闆門店停戰協定的簽署
MaterialCarrot
Some thoughts that come to mind:
Numbers of course. The Chinese attacked US/UN forces with tremendous strength of numbers. According to the Chinese, at peak strength they had about 1.5 million men in Korea. Peak strength for the US was 330,000. In 4 years of combat 35,000 Americans died in Korea. In the less than two years of combat that China was involved they, according to the Chinese government, sustained over 180,000 deaths, with speculation that the number could be much higher.
Other than material and logistical inferiority, the Chinese army fought very well and were generally well led. Chinese soldiers were largely very motivated and able to withstand much privation, and were excellent at infiltration and close infantry combat.
Allied overconfidence. The US (MacArthur in particular) ignored clear indications that the Chinese were going to intervene. This hubris resulted in US/SK/Allied forces being caught off balance when the Chinese attacked. Much of the second half of the Korean War was the Allies recovering from being knocked off balance.
Logistics. Despite what I said about Chinese logistics problems (and they definitely had them), the Korean War was fought right next to China, whereas outside of SK, the US and most of its allies were fighting at the end of a several thousand mile long logistics chain. The US had and used very effectively it's massive firepower advantage, but in no reality could the US put millions of US troops in Korea the way the Chinese could walk them in.
Political motivation. Related to the point above, China viewed the Korean War as directly related to its interests, perhaps even an existential threat. The US and Allied reasons for being there were much more tenuous. Even if the US could have put a million soldiers in Korea as I wrote above, there's no way in hell the American public would have supported it. The US Administration was under constant domestic political pressure to keep US involvement in the Korean War limited, and that's what they did. This was a war that in the US largely nobody wanted. There's a reason it to this day it is referred to as "The Forgotten War."
In Mortal Combat: Korea, by Tolland is a great overview of the war. On Desperate Ground, by Sides is an excellent and riveting history of the US fighting China at the Chosin Reservoir.
我腦海中浮現了一些想法：
當然是數量。中國人以巨大的兵力攻擊美國/聯合國軍隊。根據中國人的說法，他們在北韓高峰期的時候有大約150萬人。而美國的最高兵力為33萬人。在4年的戰鬥中，35000名美國人死在了北韓。根據中國的統計，在參與不到兩年的戰鬥中，他們死亡人數超過了18萬，人們猜測這個數字可能會更高。
除了物資和後勤方面的劣勢之外，中國軍隊打得很好，總體來說上司得很好。中國士兵在很大程度上積極性很高，能夠承受大部分的困難，并且在滲透和近距離步兵作戰方面非常出色。
盟軍的過度自信。美國(尤其是麥克阿瑟)忽視了中國準備進行幹預的明确迹象。這種傲慢導緻美國/南韓/盟軍在中國進攻時失去平衡。北韓戰争後半期的大部分時間是盟軍從被打亂的平衡中恢複過來。
後勤。盡管我說過中國的後勤問題(他們肯定存在這些問題)，但北韓戰争就在中國旁邊打，而在南韓之外，美國及其大多數盟友都在幾千英裡長的後勤鍊的末端打。美國曾非常有效地利用了它的強大火力優勢，但在現實中，美國絕不可能像中國那樣向北韓派遣數百萬美軍。
政治動機。與上述觀點相關的是，中國認為北韓戰争與其利益直接相關，甚至可能是一種生存威脅。美國和盟軍在那裡的理由要薄弱許多。即使美國可以像我上面說的那樣在南韓部署百萬士兵，美國公衆也絕對不會支援的。美國政府不斷受到國内政治壓力，要求限制美國參與北韓戰争，他們就是這麼做的。這是一場在美國基本上沒有人想要的戰争。這場戰争至今仍被稱為“被遺忘的戰争”是有原因的。
在《殊死搏鬥：北韓戰争》一書中，托蘭對這場戰争進行了精彩的概述。《絕望之地》講述了美國在長津湖與中國作戰的精彩而引人入勝的曆史。
Emperor-Commodus -> MaterialCarrot
How would you rank The Coldest Winter by David Halberstam? I read it a long time ago and was thinking about re-reading. IIRC he puts much of the blame on MacArthur for having a terrible intelligence corps and ignoring political realities in favor of constantly being on the offensive.
你如何評價大衛-哈爾伯斯塔姆的《最寒冷的冬天》？我很久以前讀過這本書，現在正考慮重讀。我記得他把大部分責任歸咎于麥克阿瑟，因為他有一個糟糕的情報團，無視政治現實，隻顧着不斷發動進攻。
MaterialCarrot -> Emperor-Commodus
Have not read it, but I know it's well regarded. Yes, what I have read on balance lays a lot of blame on MacArthur for being caught so flat footed.
Since you've read a general history book about Korea, I'd recommend On Desperate Ground. It's just about the Chosin Reservoir battles, but really puts you in the minds and bodies of the guys fighting it, as well as putting the battle in a greater strategic context. Fascinating stuff.
