea could use our own weapons against us.
AgoraiosBum
China had millions of veterans who had been fighting since 1937 - both against the Japanese and in the civil war - and were able to achieve strategic surprise and highly favorable ratios in its attack of 1950. After that point, China consistently had more troops, but the Allies had better supplies and logistics, and it was generally a stalemate.
China has millions of veterans who have been fighting since 1937, including the War of Resistance Against Japan and the Civil War, and were able to accomplish strategic assaults and highly favorable rates in the 1950 offensive. Since then, China has had more troops, but the Allies have better supplies and logistics, and overall it is a stalemate.
Asahi220
PLA tactics, US arrogance, Surprise and Terrain
UN forces were already isolated from each other due to the terrain of North Korea and as units were already detached from each other and had very little ability to support if one unit came under attack this played into Chinese tactics perfectly as their modus operandi was to infiltrate and isolate individual units and defeat them in detail while simultaneously destroying rear command.
Add to the cluster the UN forces were basically in victory formation and did not keep it secret on how each unit was deployed and where so PLA forces new exactly where to attack. So you have these isolated units on cold rocky hills and mountains already hoping to be home for Christmas suddenly surrounded with rear command areas also under heavy attack. Then the PLA would set up ambush points a long lines of retreat and thus you get maximum casualties.
Suffice to say the US came away taking the wrong lessons from the conflict. The US took away that as long as there was no surprise and tight coordination between units could be maintained firepower would still win the day. Also to be disproved in Vietnam
The tactics of the People's Liberation Army, the arrogance of the United States, raids and terrain
Because of the terrain in North Korea, the UN forces have been isolated from each other, and the forces have been separated from each other, and if one force is attacked, the UN forces have little support capability, which is fully in line with Chinese tactics, because their way of fighting is to infiltrate and isolate individual forces and defeat them in an all-round way, while destroying the rear command.
In addition, the United Nations forces were largely in a victorious formation and there was no secrecy about how and where each force would be deployed, so the Volunteers knew the exact location of the attack. So you have these isolated troops on cold rocky hills and mountains that have hoped to go home for Christmas, suddenly surrounded and the rear command area is also under heavy attack. The volunteers then set up ambush points to form a long retreat line so that you get the most casualties.
It can be said that the United States has learned the wrong lesson from this conflict. The United States believes that firepower superiority can still prevail as long as it is unexpected and close coordination between forces is maintained. This was also overturned in Vietnam.