Post-emptive strikes are an ancient strategy for pre-emptive strikes. The "Military Chronicles" and "Zuo Biao" in the "After the people to wait for their decline" can be said to be a summary of the post-attack, meaning that after the enemy attacks, we must wait for the enemy's fighting spirit to decline. Throughout the ages, there have been many examples of post-attack battles, and the more famous ones are the Battle of Chenggao in Chu Han, the Battle of Kunyang in the New Han Dynasty, and the Battle of Chibi in Wuwei. Mao Zedong believed that these famous wars were won by the two sides, when the strengths and weaknesses of the two sides were different, and the weak ones gave way first and attacked the others later, thus winning. In the anti-friction struggle, Deng Xiaoping successfully adopted the strategy of attacking later and winning the war.
The CPC and the Eighth Route Army have attached great importance to the overall situation of the War of Resistance Against Japan, and their unreasonable attacks on the diehards politically and militarily have been exhausted to the fullest, and they are really "retreating and retreating." However, Zhu Huaibing, Shi Yousan, and others insisted on going their own way, and under chiang Kai-shek's orders, repeatedly invaded our Taihang and Ji'nan base areas. In particular, Zhu Huaibing's command post department created an extremely serious "Jiabi Incident" and wantonly besieged our army in Ci County, Wu'an, and Xiangxian Counties, causing our army to suffer heavy casualties and losses. Shi Yousan even directly colluded with the Japanese army and openly cooperated with the Japanese army in carrying out a "sweep": In early February 1940, Zhu Huaibing, Lu Zhonglin, Sun Dianying, Shi Yousan, and others, under the orders of Chiang Kai-shek, once again launched a large-scale attack on our army in Taihang and southern Hebei. Chiang Kai-shek also sent two armies south of the Yellow River to Taihang as a backup. At this time, the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army promptly instructed Deng Xiaoping and Liu Bocheng to seriously deal with the attacks of Pang Bingxun, Zhu Huaibing, and Shi You, and to draw troops from the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region into the Taihang base area to strengthen the strength of the 129th Division.
Faced with the two-sided advance of the Kuomintang diehards, Deng Xiaoping and Liu Bocheng were determined to attack at the same time. At that time, the Taihang and Ji'nan troops and the Jin-Cha-Ji and Ji-Ji middle-class troops who came to reinforcements had a total of 13 regiments, which were three times the number of the recalcitrant troops, and the two armies reinforced by the Kuomintang were still within the Yellow River, and the situation was favorable to the Eighth Route Army. Therefore, Liu Deng decided to mobilize all the troops who could participate in the battle, and launched the Campaign of Ci (County), Wu (An), Shi (County), Lin (County), and the Battle of Wei (He) East.
When studying the campaign plan, Deng Xiaoping said: Zhu Huaibing is the vanguard of attacking us, and according to the current situation of the stubborn army, our combat intention should be to concentrate our forces on annihilating Zhu Huaibing's troops, monitorIng Lu Zhonglin and Sun Dianying's troops, and striving for their neutrality as much as possible. Shi Yousan's rogue nature, capriciousness, and resolute anti-communism are also the targets of our current crackdown.
The success or failure of this operation has a direct bearing on the entire situation of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression in North China and is a two-pronged operation between military and political. To this end, Deng Xiaoping and Liu Bocheng meticulously drew up a battle plan in accordance with the instructions of the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army. With the independent detachment as the special action detachment, the main force was organized into three columns of left, center, and right, attacking in three ways, adopting the tactic of encirclement and interspersing, inserting Zhu Huaibing's depth and pounding his heart. Deng Xiaoping unified the command of 3 main columns.
Liu Bocheng said: As the commander of a division, it is not convenient for me to show my face in this fight against the stubborn army, and I will have room for future negotiations. Later, after instructing the headquarters of the Eighth Route Army, it was decided that Deng Xiaoping Political Commissar and Chief of Staff Li Da would "come forward" and command the operation in front.