我沒有讀過，但我知道它很受好評。是的，總的來說，我讀到的很多内容都指責麥克阿瑟被搞得措手不及。
既然你已經讀過了關于北韓的通史書，我推薦《絕望之地》。它隻是關于長津湖的戰役，但真正讓你進入士兵的思想和身體，以及把戰鬥放在一個更大的戰略背景下。令人着迷。
pokefisk -> MaterialCarrot
I've seen many people mention the first book, but I'll read both. Just wonder which one should I start first?
Should I get wider picture first?
我看到很多人提到第一本書，但我兩本都會讀。隻是不知道應該先從哪一本開始？
我是不是應該先了解一下更廣闊的背景？
MaterialCarrot -> pokefisk
Personally, I would start broad with the general overview, then read about Chosin Reservoir after that.
就我個人而言，我會從總體概述開始，然後閱讀有關長津湖的文章。
Thank you, I have no knowledge of this war, and close to zero background for anything related. Just spent last years reading ww2,then little about soviet-Afghanistan conflict(s), then it was turn for reading up about French troops and Dien Bien Phu.
謝謝你，我對這場戰争一無所知，而且幾乎沒有任何相關的背景知識。剛剛花了幾年時間閱讀二戰的資料，然後是閱讀一些蘇聯和阿富汗的沖突，現在輪到閱讀關于法國軍隊和奠邊府戰役的資料了。
librarianhuddz -> MaterialCarrot
That book made me coooooold. Just reading it I could feel my hands starting to freeze.
那本書讓我感覺非常冷。隻是讀着它，我就能感覺到我的手開始結冰了。
MaterialCarrot -> librarianhuddz
Agree 100%. I grew up in the Midwest and am familiar with cold winters, but some of those chapters made me practically miserable just to read.
完全同意。我在中西部長大，熟悉寒冷的冬天，但是其中的一些章節僅僅是讀起來，就讓我覺得很痛苦。
Commodify -> MaterialCarrot
According to the Chinese, at peak strength they had about 1.5 million men in Korea. Peak strength for the US was 330,000. In 4 years of combat 35,000 Americans died in Korea. In the less than two years of combat that China was involved they, according to the Chinese government, sustained over 180,000 deaths, with speculation that the number could be much higher.
Good post but on this part you can't forget the South Koreans, who constituted the majority of both UN personnel and casualties. When they are thrown in, both force numbers and casualties between the Chinese and UN are far more even. More, it explains a lot of PVA success because the majority of the front was being covered by troops that were no more heavily armed than themselves.
引用“根據中國人的說法，他們在北韓高峰期的時候有大約150萬人。而美國的最高兵力為33萬人。在4年的戰鬥中，35000名美國人死在了北韓。根據中國的統計，在參與不到兩年的戰鬥中，他們死亡人數超過了18萬，人們猜測這個數字可能會更高。”
不錯的文章，但是在這一點上，你不能忘了南韓人，他們在聯合國人員和傷亡人員中占大多數。當他們加入進來的時候，中國和聯合國之間的軍隊數量和傷亡人數更加平均。更重要的是，這也解釋了許多人民志願軍的成功，因為前線的大部分地區都被裝備不如他們多的部隊所覆寫。
Thtguy1289_NY -> Commodify
If you include South Koreans, then you need to include North Koreans as well. And we see an even greater casualty disparity, rather than an equalization
如果你包括南韓人，那麼你也需要包括北韓人。我們看到的是更大的傷亡差距，而不是平均的。
Well, it's not like the ROK faired great in the beginning either. They lost 70k+ men before the UN even got there!!
不過，南韓在一開始也表現得不是很好。在聯合國軍到達之前，他們就損失了7萬多人！！
Jemnite -> MaterialCarrot
It's a bit strange to mention the logistical issues and yet cite logistics as an advantage. Supply lines for the PVA were absolutely horrendous with the rail-lines completely destroyed by the time that the PVA crossed the Yalu and the PVA had to resort pack animals and carrying much of their food and equipment with them (on foot). In addition, they were unable to transport supplies except for the dark hours of the morning/night thanks to overwhelming task force air superiority. The PVA couldn't even secure airspace above their own headquarters, which led to the death of Mao's son by airstrike. By the time the PVA launched the Third Phase Offensive, they had effectively outrun their supply lines despite only marching around 600-700 miles south of the Yalu.
There's a tendency to mistake the astounding strategic mobility of the PVA to logistics. However the ability of the PVA to shift large amounts of troops around to the complete surprise and bafflement of the UN task force was not because of logistics, but despite them. The PVA applied extremely rigorous march and discipline, and displayed superior strategic capabilities which allowed them to seize and maintain the advantage of initiative despite being in a markedly inferior logistics position.
