"A thousand autumn histories in the palm of your hand, a million soldiers in your chest."
In 1912, when the 19-year-old Mao Zedong was still studying at the Hunan Provincial Higher High School, he was identified by the principal Fu Dingyi as "a great instrument that can be built", and specially lent him a copy of the "Imperial Approval General Collection". Mao Zedong loved it and read it diligently all his life. It was precisely because he was familiar with the history books and used history to learn from the present that Mao Zedong had an outstanding ability to govern the party, the army, and the country.
According to Meng Jinyun, a nurse next to Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong always had a "Zizhi Tongjian" at the head of his bed, which he did not know how many times he read it.
Meng Jinyun
Mao Zedong once said with emotion: "I have benefited greatly from every time I read this book. Some people think that the history of ancient China is all crap, and some people think that the things in Chinese history are all the essence, and I think these two kinds of people are one-sided. My view is that there is both essence and dross, both inherited and critically analyzed. ”
Mao Zedong's reading of the Zizhi Tongjian and other historical books was to seek wisdom in history by starting from the transformation of China and the world.
Therefore, Mao Zedong was a leader who was most familiar with Chinese history and the most flexible in applying historical experience, and Zhou Enlai said: "Chairman Mao is the people's leader who grew up from thousands of years of historical lessons, nearly a hundred years of revolutionary movements, and nearly thirty years of direct struggle." ”
One
Zhuge Liang was one of Mao Zedong's favorite historical figures, especially zhuge Liang's spirit of "bowing down and dying". Mao Zedong said many times: "I also want to learn from Zhuge Liang, bow down to exhaustion, and only after death."
Beginning with the Tang Dynasty, Emperor Xuanzong of Tang set up a special temple sacrifice for ten famous generals in history, called the "Ten Philosophers of the Martial Temple", to show their military talent and outstanding contributions. The "Ten Philosophies of the Martial Temple" can basically represent the highest level of ancient military experts on the mainland. And Zhuge Liang is one of these "Ten Philosophies".
In the "Romance of the Three Kingdoms", Zhuge Liang is a god man who "knows astronomy from above and geography from below", and has the reputation of "Lying Dragon and Phoenix, one person can settle the world". Although zhuge liang in the main history is not as mysterious as in the novel, he is still a great politician and military figure.
Some people say that Zhuge Liang did not have much military achievements and did not have any excellent battle records. In fact, these people have made a mistake, that is, to equate military achievements with military achievements.
Zhuge Liang
In fact, military achievements do not simply refer to military achievements, but also include how many military theoretical works this person has written, whether his military ideas have surpassed those of his contemporaries, whether his military inventions have helped war, and so on. Military thought, military theory, writings, military inventions, and military engineering are also military achievements, and they are not weaker than military achievements!
Mao Zedong believed that military scientists can be divided into three types: strategists, tacticians and military theorists. Zhuge Liang may not be outstanding enough in terms of battle results, but he can be called an excellent military scientist in strategy, military theory, and military invention.
As early as the period of the agrarian revolution, Mao Zedong was good at drawing on Zhuge Liang's art and experience in military struggle. In particular, Zhuge Liang's ability to propagate and agitate. Mao Zedong once told the cadres of the Red Fourth Army that when Huang Zhong, a shu Han general during the Three Kingdoms, faced the powerful Xiahou Yuan, Zhuge Liang used the "Radical General Method" to agitate Huang Zhong, so that Huang Zhong successfully beheaded Xiahou Yuan under his horse.
Although the soldiers of the Red Army all had a high degree of class consciousness and did not need to be "radicalized," the working methods instigated by Zhuge Liang's propaganda were still worthy of reference.
Compared with Cao Wei, the national strength of Shu Han was weak, but Zhuge Liang adopted the Tun Tian system, which ensured the logistical supply of the Shu Han army and allowed the Shu army to maintain a strong combat effectiveness.
After the founding of the People's Republic of China, Mao Zedong repeatedly encouraged General Wang Zhen in Tuntian, Xinjiang, saying that in ancient China, there was a system of reclamation, and Zhuge Liang also practiced it in Hanzhong, which could realize the creation of wasteland and employment, and also consolidate the frontier, which was indeed a good way to consolidate border defense. He also asked Wang Zhen to read more about the history of the Three Kingdoms and learn from Zhuge Liang's experience in Tuntian.
