The birth of "On Protracted War"

Text/Xiaozhuang

One

Strategic deployment of Shanxi

Lenin said: "Without revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary action." ”

Mao Zedong said: "Once the correct thinking representing the advanced classes is grasped by the masses, it will become a material force for transforming society and the world. ”

Therefore, no matter when, we need the guidance of advanced and correct ideas and theories.

And if the leaders of the proletarian cause despise Marxism-Leninism and revolutionary theory, but are intoxicated with the narrow and unprincipled so-called pragmatism, but sit on the podium, blindly call themselves heroes, put on old qualifications, and refuse to develop criticism and self-criticism, then they become empiricists.

Having said that, with the opening of the all-out War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, how should this nationwide War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression be fought urgently requires relevant theoretical guidance.

And this theoretical guidance not only needs to answer a series of questions about the War of Resistance, but also has the role of practical guidance like an operation manual; not only that, but most importantly, it must also be able to point out the future and direction of the War of Resistance; only in this way can it be called an advanced and correct theory.

When Mao Zedong wrote "On Protracted War," ten months had passed since the Lugou Bridge Incident, and some practical experience had already been gained in both the frontal battlefield of the Nationalist Army and the battlefield behind enemy lines of the Eighth Route Army, and these experiences had become the practical basis for Mao Zedong's writing of "On Protracted War."

If we want to understand "On Protracted War," we must first look at how the War of Resistance Against Japan, which has been going on for ten months, has developed.

At the beginning of the Anti-Japanese War, the Eighth Route Army mainly went to Shanxi to cooperate with the Jin army at Yan Xishan, which was mainly based on the independent mountain guerrilla warfare formulated by Mao Zedong.

However, the Japanese offensive was very rapid and fierce, and after they occupied Shanghai, they immediately marched into Shanxi, and on November 8, Taiyuan was lost.

The loss of Taiyuan brought about a fundamental change in the war situation in North China: On the battlefield in North China, regular warfare with the Kuomintang as the main body began to take a back seat, while guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines with the Communist Party as the main body began to take a dominant position.

Therefore, the North China Battlefield provided a pilot for the War of Resistance Against Japan, that is, when the Nationalist army retreated, could the Eighth Route Army completely rely on its own strength and gain a firm foothold in North China? And prepare for a future strategic counteroffensive?

To this end, Mao Zedong must immediately respond to changes and make a comprehensive strategic plan for the stability and development of the Eighth Route Army, so that the Eighth Route Army can gain a firm foothold in North China.

This strategic plan can be broadly divided into three steps:

Step 1: Create a base

As the Kuomintang army in Shanxi collapsed in its entirety, the old Kuomintang regime in many places immediately collapsed or disappeared on its own, so that the people in the occupied areas ravaged by Japanese aggression were eager to have someone to lead them to revolt and defend their homeland. Especially in the vast towns and villages where the Japanese army could not reach. Therefore, the first task of the Eighth Route Army is to mobilize the masses in these places, establish political power, organize the people, and create base areas.

Therefore, Mao Zedong successively issued instructions: "Most of the villages in Shanxi Province should be turned into guerrilla base areas, mobilize the masses, absorb the defeated army, expand themselves, be self-sufficient, not rely on others, fight more small victories, and boost morale to influence the whole country." ”

Step 2: Strategic layout

Mao Zedong was very soberly aware that the Japanese army could never allow the Eighth Route Army to make it restless day and night in its rear, so once they stabilized the situation a little, they were bound to launch an army attack on the base areas behind the enemy lines.

This means, then, that if the Eighth Route Army cannot crush the Japanese offensive through the same anti-encirclement and suppression war as it did in the original war of encirclement and suppression, then the base areas behind enemy lines established by the Eighth Route Army will not actually be able to gain a foothold.