提到後勤問題，卻又把他們(中國)的後勤作為優勢，這有點奇怪。人民志願軍的補給線絕對是糟糕的，鐵路線在志願軍穿過鴨綠江時就被完全摧毀，志願軍不得不借助馱運的牲口，帶着他們的大部分食物和裝置(步行)。此外，由于特遣部隊壓倒性的空中優勢，他們無法運輸物資，隻能在清晨或夜晚的黑暗時間運輸。志願軍甚至無法保護他們自己總部上空的空域，這導緻了毛的兒子在空襲中犧牲。當志願軍發動第三階段攻勢時，盡管他們隻是在鴨綠江以南行進了大約600-700英裡，但實際上已經超出了他們的補給線。
人們往往會把志願軍驚人的戰略機動性誤認為是後勤因素。然而，志願軍能夠調動大量部隊，讓聯合國特遣部隊感到完全意外和困惑，不是因為有後勤，而是盡管後勤這樣。志願軍采用了極其嚴格的行軍和紀律，并顯示出優越的戰略能力，這使他們能夠在後勤處于明顯劣勢的情況下，還能抓住并保持主動的優勢。
MaterialCarrot -> Jemnite
I don't disagree, but to understand my point, take China as it existed in 1950 and the US as it existed in 1950 and then have them fighting in Oregon, rather than Korea. A completely different situation that would afford the US an ENORMOUS advantage.
That's my point. The strategic logistical situation for the Chinese compared to the US with the war being fought on the Chinese border was highly favorable, even though on a operational level the Chinese struggled mightily with logistics.
我不反對，但是為了了解我的觀點，我們就拿1950年的中國和1950年的美國來說，然後讓他們在俄勒岡州而不是在北韓作戰。一個完全不同的局面将給美國帶來巨大的優勢。
這就是我的觀點。與美國相比，中國的戰略後勤形勢非常有利，盡管在作戰層面上，中國在後勤方面遇到了巨大的困難。
I think that analogy sort of falls apart when you consider that China in 1950 couldn't even make it to Japan let alone fight in Oregon. But I get your point. I just don't think it's a decisive factor in PVA performance considering it was the bare minimum for them to even enter the war.
我認為，當你考慮到1950年的中國甚至無法到達日本，更不用說在俄勒岡州戰鬥了，這個類比有點站不住腳。但我明白你的意思。我隻是不認為這是志願軍出色表現的一個決定性因素，考慮到這甚至是他們加入戰争的最低程度的配置。
FlashbackHistory -> MaterialCarrot
There are a lot of problems with this take.
Numbers...
The Chinese numerical advantage often gets overstated as part of the "Red Chinese Hordes" mythos. Let's look at some more relevant numbers.
During the war, the Chinese sent 2.4 million troops to Korea (1.9 million, plus another 500,000 sent as replacements), with another 500,000-600,000 militia in rear-area support roles.
During the war years, 1,789,000 million American personnel served in the Far East (mostly in Korea, with some in Japan and the Philippines). But ... the UN Command wasn't just Americans. When it came to foreign troops, there were Brits (55,000), Canadians (25,000), Turks (15,000), Australians (8,500), Filipinos (7,500), Thais (6,000), Dutchmen (5,000), Colombians (5,000), and more! On top of that, you have the massive numbers of South Koreans. Getting numbers for total ROKA and ROKMC enlistments during the war is tricky, plus overall numbers are muddled by the use of policemen and student-soldiers. But to give some idea of the manpower we're talking about consider that by July 1953, South Korea had 554,000 men in its army. At this point point, almost 25,000 of these men were serving in American and British units as KATUSAs and KATCOMs, making up as much as 10-20% of some nominally "American" units. Large numbers of Koreans were also working as porters and in other support roles. And when you look at South Korean military losses (187,000 dead is the official figure), they actually end up being comparable to China's admitted losses (180,000, although the actual number is likely higher).
UN forces and Communist forces had surprisingly comparable troop levels in-theater for much of the war. Communist forces did outnumber UN ones for much of the war, but the overall odds weren't 10:1 or 5:1 and there were plenty of periods where the odds weren't even 3:1 or 2:1. Indeed, by the time the war ended in 1953, the Chinese-North Korean side had about 1.5 million men versus 1 millon South Koreans, Americans, and other UN troops.
Logistics…
I'll just reiterate what I said the last time you tried to argue this.
In virtually all cases, UN forces were much better supplied than the Chinese. American ships alone mover over 30 million tons of cargo into Korea during the war. The entire Chinese logistical effort moved a little over 5.5 million tons. The Communists had to deal with shortages of trucks that forced them to carry a lot of tonnage with coolies and oxcarts to move. On top of that, there was constant interdiction from aircraft and warships that made daylight operations suicidal. The UNC had none of those constraints. If you look at things like the disparity between shells fired, the scale of the Chinese logistical disadvantage is blatantly obvious.
In fact, the UN supply lines for some items were much shorter than the Chinese ones. The US had the huge advantage of being able to use Japan as a staging area and production center. Everything from napalm tanks to boots were made in Japan and shipped the short distance to Korea. Meanwhile, any Soviet-made supplies had to be shipped hundreds and hundreds of miles.
The idea that the US couldn't support large numbers of troops in Asia is also pretty absurd, given that it had already supported a much, much bigger and much more active force in the area just five years earlier...
你這個觀點有很多問題。
關于“數量”...