In 1953, after our army captured Cheng Lianzhen, the leader of the Buyi female bandit, in Guizhou, many comrades advocated killing the female bandit leader. But Mao Zedong said he could not kill. He said that Zhuge Liang dared to make seven captures and seven verticals against Meng Yudu, and we arrested Cheng Lianzhen, so why didn't we dare to make eight captures and eight verticals? Not even two grapples and two longitudinals? You can't kill it all at once.
As a result, after Cheng Lianzhen was released, she took the initiative to apply to participate in the work of cleaning up bandits. She went deep into the bandits' dens and persuaded the bandits to lecture on the Communist Party's lenient policies and surrender. Soon after, the local bandits came down from the mountain to surrender, and the bandit plague that had plagued the people for a long time was quelled.
Two
Chairman Mao, who is familiar with history and military affairs, does have its own unique features in analyzing things, always getting to the point and getting into the wood, so that people cannot help but admire his ability to see the essence through phenomena.
The Three Kingdoms period was a period of drastic changes in the political situation in the history of the mainland. The rulers were faint and corrupt, the families and the rich clans were tilting against each other, the land annexation was intensifying, the class contradictions were constantly intensifying, and finally the vigorous Yellow Turban Uprising broke out. Many local forces on one side took the opportunity to expand their power, bringing great disasters to the people.
Eliminating the warlords and separating the country and realizing national reunification is the urgent aspiration of the people. Zhuge Liang was a politician who took the feudal regime of eliminating the division of the country, realizing national reunification, and establishing a consolidated centralized system as an existing politician, and he spent his whole life struggling to achieve this goal.
In the Longzhong Pair, Zhuge Liang proceeded from the fundamental purpose of unifying the whole country and formulated a strategic policy for Liu Bei to unite Wu and resist Cao.
He believed that Cao Cao had "millions of people" and "blackmailed the Son of Heaven to order the princes", and that he could not "contend" with him without a considerable favorable situation; as for Sun Quan, although it was also an obstacle to the completion of the great cause of reunification, he could not be an enemy of him for the time being.
There was also a contradiction between Cao and Sun, so this contradiction could be used to establish a basic strategy of uniting Wu against Cao. Throughout his life, Zhuge Liang has always been carried out in accordance with the strategic principle of "uniting Wu and resisting Cao".
Zhuge Liang also attached great importance to establishing a solid base area, because this was the basic condition for accomplishing the cause of reunification. According to the objective situation at that time, Zhuge Liang chose this base area in Jingzhou and Yizhou. This was in line with Liu Bei's situation and strength at that time, and it was also in line with objective reality.
After the Battle of Chibi, Zhuge Liang assisted Liu Bei in creating his own strategic base, which gave Liu Bei the conditions to compete with Cao Cao.
After having a base area, how to consolidate and develop it is an important issue.
Zhuge Liang formulated a political program of "western peace with Zhurong, southern Fuyiyue, external alliance with Sun Quan, and internal revision of political reasoning", promoted the legalist line in internal affairs, properly handled the contradictions between foreign scholars and indigenous landlords, and eased the internal contradictions of the ruling class.
Militarily, Zhuge Liang adhered to the principle of "ruling the army by law" and advocated "clearly rewarding and punishing the principle, rewarding and rewarding them to persuade them to do their deeds, and carrying out reprimands to prevent their falsification", so the combat effectiveness of the Shu army was greatly improved, creating a solid foundation for the subsequent Northern Expedition.
It is a pity that the subsequent situation in the world did not develop as Zhuge Liang envisioned.
Eastern Wu's attack on Jingzhou, and later the Battle of Yiling, caused heavy losses to the strength of the Shu state, and Zhuge Liang did not wait for the favorable conditions of "changes in the world". However, Zhuge Liang did not change his original intention and carried out seven Northern Expeditions, although he did not achieve the expected success, but still showed Zhuge Liang's ambition to take the initiative to attack and strive for the unification of the whole country.
Mao Zedong once said: "In all wars, the enemy and us strive for the initiative in the battlefield, the battlefield, the theater and even the whole war, and this initiative is the freedom of the army." If the army loses the initiative and is forced into a passive position, the army is not free and is in danger of being destroyed or defeated. ”
This coincides with Zhuge Liang. At that time, Shu Han was in an unfavorable position of the enemy being strong and we were weak, and if Zhuge Liang did not adopt the policy of active selection and active attack, and did not actively strive for the initiative in the war, then it would be even more unfavorable to Shu Han.
