In 1956, Khrushchev threw out a "secret report" at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which immediately shocked the world and made the countries of the socialist camp unable to find their ideas. There were also Polish-Hungarian incidents. What Khrushchev did to his predecessors, our country did not say anything to Khrushchev at first, after all, it was the Soviet Union's own business. But then Khrushchev believed that all socialist countries should reform as the Soviet Union did, and even put forward our policy as irresponsible.
When Khrushchev visited China in October 1958, our country advised him not to deny Stalin. In 1961, our country once again suggested that the Soviet Union should "look at Stalin", and if Stalin was denied, it would give the West a chance, and Khrushchev did not listen to these suggestions, and within three years he was ousted by Brezhnev and others. So if Khrushchev follows our advice, will he be able to save himself?
"Lifted the lid and stabbed Lou Zi"
Khrushchev is a person who is good at expressing himself with body language, and he seems to be fierce and fierce, but in fact, Khrushchev is a narrow-minded person. When Stalin died in 1953 and Khrushchev had not yet reached the pinnacle of power, he gave the impression of a trustworthy man. However, when Khrushchev came to power, he showed a posture of "seeing the eyes and repaying the favor", venting his resentment against his predecessor, and using the old man's words "lifted the lid and stabbed Lou Zi."
At the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev opposed his predecessors, believing that as long as Stalin was exposed, the Soviet Union could be liberated from its previous state. He thought that he had accomplished the task by exposing Stalin, but the entire soviet society's system, model, political economy, and social spirit were all constructed by Stalin and needed to be rebuilt, and Khrushchev did not do so.
From Khrushchev himself, some scholars believe that his knowledge and talent are not as high as Stalin's. Khrushchev trained cadres in the Stalin era and was a product of that era, and he saw only the surface of the Stalin question. Albertov once commented on Khrushchev: "He is a product of Stalinism, and he cannot do anything to oppose the past." This is what ordinary people often say that "it is difficult to cut yourself with your own knife".
The Soviet scholar Medvedev also summed up Khrushchev by saying: "Khrushchev was Stalin's protégé, a product of the Stalin era, which made him politically skillful and left him a legacy of ruthlessness, prudence, and the kind of truth that can be ignored." It was that epoch that gave rise to Khrushchev as "an extraordinary, tragic, contradictory figure of dual consciousness." His report on the disclosure of Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was an excellent political step, and it determined in many ways the direction of development in the transitional period after Stalin's death. He wanted to break with Stalinism, but not with the system. Although he broke with the creator of this system, he worshipped the world created by this founder. This contradiction could not be resolved, but he did not understand it. ”
Medvedev believed that Khrushchev "gave society a little freedom, but he then tightened the 'faucet'." Khrushchev later mentioned in his memoirs: "When the Soviet Union decided to start the period of thawing and consciously went down, everyone, including me, was worried about the thaw: 'Whether there will be a flood that will rush towards us because of the thaw, it will be very difficult to deal with.' But Khrushchev did not know that his "secret report" at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU had already had an irreversible effect.
Medvedev believed that when Khrushchev came to power, he wanted to change and was afraid of accidents, and that he bumped into the east and the west, and was inconsistent in his domestic and foreign policies, and even wavered himself first. The limitations of this contradictory figure are related to Khrushchev's character, and of course it is also the result of his blind struggle for power.
"Change the soup without changing the medicine"
It was Khrushchev's ambivalence that led him to come to power in the Soviet Union, calling for democracy on the one hand, and on the other hand he himself was still in his old age. There is nothing wrong with reform, but Khrushchev does not have the ability to change. He knew the world was changing, but he couldn't possibly push the Soviet Union forward in a big stride.
For example, Khrushchev proposed economic reforms, and there has been some progress. However, the 1961 CPSU Program was still a planned economy. Khrushchev was even anxious to abolish handicraft cooperatives and to build the Soviet Union into a single ownership system of the whole people, when the Soviet Union expanded collective farms, and some even merged 30 rural areas and more rural areas into one collective farm, but how to manage them lacked effective measures.
In the process of opposing his predecessors, Khrushchev also wanted to promote political democracy in the Soviet Union; he proposed opposing individual centralization, strengthening collective leadership, opposing individual behavior, strengthening the legal system, and even proposing reform measures such as the cadre tenure system; before 1958, there was indeed progress, but by the end of Khrushchev's administration, some reforms had "died prematurely" and had not been carried out at all. Scholars say that the cadres selected by Khrushchev are based on the "principle of loyalty to people and obedience."