作為“紅色中國大軍”謠言的一部分，中國的人數優勢常常被誇大。讓我們來看看一些更相關的數字。
戰争期間，中國向北韓派遣了240萬軍隊(190萬，另外50萬作為替補)，還有50萬至60萬民兵在後方提供支援。
戰争期間，有178.9萬美國人在遠東服役(大部分在北韓，還有一些在日本和菲律賓)。但是... 聯合國軍不隻有美國人。說到外國軍隊，有英國人(5.5萬人)、加拿大人(2.5萬人)、土耳其人(1.5萬人)、澳洲人(8,500人)、菲律賓人(7,500人)、泰國人(6,000人)、荷蘭人(5,000人)、哥倫比亞人(5,000人)等等！除此之外，還有大量的南韓人。要獲得戰争期間南韓軍隊和南韓海軍陸戰隊的總人數是很困難的，再加上警察和學生兵，總人數就很模糊了。但是為了讓我們對我們正在談論的人數有所了解，我們來看看1953年7月，南韓有55.4萬名軍人。在這一點上，大約有2.5萬人在美國和英國部隊服役，作為附編韓軍，占一些名義上的“美國”軍隊的10-20%。大量南韓人也從事搬運工和其他輔助工作。如果你看看南韓的軍事損失(官方數字是18.7萬人死亡)，他們實際上最終與中國承認的損失（18萬人，盡管實際數字可能更高）相當。
在這場戰争的大部分時間裡，聯合國部隊和志願軍在戰場上的兵力水準驚人地相當。在戰争的大部分時間裡，志願軍的數量确實超過了聯合國軍隊，但是總體比率不是10:1或5:1，而且有很多時候比率甚至不到3:1或2:1。事實上，到1953年戰争結束時，中朝雙方約有150萬人，而南韓、美國和其他聯合國部隊有100萬人。
關于“後勤”...
我隻是重複一下上次你們争論這個問題時，我說過的話。
在幾乎所有情況下，聯合國部隊的後勤都比志願軍好得多。在戰争期間，僅美國艦船就運送了超過3000萬噸的貨物進入北韓。整個中國的後勤運輸量略高于550萬噸。中國不得不處理卡車短缺的問題，這迫使他們用苦力和牛車搬運大量噸位的貨物。此外，飛機和軍艦不斷的阻攔使得在白天無法行動。聯合國軍沒有這些限制。如果你看看發射的炮彈之間的差距，中國在後勤方面的劣勢是顯而易見的。
事實上，聯合國軍的一些物資補給線比中國的補給線短得多。美國有巨大的優勢，能夠把日本作為集結地和生産中心。從凝固汽油彈坦克到靴子，所有的東西都是在日本制造的，然後用船運到不遠的北韓。與此同時，任何蘇聯制造的補給品都必須運輸到數百英裡之外的地方。
認為美國無法在亞洲支援大量軍隊的想法也相當荒謬，因為就在5年前，美國已經在該地區支援了一支規模大得多、活躍得多的軍隊...
Wenuven -> MaterialCarrot
Allied overconfidence. The US (MacArthur in particular) ignored clear
indications that the Chinese were going to intervene. This hubris
resulted in US/SK/Allied forces being caught off balance when the
Chinese attacked. Much of the second half of the Korean War was the
Allies recovering from being knocked off balance.
I'd argue that the hubris was thinking he could win the PR war sacrificing American lives for the sake of drawing the US into a full scale war with China a la Thermopylae and Sparta/Persia. Believing that Americans wouldn't swallow losing to their "inferiors".
Remember this is the generation of military leaders that bought into their own divinity and racial / sociocultural divides were still very real.
引用“美國(尤其是麥克阿瑟)忽視了中國準備進行幹預的明确迹象。這種傲慢導緻美國/南韓/盟軍在中國進攻時失去平衡。北韓戰争後半期的大部分時間是盟軍從被打亂的平衡中恢複過來。”
我認為，他的傲慢是認為他可以赢得公關戰争，犧牲美國人的生命，以便将美國拉入與中國的全面戰争，就像溫泉關戰役和斯巴達/波斯戰争那樣。相信美國人不會容忍輸給比他們“低等的人”。
請記住，這一代的軍事上司人深信自己的神性，種族/社會文化的分歧仍然非常真實。
CanadaJack -> Wenuven
This is also the particular military leader who fought tooth and nail to just nuke them.
這也是指那個竭盡全力想用核武器攻擊他們的軍事上司人。
PandaBearShenyu -> MaterialCarrot
Numbers of course.
Uh, no. I can't believe this hUMAn WAvE talking point got dug back out of the grave where it belonged.
No the Chinese did not have "tremendous strength of numbers", nor did they ever have 1.5 million troops in Korea in remotely relevant terms. When you have basically no logistics, you need to field a much larger number of troops because most of them will be in transit. See battle of Shanghai where on paper the KMT fielded 3-4 times the number of troops as the IJA but in actual combat the number of actual fighting KMT troops were a fraction of the IJA's deployment where it mattered because most of the KMT troops were in transit.
When you have actual logistics, you need to field much fewer troops on paper to match your adversary in actual combat.
The peak PVA deployment in the area of fighting is at best comparable to UN forces. The Chinese never had the logistics to support a prolonged deployment of troops in combat zones remotely close to the UN due to the latter enjoying complete air superiority.
The PVA employed very sophisticated short attacks that used multiple highly mobile small squads to attack UN positions from multiple directions to seem like large numbers, they also use this to cut off UN positions from each other.