At 2 o'clock on March 5, Deng Xiaoping gave an order to launch the Magnetic Weapons Forest Campaign. The central column, under the command of Chief of Staff Li Da, attacked according to the predetermined route. The combined units of the enemy's two divisions were indeed weakly defended, and they fled under the heavy artillery fire of our army. The central column inserted itself into the former cattle pond that night, captured all the pillboxes along the way, annihilated most of its supplementary regiments, and forced the main force of the recalcitrant army to retreat to the bottom of the ridge, the two forks, the garden, and the Jiabi area.
The right wing advanced from the offensive point of attack, encountering Sun Dianying's troops on the way. The right wing commander Zhou Xihan stepped forward to explain that the Eighth Route Army was specialized in attacking Zhu Huaibing, and the commander of the unit immediately ordered the road to be abandoned. The right wing quickly captured Nanwangzhuang and Qijialing, repelled the recalcitrant army's counterattack many times, and closed the door to the recalcitrant army's breakthrough. The left wing and the Einsatzgruppen also advanced to the predetermined area to prevent the recalcitrant army from escaping.
At dawn on March 6, after approaching the recalcitrant army, the troops of the 129th Division suddenly attacked with lightning speed and covered their ears, directly attacking Zhu Huaibing's army headquarters.
According to the reports of various ministries, on March 6, Deng Xiaoping issued the second combat order, requiring the troops to resolutely pursue and annihilate the recalcitrant army in the area north of Linxian County, and to complete the combat task at all costs. He also reminded all the departments that the focus of the surprise attack was still on Zhu Huaibing's army and the Ninety-fourth Division, and on the Twenty-fourth Division and other intermediate units. Unless the enemy attacks us or obstructs the way forward through which we must pass, we must not take military action so easily as to violate our Party's policy of struggle.
Zhu Huaibing did not expect that the Eighth Route Army would hit his army headquarters so quickly, and before he could organize a counterattack, his troops had already been defeated and could not be contained, so they had to abandon all their weights and rear organs, hurriedly cross the Zhanghe River, and flee in the direction of Lin County.
Deng Xiaoping ordered a full-scale pursuit. After several days of fierce fighting, Zhu Huaibing's Ninety-seventh Army and other miscellaneous armed men were annihilated. Many of the generals became prisoners of the 129th Division.
On March 9, Wei Lihuang, commander-in-chief of the Kuomintang First Theater, came forward to demand that the Eighth Route Army stop pursuing, and Zhu De, commander-in-chief of the Eighth Route Army, agreed to this demand on behalf of the Eighth Route Army. Subsequently, Deng Xiaoping was ordered to lead the pursuing troops to retreat and release all the prisoners of war.
The Battle of Ciwu and the Battle of Weidong were coordinated to smash the Kuomintang diehards in uniting with the reactionary forces of Taihang, Ji'nan, and Luxi, cut off the eighth route army's conspiracy to link the north and south, and change the serious situation of the tiger and wolf attack. This battle was a typical example of Deng Xiaoping's political needs standardizing the campaign according to the political tactics of the Central Military Commission and Mao Zedong in the struggle against the Kuomintang diehards. When Deng Xiaoping directed this campaign, his aim was not to eliminate the more stubborn troops the better, but to proceed from the political purpose of unity, and the extremely stubborn people wanted to resolutely eliminate them and win over the rest, so he adopted the struggle strategy of "using contradictions, winning the majority, opposing the minority, and breaking through each other."
