First, the main reason why the 5th campaign was "fought in a hurry"
At that time, our army received intelligence from all sides, and the United States had increased its troops from Korea at home and transported 2 divisions to Japan. Three new divisions of the South Korean Army are being organized and trained in Japan.
In order to cooperate with the frontal offensive, the US military is likely to repeat the incheon landing and cut off the back road of the Korean People's Army entering the Nakdong River. The U.S. military may attempt to first land on the east coast of Korea along the Wonsan area, attack our troops on the eastern front from flank and rear, and then land from the area of Nampo, the town of Nampo on the west coast, advance from east to west, cut off the waist of the Korean bee (that is, the line from Anju to Wonsan), and attempt to pinch our army back and forth with the enemy who is attacking head-on. The Central Military Commission, Chairman Mao Zedong, and Commander Peng Dehuai attached great importance to this information and were also anxious.
On the basis of the above understanding and analysis of the enemy's situation, Chairman Mao Zedong's determination at that time was: We should strive to avoid a long-term confrontation on the "38th Line, and after the arrival of the 3rd and 19th Corps, our army should be prepared to take advantage of the enemy's entry into the southern and northern areas of the "38th Line" and when it is unstable, launch a campaign counterattack against the enemy, eliminate the US army and Syngman Rhee's army in the northern and southern areas of the "38th Line," strive to annihilate tens of thousands of enemy troops in 5 divisions (including 3 US divisions) in an organized manner, and then advance southward.
In accordance with Chairman Mao Zedong's telegram, General Manager Peng decided to organize and implement the 5th campaign, annihilate several enemy divisions, force the enemy to retreat to the south of the "38th Line," and completely crush the enemy's offensive.
Chief of Staff Xie asked the Shiji Operations Division to quickly come up with a concrete implementation plan for the implementation of the campaign.
As early as early March, when I learned that General Peng intended to launch a larger-scale campaign counterattack against the enemy after the arrival of the newly recruited Korean corps, I and the relevant comrades of the Operations Department began to study and formulate a combat plan for the 5th campaign, and conceived specific handling opinions on possible situations and problems, so as to provide Peng Zong and other leaders of the Volunteer Army with reference for studying and determining the determination to fight in a timely manner. At the request of the Chief of Staff Xie, on the basis of the preliminary plan formed in early March, and in light of the new changes, we carefully studied and revised it, and soon formed a new implementation plan for the campaign counterattack.
I reported to the Chief of Staff of the SPLA on the implementation plan for the 5th Campaign Counterattack, which was studied and formed by the Operations Division, and focused on the following points: The similarities between this campaign and the 3rd Campaign are that the enemy's defenses are first broken through from the front, and then detours are interspersed in depth. This time, the strength of our army is much larger than that of the 3rd battle, and the strength of the enemy's ground troops is 2:1, which has a greater advantage. Although our army has the superiority in terms of strength, it should be fully estimated that the 3rd and 19th corps of our army, which are mainly engaged in offensive tasks, are all newly recruited units and have not yet gained experience in fighting against the US army, so it may affect the exertion of our army's superiority in manpower. At the same time, due to the enemy's high degree of mechanization, more artillery and tanks than our army, and the absolute superiority of the navy and air force, our army should still give play to the special skills of night combat and close combat and make full use of the enemy's weaknesses and mistakes. Troops carrying out frontal breakthroughs must lose no time in quickly interspersing and encircling the enemy in a roundabout way, and strive to annihilate the enemy before dawn. According to the experience of the 3rd campaign, the troops who carry out the roundabout encirclement of the campaign must dare to march and fight in the daytime, and the closer they get to the enemy, the more they can make the enemy's superiority in air and ground artillery fire not be brought into play. The main area of the offensive should be selected in the Jinhua and Huachuan areas, which is convenient for the assembly and deployment of our army. In order to advantageously create a roundabout encirclement in the campaign, it is also possible to consider placing the invading enemy in the Areas of Jinhua and Cheewon, expanding its protrusions, and then attacking the southeast with the 3rd Corps after breaking through from the front, and the 9th Corps attacking southwest after breaking through from the front, and launching a centripetal assault on the enemy. The 19th Corps broke through the Linjin River from the right flank of the 3rd Corps and attacked in the direction of Dongdouchuan and Hui government; the 39th Army and the 40th Army broke through the enemy's defenses on the left wing of the 9th Corps and went straight into Kahei and Chunchuan, thus separating the enemy in the east and west, so as to ensure that the 3rd Corps, the 9th Corps, and the 19th Corps could more effectively encircle and annihilate the enemy; the time of the campaign was preferably after April 25, so that our new korean troops could take a little rest, recover the fatigue of the long march, and understand the terrain familiar with the enemy's situation and the direction of attack. However, since we have received information on the enemy's attempts to carry out landing operations on the east and west coasts of Korea, we must strive to crush the enemy's plans for landing operations in the rear before the enemy carries out landing operations. Our Operations Service and the Intelligence Service must work closely together to understand and grasp the enemy's movements.