引用“當然是數量...”
呃，不，我真不敢相信這種“人海戰術”的觀點被從它本該呆的墓裡挖出來了。
不，中國沒有“巨大的人數優勢”，他們也從來沒有在北韓駐紮過150萬軍隊。當你基本上沒有後勤保障的時候，你需要派遣更多的部隊，因為他們中的大多數都在運輸。看看上海戰役，國民黨在紙面上出動的兵力是日軍的3-4倍，但在實戰中，國民黨實際部署的兵力隻是日軍皇軍的一小部分，因為大部分國民黨軍隊都在運輸。
當你有實際的後勤保障時，你需要在紙面上投入更少的部隊，以在實際戰鬥中與你的對手相抗衡。
在戰鬥地區志願軍的部署高峰，充其量和聯合國部隊相當。由于聯合國享有完全的空中優勢，中國從來沒有後勤支援在離聯合國很近的戰區長期部署部隊。
志願軍使用非常複雜的短促突擊的攻擊方式，使用多個高度機動的小分隊從多個方向攻擊聯合國陣地，看起來像人數衆多，他們也使用這種方式切斷聯合國陣地之間的聯系。
This is complete intellectual dishonesty or hopefully just pure ignorance. UN airplanes bombed everything that moved in Korea, and that is not an exaggeration, every village, road, town, city, in North Korea was bombed and up to 30% of the North Korean civilian population were killed. Of the 7000 trucks the CHinese had, they lost more than half of that in the first month. They had no logistics lines. The vast majority of Chinese casualties came from starvation, freezing, and disease, not combat.
After the first months, the Chinese had no ability to launch any large scale assault or change the tide of the war. Even then holding the 38th parallel for 3 years is nothing short of a miracle. Throwing literal rocks down a mountain slope at American troops was not at all uncommon for the PVA and many units straight up had no ammo and had their bayonets permanently attached.
引用“後勤。盡管我說過中國的後勤問題(他們肯定存在這些問題)，但北韓戰争就在中國旁邊打，而在南韓之外，美國及其大多數盟友都在幾千英裡長的後勤鍊的末端打。美國曾非常有效地利用了它的強大火力優勢，但在現實中，美國絕不可能像中國那樣向北韓派遣數百萬美軍。”
這說法完全是學術上的不誠實，或者但願隻是純粹的無知。聯合國的飛機轟炸了北韓的一切，毫不誇張地說，北韓的每個村莊、道路、城鎮、城市都遭到轟炸，多達30%的平民被殺害。在中國擁有的7000輛卡車中，他們在第一個月就損失了一半以上。他們沒有後勤保障。絕大多數中國人的傷亡來自饑餓、嚴寒和疾病，而不是戰鬥。
在最初的幾個月後，中國沒有能力發動任何大規模的進攻，也沒有能力改變戰争的趨勢。即使這樣，保持三八線長達三年，也不失為一個奇迹。從山坡上向美國軍隊扔石頭對志願軍來說并不少見，很多部隊直接就沒有彈藥，一直随身攜帶刺刀。
The Chinese had no relevant logistics capability. Being closer to China doesn't mean you can use some kind of magic anime power to will supplies across hundreds of miles of a country with no functioning bridges, roads, rail that are being patrolled by the biggest deployment of U.S. air power ever 24/7. Chinese troops famously only ever moved at night when American planes couldn't see them. This is not make believe land where you point to a map with your crayon and go "this close, have supply, this far, no supply."
The intellectual dishonesty part comes from the wilful ignorance of how logistics works, we could ship a birthday cake into Germany during world war II and supply our troops better than Nazi troops in their own homeland. Distance is not a factor when you:
* Have the supplies
* Have the production
* Can transport all this shit to the field of operation.
The only disadvantage would be the opening of the war if you needed the first shipments to arrive, but after that, your apparently disadvantage from distance is functionally non-existent. Oh and we also outproduced the Chinese at that point to a factor of 300 to 1, more than the disparity with the Japanese by multiples.
中國沒有相關的後勤能力。靠近中國并不意味着你可以使用某種神奇的動漫力量，在一個沒有橋梁、公路和鐵路的國家裡，穿越數百英裡，并有美國最大的空中力量全天候巡邏的情況下，提供補給。衆所周知，中國軍隊隻在美國飛機看不到的夜晚行動。這不像你用蠟筆指着地圖說“這麼近，有補給，這麼遠，沒有補給。”
學術上的不誠實部分，來自于對後勤工作的故意忽視，在二戰期間，我們可以把生日蛋糕運到德國，為我們的軍隊提供比納粹在自己的祖國更好的補給。距離不是一個因素，當你：
* 擁有補給，
* 擁有生産力，
* 擁有可以把這些玩意運到戰場上去的能力。
唯一的劣勢是，在戰争開始的時候，如果你需要第一批貨物到達，但是在那之後，遠距離方面的明顯劣勢就不複存在了。噢，當時我們的産量也超過了中國，達到了300比1，比和日本的差距還要大好幾倍。
UN on the other hand had no threat whatsoever to their logistics lines and were presented with none of the issues. The Chinese had an understanding that they basically had 20 minutes to fight before the UN troops basically erected a wall of flame around their positions.