Khrushchev cannot blame him entirely for this, because Khrushchev's reforms have not solved the key points at all. As Arbatov said: "He [Khrushchev] consciously did not want to abandon the political system inherited from the Stalin era, because as the head of the party, if he did so, he would directly threaten his own interests." And he couldn't think of good measures. Therefore, Khrushchev did not want to make a profound change, he aimed at power, he actually did not want to abandon the Soviet political system, which protected individual power, and he led the Soviet Union much simpler and more conveniently. He does not let personal superstitions, in fact he also likes to be praised. ”
This way of changing soups without changing medicines has made more and more people oppose Khrushchev.
"No gold steel drill porcelain work"
As we said earlier, Khrushchev's ability and theoretical level are average, but as a fuehrer, he only needs to use the right people, but Khrushchev will inevitably fail if he wants to reform the economy according to his own ideas.
In 1957, when Khrushchev put the reform of industry and construction on the situation of management organization and transferred economic management from the CPSU to the localities, this idea was not a line of thought or reform, but in fact it was to transfer one means of management to another.
Khrushchev was in such a hurry that he hastily reformed it without carrying out a pilot demonstration in economic reform. No wonder some Soviet scholars said: "Industrial reform is a complex project that should be replicated in a region after years of piloting." The analysis of this reform by the Soviet newspapers cannot be regarded as an attempt."
What are the results of work reform? The surpluses controlled by the CPSU declined, and the state lost its unified management of the national economy. Originally, the Soviet Union was a country composed of republics, and in some places "localism" and "decentralism" arose, and there were more people grasping economic work and fewer people in unification. Khrushchev broke the previous management mechanism, but did not form a new set of effective mechanisms.
Later, Khrushchev also liked to give orders, decide on economic reforms according to his own judgment, and even use administrative instructions to promote economic reforms. Since Khrushchev himself was not an economic expert, and he would not listen to the opinions of his economic experts, he would certainly act in his own way, which disrupted the economic reform of the Soviet Union.
"Can't eat hot tofu in a hurry"
As we said just now, Khrushchev is an acute child. As the saying goes, "Character determines destiny". On the one hand, Khrushchev gave people a "reform" face, but he did things according to his own will, such as personnel work, and he did not fully investigate and made a lot of changes.
For example, the lifelong system of leading cadres involved the leading organs at all levels of the Soviet Union, and according to Khrushchev's term of office system, the members of the CPSU were to be replaced by a quarter at each election. In 1962, soviet deputies were replaced by 70 per cent in the elections. He also canceled the interests of leading cadres, such as bureau-level cadres who could not be assigned drivers and did not have special cars. During the industrial reform, a large number of leading cadres were transferred, and even during the agricultural reform, Khrushchev moved the Ministry of Agriculture and other agricultural institutions, schools, etc. out of Moscow and to the countryside. These measures have offended the interests of some people, and Khrushchev's "political enemies" are increasing.
As for Khrushchev's character, the famous Soviet statesman Bulatsky once recorded: "Khrushchev is not only a victim of the environment, but also a victim of his character." He was acute, too hurried, and easily agitated, a shortcoming he could not overcome. ”
Bulatsky also records that when Khrushchev and Bulganin visited Britain in 1956, at a reception at the Soviet embassy, Churchill said to Khrushchev: "Mr. Khrushchev, it is good to hear that you are now carrying out large-scale reforms. I just want to advise you not to be in a hurry. If you jump two steps across the chasm, it is quite difficult, and you may fall into the ditch. "Even the Western countries have seen the problem and have advised Khrushchev, how can Khrushchev listen?" But now it seems that Churchill's prediction was correct, and Khrushchev really fell into the ditch in the end.
epilogue:
In the later period of Khrushchev's administration, many policies were already idle, and even achieved good results, although he opposed Stalin, but Khrushchev could not find another way of governing, resulting in Khrushchev's prestige getting lower and lower, and in the end no one supported him.
Bulatsky once said: "In 1964 no one went out on the streets to defend Khrushchev". This is the situation of Khrushchev after Brezhnev and others won the victory in the "palace coup". That's in contrast to his initial opposition to his predecessor winning support. Some initially supported him, both purposefully and hopefully, but later all hopes were dashed. Even if Khrushchev had heeded our advice, he would not have been able to recover it, because "lifting the lid and stabbing LouZi" was an irreversible mistake, and it had to be said that Khrushchev was a tragic figure.