The retreat and post-attack used by Deng Xiaoping and Liu Bocheng in the anti-stubborn struggle are actually unified, and the purpose of retreat is to subdue people. Its advantage is that it can avoid the enemy's sharp edge, arrogantly indulge the other party, and look for its flaws. It can also boost morale and wait for the work. Especially in the use of this strategy on the battlefield, more sympathy and solidarity will be obtained, which is conducive to isolating the enemy and breaking through each other. In this regard, Mao Zedong's image metaphor is that everyone does not know that two boxers are right, smart boxers often give in one step, while stupid people are fierce, and they use the full copy collar at the beginning, and the result is often knocked down by the concessioners. Deng Xiaoping recalled: "The Kuomintang engaged in friction with us, and there were several large liberated areas, but the most concentrated one was in Jinji and Hebei. Originally, when the country was in trouble, the two parties should work together in the same boat, and all armies throughout the country should work together to fight against the Japanese invading army and restore China. However, Chiang Kai-shek, out of his reactionary class nature, passively resisted Japan and actively opposed communism, and plotted one anti-communist conspiracy after another. Mao Zedong believed that if such a thing was not stopped, China would perish at the hands of these reactionaries. "Deng Xiaoping and Liu Bocheng led the military and people in the Jinji-Hebei Luyu region to fight the tiger at the front door and reject the wolf at the back door under the dangerous situation of the Japanese and the diehard tigers and wolves, and won a major victory in the struggle against the Japanese and the anti-communist diehards.
Political offensives and military strikes have always complemented and complemented each other. Because if the military strike is coordinated with the political offensive, it can minimize the military losses and achieve greater operational efficiency; In contrast, political offensives are usually effective only if they are militarily strong. This is also a basic law for seeking total military and political victory. At the crucial moment of the military struggle against the enemy, Deng Xiaoping always took advantage of all possible conditions, even to create conditions, to win a complete military and political victory. The Pinghan Campaign used a variety of means at the same time, and the final cause of the peaceful uprising of Gao Shuxun's troops was a typical successful example.
At that time, Deng Xiaoping often discussed with Liu Bocheng the need to repel the offensive of the Kuomintang reactionaries; on the one hand, it was necessary to defeat the enemy militarily, and on the other hand, it was necessary to carry out united front work against the civil war in the Kuomintang army, especially to take advantage of the contradictions between miscellaneous cards and concubines in the Kuomintang army, the contradictions between peaceful democrats and fascists, and to win over all the senior Kuomintang generals who could win over to stand under the banner of peace and democracy: Deng Xiaoping took advantage of the conditions that he was more familiar with gao Shuxun's many dealings with, and sent people to the high levels to do work on many occasions. He also sent people to set up a liaison station near Xinxiang to contact Gao Shuxun, and he personally dealt with important issues related to this.
Gao Shuxun was the commander of the New Eighth Army, the commander of the General Regiment of the Thirty-ninth Army Group, and the deputy commander of the Eleventh Theater. The New Eighth Army was an old unit of the Northwest Army, which had long been discriminated against and ostracized by the Central Department of the Kuomintang Army, and the Kuomintang had always wanted to eat him. Therefore, the contradiction with Chiang Kai-shek was very deep, and after the victory of the War of Resistance, Gao Shuxun was even more dissatisfied with Chiang Kai-shek's sending him as the vanguard of the civil war. From 1942 to 1944, Gao Shuxun had contacts with our party for a long time. In September, before Gao Shuxun's troops left for Pinghan Road, Deng Xiaoping and Liu Bocheng placed Wang Dingnan, an underground member of the Communist Party of China in Gao Shuxun's troops, and stepped up the work of winning over Gao Shuxun.
After Gao Shuxun's troops marched along the Pinghan Road with the Kuomintang troops in the north, Gao Shuxun secretly sent Wang Dingnan to contact our army. Wang Dingnan handed over to Liu Deng a letter personally written by Gao Shuxun to Deputy Commander Peng Dehuai hoping for a friendly alliance, and explained that in recent years, Gao Shuxun had been discriminated against and ostracized in the Kuomintang army, and felt that only by being close to the Communists could he survive. After listening to Wang Dingnan's report, Deng Xiaoping said: You have come just in time, and we are also ready to do this work. In order to repel Chiang Kai-shek's offensive and isolate him politically, it is necessary to open up a new front in the Kuomintang army, first of all to win over the non-concubine troops who are ostracized and discriminated against by Chiang Kai-shek, and to win over all the Kuomintang generals who may be won over, and to stand under the banner of peace and democracy.