Your argument seems to imply that the Chinese performed well because they were "politically motivated" and "had tremendous numbers", had no logistics when you wanted to talk down about them and suddenly had logistics when you needed them to seem like a credible threat that the UN overcame.
The real reason is:
Yes, the PLA troops are extremely motivated, and PLA doctrine to this day is to be hyper disciplined and to be extremely aggressive, much more so than their enemies in combat.
The PLA just came off of fighting multiple wars with ample experience in guerrilla fighting against the Japanese, and field battles including water crossing against the KMT. Their elite troops were comparable to alpines troops in terms of their ability to fighting in difficult terrain and harsh weather.
insane levels of discipline and political purity since those that weren't died during the long march, and as you said, the Chinese gauged correctly that allowing the U.S. to occupy all of Korea was an existential threat and they just finished their last century of humiliation from foreign invaders.
Having big numbers and being politically motivated don't win you wars alone, sorry to say but that wasn't the case since World War I when everyone found out the hard way. The Chinese were just excellent, albeit severely under and sometimes un-equipped and supplied warfighters.
另一方面，聯合國的後勤線沒有任何威脅，也沒有遇到任何問題。中國人明白，在聯合國軍在他們的陣地周圍豎起一堵火牆之前，他們基本上隻有20分鐘的戰鬥時間。
你的論點似乎暗示，中國表現出色，是因為他們“有政治動機”，“人數衆多”，當你想貶低他們時，他們沒有後勤保障，當你需要他們，讓他們看起來像是聯合國克服的一個可信威脅時，他們就突然有了後勤保障。
真正的原因是：
是的，中國人民解放軍的士氣非常高漲，直到今天，解放軍的信條仍然是紀律嚴明和極富攻擊性，比他們在戰鬥中的敵人更甚。
解放軍那時剛剛結束了多場戰争，擁有豐富的抗日遊擊戰經驗，以及包括四渡赤水在内的對國民黨的野戰經驗。他們的精銳部隊在困難地形和惡劣天氣條件下的戰鬥能力，可以和阿爾卑斯山地部隊匹敵。
正如你所說的，中國人正确地判斷了讓美國占領整個北韓是一種生存威脅，他們剛剛結束了來自外國侵略者的百年屈辱，是以他們的紀律和政治純潔性達到了前所未有的程度。
隻有人數衆多和政治動機并不能讓你赢得戰争，很抱歉地說，但是自從一戰以來，情況就不是這樣了，當時每個人都經曆了艱難的過程。中國人就是很出色，盡管物資嚴重不足，有時甚至缺乏裝備和補給的作戰人員。
MightyVanguard -> MaterialCarrot
Adding into the logistical issues, the Chinese sent into Korea weren't as mechanized as the allied troops, and had access to the north Koreans who knew mountain paths that could be traversed on foot, but not easily with vehicles. With these advantages, they could march men on these paths past the allies.
除了後勤問題之外，中國派往北韓的部隊沒有像盟軍那麼機械化，可以接觸到北韓人，他們知道可以徒步穿過的山路，但車輛不容易通過。有了這些優勢，他們就可以在這些山路上行軍，繞過盟軍。
Commodify
The single most important factor was terrain. Korea at the time was mostly forested. The PVA's victory in Korea was neither the first nor the most impressive victory of light infantry against a more heavily armed force in the forests. The Japanese and Finns had done even better as far as loss ratio was concerned ten years earlier. The terrain restricted the mobility of the round-bound Americans. It forced tanks to travel in column, and the PVA could destroy the columns by disabling the front and rear tanks. Forests further reduced aerial reconnaissance potential, safeguarded the PVA from airstrikes, and reduced visibility in general. That allowed the PVA to creep up on UN forces and attack at short distances, where artillery bombardment would lead to friendly fire.
Next, the UN's firepower advantage only applied to limited segments of the front. The majority of UN troops were South Korean, and they were no more heavily armed than the Chinese.
Third, the Americans suffered from maladaptive SOP. While the Marines (those of whom who had actually seen combat in the Pacific, that is) had experience with "short attacks" through fighting the Japanese, the army was used to big conventional battles in Europe. More, the marines had only defended against Japanese attacks in the confines of an island, with overwhelming naval fire support available at any time. They rarely had to consider the threat of a flanking attack, an envelopment, or a deep penetration into their rear areas. They further always were numerically superior to the Japanese, while in Korea the Chinese usually had numerical superiority. The end result was an American army that had no idea how to counter an enemy whose basic operational method was to leverage vegetation, dead space, night, and bad weather to attack at short distances. It preferred to create strongpoints along roads - what one would do if resisting a German offensive - instead of contesting the surrounding forests and mountains. It wasn't until late in the war that Ridgeway was able to create a geographically sound defensive line.
In Korean war histories much noise has been made about MacArthur's "stupidity" in pushing beyond the Pyongyang chokepoint and the brilliance of Chinese tactics, but the reality is that the UN could have won the war despite both those things. Chinese SOP was not impossible to counter, the US army of 1950 simply had all the wrong ideas of how to fight an unconventional enemy.
