Looking back at the Battle of Stalingrad in World War II, the defeat of the German army, people are more lamenting that the two armored units of the German army have not achieved the combat purpose, and the 4th Panzer Army commanded by Hoth even wasted time on the way to attack from the south and the defense from the north, which is not to mention, because the 4th Panzer Army came and went, resulting in the abandonment of the previous achievements of the 1st Panzer Army in the Caucasus, watching the Soviet army's fuel supply base in front of it and sighing.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="2" after > the blue plan was launched, the situation on the East-West Front was very good, covering up the shortcomings of german blitzkriegs</h1>
In 1942, the battlefield situation seemed to be more favorable to the German army, especially the two fronts, the Soviet army and the British army a series of defeats, so that the German high command felt that ending the war before the winter of 1942 was no longer an empty phrase, so in the operational command basically could not listen to the senior generals on the front line, and turned a blind eye to the problem of insufficient supplies and too long fronts in blitzkriegs, and the only order was to attack and attack.
Why did the German high command have such a great impulse and enthusiasm? On the one hand, in the summer of 1942, the German army had found that the U.S. military focused on maintaining the balance of the Pacific theater, resulting in the British Royal Navy fighting alone in the Atlantic, almost every month German submarines could sink about 700,000 tons of British and American ships, and the industrial production of Britain, the United States and Canada could not make up for the losses on the front line.
It was the superiority of the Luftwaffe and air forces in the Atlantic, coupled with Rommel's success in North Africa, that deprived the Anglo-American Allies of the energy to launch a counterattack against the Germans, let alone the second battlefield that Stalin hoped to open. Therefore, during this period, the German army was not only not afraid that the Allies would land on the Western Front, but mobilized a large number of troops to participate in the Battle of Stalingrad on the Eastern Front. In fact, by September 1942, most of the control of the Mediterranean was owned by the Germans, almost becoming an inland lake for the German army, and there was nothing for the British and American allies to do.
On the Eastern Front, the Soviets suffered heavy losses due to the Battle of Kharkov, which objectively made the undefended Stalingrad the focus of contention between the two sides, and by July 17, the 6th Army could see that the city could be taken, and the 4th Panzer Army was reinforced from the South to the Caucasus, so that Kleist could seize grozny, the oil supply center of the Soviet Army, as soon as possible.
From this level, only in terms of the battlefield environment at that time, the German high command was not hot-headed, ready to attack the Caucasus with two armored army groups, but also wanted to cut off the soviet army's energy supply as soon as possible, if the goal was achieved, the battlefield situation instantly fell to the German army, unfortunately, after the 4th Panzer Army went south, a large 350-kilometer buffer zone appeared on the flank of the 6th Army, creating favorable conditions for the Soviet army to implement strategic adjustments.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="26" >02 4th Panzer Army back defense is both bear's paw meat, the German army loses one or the other</h1>
In good conscience, on July 17, the 4th Panzer Army went south to re-enter the north at the end of July, during which time, did it have any assistance to Kleist's armored attack? Of course there is, and it is one step away from achieving the goal.
As far as the operational situation in August 1942 is concerned, with the help of the 4th Panzer Army, on August 8, Kleist's 1st Panzer Army occupied the Soviet Army's Maykop oil field, although the Soviet army destroyed the oil field in advance, resulting in the need for the German army to rebuild another one, objectively speaking, it also brought major difficulties to the Fuel Supply of the Soviet Army. On August 23, the 6th Army forward had reached the North Volga River, and on August 25, Kleist's armored unit was 50 miles away from the oil production center of Grozny, the largest oil field of the Soviet Army, and only 100 miles from the Caspian Sea.
However, the German high command did not adopt the strategy of emphasizing one head over the other, but took care of both ends and was important, so why were they so eager to achieve it? There is nothing wrong with the situation on the battlefield, because as long as the 4th Panzer Army quickly returns to the defense, it is certain to continue to complete the task of occupying Stalingrad, because when the 4th Panzer Army went south, the 6th Army had opened the battlefield situation and occupied 90% of the Stalingrad urban area, but at this time the 4th Panzer Army had been divided into two parts and could not quickly form a concentrated attack force.
Some people must wonder why the German army did not suspend the attack on Stalingrad and concentrate its forces on occupying the Caucasus under such favorable conditions. In fact, as long as the 6th Army returned from Stalingrad in time to make up for the gaps in the flanks, the Soviets did not encircle their strength, and the 4th and 1st Panzer Armies continued to attack the Caucasus, and the Blue Plan was completely possible, but the German high command wanted to have both ends, which led to the loss of one or the other, and did not succeed at all.
In this sense, the collapse of the 6th Army in Stalingrad was completely avoidable, because it was an undefended city, and it was not until July 17 that the Soviet army formed the Stalingrad Front, and later increased its strength while fighting, and the Battle of Stalingrad had such a great impact on World War II that I am afraid that Stalin and the Soviet base camp did not expect it at that time.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="27" >03 The Germans made mistakes again and again, Kleist was alone, and The Holt force was dismembered</h1>
There must be some people wondering, in the face of the obstinate behavior of the German command, is no one able to make the right suggestions? In fact, there were not only capable people in the German army, but also made feasible suggestions, but unfortunately all of them were dismissed.
As early as 13 July, when the German commander attacked Rostov, marshal Bock, who had been reactivated, was reluctant to do so, and he still wanted to take advantage of the emptiness of Stalingrad's troops to occupy and continue to complete the desire to attack Moscow, in his heart, the defeat in the Battle of Moscow in the winter of 1941 had always been a problem, but he was soon relieved of his duties and left the battlefield for good.
The other two people had different ideas from Bock, one was the chief of the general staff Halder, and the other was the commander of army group Group South, Liszt, both of whom proposed to concentrate their forces on capturing the Caucasus after the 4th Panzer Army went south, but they also crashed into the muzzle of the gun, and the German high command wanted to occupy both Stalingrad and the Caucasus, and as a result, they were both dismissed, so who dared to make the right opinion?
In the 350-mile gap between Army Group A and Army Group B, the Reason why the German High Command thought that there was no major obstacle was because there was no lack of troops here, there were still three legions of the servant state on the defensive, but because the romanian and Hungarian legions were not very harmonious, the Italian legions were placed in their space, and it did not matter whether they could fight or not, because the German high command believed that the Soviet army had no strength to resist, as long as Stalingrad was occupied, everything would be solved.
From the above analysis, it can be seen that when the German high command made the 4th Panzer Army to return to stalingrad at the end of July, it did not expect much loss to Kleist's attack, he not only had to quickly adjust the deployment and change the way of play, but even worried that the retreat route would be cut off by the Soviet army, this lone army would not run fast, it would also be wrapped in dumplings by the Soviet army like the 6th Army, and when the 4th Panzer Army returned to its original position of going south, the Soviet army had long been there, and only half a month had passed during this period. A miscalculation by the German high command led to a complete loss in the summer of 1942 and a foreshadowing of the defeat of the entire Eastern Front.
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