After listening to the report, the chief of staff of the SÉPU asked me and the comrades of the Operations Department to revise the proposed campaign implementation plan for the chief of the Volunteer Army to convene a meeting to study it.
According to the information our army has received, the enemy's attempt to land from the east coast is becoming more and more obvious. Mr. Peng was very worried about the emergence of such a situation that was unfavorable to our army. On April 6, 1951, the Party Committee of the Volunteer Army held a meeting and conveyed the strategic policy of the Central Military Commission and Chairman Mao Zedong on "preparing for war for a long time and striving for the short term as much as possible" and instructions on conducting the 5th Campaign. In order to crush the enemy's landing from behind our flank and to cooperate with the attempt to attack our army from the front, our army must strive to launch a counterattack against the enemy in the front before the enemy has landed. The main purpose of our army's 5th campaign was to "destroy several enemy divisions, crush the enemy's plans, and regain the initiative." "The focus of the counterattack was on the Western Front, mainly to eliminate the American Army (at that time, the enemies on the Western Front were the Us 3rd, 24th, and 25th Divisions, the British 29th Brigade, the Turkish Brigade, and the 1st and 6th Divisions of the South Korean Army).
According to our calculations, the 3rd and 19th Corps into the DPRK could reach the area north of the "38th Line" as soon as around April 20. Therefore, General Peng and the other chiefs of the Volunteer Army decided: If the enemy in the frontal attack is advancing quickly, we will carry out a campaign counterattack around April 20, and if our army's defensive forces can continue to resist the enemy's attack, delay time, and slow down the enemy's offensive, our army will launch a campaign counterattack in early May.
In the process of intensive preparations for the campaign, the situation has changed.
On April 11, U.S. President Harry Truman removed MacArthur, commander-in-chief of the U.S. Far East, and was promoted from Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. 8th Army in the Korean Theater to Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Far East Army and Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Army, and Lieutenant General Van Vleet succeeded Ridgway as commander of the U.S. 8th Army. In accordance with Truman's intention not to expand the Korean War, Ridgway adopted the policy of steadily advancing toward northern Korea, and after trying to gain a favorable situation, he used strength as capital to negotiate an armistice with me. Subsequently, our army also learned that the 40th and 45th divisions of the US National Guard have been transported to Japan, and the three newly formed divisions in South Korea have also stepped up their training in Japan and actively expanded the air bases such as Gimpo and Busan. In this regard, I and the comrades in the Operations Department analyzed and judged that the enemy might use these troops to land from the Wonsan area on our east coast, attack our army from flank and rear, and cooperate with the enemy in the frontal attack, so as to cut off the rear road and supply line of our frontal defensive troops, form a favorable strategic posture, and try to re-emerge the situation after the Inchon landing.
General Manager Peng was very worried about the passive situation in which our army was engaged in two-sided operations, especially since our army had already made arrangements according to the campaign counterattack launched by the enemy who was attacking the enemy head-on, and it would be quite difficult to readjust the deployment of hundreds of thousands of troops in a short period of time. For this reason, General Manager Peng was very anxious and asked the Zhisi Operations Department to seriously analyze the situation between the enemy and us and put forward the opinion on whether the time for launching the offensive could be advanced by a few days. According to the study of the Operations Department, before April 21, all corps can assemble and enter the starting position of the attack, but the first echelon of the various armies and divisions cannot enter the position where the impact is launched, and it is difficult for the artillery to enter the position and complete the firing preparation. Therefore, the time of the attack on the enemy is recommended to be around the 25th.