The ultimate goal of Zhuge Liang's strategy is to eliminate separatism and division and realize the reunification of the whole country. Unfortunately, although Zhuge Liang achieved the goal of "bowing down and exhausting, and then dying", his strategic goal was still not achieved. While sighing for Zhuge Liang, Chairman Mao also gave three reasons, which can be described as to be to the point.
Three
Mao Zedong repeatedly pointed out Zhuge Liang's serious mistakes in the military field, believing that the root cause of Zhuge Liang's failures lies in the three major mistakes in his military strategy and practice.
The first mistake was to use the wrong person.
Li Yinqiao was Mao Zedong's most trusted defender, and Mao Zedong praised Li Yinqiao many times, saying that he had not chosen the wrong person. Li Yinqiao was a little embarrassed, so he modestly said: "When will the chairman choose the wrong person?" Mao Zedong said with a serious face: "Even Zhuge Liang, there are times when Guan Yu and Ma Mo are used incorrectly!" ”
Li Yinqiao
In folklore, Zhuge Liang is the embodiment of wisdom, and Li Yinqiao also worships Zhuge Liang. Hearing the chairman say that Zhuge Liang had misused people, he asked the chairman: "Chairman, I know that Zhuge Liang used the horse rumors with tears, but Second Master Guan was so powerful, how could he have misused them?" ”
Mao Zedong lit a cigarette and explained to Li Yinqiao: "Zhuge Liang should not have let Guan Yu guard Jingzhou in the first place. Guan Yu had always looked down on Eastern Wu and had no way to implement Zhuge Liang's policy of joining forces with Wu to resist Cao. Coupled with Zhuge Liang's unprincipled accommodation to Guan Yu in his daily life, it fueled Guan Yu's pride, so it later became a big mistake. Are you saying that Zhuge Liang used the wrong person? ”
After listening to it, Li Yinqiao woke up like a dream and nodded continuously.
Mao Zedong asked Li Yinqiao again: "You said that Zhuge Liang used the wrong horse mob, what is wrong, do you know?" Li Yinqiao scratched his head and grinned, "I don't know!" Talk to me, Sir! ”
Mao Zedong told Li Yinqiao that before the Battle of Jieting, Zhuge Liang ordered Zhao Yun and Deng Zhi to occupy Jigu as suspects, and he personally led a large army straight to Qishan, and Guanzhong was shaken. Emperor Cao Rui of Wei ordered the general Zhang Guo to march west into the street pavilion to defend against the Shu army.
Ma Mo and Zhang Hao fought at the street pavilion, and Ma Mo's army was defeated, which directly led to the fruitless return of Zhuge Liang's Northern Expedition. After the war, Zhuge Liang killed Ma Mo to correct military law, but the best opportunity for the Northern Expedition passed.
Still
The fundamental reason for Zhuge Liang's defeat in this Northern Expedition was not the defeat of the street pavilion, but zhuge Liang's strategic mistakes.
At that time, Cao Wei's troops were empty in the right area, and Zhuge Liang could have seized this favorable opportunity to pacify Guanzhong in one fell swoop, and even take Chang'an directly. However, Zhuge Liang did not adopt Wei Yan's suggestion of concentrating his forces to capture Guanzhong, but after dividing his troops into Jigu Valley, he attacked the street pavilion only with ma Mo, and did not concentrate his superior forces to achieve victory in one go, resulting in the defeat of the soldiers.
Mao Zedong believed that Ma Mo was a rare talent, but he was not good at frontal attacks, and Zhuge Liang had the problem of improper employment in his use.
Zhuge Liang's second mistake was that he gave up command of the battle at such a critical moment as the Battle of Jieting.
An excellent military commander must grasp at any time the changes in the situation in which the enemy and ourselves are strong or weak, choose favorable timing and geographical conditions, and achieve the goal of defeating the enemy and achieving victory. Zhuge Liang's first Northern Expedition was a good time, but when Ma Mo was trapped in the street pavilion, Zhuge Liang did not command a large army to respond to Ma Chen and launch a decisive battle with Cao Wei.
The reason for this was that Zhuge Liang was far away from the battlefield at that time, and he could not grasp the changes in the situation that occurred on the battlefield in time, and could not make timely and corresponding adjustments, which led to the defeat of the street pavilion.