最重要的一個因素是地形。當時北韓大部分地區都是森林。志願軍在北韓的勝利既不是第一次，也不是最令人印象深刻的輕裝步兵在森林中對抗重裝部隊的勝利。日本人和芬蘭人在十年前的損失率方面做得更好。地形限制了美國人的機動能力。迫使坦克排成縱隊行進，而志願軍可以通過使前後坦克癱瘓，來摧毀縱隊。森林進一步降低了偵察機的能力，保護了志願軍免受空襲，總體降低了能見度。這使得志願軍可以悄悄接近聯合國部隊進行短距離突擊，而這距離的炮擊将會導緻誤傷友軍。
其次，聯合國的火力優勢隻适用于前線的有限部分。大多數聯合國軍都是南韓人，他們的武器裝備并不比中國人多。
第三，美國人受制于不适應的标準作戰程式(SOP)。雖然海軍陸戰隊(其中一些人實際上在太平洋戰場上參加過戰鬥)在與日本人的戰鬥中有“短促突擊”的經驗，但陸軍已經習慣了在歐洲進行大規模的正常戰鬥。更重要的是，海軍陸戰隊隻在一個島嶼範圍内防禦日本人的攻擊，而且在任何時候都有壓倒性的海軍火力支援。他們很少考慮側翼進攻、包圍或者深入後方的威脅。他們在人數上總是優于日本人，而在北韓，中國人通常在人數上占優勢。最終的結果是美國軍隊不知道如何對付敵人，他們的基本作戰方法是利用植被、死角、夜晚和惡劣天氣進行近距離攻擊。它更喜歡沿着道路建立據點，如果是抵抗德國的進攻就會這樣做，而不是争奪周圍的森林和山脈。直到戰争後期，李奇微才建立起一條地理上可靠的防線。
在北韓戰争史上，人們對麥克阿瑟跨過平壤咽喉的“愚蠢”和中國高超的戰術有很多的讨論，但現實是，盡管存在這兩個情況，聯合國本可以赢得這場戰争的。中國的标準作戰程式并不是不可對抗，1950年的美軍隻是對如何與非正常敵人作戰的問題上，有錯誤的想法。
MaterialCarrot -> Commodify
Good post, I would just add on the terrain aspect is that Korea was (and of course still is) extremely mountainous. So as well as being heavily forested, the mountainous terrain further restricted and inhibited US forces that were built around firepower, mechanization, and mobility. The terrain gave a leg up to light infantry.
很好的文章，我想補充一下地形方面的問題，南韓當時(當然現在也是)非常多山。是以，除了森林茂密之外，多山的地形進一步限制和抑制了圍繞火力、機械化和機動性建立的美國部隊。這地形有利于輕步兵。
YooesaeWatchdog1 -> Commodify
Another thing to note is that the US consisted of 40%+ global GDP at that point while China was one of the poorest countries in the world on par with Congo today. this sort of upset would be like Afghanistan fighting the US to a standstill.
另外值得注意的一點是，當時美國的GDP占全球的40%以上，而中國是世界上最貧窮的國家之一，與今天的剛果不相上下。這種難受，就像阿富汗與美國的作戰陷入了僵局一樣。
civver3 -> Commodify
the US army of 1950 simply had all the wrong ideas of how to fight an unconventional enemy
Foreshadowing the Vietnam War, to simplify it excessively. Makes me think generations often have to relearn how to fight wars.
引用“1950年的美軍隻是對如何與非正常敵人作戰的問題上，有錯誤的想法。”
為越南戰争埋下了伏筆，把它過分簡化了。讓我覺得，每代人常常不得不重新學習如何打仗。
FlashbackHistory
I've written answers here and here that get into this issue. The gist:
The Chinese achieved strategic surprise in the winter of 1950 and were able to launch two major offensives on largely unaware UN forces in northern Korea. The Chinese did some smart things to achieve these surprises, like mass camouflage and deception efforts. They also benefited from the willful ignorance of MacArthur and intel chief Charles Willoughby regarding the Chinese buildup on the Yalu. The Chinese also benefited from two limitations to UN air reconnaissance: Washington's ban on flights north of the Yalu and the pause on RB-29 flights caused by the appearance of Soviet-piloted MiG-15s in November 1950.
我已經在很多地方都寫下了關于這個問題的回答，大意是：
中國在1950年冬天完成了戰略突襲，并在北韓對幾乎不知情的聯合國部隊發動了兩次大規模進攻。為了達成這些出其不意，中國人做了一些聰明的事情，比如大規模僞裝和設局。他們得益于麥克阿瑟和情報局長查爾斯-威洛比對中國在鴨綠江上的集結的故意無視。還得益于聯合國偵察機的兩個限制：華盛頓禁止鴨綠江以北的飛行，以及1950年11月蘇聯駕駛的米格-15戰鬥機的出現，導緻RB-29飛行暫停。
The Chinese were sprinters, not marathon runners. They could achieve spectacular short-term successes ... but they often couldn't follow up those successes. During the mobile phase of the war in 1950-1951, Chinese logistics took months to stockpile the supplies that would be exhausted in a week-long offensive. With better sustainment, the Chinese might well have wiped out UN forces in November-December 1950 or April 1951.