After we reported the situation and opinions we studied to the heads of Deng, Hong, Han, xie, and others, they all agreed and made a report to General Manager Peng.
Second, another reason why the 5th campaign was "fought in a hurry"
After listening to the opinions of the Volunteer Army Headquarters, General Manager Peng also wanted to directly listen to the opinions of the leading comrades of various corps. Wang Jinshan, deputy commander of the 3rd Corps, Du Yide, deputy political commissar (Commander and political commissar Chen Geng was being treated in a domestic hospital due to a leg injury and had not yet arrived), Yang Dezhi, commander of the 19th Corps, Li Zhimin, political commissar, Song Shilun, commander and political commissar of the 9th Corps, and Tao Yong, deputy commander, were summoned to the Zhisi meeting. Deputy commanders of the Volunteer Army, deputy political commissars and chiefs of staff, directors of the Political Department, and leading comrades of the artillery and engineering command posts all attended the meeting.
After the meeting began, General Manager Peng talked about the current situation and intentions of the enemy, and stressed that Chairman Mao Zedong and he were very worried about the landing of the US troops on the east coast; if the enemy landed on the east coast first, it would put our army in the position of being attacked by the enemy in the belly and back. Therefore, our army's campaign counterattack operations should be carried out before the US troops land. The purpose of summoning the leading comrades of the corps to a meeting this time is mainly to discuss and study this issue and solicit the opinions of the comrades.
The commanders of each corps reported on the advance of their respective corps after entering the DPRK, and said that they could be assembled at the starting point of the offensive north of the "38th Line" by April 20. He also said that the eldest brother army, who first entered the DPRK, has sent advisers and has arrived at each army and division separately to introduce the situation in Korea and assist in command. The political commissars of all corps also reported on the ideological situation of cadres and fighters after joining the DPRK, and carried out ideological education and political mobilization all the way from china to the DPRK; now the commanders and fighters are very emotionally active in fighting, their understanding of "resisting US aggression and aiding Korea, and defending the family and defending the country" has risen rapidly, and they are also very confident in defeating the American devils, and they all want to quickly engage in a contest with the US army.
The commanders of the various corps who had just entered the war in korea had no experience in fighting with the US military and had the idea of taking the enemy lightly. What impressed me particularly deeply was that after reporting on the situation of the corps, Deputy Commander Wang Jinshan of the 3rd Corps said: General Peng, it is not a problem for us to destroy 1 division of the enemy in 1 corps, and I promise to capture 5,000 US prisoners.
Deng Hua, Hong Xuezhi, Han Xianchu, and other leaders of the Volunteer Army, who attended the meeting at that time, heard that the newly arrived leading comrades of the corps were optimistic and confident of victory. It's hard to say anything. They believe that these comrades have no experience in contending with the US military, and that this optimism and confidence are not based on reliable foundations just by using the experience of the five ace armies that have fought all the American equipment of the Kuomintang.
Deputy Commander Deng Hua said very gently: "According to our combat experience in 4 battles, the US military is not a Kuomintang ace army with American equipment, the US military has absolute superiority in air and naval support, and the quality and quantity of tanks and artillery are much stronger than the quality and quantity of the equipment of the Kuomintang ace army." Although our army won the first 4 battles, our 6 corps on the Western Front and the 9th Corps on the Eastern Front fought very hard. "The deputy commanders of the Volunteer Army and the new corps commanders, who were both corps commanders or deputy commanders in the late stages of the Civil Liberation War, were on the same rank and were all battle-hardened generals, and under the circumstances at that time, several deputy commanders of the Shiji Division wanted to persuade them, but they could not be convinced, so it was not convenient to say anything more, lest they mistake it for arrogance towards them. The commander of the 9th Corps, Song Shilun, who had experienced the Eastern Front operations of the 2nd Campaign, already had a relatively rich experience in fighting with the US army, and the various armies and divisions of the corps had entered the attack starting position, so he remained silent and did not say anything.