As a result, a military layout with a very strategic vision was created, and Mao Zedong ordered the original 115th Division to be divided into two, and the 120th Division and the 129th Division were formed into four parts.

thereinto:

The 115th Division, with Mount Wutai as the center, expanded northeast Jin and opened up the Jin-Cha-Ji base area;

The other part of the 115th Division, centered on the Lüliang Mountains, marched to southwest Jin and opened up a base area in southwest Jin;

The 120th Division, with the Guanju Mountains as the center, expanded northwestern Jin and opened up a base area in northwestern Jin;

The 129th Division, along the Zhengtai Railway, went south, relying on the Taihang Mountains and the Taiyue Mountains, to open up the Base Area of Jinji-Hebei-Yu.

The cleverness of this layout lies in the fact that the north can threaten the big cities such as Beiping and Tianjin, and the east can serve as a barrier to the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region; the south can develop towards the Jiluyu Plain, and all four areas are built on the mountain range, which creates conditions for the Eighth Route Army to rely on the mountains to break the encirclement and suppression of the Japanese army.

And these four areas, at the same time, can echo each other, each other for each other, one side has difficulties, then the remaining aspects can play a role in pliers.

This is not yet the most brilliant place, and the most brilliant place will not be revealed until the third step.

The third step: expand military strength and break the encirclement and suppression

In order to break the Japanese offensive when the Japanese army attacks, it is necessary to develop the guerrillas rapidly, strengthen the military strength, and closely integrate with the masses of the people. In the first ten years of the war against encirclement and suppression, the Red Army accumulated very skilled experience in the people's war, and at this time, as long as the ranks expanded a lot and the relationship with the masses of the people was close enough, then it would be able to break the Japanese army's advance and suppression.

Once the Japanese army can be broken, then the layout of the second step will show long-term and powerful strategic power.

At this time, you will find that the four base areas created by the Eighth Route Army, in addition to military cooperation with each other, also almost spread throughout the whole province of Shanxi.

Looking at it, Shanxi was ostensibly occupied by the Japanese army, but in fact all they could occupy was a few railways (major transportation routes) and a number of cities, and from the perspective of geography and population, most of the territory (especially the vast countryside) was actually still in the hands of the Eighth Route Army.

Moreover, the land occupied by the Japanese army must also be guarded by separate troops.

This has great symbolic significance, that is to say, as long as the whole country implements this strategy and mobilizes the masses of the people, then it is impossible for the Japanese army to occupy China completely, let alone destroy China.

On the surface, the Japanese army surrounded China from the north to the south on the outer line, and its military strength was invincible wherever it went, but from the perspective of Shanxi Province, in fact, the Japanese army was surrounded by the Eighth Route Army.

If we look at only the major cities of the country, it seems that the Japanese army will form a siege trend, but if we look at the geography of the whole country, the vast rural areas of China can encircle the Japanese army on China's territory.

And with such a foundation, then in the future, once the anti-fascist front is formed, the Chinese battlefield will become a part of the world anti-fascist battlefield, and the Japanese army will not only be surrounded by China, but also in the encirclement of the entire anti-fascist front.

In this way, Mao Zedong sketched and delineated the entire strategic trend for the entire War of Resistance Against Japan in accordance with the situation in Shanxi.

At this time, the nearly ten-month War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression behind enemy lines in North China has shown that the anti-Japanese base areas are capable of gaining a foothold in the advance and suppression of the Japanese army.

It was precisely with such a template as Shanxi that Mao Zedong took this as the basis, stood on the philosophical height of historical materialism, took the materialist dialectical theory of Marxism-Leninism as a tool, combined with the characteristics of Japan and China, summed up the experience gained in the past ten months of the War of Resistance, and thus wrote the work that shone brightly in the world and guided the people of the whole country to fight in blood, and the trend and development of the subsequent war were also completely developed in accordance with the strategic situation depicted in this work.

Two

"On Protracted War"

When we read On Protracted War, we will find that it is first a philosophical work and then a military work.

When many people read this work, it is often difficult to sort out and absorb the article because of the strategy, tactics, military, tactics, politics and other elements depicted in it.

In fact, if you read it from the perspective of materialistic dialectics, then this article can not only be read more thoroughly, but also benefit a lot from it.

We can divide the whole text into three parts:

Part I: Analysis of the characteristics of both sides of the contradiction.

What are the core laws of materialistic dialectics? It is the law of the unity of contradictions and opposites.