At the tactical level, the Chinese were generally good about playing to their strengths and their enemies' weaknesses. They often fought at night and used the cover of terrain and darkness to reduce the efficacy of UN heavy weapons and airpower. They combined frontal attacks with flanking pincers to pin and annihilate entire enemy units.
中國人是短跑運動員，而不是馬拉松運動員。他們可以在短期内取得驚人的成功... 但往往不能延續這些成功。在1950年至1951年的戰争機動階段，中國的後勤花了幾個月的時間儲備物資，而這些物資在一周的進攻中耗盡。如果有更好的後勤保障，中國很可能在1950年11月至12月或1951年4月消滅聯合國部隊。
在戰術層面上，中國人通常善于利用自己的優勢和敵人的弱點。他們經常在夜間作戰，并利用地形和黑暗的掩護來降低聯合國重型武器和空中力量的效能。他們把正面攻擊和側翼夾擊結合起來，以鎖定并消滅整個敵人的部隊。
panick21
Since there are so many experts here, what if the US had captured Pyongyang and then established defensive lines across Korea. This would have lead to North Korea basically being a rump state right? Unlikely that China could have dialoged them from there.
既然這裡有這麼多的專家，如果美國占領了平壤，然後在北韓全境建立防線，會怎麼樣？這将導緻北韓基本上成為一個廢墟國家，對吧？中國不太可能在那裡與他們對話。
Trick_Ad3016 -> panick21
This is basically what every Korea expert since the Korean War says that the US and ROK should have done. PVA would not have been able to overrun this defense line, and PRC might not even have intervened. And a rump NK would absolutely have fallen after the Cold War, and we would be living in a world with a reunified and peaceful Korea.
Instead we have a Korea where its northern half and nuclear-armed on top of that.
I guess hindsight is 20/20.
這基本上就是自北韓戰争以來，每一個北韓問題專家所說的美國和南韓應該做的事情。志願軍不可能越過這條防線，中國甚至可能不會介入。冷戰結束後，殘破的北韓絕對會倒下，而我們将生活在一個統一、和平的北韓半島的世界中。
然而事實相反，我們面對的是北半部擁有核武器的北韓。
我認為做事後諸葛亮是很容易的。
Plethorian
I think even more crucial was the fact that in the initial push south the North captured tremendous amounts of US arms and other supplies. We had to basically start from scratch, while the North could use our own arms against us.
我認為更重要的是，在最初向南推進的過程中，北韓繳獲了大量美國武器和其他補給。我們基本上不得不從頭開始，而北韓可以用我們自己的武器來對付我們。
AgoraiosBum
China had millions of veterans who had been fighting since 1937 - both against the Japanese and in the civil war - and were able to achieve strategic surprise and highly favorable ratios in its attack of 1950. After that point, China consistently had more troops, but the Allies had better supplies and logistics, and it was generally a stalemate.
中國有數以百萬計的老兵，他們從1937年開始就一直在戰鬥，包括抗日戰争和内戰，并且能夠在1950年的進攻中完成戰略上的突擊和高度有利的比率。此後，中國一直擁有更多的部隊，但盟軍擁有更好的補給和後勤，總體上是一場僵局。
Asahi220
PLA tactics, US arrogance, Surprise and Terrain
UN forces were already isolated from each other due to the terrain of North Korea and as units were already detached from each other and had very little ability to support if one unit came under attack this played into Chinese tactics perfectly as their modus operandi was to infiltrate and isolate individual units and defeat them in detail while simultaneously destroying rear command.
Add to the cluster the UN forces were basically in victory formation and did not keep it secret on how each unit was deployed and where so PLA forces new exactly where to attack. So you have these isolated units on cold rocky hills and mountains already hoping to be home for Christmas suddenly surrounded with rear command areas also under heavy attack. Then the PLA would set up ambush points a long lines of retreat and thus you get maximum casualties.
Suffice to say the US came away taking the wrong lessons from the conflict. The US took away that as long as there was no surprise and tight coordination between units could be maintained firepower would still win the day. Also to be disproved in Vietnam
解放軍的戰術，美國的傲慢，突襲和地形
由于北韓的地形，聯合國部隊已經彼此孤立，而且部隊已經互相分離，如果一支部隊遭到攻擊，聯合國部隊幾乎沒有支援能力，這完全符合中國的戰術，因為他們的作戰方式是滲透和孤立單個部隊，并全面擊敗他們，同時摧毀後方指揮部。
此外，聯合國部隊基本上處于勝利陣型，并且沒有對每個部隊的部署方式和部署地點保密，是以志願軍知道确切的攻擊地點。是以，你有這些孤立的部隊在寒冷的岩石山丘和山脈上，他們已經希望回家過聖誕節，突然被包圍，後方指揮區也受到猛烈攻擊。然後志願軍設定伏擊點，形成一條長長的撤退線，這樣你就得到了最大的傷亡。
可以說，美國從這場沖突中吸取了錯誤的教訓。美國認為，隻要不出其不意，并保持部隊之間的緊密協調，火力優勢仍然可以獲勝。這點也在越南被推翻了。