After hearing the speeches of these corps leaders, I thought that they were almost exactly the same as when we first entered the DPRK, and that we were also blindly optimistic and confident at that time, and only after four battles with the US army did we draw a correct understanding from actual combat. The 6th Corps of the 13th Corps and the 3 Corps of the 9th Corps, which entered the DPRK in the 2nd Campaign, fought 4 consecutive battles, and had not yet destroyed a whole division of the enemy in a systematic manner, but only annihilated the units below the regiment (the regiment of the South Korean Army called the company), and the main commanders of the enemy's regimental headquarters ran away by car or tank. In the four battles, only more than 5,300 American troops and other soldiers from other countries were captured. They are too light on the enemy. It is said that Deputy Commander Wang Jinshan has always been brave and not afraid of death in combat, and has a crazy spirit.
I quietly said to the chief of staff of the Xiefang side: "At present, the armies and divisions under the jurisdiction of the corps can only reach the starting point of the offensive on April 20, and there are still twenty or thirty kilometers away from the starting position of the impact, the artillery has not yet entered the firing position, and the specific implementation plan for the coordination of the infantry and artillery of the various armies, divisions and artillery has not yet been drawn up, so how can this launch an attack?"
Chief of Staff Xie also quietly said to me: "You see the atmosphere at the meeting, they didn't even listen to what Deputy Commander Deng said, and Deputy Commanders Hong and Han were inconvenient to speak. ”
After listening to the reports and speeches of the commanders and political commissars of the corps, General Manager Peng probably believed that the opinions of the front-line commanders were closer to reality. Therefore, it was decided to launch the 5th campaign at dusk (17:00) on 22 April, to attack the enemy head-on and carry out the battle
Fight back.
Writing this, I would like to say something about an episode related to this history. More than 30 years after the end of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, in 1986, I went to Dalian to visit the elderly chief Zeng Siyu, and Commander Zeng Siyu told me that he was writing a memoir of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea. He was then the commander of the 64th Army of the 19th Corps.
Commander Zeng Siyu said to me: "When our army entered the DPRK to participate in the 5th campaign, the first echelon of our 64th Army had not yet entered the charging (attacking) departure position, and received an order for our army to launch an offensive. Is it time to prepare for my day? Commander Yang Dezhi replied, "Don't ask, just follow the order." I still don't understand what this is all about. Comrade Yang Di, is it good or bad for you to talk to me about what you know? ”
I smiled and said, "Old Chief, didn't you ask Commander Yang Dezhi again?"
Zeng Siyu said, "It's not easy to ask!" Or you can talk about it. ”
And I replied, "Now that it's been more than 30 years, I'll just say that."
I told you about the reports, speeches, and guarantees given to General Peng at the meeting of corps chiefs held by Zhiji at that time, all the corps commanders were very optimistic and confident of winning the 5th battle, and said that the troops were ready, and as long as General Peng gave the order, they could launch an attack. The commanders of these corps were optimistic and light on the enemy, especially the deputy commander of the 3rd Corps, Wang Jinshan, who promised to capture 5,000 American prisoners. In this atmosphere, Deputy Commander Deng Hua spoke euphemistically about the situation, but they did not listen. Hong Xuezhi and Deputy Commander Han Xianchu were not able to speak. At that time, General Manager Peng was very worried about the landing of the US troops from the rear of our army on the east coast, and due to the reports of the commanders and political commissars of the corps and the request for battle, General Manager Peng made up his mind and ordered the launch of the 5th campaign on the evening of April 22.
I said, "At that time, you called Commander Yang and asked you to give you a day to prepare, can he report to General Peng?" Because they have all made a guarantee ticket to Mr. Peng and patted their chests. ”
After Comrade Zeng Siyu listened, he said, "Oh! As it turned out, Commander Yang Dezhi hung up the phone after rejecting my opinion on the phone. Seeing that Commander Yang Dezhi did not accept my suggestion, he was in a hurry, and immediately rushed to the first line division on the task of breaking through, and gave them a death order, demanding that they must quickly run into the impact starting position at all costs. We finally launched the attack on time in a hurry, broke through the enemy's defenses on the Linjin River, and completed the task well. ”
I said, "Commander Zeng, the 64th Army under your command and your corps are well fought. However, it was really painful for the troops of the 3rd Corps, and the troops who served as breakthroughs ran for a while after launching the attack before launching the attack, and the artillery preparation time had passed, and the extended firing was already being carried out. ”