According to the philosophical principle of materialism, the movement and development of all things in the world are essentially the movement and development of contradictions.

Therefore, the military will not be an exception, this war is a war between Japan and China, and the two countries constitute a pair of contradictions.

Therefore, the first analysis of the characteristics of the two sides of the contradiction becomes the core content that constitutes the first part of the article.

Therefore, we see that in "On Protracted War", whether it is refuting the theory of national subjugation or refuting the theory of quick victory, what is the basis for the article to refute these theories?

It is the different characteristics between the two sides of the contradiction (China and Japan) in "On Protracted War", that is to say, you refute the theory of subjugation and the theory of quick victory, not only because these two arguments are not conducive to boosting morale, but because the arguments of these two arguments are not correct at all.

Marx said: Theory can be convincing as long as it is thorough enough.

The reason why Mao Zedong was able to refute the theory of subjugation and the theory of quick victory was because the characteristics of the two sides of the contradiction he analyzed were sufficiently comprehensive and thorough.

The theory of subjugation and the theory of quick victory are just the opposite, their arguments are only a part of things, and their arguments and arguments are not thorough enough, for example, the theory of subjugation only sees the strength of Japan's military strength, and cannot see the regressive nature of its war, as well as the limitations of human, material, and financial resources brought about by the small size of Japan's country.

The theory of quick victory, on the other hand, only sees the assistance of external forces and certain partial victories, but does not see the extremely strong military, organizational, and economic strength of Japanese imperialism.

It is precisely because the characteristics of Japan and China, as analyzed by Mao Zedong, are comprehensive and thorough enough that the article can comprehensively and thoroughly refute the theory of subjugation and the theory of quick victory.

Originally, for ordinary people, this is a very powerful work, but for "On Protracted War", its height is far more than that.

The second part: according to the characteristics of contradictions, predict the development and direction of things

All stillness in this world is relative, only motion is absolute.

The two sides of the contradiction must constantly move under certain conditions, and since they want to move, there will be a trajectory of movement.

Thus, the whole text ushered in the climax of the second part, which depicted the trajectory of the War of Resistance Against Japan according to the characteristics of the two sides of the contradiction.

That is what we are familiar with in the text clearly pointed out: why is it a protracted war and the three stages of a protracted war.

Mao Zedong not only accurately depicted the three stages of protracted war, but also explained and predicted the various war situations that may occur and are bound to occur in the three stages.

However, this is not enough, in the second part of "On Protracted War", not only from the perspective of movement and development to depict the various situations of this war, but also from a comprehensive perspective to depict the "war situation with intertwined teeth", that is, you can see not only how it moves and develops, but also where the boundaries of movement and development are.

It adds elements of the entire world's anti-fascist war so that you can almost stand in God's perspective, see from which direction the war will evolve, and see the boundaries and postures of its evolution.

And this speculation and rehearsal is not only a determination of nature, but also contains an estimate of quantity.

The theory of stages drawn in the article through the experience gained through the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the estimation and judgment of the comprehensive strength of the Japanese army, and the estimation and judgment of the development situation of our army's base areas behind enemy lines can also be completely convincing.

"On Protracted War" is written here, which can already be called a work handed down from generation to generation, but this is still not enough, as we have said, in addition to pointing out the future and direction of the War of Resistance, it also has a remarkable feature, that is, it is still an operation manual.

Part III: Strategy and Tactics

It is precisely because of the content of the first two parts that the third part of the content is born, that is, the strategy and tactics of the War of Resistance Against Japan.

As it says:

Everything is for people to do, and protracted battles and final victories will not appear if no one does it. To do this, we must first have someone to draw out ideas, reasons, and opinions on the basis of objective facts, and put forward plans, principles, policies, strategies, and tactics before we can do a good job. - "Mao Xuan Vol. II, On Protracted War"

The reason why this article has enough philosophical height is that it is not only full of materialistic dialectical theories for the prediction of protracted war, but also the explanation of strategy and tactics is first of all interpreted from a philosophical height.

Therefore, we will see that the text first explains the dialectical relationship between war and peace, and then explains the role of agency in war, as well as the philosophical issues of war and politics, and the purpose of war.

