In the Soviet-German battlefield in the second half of 1941, the battlefield environment after the Battle of Kiev had shown a very favorable situation for the German army, on the one hand, the German army used the advantage of 1.8 million people and three armored groups at a time, and it was inevitable to take Moscow; on the other hand, the army group north had surrounded the city of Leningrad, and the Soviet army had no strength to fight back. Army Group South took advantage of the Battle of Kiev and was ready to attack the Caucasus, and Kleist's first panzer group went forward to the Rostov area at the mouth of the Don River, and the Baku oil field of the German dream was in front of them.
However, in the Battle of Rostov in November, the Germans lost more than 20,000 people, 275 tanks, and retreated 80 kilometers. In fact, this was the commander of the 1st Armored Group, Kleist, who was light on the enemy and misjudged the situation on the battlefield, and was caught by Timoshenko's deep plan to lure the enemy deeper. Let's take a look at how the Soviets won this battle.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="3" >01 The Germans were in a hurry, and the Soviets changed their playing style. </h1>
Since the outbreak of the Soviet-German War on 22 June 1941, Marshal Timoshenko, one of Stalin's most trusted right and left armies, had been entrusted with the task of first taking over pavlov's command of the Western Front's counterattack on the battlefield, and then coming to the Southern Front to stop the attack of Army Group South. But the situation on the battlefield seemed to be deliberately against him, and whenever he went, the German army would welcome him with one encirclement and annihilation battle after another, and after the defeat of the siege of Smolensk, Timoshenko suffered from the siege of Kiev, and after the Battle of Moscow, Temusingo was also considering how to launch a counterattack against the Germans on the southern front.
In fact, not only was Timoshenko thinking that the Soviet style of play needed to change, Stalin and the members of the Soviet high command were trying to avoid a head-on confrontation with the Germans. Although Zhukov commanded the reserve front in Yeltria for the first counterattack since the Great Patriotic War, it did not avoid the German encirclement of Vyazma and Bryansk, and another 670,000 people fell into the German trap.
Thus, as Army Group South Commander Lundstedt and Group 1st Kleist prepared to attack the Caucasus, Timoshenko was pondering how to launch a defensive battle with his own forces, and the Rostov Blockade followed.
According to the comparison of troop strength at that time, the Soviet Rostov Group had 4 armies and had the advantage in strength, while the German army only attacked with the 1st panzer group as the main force, but the German armor had the advantage. But this was not the main thing, Kleist did not expect the Soviets to change the way of play, not only deliberately let the Germans into the city, but also took a flanking and roundabout way of playing, caught Kleist off guard.
In this sense, it was also an attempt by Timoshenko to take the risk of putting the Germans into the city and closing the door, just as Zhukov was preparing to change the way Moscow was fought, it was a very positive battle, and the Germans made a subjective judgment error.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="25" >02 The Germans attacked the Caucasus, and Kleist attempted to make a new contribution. </h1>
After the Battle of Kiev, the German army from top to bottom was full of confidence in the occupation of Moscow, because the Soviet army was too unbeaten, so in the hearts of the front-line commanders, the German armored blitzkrieg was still invincible, so in the psychology of the idea of pride and light enemy, from the north to the south of the three battlefields there was an optimism that moscow could go home for the New Year.
Although there was nothing to do with Army Group South attacking Moscow, Rendelstedt and Kleist wanted to do something more on the Southern Front, that is, to capture the Rostov sea mouth, so that the strategic resources of the Caucasus and the oil from the Baku oil fields could be transported back to the mainland by sea or as a supply for the German army.
The Germans were not wrong, and one of the original intentions of the Barbarossa plan was to occupy strategic resources on the southern front. But the German army thinks so, the Soviet army will not give the resources in hand to people, to know that more than 70% of the soviet army's resources and more than half of the grain are supplied by Ukraine and the Caucasus, the German army occupied the Caucasus, the Soviet army not only has no supplies, there is no way to retreat, Timoshenko knows the stakes.
Judging from the course of the campaign, Kleist still did not put rostov's Soviet strength in his eyes, here are the factors of heavy losses of the Soviet army in the siege of the kiev campaign in the early stage, there are also factors that the German army has eliminated most of the Soviet troops before the attack on Rostov, Kleist believes that the Soviet army defending Rostov is not his opponent at all, so only 4 divisions are used as the forward, trying to attack two Soviet infantry divisions with two tank divisions, did not expect that the Soviet army had already made preparations, on the one hand, the artillery had the advantage, The return of fire on the German armored forces, on the one hand, the strong support of the Air Force also made Kleist suffer.
If Kleist had been light on the enemy before the Soviet counterattack on November 17, the Germans had every opportunity to change their tactics in the 10 days from the 17th to the 27th, but the Germans did not find this a decoy, and still continued to counterattack the Soviets, and by the time the Soviet 56th Army carried out a counter-assault on the 27th, the Germans had to lose more than 20,000 people to withdraw from Rostov, and the battle ended.
In this sense, it was not easy for the Soviet army to win the Battle of Rostov, according to the conditions of the battlefield at that time, the German army was fully capable of annihilating the Soviet army, which included Kleist's subjective light enemy and the mistake of the lone army's surprise attack, and Lundstedt's failure to report the situation on the battlefield in time.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="26" >03 Rostov counterattack had important positive significance, and Timoshenko breathed a sigh of relief. </h1>
The cause of the Battle of Rostov is actually not complicated, the German army in October 1941 successively achieved offensive superiority, the Soviet army retreated to rostov direction of the four army groups are not the most elite of the Soviet army, in addition to the number of personnel, that is, the artillery has a certain advantage over the German army, but the Soviet army also took advantage of the time and place.
It should be said that the weather effects of the German army in the Battle of Moscow led to the muddy roads and the limited German offensive, which also appeared in the Battle of Rostov. Since Kleist needed to send tanks to the battlefield to tow the supply vehicles and wheeled loading vehicles trapped in the mud, objectively speaking, the Soviet anti-tank firearms played a role, and the German 37mm guns could not pose a threat to the Soviet T34, these two objective factors helped the Soviet army.
Of course, the most important reason why the Soviet army could win the war was that Timoshenko used a pincer-shaped play, he placed the 12th and 18th armies on the left wing, the 56th Army on the right flank, and the 9th Army as a maneuver, which made the German army alone and unable to take care of the tail.
The Germans did not grasp two opportunities, one was that when the Soviet army launched a counterattack on November 17, the German army not only watched the Soviet army close the encirclement circle and did not break through in time, but also sent additional troops to stubbornly block it; the other was that on November 27, when the Soviet army closed the encirclement circle from the northwest and south to Rostov, the German army entrenched in the city was still holding out for help, and then was completely surrounded by the Soviet army, and the other German troops had no choice but to retreat 60 to 80 kilometers.
From the above analysis, it can be seen that the Soviet army in the Battle of Rostov nominally fought a counterattack war, in fact, a planned city defense battle, although the Losses of the Soviet Army were also large, there were 140,000 casualties, but the positive significance of winning this battle can not be ignored, on the one hand, it was to lure the enemy to make deep use of the German light enemy ideology, and Cléster was caught off guard, which was a change in the thinking of using flexible and mobile strategies and tactics; one was to break the German attempt to attack the Caucasus. It also prevented the 1st Panzer Group from going north to participate in the Battle of Moscow. For Timoshenko, after a bunch of defeats, this time he finally raised his eyebrows.
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