Mao Zedong pointed out to the point: The deep-seated reason for the defeat of the street pavilion was caused by the fact that the commander Zhuge Liang did not personally come to the front line, did not grasp the first-hand situation, and commanded remotely in the rear. This statement shows the military ability of Mao Zedong's genius, and the ability to see the essence at a glance, and washes away the grievances of Ma Chen for a thousand years, which is the true color of a great proletarian revolutionary.
What would it be like if Zhuge Liang were replaced by Mao Zedong? Mao Zedong's suggestion for the Battle of Jieting was that "it is advisable to light up and come to the front", believing that Zhuge Liang should personally lead the army to advance rapidly, and should not disperse the troops. Obviously, Zhuge Liang also realized this mistake and learned a lesson. Since then, "every time it comes out, the light will be in the army." ”
Mao Zedong believed that Zhuge Liang's third mistake was the military strategy he proposed in "Longzhong Pair", and there were also some problems.
Mao Zedong believed that Zhuge Liang suggested in the "Longzhong Confrontation" that Liu Bei "wait for the world to change, then order the general To send the troops of Jingzhou to Xiangwan and Luo, and the general to lead the people of Yizhou out of Qinchuan", that is, the strategic principle of attacking from Jingzhou and Yizhou, there were also certain problems.
Jingzhou and Yizhou are thousands of miles apart, and this practice of dividing troops into northern expeditions will make it difficult for Liu Bei's group, which already has limited troops, to gain superiority in terms of troop strength. As a result of "Guan Yu, Liu Bei, and Zhuge Liang's three divisions of troops", Jingzhou could not be defended, and the Northern Expedition could not be completed. Therefore, Chairman Mao sighed: "Three points of strength, an undefeated!" ”
Four
Mao Zedong didn't just talk on paper. At the end of 1931, when the Provisional Central Committee in Shanghai demanded that the Red Army concentrate its forces and attack the enemy's heavily guarded cities, Mao Zedong resolutely opposed it.
He believes that the enemy in the big city has a large number of troops, the city is thick, the city is thick, it is easy to defend and difficult to attack, and under the enemy's stubborn defense, it is difficult for the Red Army, which lacks the equipment and experience to attack the stronghold, and will lead to its own heavy casualties.
Mao Zedong proved right. During the attack on Ganzhou, the Red Army suffered more than 3,000 casualties, and the situation was extremely critical. It was Mao Zedong who promptly proposed to develop into western Fujian, where the Kuomintang troops were weak, that the Red Army captured Longyan, Zhangzhou, and other places, captured a large number of guns and ammunition from the enemy, and won a major victory.
Zhou Enlai spoke highly of Mao Zedong's military ability: "Mao Zedong was very good at fighting wars, and he was very impressed with every battle he won. Since then, "Chairman Mao's use of troops is like a god" has also spread throughout the Red Army.
After the Zunyi Conference, under the command of Mao Zedong, our army defeated powerful enemies at home and abroad and won the final victory of the Chinese revolution. Therefore, Mao Zedong is fully qualified to comment on Zhuge Liang, one of the "Ten Philosophies of the Martial Temple".
Zhuge Liang's three major mistakes caused Shu Han to suffer huge losses. But Mao was able to look at Zhuge Liang's several major mistakes dialectically.
In 1957, Mao Zedong said in his speech at the congress of the Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow: There is an idiom in China called "three stinky cobblers, the top Zhuge Liang." ”
Zhuge Liang was flawed, but he was "faithful in his words, respectful in his deeds, open in heart, fair in his preaching, pooling the minds of the masses, and benefiting the masses," and he very well inherited the tactical idea of "winning victories due to changes in the enemy," based his correct methods of warfare on a correct analysis of the situation between the enemy and ourselves, and strove to win the initiative and transform the situation into a side favorable to himself, containing the elements of materialistic dialectics of tonics.
What Mao Zedong admired most about Zhuge Liang was that he was good at analyzing the situation between the enemy and ourselves, using tactics such as "surprise", "attacking him unprepared", and "avoiding the real and attacking the virtual", not losing the fighter plane, and cautiously and swiftly fighting. Mao Zedong believed that these characteristics still have a certain reference role in modern warfare.
Disclaimer: Transferred from historical theory