Deng Xiaoping
On October 22, 1984, Deng Xiaoping made an important speech at the Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory Committee. The Central Advisory Committee, referred to as the Central Advisory Committee, was established in 1982 at the "Twelfth National Congress", existed for 10 years, and was abolished at the "Fourteenth National Congress" in 1992.
The Central Advisory Committee is an organizational form under special historical conditions to solve the problem of the replacement of the old and new party leading bodies at and above the provincial level, with the aim of rejuvenating the leading bodies of the Party Central Committee and the provincial level, and at the same time allowing some old comrades to "continue to play a certain role" and "be political assistants and staff officers of the Central Committee" after withdrawing from the front line. ”
Only from the above description can we see the status of the Central Advisory Committee within the Party Central Committee. Therefore, Deng Xiaoping's speech at the third meeting of the Central Consultative Committee has attracted special attention. In his speech, Deng Xiaoping mentioned that the settlement of the Hong Kong issue will directly affect the settlement of the Taiwan issue, but he is very clear that the settlement of the Taiwan issue will take time, and it may not be possible to be too anxious.
At this meeting, Deng Xiaoping set a tone for resolving the Taiwan issue, saying:
"Recently, a foreigner asked me if the policy for resolving the Taiwan issue is the same as for Hong Kong. I say wider. The so-called wider means that in addition to the policies to solve the Hong Kong problem that can be applied to Taiwan, Taiwan is also allowed to retain its own army. We insist on seeking a peaceful solution to the Taiwan issue, but we have never given up the possibility of non-peaceful means, and we cannot make such a commitment. What if the Taiwan authorities never negotiate with us? Can we abandon national unity? Of course, we must not use force lightly, because our energy must be spent on economic construction, and the issue of reunification will not hurt the overall situation if it is resolved later. However, the use of force cannot be ruled out, and we need to remember this, and our next generation must remember this. This is a strategic consideration. ”
Taiwan has been an inseparable part of China since ancient times, and the essence of the Taiwan issue is China's internal affair, and the emergence of this issue is the result of the civil war between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and is directly related to the intervention of the United States. As everyone knows, Chairman Mao devoted tremendous energy to resolving the Taiwan issue before his death.
Chairman Mao
The Communist Party of China has always regarded the settlement of the Taiwan issue and the realization of the reunification of the motherland as its most important goal of struggle. Chairman Mao, as the core of the first generation of our party's central leading collective, made unremitting efforts to promote the reunification of the motherland. Looking at the policy decisions made by Chairman Mao on the Taiwan issue during his lifetime, we can see that whether it was the great call for "liberating Taiwan by force" before and after the founding of the People's Republic of China, or the two strategies of combining force and peace, he never promised to renounce the use of force.
Taiwan is a historical issue, and its essence is completely different from the recovery of Hong Kong and Macao. On December 1, 1943, the governments of China, the United States and the United Kingdom jointly signed the Cairo Declaration, which clearly stipulates that the purpose of the three countries is to deprive Japan of all the islands seized or occupied in the Pacific Ocean since the beginning of the First World War in 1914; to return to the Republic of China the territories stolen by Japan in China, such as the four northeastern provinces, Taiwan, and the Penghu Islands (including the Diaoyu Islands), and to expel Japan from the country of other lands seized by Japan by force or greed.
By July 26, 1945, the Allies had added the provisions of the Founding Declaration to the Potsdam Proclamation as a condition of the Allies' unconditional surrender to Japan. Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation also clearly stipulates that the conditions of the Cairo Declaration must be implemented, and that Japan's sovereignty will be limited to Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and other small islands as determined by our people.
This means that as long as China waits for Japan to defeat and surrender, Taiwan can return to the embrace of the motherland. On August 15, 1945, Japan surrendered unconditionally. On September 2, representatives of the Japanese government boarded the USS Missouri, which was parked in Tokyo Bay, and signed the Japanese Surrender Clause.
The clause expressly stipulates that the clauses of the Potsdam Proclamation of 26 July 1945, signed jointly by China, the United States and the United Kingdom and subsequently with the participation of the Soviet Union, are hereby accepted. Since then, Taiwan has become a part of China's territory, both historically and legally. On October 25, China and Japan held a signing ceremony for Japan's surrender at the Taipei Public Hall in Taiwan, ending Japan's colonization of Taiwan.
In 1945, The Japanese Governor-General in Taiwan, Rikichi Ando, signed the Letter of Surrender
On the same day, Chen Yi, a second-ranking general in the Kuomintang Army, was appointed chief executive of Taiwan and concurrently served as the commander-in-chief of Taiwan's police. On behalf of the Kuomintang government, Chen Yi announced that from today onwards, Taiwan and the Penghu Archipelago will officially re-enter The territory of China, and all the people of the land will be under the sovereignty of the Chinese Government. I hereby report this fact of great historical significance to my compatriots and to the whole world.