Deng Xiaoping said to Wang Dingnan: The PARTY Central Committee and Chairman Mao demanded that we make rapid achievements in this work, so you must hurry back and do a good job in Gao Shuxun's work.
Deng Xiaoping and Liu Bocheng jointly wrote a reply to Gao Shuxun, welcoming General Gao Shuxun to send people to contact him, hoping that he would continue to forge ahead and make contributions to the revolution and the people.
After the Pinghan Campaign began, Liu Deng began to attack in various ways, because the enemy relied on the relatively complete fortifications built by the villages, shrunk his positions and stubbornly resisted, waiting for reinforcements, so the combat results were very little, and even if he organized the attack again, it was difficult to achieve the operational objectives. In the face of the pressure of the large troops, Liu Deng weighed and analyzed the advantages and disadvantages, and believed that in order to fight the Pinghan Campaign well, in addition to carrying out a strong military strike, it is more necessary to use the political offensive that can be used to disintegrate the enemy army, so as to sabotage its military attack deployment and combine military and political battles with fighting!
On August 24, 1945, after the three armies of the Kuomintang Northern Prisoners entered the preset encirclement circle of our army, Gao Shuxun's troops were even more shaken and passive. When Deng Xiaoping learned of this situation, he believed that after consulting with Liu Bocheng, he believed that the opportunity was rare, and that he would be able to win the victory in the Pinghan Campaign with greater certainty by winning the Battle of Pinghan by taking a two-pronged approach to win the Battle of Pinghan by taking a two-pronged approach to win the Battle of Pinghan by winning the New Eighth Army under Gao Shuxun's leadership. So he immediately managed to summon Wang Dingnan.
Deng Xiaoping told Wang Dingnan that the situation was changing rapidly, and Gao Shuxun's New Eighth Army and the Hebei Nationalist Army had left Xinxiang and reached Matou Town, CiXian County. The Central Committee of the Party and Chairman Mao instructed us to stop the three Kuomintang armies from advancing north at all costs. This is our serious strategic task at present. He clearly explained the task to Wang Dingnan: Now you go back and tell General Gao Shuxun that according to the needs of the situation, he will revolt on the spot and cooperate with us to complete the strategic task of preventing the Kuomintang from moving north.
While pursuing a political offensive, Deng Xiaoping, in order to prompt Gao Shuxun to revolt as soon as possible, used the 3rd Column to first strike a certain blow at the New 8th Army, and after giving psychological pressure, it was changed to a pretense, and at the same time made a key attack on the enemy's Fortieth Army and the Thirtieth Army and inflicted heavy casualties on it. At the same time, let the intention of unleashing our army's imminent general offensive, the first target of annihilation is the false intelligence of the weaker Gao Shuxun's troops, thus causing extremely dangerous pressure on the high departments' psychology, so that Gao Shuxun can more deeply feel the crisis of "embattled" and the way out of the uprising of the troops.
In the early morning of October 28, when Liu Deng ordered the whole army to launch a general attack, Wang Dingnan hurriedly returned to report to Liu Deng that Gao Shuxun was willing to negotiate with our army, but there were still some concerns, mainly worried about the Kuomintang killing his family in Xuzhou. Deng Xiaoping listened to the report and said categorically: This is a military battle and another political battle. We must win both military and political victories. Gao Shuxun's current uprising will not only play a great role in the present, but also have a great political impact on the future. You tell him that timing is important! Liu Bocheng emphatically said: When the break is continuous, it is chaotic. Regarding the safety of Mrs. Gao and the families of other officers, we can ask the central authorities to solve the problem. A telegram to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was immediately issued.
When Wang Dingnan was about to leave, Deng Xiaoping once again stressed: The CPC Central Committee and Chairman Mao have clearly instructed that the two armies of the Kuomintang must not be allowed to continue to advance northward. You went back and told General Gao Shuxun that you hoped that he would immediately hold a battlefield uprising with the great national righteousness first, stand on the side of the people, cooperate with our army in accomplishing the strategic task of preventing the two Kuomintang armies from moving north, and make contributions to the country and the people.