Because only by understanding a series of philosophical issues related to the war can we truly understand the significance of this war and understand what the Chinese nation is fighting for.

With an understanding of this war, the next step is the specific operation manual, such as: planning, flexibility, and initiative in tactics; internal and external lines, offense and defense; mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare; protracted warfare and quick decisive battles; war of attrition and annihilation; combat gaps and decisive battles, etc. These tactical policies and tactics are based on the height of the future, direction, nature, and significance of the war, rather than simply stacking techniques.

In the end, the outline of the article, thousands of summaries in the end is only like that: this is a people's war.

Three

Philosophical heights

Chairman Mao once said: If we cannot look at the development of things from the height of philosophy, it will be impossible to achieve a breakthrough.

"On Protracted War" has become a brilliant work that can guide the entire course of the War of Resistance Against Japan because of its philosophical height, but at the same time, because of the height it stands on, it has more than only the significance of guiding the War of Resistance Against Japan.

There are countless military experts in Chinese history, and there are also many brilliant generals who have achieved extremely high military achievements, but none of them can write a military work of such a high degree as "On Protracted War".

Generally clever military experts, they are good at platooning troops, boosting morale, borrowing the geography of mountains and rivers, hundreds of rivers and rivers and everything else that can serve the war, and becoming his tools for fighting. They are characterized by a tendency to fight unprepared battles and will win every battle, and we often call such military experts generals.

But militarists at this level can only stay at the second-rate level.

Truly first-class military experts, in addition to having the basic qualities of second-rate military experts, can also rise to a new level. On this step, their characteristics are: good at subjugating soldiers without fighting, in addition to war, they also study the psychological characteristics of opponents, internal contradictions, factional battles, and often can achieve the greatest victory with minimal investment.

However, for the top military experts, the first-class level is still not enough.

Those top military experts can be attacked by the enemy's extremely powerful forces, and this extremely powerful force includes the enemy's powerful troops, weapons, equipment, soldiers' combat quality, economic advantages, material conditions, logistical support and other factors, such a powerful force is coming, and you have to fight, and you must win, you are qualified to be called a top military expert.

Such a military strategist must, under the circumstance that his own strength is extremely weak, take advantage of all kinds of contradictions within and outside the enemy's army to mobilize the enemy, disperse the enemy, and even divide the enemy, and then in an extremely passive environment, look for fighters, and then concentrate superior forces, fight the enemy's weak parts, and gradually turn passive into active.

The greatest characteristic of such militarists is that they can create operational conditions under extremely dangerous circumstances, turn passive into active, and achieve strategic victory over more with less and defeat the strong with the weak under the condition that their tactics are at an extremely inferior position.

Mao Zedong's Four Crossings of Chishui is a representative work of such top military experts.

The birth of "On Protracted War" has obviously surpassed the level of top military experts, or it has completely surpassed the military level.

It stands at the height of philosophy, integrates a series of factors such as politics, military, geography, etc., and predicts that it not only represents the development trend of the War of Resistance Against Japan, but also has a strong universality and representation for the development logic of all things.

It is precisely because it analyzes war from a philosophical perspective that it can be so overwhelming that it can portray a war that has just begun so accurately and so far ahead of its time.

Moreover, the greatness of "On Protracted War" lies in the fact that it is a work that stands on the standpoint of the proletariat, and its most fundamental foothold is among the masses of the people, so it says that "the soldiers and the people are the basis of victory."

The wheel of history is rolling forward, and 83 years have passed since this "On Protracted War", but its brilliance will not be dimmed by the passage of time, and its value will not be limited by the historical stage in which it is located, because it has never been a simple military work.

The course of the socialist cause will not stop there, and although the forces representing the advanced classes sometimes fail, this is not because of incorrect thinking, but because in the comparison of the forces of struggle, the advanced forces are not as good as the reactionary forces, so they have failed for the time being, but they will one day succeed.

In the future, more and more people will regain the philosophical tools of materialistic dialectics, absorb the ideological theories he has left behind, and continue to advance in the direction of proletarian history.