On January 12, 1946, the National Government issued the "Order on the Restoration of the Nationality of Taiwan Compatriots", which officially declared: The people of Taiwan (including the Han nationality and the indigenous mountain ethnic group) were originally nationals of our country and lost their nationality due to the invasion of the enemy;
With the outbreak of the Kuomintang-Communist Civil War, the Kuomintang army was gradually defeated and retreated to Taiwan, and Chairman Mao set his sights on the issue of liberating Taiwan. In fact, even before the Battle of the Crossing River began, Chairman Mao had already proposed that an important task of the PLA was to liberate Taiwan, and made preparations for it.
On March 25, 1949, in accordance with the spirit of the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee, Xinhua News Agency published an editorial entitled "Chinese people must liberate Taiwan," and for the first time put forward the slogan of "liberating Taiwan." The editorial once again clarified the next tasks of the PLA:
The task of the Chinese people's liberation struggle is to liberate all of China until the liberation of Taiwan, Hainan Island and the last inch of land belonging to China. Since the situation in China has undergone tremendous changes, the victory of the liberation struggle of the Chinese people must be fully realized in the near future. Chinese people must liberate Taiwan and the whole of China.
So, what was the attitude of the United States toward Taiwan at that time? U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt died of illness in 1945, and Vice President Harry S. Truman took over as president. The Truman administration initially inherited Roosevelt's foreign policy. In May of that year, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Harriman specifically mentioned the Taiwan issue in a memorandum to the Soviet government.
From left: Chiang Kai-shek, Roosevelt, Churchill, Soong Mei-ling
The memorandum once again makes it clear that "the provisions of the Cairo Declaration concerning the return of Taiwan and the Penghu Islands to China and the establishment of Chinese sovereignty over the islands at the end of the War between Japan should be fully affirmed." This attitude of the U.S. government continued until the outbreak of the Korean War.
After the Battle of the River Crossing in April 1949, the situation of the Kuomintang became worse and worse, and Chiang Kai-shek finally chose Taiwan as the last place to retreat. In view of this, Chairman Mao immediately sent a telegram to Sanye to send troops to Fujian as soon as possible to establish a forward position for the liberation of Taiwan, "You should quickly prepare to enter Fujian early, strive to occupy Fuzhou, Quanzhou, Zhangzhou and other key points within June and July, and prepare cameras to capture Xiamen." The troops entering Fujian can be dispatched only after Shanghai has been resolved. ”
As for the commander-in-chief of the campaign to liberate Taiwan, Chairman Mao had already ordered Su Yu. On June 21 of that year, Chairman Mao once again sent a telegram to Su Yu: If Taiwan is not occupied, the Kuomintang naval and air bases will not be removed, threatening Shanghai and other coastal areas at all times; if Taiwan is not occupied, hundreds of thousands of tons of ships will not be able to pass, and coastal trade along the river will be subject to foreign shipping trade.
After receiving the order, Su Yu immediately threw himself into various preparations for the liberation of Taiwan. The U.S. government certainly knows that the mainland will liberate Taiwan, but it is reluctant to step in. On January 5, 1950, Truman officially issued the "Statement on the Question of Taiwan" on behalf of the United States Government, which made it clear that the United States continued to recognize the description of the Taiwan issue in the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation.
At the same time, the statement also wrote in black and white:
"Over the past four years, the United States and other allies have also recognized China's exercise of sovereignty over the island";
"The United States has never had any ambitions to plunder Taiwan or other Territories of China. The United States now has no intention of obtaining special rights or establishing military bases in Taiwan, and the United States does not intend to use its armed forces to interfere in its current situation. The U.S. government does not intend to take any measures that would be sufficient to draw the United States into China's civil strife";
"It is not intended to provide military assistance or advice to the Chinese military in Taiwan."
U.S. President Harry S. Truman
Just seven days later, in a public speech, U.S. Secretary of State Acheson unveiled the U.S. strategic defense line in the Far East (i.e., the Pacific Island Defense Circle), in which both Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula were excluded from the defense line. This attitude of the US Government enabled Chairman Mao to speed up preparations for the liberation of Taiwan.
In May 1950, Hainan Island was liberated. All countries in the world believe that the PLA will inevitably liberate Taiwan next, and THE US intelligence agencies believe that the PLA will launch a war to cross the sea before the typhoon comes at the end of September of that year. At Su Yu's suggestion, Sanye was mainly composed of 3 corps and 12 corps, plus 4 corps of Shino as reserves, bringing the total strength to 650,000 men.