On October 29, Wang Dingnan rushed back to report to Deng Xiaoping: I met Gao Shuxun today and relayed to him the words of Commander Liu and Political Commissar Deng as they were. When bidding farewell, He told him that Liu Deng, the chief of Liu Deng, was very concerned about the safety of Gao's wife, Liu Xiuzhen, and had sent a telegram to him asking Chen Yi, commander of the New Fourth Army of the CPC Central Committee, to send someone to Xuzhou Station to pick her up.
After hearing this, Deng Xiaoping was very happy and said to Li Da, chief of staff: I see that you will go immediately, on behalf of Commander Liu and I to visit Gao Shuxun, on the one hand, to encourage him to strengthen his determination, and on the other hand, to see if he still has any problems, so as to make a final discussion.
Li Da was joined by the Unit of the Northwest Army in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army during the Ningdu Uprising in 1931, and he was an old acquaintance of Gao Shuxun, and it was most appropriate for him to serve as a liaison. At the critical moment when Gao Shuxun was inclined to an uprising, Deng Xiaoping and Liu Bocheng sent Li Da,the chief of staff, to negotiate in person, so that Gao Shuxun felt the sincerity and kindness of our army and made it clear that the uprising would be announced the next day. Gao also proposed that after the uprising, the New Eighth Army was reorganized into the Peaceful Jianguo Army, with him as commander-in-chief, and under the leadership of Chairman Mao and Commander-in-Chief Zhu, he was on the same footing as Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping. On behalf of Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping, Li Da agreed.
Soon, Zhang Aiping, commander of the Fourth Division of the New Fourth Army, was ordered to send someone to Xuzhou and take Lady Gao and the families of other rebel officers to the Liberated Areas. After hearing this, Gao Shuxun said gratefully: "When the Communist Party does things, it is really true that words must be believed and deeds must be fruitful.
It was precisely because of the careful guidance of Deng Xiaoping and Liu Bocheng, after military attacks and deterrence, political pressure and struggle, that Gao Shuxun finally made up his mind and declared a battlefield uprising on October 30. When Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping learned of this news, they immediately realized that in the uprising of Gao Shuxun, Ma Fawu must have felt panicked and isolated, and it was possible to break through and escape. Based on this consideration, Liu Deng decisively made new adjustments to the siege deployment, opened the net, and shifted the main force to the area north of the Zhanghe River.
The revolt of General Gao Shuxun played an important role in the victory of the Pinghan Campaign, and its impact even exceeded that of the campaign itself. Sure enough, as Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping expected, Gao Shuxun announced an uprising on the afternoon of October 29, and the five departments of Mafa broke through at dawn the next day and fled, and all of them were annihilated.
Deng Xiaoping and Liu Bocheng used the method of attaching equal importance to both military and political affairs and enmity and power to go up to the army and plot, and pioneered the successful example of the national liberation war in which they took advantage of the contradictions within the Kuomintang to instigate their senior generals to lead a front-front uprising, so as to promote the rapid end of the campaign and the complete victory. In his appraisal of the Gao Shuxun uprising, Mao Zedong pointed out: In order to crush the Kuomintang offensive, our Party must carry out the work of dividing all the Kuomintang troops that are ready to attack and are in the process of attacking. At the critical juncture of the war, a large number of Kuomintang troops followed Gao Shuxun's example and stood on the side of the people to oppose the civil war and advocate peace. Deng Xiaoping later recalled: "The Pinghan Campaign should be said to be mainly a political battle fought well, and won the Gao Shuxun uprising. If the fight is hard, we will suffer heavy casualties. I have always regretted that we later handled Gao Shuxun unfairly. He has a great credit. Without his uprising, although the enemy would not have won, he would not have failed so crisply, and he still had the ability to retreat, at least to run out of full force. As soon as he revolted, the two armies of Marfa V were wiped out by us, and only three thousand men were run away. In this political battle, our capital is not small.