"I am even happier at the snow of the Min Mountains, and after the three armies, I am all happy." Through the poem "The Long March of the Seven Laws," Chairman Mao recalled the various difficulties and obstacles encountered by the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army on its 25,000-mile long march, as well as the scenes in which the Red Army smiled and smiled after overcoming many difficulties and winning victories along the way.
Why did the Red Army begin its twenty-five-thousand-mile long march? Here we have to talk about a person, and he is Li De. Because Li De made a "left-leaning" mistake in military command, the Red Army failed in the fifth anti-encirclement and suppression campaign, and was forced to withdraw from the base area, and could only carry out an expedition to get out of the predicament.
Encirclement and suppression by the Kuomintang
In 1931, the September 18 Incident broke out, and the Japanese army began to invade China on a large scale. In the face of national difficulties, the Communist Party's proposal to cooperate with the Kuomintang and the Communist Party to jointly resist Japan was opposed by Chiang Kai-shek, a Kuomintang member.
He was stubborn and stubborn, always insisting that "the outside must be at home", specifically by not allowing the army and the masses to participate in the anti-Japanese struggle, and also launched many encirclements and suppressions against the revolutionary base areas of the Red Army. The first to fourth encirclement and suppression were crushed under the command of Chairman Mao, Zhu De, and others.
In 1933, along the border of the Central Soviet Zone, Chiang Kai-shek launched the fifth encirclement and suppression of the Kuomintang, and he wanted to make this station the last stop of the Communists, so he intensified his attack on the Communists.
Chiang Kai-shek appointed himself commander-in-chief, mobilized a million troops, and procured 150 fighter jets and many other military equipment and supplies from the United States, Germany, and France.
On the part of the Communist Party, Chairman Mao lost the right to lead the Party under the exclusion of the "Left" dogmatists, and it was Li De who exercised military leadership over the Red Army at this stage.
Born in Germany, Lidd was an Austrian whose English name was Otto Braun, but an Austrian who worked for the Soviet Comintern and was a senior adviser to the Comintern.
During World War I, Li De was arrested for joining the German Communist Party. Later, Li De found an opportunity to escape from prison and fled to the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union, Li De met Wang Ming and was deeply appreciated by Miff.
Later, on Wang Ming's strong recommendation, Li De was sent to China in 1932, and the following year he came to Ruijin in China as a central military adviser to china and began to guide the Chinese Communist Party in military operations.
Li De came to the Central Soviet Region and commanded the Fifth Anti-Encirclement and Suppression War
After Li De came to the Central Soviet Region, everyone was very surprised by this big foreigner with a high nose, and some revolutionary leaders at that time also doubted his military ability.
However, there was strict discipline in the army, and since bogu, the interim head of the central government, appointed Li De as a military adviser, the subordinates could only obey military orders.
Chiang Kai-shek launched the Fifth Encirclement and Suppression Campaign in 1933, which controlled traffic in order to stop Communist transportation and tighten the economic blockade of the Soviet Zone.
Militarily, Chiang Kai-shek pursued a fortress policy, taking the defensive as an attack, hoping to seize the opportunity to suppress the communist army, and he mobilized half a million Kuomintang troops to the Jiangxi front.
At this time, Chairman Mao's consistent operational ideas of "enticing the enemy to go deeper," "breaking through each other," and "campaign warfare" had long been rejected by the Leftists. As a military commander, Li De demanded that the Red Army "keep the enemy out of the country" and fight hard with the enemy.
Subsequently, Li De also talked on paper, rigidly organized position defense operations against the map, and he also clearly marked the fixed position of each mortar on the map, requiring that the position he marked could not be changed without authorization.
Judging from the situation at that time, Li De's operational thinking was very limited, and the strength of the Communist Army was far from that of the Kuomintang, and "hard fighting" was undoubtedly a big loss.
Li De's combat ideas caused dissatisfaction among many subordinates. Peng Dehuai said angrily:
"What a blind commander, what two fists fight together, once our troops are dispersed, how can we deal with a powerful enemy army?"
Bogu didn't understand anything, so Li De just looked at the map. Saltpeter is surrounded by enemy bunkers, if you want to fight saltpeter, you can only drill into the enemy's bunkers, it is simply a fool's errand! ”
Similarly, Chairman Mao and others did not dare to agree, and vigorously persuaded:
"Such a combat plan is too rigid, our Red Army relies on flexible mobility in combat, but now it is becoming more and more passive!"
Moreover, our troops are not as strong as the enemy's, and our weapons are not as advanced as the enemy's, so how can we fight head-on?" But Li De insisted on going his own way and refused to listen to Chairman Mao's opinion, saying that Chairman Mao personally could not change the decision of the Communist International.
At the same time, Li De's operational ideas were also spied on by spies sent by Chiang Kai-shek, and as soon as the news came out, Chiang Kai-shek felt that it was very strange for the Communists to fight bunker battles.
He couldn't help but wonder: Aren't there many smart people in the communist army, and why are they so ignorant this time? His subordinates informed him that the communist army now had a new commander of the Comintern, and Chiang Kai-shek understood.
Reed: I'm sorry
After the outbreak of the Xiang River, the Communists paid a terrible price because of Li De's decision-making mistakes, and the casualties of the communist troops were very heavy. Bogu said: "Our army has suffered heavy casualties, but hasn't the enemy also paid a huge price?" ”
What is even more hateful is that after the failure of encirclement and suppression, Li De actually let the communist army retreat in a hurry and did not take any countermeasures. Due to the failure of the fifth anti-encirclement and suppression campaign, the Red Army was forced to carry out a strategic shift and had to start a twenty-five thousand mile long march.
After the failure of the fifth anti-encirclement and suppression campaign, the Central Committee of China convened the Zunyi Conference in 1935.
This meeting summed up the reasons for the failure of the fifth anti-encirclement and suppression campaign, which lies in Li De's "left-leaning mistake" in Bogu Lide, and Li De's combat method applies european combat experience and does not analyze specifically according to our national conditions and specific problems.
At the meeting, Bogulid was deprived of his military command, Chairman Mao's military command was restored, and the erroneous ideological line was stopped in time, thus turning the Chinese revolution into a safe place.
After the Zunyi meeting, Li De was removed from all positions, and without any position, he began to reflect on the major mistakes he had made.
He began to understand that his original operational thinking was simply stupid, he said: "When I first commanded the operation, I only commanded according to the previous experience of the Soviet Union.
I did not take into account China's actual situation, including China's terrain, the disparity in strength between the enemy and our troops, the disparity in weapons and equipment between the enemy and ourselves, and the traditional combat experience of the Chinese, so I made a big mistake and almost endangered the Chinese revolution, and I feel very sorry! ”
Li De, who had repented of this, began a long march with the large red army. Since his previous profession was military consultants, it was not suitable for actual combat operations, but for imparting military theoretical knowledge, and later the Communist Party arranged for him to teach at the Red Army University.
A few years later, Li De returned to Germany, where he went to a German publishing house to serve as president of the Writers' Association. In his later years, Li De began to write books. Some of his books are about the Chinese revolution, but some of them distort Chinese history.
The events of Li De tell us that everything has its universality and particularity, and we must abide by the ideas of dialectical materialism and historical materialism in doing things, and we must not be rigid and rigid, but must integrate theory with practice and analyze specific problems.