Everything is ready, just wait for the central government to give an order. However, it was at this time that the Korean War broke out. The United States first directly intervened in the Korean War, and then sent the US Seventh Fleet stationed in the Philippines to the Taiwan Strait to prevent the People's Liberation Army from liberating Taiwan, and also threw out the statement that "Taiwan's status is undecided."
Proceeding from national sovereignty, and the extremely great significance of the northeast region, Chairman Mao was finally forced to suspend the campaign to liberate Taiwan and instead form a volunteer army to resist us and aid Korea to defend the country. After the end of the Korean War, Chairman Mao continued to regard the liberation of Taiwan as one of the important tasks, and Deng Xiaoping participated in many important policy decisions on taiwan work.
Unfortunately, for various reasons, until Chairman Mao's death, the Taiwan issue could not be resolved. After the end of the special period, Deng Xiaoping, as the core of the second-generation central leadership collective, personally led the work on Taiwan, and even if he was harassed when he visited the United States later, he did not waver in his determination to resolve the Taiwan issue in the slightest. In 1977, James Earl Carter became president of the United States, and he was disappointed with the stagnation in Sino-AMERICAN relations and decided to completely change the situation during his term.
U.S. President Carter
On February 8 of that year, Carter met with Huang Zhen, director of the Chinese Liaison Office in the United States, at the White House, saying that the goal of the current administration's China policy is to "normalize relations," adding: "The principles of the Shanghai Communiqué were and will continue to be the cornerstone of bilateral relations." Since then, China and the United States have held a series of secret talks.
In August 1977, Deng Xiaoping met with Secretary of State Vance in Beijing. During the talks, Deng Xiaoping drew a bottom line on the Taiwan issue, saying to Vance:
"We must clarify the fact that the United States has invaded and occupied Taiwan, China's territory. The problem now is that the United States wants to control Taiwan so that the Chinese people cannot realize the reunification of their motherland. We have said many times that in order to normalize Sino-US relations, there are three conditions on the Taiwan issue, namely, 'abrogating the treaty, withdrawing troops, and severing diplomatic relations,' in accordance with the Japanese way. Honestly, going the Japanese way is a concession in itself. Now is the time for the United States to make up its mind. ”
Vance listened and interjected: "We are ready to abrogate the treaty, withdraw our troops, and sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan." Deng Xiaoping ignored Vance's claims and continued to refute the US side according to his established strategy, exposing the nature of its ulterior motives:
"What you call a plan, in our opinion, is two issues. First, you want us to assume the obligation to liberate Taiwan without force, but in fact it is still interfering in China's internal affairs. Second, the 'embassy' that you proposed not to be listed is actually a copy of the 'inverted liaison office'. Obviously, we cannot agree with this proposal. Now it is the case that the United States owes China, not China. With this clear, the problem is solved. The Taiwan issue is China's internal affair, and no one else can interfere. We are ready to strive to resolve the Taiwan issue by peaceful means after the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States on the basis of the three conditions and without the participation of the United States, but we do not rule out the use of force to resolve it. ”
Deng Xiaoping's attitude was so firm that Vance knew that there would be no compromise on China's position on the Taiwan issue, and as a result, his visit to China "touched a nose of ash." In January 1978, when Deng Xiaoping met with deputies of the members of the us two houses of parliament, he once again clearly defined the bottom line of resolving the Taiwan issue.
Deng Xiaoping and Carter
Deng Xiaoping repeatedly pointed out the bottom line of China's settlement of the Taiwan issue, which made the Us side fully aware that it was impossible for China to promise to abandon the use of force to liberate Taiwan. In May 1978, President Carter expressed acceptance of the three basic conditions put forward by the Chinese side for the normalization of Sino-US relations (namely, severance of diplomatic relations, withdrawal of troops, and abrogated treaty), and took practical action within the year.
Beginning in July of that year, China and the United States began arduous negotiations on the establishment of diplomatic relations. During the negotiation, Carter told the Chinese side that the US side is serious about the talks, but hoped that the Chinese side could take care of some US political needs. Proceeding from the overall situation, Deng Xiaoping made a historic readjustment of the principle of work toward Taiwan, from "We must liberate Taiwan" to "Taiwan is returned to the motherland and the great cause of reunification is realized." ”
On December 13, 1978, the Sino-US negotiations entered a final critical moment. Deng Xiaoping decided to personally meet with Woodcock, director of the US Liaison Office in China, to promote the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States. At this time, China and the United States basically reached an agreement on the draft of the joint communiqué, and Deng Xiaoping once again clearly pointed out:
After the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States, the US Government needs to be cautious in handling its relations with Taiwan and not to influence the Chinese side to adopt the most reasonable method to peacefully resolve the Taiwan issue. If the United States continues to sell weapons to Taiwan after the establishment of diplomatic relations, this will only set up obstacles to China's peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue, and in the end it can only be resolved by force.
At 10:00 a.m. Beijing time on December 16, 1978 (9:00 p.m. Washington time on December 15), China and the United States simultaneously issued the Joint Communiqué of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations (the Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between China and the United States). The Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between China and the United States came into force on January 1, 1979, and the communiqué said:
The People's Republic of China and the United States of America agreed to recognize each other and establish diplomatic relations as of 1 January 1979. At the same time, the Chinese and US governments issued separate statements, the US statement expressed the hope for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue, and the Chinese side's statement stressed that how to resolve the Taiwan issue is China's internal affair.
If the "Sino-US Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations" laid the political foundation for the development of Sino-US relations, then Deng Xiaoping's historic visit to the United States really opened the door to Sino-US friendly exchanges. According to Chai Zemin, China's first ambassador to the United States, on December 14, 1978, the day before China and the United States reached the "Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between China and the United States," Carter extended an invitation to Deng Xiaoping to visit the United States.
Deng Xiaoping made the decision to visit the United States in less than 24 hours, which was scheduled to be from January 28 to February 5, 1979. On January 28, 1979, the Chinese lunar calendar has not yet celebrated the Spring Festival. This day is a day of family reunion, not a long trip, and Deng Xiaoping boarded a special plane to visit the United States. Choosing to visit the United States on this day is enough to show how much Deng Xiaoping attaches to visiting the United States.
Deng Xiaoping visited the United States for 9 days, and he frequently participated in various activities, which won great attention from all over the United States. These 9 days, which are the 9 days to change China and the world, are called "nine days of whirlwind" by the media. Since his visit to the United States, the Taiwan issue has become the focus of attention of US politicians and media, and Deng Xiaoping also knew this.
Sure enough, it was time to come. On January 30, Deng Xiaoping and Carter held talks, and the two sides talked about the most intractable issue of Taiwan. Carter once again demanded that the Chinese side promise to "not use force" to resolve the Taiwan issue, and also expressed the hope that Deng Xiaoping would use words such as "peace" and "patience" when referring to the Taiwan issue during the United States.
Deng Xiaoping flatly refused. After the negotiations, Deng Xiaoping took a break and went to the Senate building of the Capitol building by appointment to attend a working lunch held by the US side. Journalists were not allowed to attend the luncheon, but the reporters were told that they could hear the conversation at the luncheon by pulling it into the loudspeaker outside the hall, and it was not known whether the loudspeaker would sound.
Deng Xiaoping and Carter held talks
At that time, many members of the US Congress had different opinions on the establishment of Sino-US diplomatic relations, and some advocated taking tough action against China, believing that the Taiwan issue was a good chess piece that could be used. Suddenly, Deng Xiaoping's characteristic Sichuan accent came from the loudspeaker:
"I think you are all very clear that in the process of normalizing Sino-US relations, the key is the issue of Taiwan's return to the motherland. People are worried about what methods will be used to solve the Taiwan issue and what kind of policies China will adopt to solve the Taiwan issue. Surely you have noticed that we no longer use the word 'liberation' of Taiwan, but instead say that we want to solve the problem of Taiwan's return to the motherland and the completion of the great cause of reunification. ”
On January 31, Deng Xiaoping gave a live interview to a joint live broadcast of three major television networks across the United States. When a reporter asked China "whether it will adopt peaceful means to resolve the Taiwan issue," Deng Xiaoping once again gave a solemn answer:
"Like you, we hope to resolve this issue peacefully, but China cannot promise not to adopt other means to resolve it, because if we make this commitment, it will be detrimental to peaceful reunification." If we promise not to use force to settle the Taiwan issue, we will be tying our own hands, and this result will make the Taiwan authorities fundamentally different from us in talking about the issue of peaceful reunification. In this way, the final outcome will lead to a settlement using force. ”
In the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping was always working hard to solve the Taiwan issue. For example, in September 1980, when Deng Xiaoping met with Chen Shubai, the son of Chinese-American scholar and Kuomintang veteran Chen Jitang, he once again appealed for the liberation of Taiwan to be resolved in their generation, saying:
"I think reunification is the trend of the times, the question is whether our generation is the next generation. I want to pay the bills for our generation as well. No, there's your generation. Wish it had been earlier. This needs to be slowly accumulated. In the eighties, we put unification on the agenda every day. ”
In his later years Deng Xiaoping was at home
Before Deng Xiaoping's death, he always regarded the settlement of Taiwan as an important task, and talked about it on many occasions and at many central meetings. Deng Xiaoping has been gone for many years, but his great idea of liberating Taiwan will certainly be realized, and the motherland will certainly be able to complete its complete reunification.